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Full text of "Pearl Harbor attack : hearings before the Joint Committee on the investigation of the Pearl Harbor attack, Congress of the United States, Seventy-ninth Congress, first session, pursuant to S. Con. Res. 27, 79th Congress, a concurrent resolution authorizing an investigation of the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, and events and circumstances relating thereto .."

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PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



HEARINGS 

BSFORB THE 

JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION 

OF THE PEAKL HAEBOR ATTACK 

C0NGBE8S OF THE UNITED STATES 

SEVENTY-NINTH CONGRESS 

FIRST AND SECOND SESSIONS 

PURSUANT TO 

S. Con. Res. 27 and 49 

(79th Congress) 

A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING AN 

INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL 

HARBOR ON DECEMBER 7, 1941, AND 

EVENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES 

RELATING THERETO 



PART 16 

JOINT COMMITTEE EXHIBITS NOB. 88 THROUGH 110 



Printed for the use of the 
Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attadc 




PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



HEARINGS 

BEFORE THE 

-8^^*5J0INT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION 
OF THE PEAKL HARBOE ATTACK . 
• CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES 

SEVENTY-NINTH CONGRESS 

FIRST AND SECOND SESSIONS 

PURSUANT TO 

S. Con. Res. 27 and 49 

(79th Congress) 

A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING AN 

INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL 

HARBOR ON DECEMBER 7, 1941, AND 

EVENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES 

RELATING THERETO 



PART 16 

JOINT COMMITTEE EXHIBITS NOS. 88 THROUGH 110 



Printed for the use of the 
Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack 




UNITED STATES 
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 
79716 WASHINGTON : 1946 






3^ , I laj^i .^ 

JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL 
HARBOR ATTACK 

ALBEN W. BARELBY, Senator from Kentucky, Chairman 
JERE COOPER, Representative from Tennessee, Vice Chairman 
WALTER F. GEORGE, Senator from Georgia JOHN W. MURPHY, Representative from 
SCOTT W. LUCAS, Senator from Illinois Pennsylvania 

OWEN BREWSTER, Senator from Maine BERTRAND W. GEARHART, Repreaenta- 

HOMER FERGUSON, Senator from Michl- tive from California 

gan FRANK B. KEEFE, Representative from 

J. BAYARD CLARK, Representative from Wisconsin 
North Carolina 



COUNSEL 






(Throngh January 14, 1946) 

William D. Mitchell, General Counsel / y ^C^ 

Gebhard a. Gesell, ChieJ Assistant Counsel 
Jdle M. Hannab-ord, Assistant Counsel 
John E. Masten, Assistant Counsel 

(After January 14, 1946) 

Seth W. Richardson, General Counsel 
Samuel H. Kadfman, Associate General Counsel 
John E. Masten, Assistant Counsel 
EuwARD P. MORGAN, Assistant Counsel 
Looan J. Lane, Assistant Counsel 






HEARINGS OP JOINT COMMITTEE 



Part 
No. 


Pages 


Transcript 
pages 


1 


1- 399 


1- 1058 


2 


401- 982 


1059- 2586 


3 


983-1583 


2587- 4194 


4 


1585-2063 


4195- 5460 


5 


2065-2492 


5461- 6646 


6 


2493-2920 


6647- 7888 


7 


2921-3378 


7889- 9107 


8 


3379-3927 


9108-10517 


9 


3929-4599 


10518-12277 


10 


4601-5151 


12278-13708 


11 


5153-5560 


13709-14765 



Hearings 



Nov. 15, 16, 17, 19 
Nov. 23, 24, 26 to 
Dec. 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 
Dec. 14, 15, 17, 18, 
Dec. 31, 1945, and 
Jan. 15, 16, 17, 18, 
Jan. 22, 23, 24, 25, 
Jan. 30, 31, Feb. 1 
Feb. 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 
Feb. 15, 16, 18, 19, 
Apr. 9 and 11, and 



, 20, and 21, 1945. 

30, Dec. 3 and 4, 1945. 
11, 12, and 13, 1945. 

19, 20, and 21, 1945. 
Jan. 2, 3, 4, and 5, 1946. 

19, and 21, 1946. 

26, 28, and 29, 1946. 

2, 4, 5, and 6, 1946. 

13, and 14, 1946. 

and 20, 1946. 

Mav 23 and 31. 1946. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



Part 
No. 



12 
13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 through 25 

26 

27 through 31 

32 through 33 

34 

35 

36 through 38 

39 



Exhibits Nos. 

1 through 6. 

7 and 8. 

9 through 43. 

44 through 87. 

88 through 1 10. 

Ill through 128. 

129 through 156. 

157 through 172. 

173 through 179. 

180 through 183, and Exhibits-Illustrations. 

Roberts Commission Proceedings. 

Hart Inquiry Proceedings. 

Army Pearl Harbor Board Proceedings. 

Navy Court of Inquiry Proceedings. 

Clarke Investigation Proceedings. 

Clausen Investigation Proceedings. 

Hewitt Inquiry Proceedings. 

Reports of Roberts Commission, Army Pearl Harbor Board, 
Navy Court of Inquiry and Hewitt Inquiry, with endorse- 
ments. 



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VIII 



INDEX OF EXHIBITS 






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II 
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XII 



INDEX OF EXHIBITS 



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XIV 



INDEX OF EXHIBITS 



3 
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INDEX OF EXHIBITS 



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5. 



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XVI 



INDEX OF EXHIBITS 




INDEX OF EXHIBITS 



XVII 





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7»71« ()— 46 — pt. 16 2 



XVIII 



INDEX OF EXHIBITS 



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INDEX OF EXHIBITS 



XIX 



.a ■'^ 

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XX 



INDEX OF EXHIBITS 



OQ 



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INDEX OF EXHIBITS 



XXI 



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EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1937 

EXHIBIT NO. 88 

War Plans Division (OP 12) 

12-1. Duties: 

(a) Policy and Projects Section: 

(1) Development of policies and projects in support of war plans. 

(2) Collaboration with the War Department in preparation of current plans 
for joint action of the Army and Navy, and in the solution of current problems. 

(3) Collaboration with other Government departments on policies and projects 
affecting national defense. 

(4) Study of subjects referred to the War Plans Division by the Chief of 
Naval Operations. 

(5) Action in advisory capacity in current administrative matters referred 
to the War Plans Division. 

(b) Plans Section: 

(1) Direction of war planning. 

(2) Preparation of designated war plans. 

(3) Review of Operating Plans and Principal Contributory Plans. 

(4) Collaboration with the War Department in preparation of Joint Basic 
War Plans. 

(5) Collaboration with other Government departments on plans affecting na- 
tional defense. 

12-2. The Director of the War Plans Division is a member of the Joint Board 
(General Order No. 7). 

12-3. The War Plans Division has membership on the following committees : 

Joint Board. 

Joint Planning Committee. 
Joint Aeronautical Board. 
Joint Air Advisory Committee. 
Shore Station Development Board. 

12-4. The War Plans Division is nonadministrative. 



EXHIBIT NO. 89 

Responsibility for Defense Against Air Attack in Hawaii 

[7] 1. The broad responsibilities of the Army and Navy in 
Hawaii were contained in Army and Navy war plans prepared and 
issued to the Army and Navy Commanders in Hawaii. These re- 
sponsibilities were expressed in the various plans in terms of joint 
missions and separate Army and Navy missions. With the exception 
as indicated below, these missions are stated identically in all war 
plans current in 1941 as follows : 

JOINT MISSION 

, To hold Oahu as a main outlying Naval Base, and to control and 
protect shipping in the Coastal Zone. 

NAVY MISSION 

To patrol the coastal zone and to control and protect shipping 
therein ; to support the Army forces. 



1938 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

ARMY MISSION 

To hold Oahu against attack by land, sea and air forces and against 
hostile sympathizers ; to support the Naval forces. 

2. In the most recent plan the phrase in the Army Mission "to sup- 
port the Naval Forces" was deleted and the following was substituted; 
"Support Naval Forces in the protection of the sea communications 
of the Associated Powers and in the destruction of Axis sea com- 
munications by offensive action against enemy forces or commerce 
located within tactical operating radius of occupied air bases." 

[2] 3. It should be noted that in all cases the missions called for 
mutual support. 

4. Based on these broad missions the Commanding General, 
Hawaiian Department, and the Navy Commander in Hawaii agreed 
to accept certain responsibilities for defense against air attack. These 
agreements are to be found in the various local joint plans and the 
separate plans of the Army and Navy in Hawaii. The basic current 
plans in Hawaii on Dec. 7, 1941 were: The Joint Coastal Frontier De- 
fense Plan, Hawaiian Coastal Frontier, 1941, and the Army and 
Navy Operations Orders and agreements based thereon. These plans 
and agreements contain the following major provisions pertaining to 
defense against air attack : 

(a) Antiaircraft De.fen^t^ 



Responsibility 



Source 



ARMY 



NAVY. 



(1) "Shall provide for: a. The 
defense of OAHU" 



* antiaircraft 



(2) Army Antiaircraft, "supported by Naval Units 

placed under the tactical control of the Army, 
will operate to defend Oahu from attacks by 
hostile aircraft." 
(31 

(3) The Army, "Arrange for such coordination of the 

antiaircraft artillery fire of naval ships in PEARL 
HARBOR and the Army antiaircraft defense as 
1 may be practicable." 

"The Pacifie Fleet and the Fourteenth Naval Dis- 
trict * • * aie taking certain security meas- 
ures, which include: 



(d) The organization of four air defense groups for the 
control and distribution of the antiaircraft Are of all 
ships anchored in Pearl Harbor." 



"In the event of a hostile air attack, any part of the 
Fleet in Pearl Harbor plus all Fleet aviation shore- 
based on Oahu, will augment the local air defense." 



[4] 
"The 



Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District 
• • • shall: (a) exercise with the Army joint 
supervisory control over the defense against air 
attack, (b) Arrange with the Army to have their 
antiaircraft guns emplaced." 



(d) Coordinate Fleet antiaircraft fire with the base 
defense." 



Par 17, Joint Coastal Frontier 
Defense Plan Hawaiian 
Coastal Frontier, 1941 

Par 2, FO No. 1 NS (Naval 
Security) Hq. Hawaiian 
Dept. 



Par. 36 (3), FO No. 1 NS (Na- 
val Security) 



Par. 16 FO No 1 NS (Navy 
Security) Hq. Hawaiian 
Dept. 



Par. Zg. (2) (6) Pacific Fleet 
Confidential Letter 2 CL-41. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



1939 



Conchmon: The orders and agreements on the ])art of the local 
Army and Navy Commanders lead to the conclusion that primary 
responsibility for antiaircraft defense rested with the Army but that 
the Navy had a secondary responsibility in conection therewith. 

(b) Aircraft Warning Service 



Responsibility 


Provisions 


Source 


Army 

Navy - 


(1) The Army "shall provide for: • * * 6. "An 
antiaircraft • ♦ • intelligence and warning 
service." 
"During the period prior to the completion of the AWS 
installation, the Navy, through use of RADAR, 
and other appropriate means, will endeavor to give 
such warning of hostile attacks as may be prac- 
ticable." 


Par 17, Joint Coastal Frontier 
Def. Plan, Hawaiian Coastal 
Frontier, 1941. 

Par. 11, Annex VII Joint 
Coastal Frontier Def. Plan 
Hawaiian Coastal Frontier. 



Cnnchision: The Army had primary responsibility for the establishment of an 
aircraft warning service. The Navy, however, agreed to furnish such means 
as it had. pending the installation of the Army facilities then under construction. 



(c) Aircraft 

(RECONNAISSANCE PHASE) 



Responsibility 


Provisions 


Source 


Army 

Navy 


(1) "Shall provide for: 

« * * 

Establishment of an inshore aerial patrol of the waters 
of the Oahu DCA in cooperation with the Naval 
Inshore Patrol." 

(1) Navy "shall provide for: a. An inshore patrol. 

b. An offshore patrol * • * i. Distant recon- 
naissance." 

(2) "When naval forces are insufficient for long distant 

patrol and search operations, and Army aircraft 
are made available, these aircraft will be under 
the tactical control of the naval commander 
directing the search operations." 


Par. 17, Joint Coastal Frontier 
Def. PlanHCF. 

Par. 18, Joint Coastal Frontier 




Def. HCF. 

Par. 2c, Annex VII, Joint 
Coastal Frontier Def. HCF. 



le] 



(DEFENSIVE AIR) 



Army. 
Navy. 



"b. Defensive air operations over and in the immedi- 
ate vicinity of Oahu will be executed under the 
tactical command of the Army." 

(1) "Each commander will • • * make available 

without delay to the other commander such pro- 
portion of the air forces at his disposal as the cir- 
cumstances warrant." 

(2) "With due consideration to the tactical situation 

existing, the number of fighter aircraft released 
to Army control will be the maximum practic- 
able." 



Par. 26. Annex VII Joint 
Coastal Frontier Defense 
Plan 

Par 2 Annex VII 



Par 26. Annex VII 







(OFFENSIVE AIR) 




Army 


"g. 


Support of naval aircraft forces in major offensive 


Par 17j;. Joint Coastal Frontier 






operations at sea within range of Army 


Def. Plan 






bombers." 




Navy 


(1) 


"Shall provide for * • • j. Attacking enemy 


Par 18, Joint Coastal Frontier 






Naval Forces." 


Def. Plan. Par 2a Annex VII 




(2) 


"Joint air attacks upon hostile surface vessels will 
be executed under the tactical command of the 
Navy." 





1940 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[7] Conclusion: The Navy was primarily responsible for close and distant 
aerial reconnaissance and offensive air operations against hostile snrface craft. 
The army was primarily responsible for defensive air operations. Regardless of 
the service primarily resp<jnsible, the opposite service was charged with support- 
ing the operation within the means available to it. 

To summarize, it will be seen from the at)ove analysis that : 

(a) Definite plans and agreements existed in Hawaii for defense against 
aircraft ; 

(b) Although the Army had the primary responsibility for antiaircraft defense, 
aircraft warning service and defensive air operations and the Navy had the pri- 
mary responsibility for close and distant reconnaissance, and offensive air opera- 
tions, each service was charged with augmenting the forces of the other with the 
means available to them in order to provide the maximum effective defense. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1941 

EXHIBIT NO. 90 



ffoiiii' Telegram Sent «onc.: 

ColKct {Oty l«tt«r 

iNWrtlrttw w.. A... 

c>.,r^o^^.^x. ©ppartnmtt of ^tatp ^, ,„ 

Full rit« ^ ,^ ,y j:'L,f_TN' 

0.ylet1.r Jf .^\ ' 

Ch.r,K to Department ^ ^ ' "^O > r 

» '0*^ December lA , IQ^i 

AMERICAN LEGATION , 

BERN 

J ^ r 

AMERICAN INTERESTS. 

Please express to Sv-dss Govenmant this Goirarnaeat 's 
appreciation of its message expressir;g willingness to 
undertake the representation of American interests in 
Japanese-occupied territories and, waen necessary, in other 
regions of the Far East. 

Department would be grateful if Swiss Government would 
by telegraph circularize to its representatives in - 
East, for the information of such American diplomat i 
consular offices as may by reason of the present si _. 
find it impossible to carry on their functions or to coir- 
municate v.-ith the Department, the following messafi^e {in 
substance already communicated to Embassy 
endeavored without /repeat without^ success z ; r:;, o i 
to the offices concerned): 

iUOTE One . In the event of a sudden ei;.er 

when communications with the Doport:.ient are 

broken 



EjKll>htTtJ iy ._ 
Sent by opcraior 



1942 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



TELt.GRAM Sent 



Drpiirtinciit of ^tatr 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1943 



ro BC 1H*N»MiTttO 

,, TELEGRAM SENT .JZ r::: ^ 

Collect {0»y letter - - — fartair 

I HiRht letter piaim 

Ch«Ke Department. iSepartHtPnt Of ^tfltC 

Full rate 

Day letter Washinilon, 

NighMetler 

CKar^e to 



reco-,:aro- i: 






calend-.r ys. r, l 
ci.oala be ter;airi-'ted {■ 



Enclphttti iy . 

Sml iy eptrolor •'' • 



1944 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



Telegram Sent 



Brpnrtmrnt nf *tatc 

H ashington. 



Enci/jhertJ hy 

Sfnt iy opfielor ' M.. !'> 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1945 



r,»nnotNTi*t coot 



Telegram StNT . .o«oo.r,oe«T,«. code 



D rpartinr nt of ^tatt 

- - '■'i luhingtcn. 



79716 O — 46— pt. If 



1946 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



Telegram Sent 



Day !.•!!- 



Qrpartmriit of ^tatv 

Washington, 



Stnt by Ofjtrul'ir M , 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1947 



HrparttmMit uf *tnli* 



Stnl tj,' ,jf,e,iUi-' M.. ,19. 



1948 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



TELtGRAM Sent 
Qrpartiurut of #tatr 

ii'ii}hinil:m. 



•*^ 






Sent by opinjtor M., 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



1949 



Drp. 



. , ,_ ., / .e Swiss 

■'i'ioers charged with the repre- 
j.'9i>t3 in.iBBte .mifiiit be authorized 

their c- - '.0, Pie-. 

;t. 






1950 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

EXHIBIT NO. 91 

EMBASSY OF THE ' j 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 1 

Tokyo, December 15, 1941. 




oL'BJT.CT: DESTRUCTION CF CUDE=, CIlHEItD AND CIPHER 
DEVICSa. 




v^ • 



T^^ 






j^' 



^ 



A^^'l 



1/ 



The HonortJblB 

Th« ,~->ecr^tfrv of otate, 
..ashii-ton. 

6lr: 

I have the honor to enclose herewith for the 
Division of Coi-aa.r.icftJ.ns and Records a list of 
the codes, -.i.-hers and ci.her devices which were 
burned or destroyed under standing instructions on 
December &, 1941 on the outbreak of war between the 
united otates and Japan. This list oom;rises all the 

codes 



r:; 




/*i6»»l 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1951 




codes, ciphers, cipher devices and other material 
pertaining to codes in possession of the Embassy. 
As provided by regulation, this statement is signed 
by the two officers in whose presence they were 
bui-ned. The true readings of all telegrams in 
confidential codes were likewise burned on December 8, 
1S41 in the presence of the same two officers. 

Respectfully yours, 

Joseph C. Grew. 



Enclosures : 

1/ List of codes, ciphers nnd cipher devices. 



lie. 2 
CL'2:gch 

Oririnnl ; u-; t.,o oo. is-s to Depai-t.-ont . 



1952 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 




EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



1953 







EMBASSY OF THE 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 



■ Si 






.:i7IJ:-;::tial 



A 



\^^ 



7lM 



///'/^^ 



1^", 



K. 



1^ 



:^f 



Ol 

CO 



^ir: 



>ocrjtrjry of jtate, 
.'aahin'-ton. 



I .xiVQ Li:e honor to rc-ort th-it; just rj-ior to tiie 
catbr-3ak of v.-r •)ef..t,'en z.a Unitod ^t-t-is ".i^ J' ; ur. t.'ie 
jii'oasj:' received, \yj poucL fro:.. t..e ^- ^. ' 

ro.-istore-- st-)'aled j.-ivelopec f.dCre^oCi l.. - ■... 

;;n3Ulate 



f^'^ 



1954 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



- '^,<;^ . -<-^^^'l.- 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTSE 1955 



, o;::;o, 






1956 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 




EMBASSY OF THE 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 



No. k'-jI'c 



,<!>' 



•3, roi^rur-.i 






W- 



* 

tc 



01 



1/ 



The Honorable 

SrcreZhrj of St^te 
Waehlni^-ton 
Slr:- 

I -r.-av^ -.'p noRor to ^iK.slt ;>';'*-'-i : 

tne .-.eEtr.ctlon of t ;e fllua of Vr.e fiecortl: 
S.ctlon -f t .?v. 



^.espectfully vo'JU^e, 



File : 0. 1?~ .2 



itiied 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1957 



Enclopure ho, 1 i j'. 31^ 
"t .ed Feuruary 1-5, i3-i£ ', 
-'.ajasfiv pt ToXyo 



-r 3ECTI>.i;'3 



■-uld 



■'C^ric Tr 



"^ — ' 



1958 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 




EMBASSY OF Ti-.E 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 

Tokyo, Maroh 25, 1942, 
SUBJECT: DKSTRUCTION OF STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL FILES. 



-r:^^^ 







'0^ 

a' 1 . 



IV) 

to 

4w 
0> 



4)^ 



The Honorable 

The Secretary of State, 
Washington. 
Sir: 

1/ I hare the honor to enclose a list of the strictly 
confidential material in the files of the ICmbassy which 
was burned in accordance with Section 7 of the Department's 
und?ited "Instructions to .-di;'=ric ;n Diplomatic and Consular 
Officers in Japanese Occupied Territories and other Regions 
of the Far East" received in January 1942 through the 
Swiss Lei'ation in Tokyo. 

In addition to the strictly confidential material listed 
on the enclosur'? to this despatch, all true readin^-s of^ 
-' telecjrams in confidential code were burned on December 8, 

1941, as reported in my unnumbered despatch dated December 15^ 
1941. 



In 






EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1959 



-2- 



In conformity v,-ith the Department's instruction, 
non-confidential bound and current correspondence was 
not in /general destroyed, but was stored in the Embassy 
vault for safe keeping in custody of the Swiss repre- 
sentative, and only such material contained therein 
v;hich might have proved compromising to any individuals 
in areas under Japanese control was removed and burned. 

Respectfully yours, 



Joseph C. Grew. 



Enc losure : \^^^ \ V- 
1/ as indicated. 



CEB:.-h 



1960 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

EXHIBIT NO. 92 



'I )1.>1': 0\' I < AtM' iN; 



;^ have so lai 
•.■;it rendition-" 



Mii or jHisonalitif ^ (i{ the (i.v, , 
iii.- luart's cuiUvui. ^ubi, 1 < .. 



i 

; 1 • ! I < 
rc:v;;n 



.- ■ \'. V r .1 ■ 
(>:mnitlr 
>t the C" 
pT«'tc>t 



ill I; t l:i!' iiuiuuiial Ki'U 
;■, and that when- any 
onviiition i^ observed a 
i> madr to the enemy 
-eriud 



1 JH i ..nl Trivv Seal Mr. AUlci 



r countries have iii-titi: 
_;; , : ,!i to sustain -n-h ,i \ 

whWr 'A'.-y :ir.- fii:htinu; f< r th. ir iiv<- 
I (AM it !i' the Hou<;e to i \pl lin (,, 
wh.tt hi- Kd me to a?k for th^ r , 
tioi.al si'.pport at thi« x\nn\ It ha^ 
V, ;_■.,:, «'rd that we -hnnhi hiivi- , 
a,V.' p. hate of tl':- k\uA in wl-,, ■ 



M.'ti.in U'l 



• : <■ ("rown at thi; 

\t U'|>tt<.! trom the pruvisions 

OrJer (Sttings of ih»" 

1 think that it would uuet the lon- 

.... .' .1, J 1 ..... ;i ..... V » i,.,l ii,. 



th:it may b«> , j^j ^ve should >epara:. 
>ion. In this ease sc 
whieh are )io«tile — an 
\\hoi-<- hostiUtv i-i ! 
,le. '.ue th.it the Gover 



\U. \'.:l 



ipply 



WAR Sm ATION. 



! Question proposei 
.h- ;:n\v atliourn." 



the matt' 
hi- rtintir.'H r^ 

!, h.- t'..!shid 

•'k-V aie 
icht at!. 



1 he I'rinu \": 



r Mr. Churchill 

■ ■ -^,it;:,. D.v. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



1961 



- , ^'^ Situation 27 JANUARY 194^ War Situatton 594 

Uo have harl a gnat deal oi bad news The Prime Minister: A vote under aU 
ill, iy from the Far East, and I think it the conditions which hitherto have made 
hi-iilv probable, for reasons wliich I shall the conduct of Farliamentary povernment 
l>,i-.(iitly explain, that we shall have a possible. Surely the hon. Gentleman' is 
.ir.it deal more. Wrapped up in this bad not the man to l>e frightened of a Whip? 

The House of Commons, which is at 
present the most powerful reprtscnlative 
Assembly in the world, must al^)--! am 
sure, will also— bear in mind tlic effect 
produced af)road by all its proceeding's. 
We have al^o to remcmbei how oddly 
forei.[;ncrs view our country and its way 
of (ioiof^ things. When Rudolf Hess ilew 
over here some months ago he firmly 
belicvtd thai he had only to gain 
access to certain t ircies in this country 
tor what he dcscribcci as " the ("hurchill 
clique " — 

Mr. Thorne (Plaistow): Where is hr 
now? 

The Prime Minister: When he ouu'ht to 
be — to be thrown out of fK>wer and for a 
Government to be set up with which 
ffitler could ne^'oti.ite a maunanimous 
peace. The only importance attaching to 
the opinions of Fless is the fact that he 
was fresh from the atmosphere ol Hitler's 
intimate table. Hut, Sir, I can assure 
you that since I have Ijt i n back in this 
country I have had anxious iiujuiric^ from 
a dozen countries, and rcpc>rts ol enemy 
propaijanda in a score ot coiuitriis, all 
turnini; iijicai the juiiiit wlieliu r His 
Majcstv's j)i.s.iit r,iiv,iiirni-nt is to In dis- 
r;a--i(l hoin {x.wii <! ii<it. This may 
si. til -illy tu us. hut in tlic>sc irsouths 
abio.id It is hurtiui and iiu.m lui vous tu the 
conuiiiiii i-tfurl. 1 am not asking; lor any 
spcuaJ, jKr^,on.il tavours in thcsr cirtuni- 
stjiKrs. t>ut i am sure the lIoi;.s.,- wnuid 
wisii lo make itj positioii clear, thciclore 
1 stand by tlic au'itul, con.-iiUitionaj, 
Parbanu nl.iry doituiie ul tree dcoatc and 
laithlul vutuij.;. 

. .in to till acaouiit of the wjr, 

s^ .:tu!i s lik . 1 lini 1 luake tor tiie 

,oul i,ouhui i.' I .'I the House. 

r tour montii^ .11; -.w had to copj 



,,, w, will be many tales of blunders and 

.i;,,rl^omin.t!S :K)th in foresight and action. 

\(. ene w,' pretend lor a moment that 

-!crs .Kc ilit-se occur without there 

iicen faults and shortcomin:;s. I 

: tins rolling towards us like thc 

ri a storm, aini that is another 

i \v)iy 1 require a formal, solemn 

: <_"• »ij<le!j(e from the House oi 

is, wJiich hitherto in this stru^j^le 

..r iimclied. The Hou^c would 

:s duty if it did not uisi-t upon two 

lirst, free<iom of- debate, and, 

. . a clear, honest, blunt Vote there- 

i laii we ^hall all know where we 

•u! ,dl th. s,- with whom we have to 

' i. ■•';:, ,i;iij aUioad, friend or foe, 

v where we .ire and where they 

1: Is beeai;s( we are to liave a tree 

(), .. le, in whi<h perhaps 20 to 30 .Mem- 

;•, •- .in take part, that I tiemand an ex- 

' >n of opinion from the VX) or 400 

iefs who will h.r.c .sat silent. 

j- 1-; In-ae.-c tiiir:cs ha\'c ;.;orie barlly 

. ■■ (ifse > 'o -'rtie ih 't ! dt m md a Vote 

I -f'-iiii. e. i'Ms will he pl.a ' (i <ei the 

• ■ ' ■ 'I'v. to ! e 'IV \<r! at a ;..♦. r st i-e. 

' ■■'■ w'i'c :}■(;- -hfiili hamper aiiv- 

J:.: ii-io'i:! critit isjn.. 



ke. iT t ••■r]i 
ls!( I. that 17!, 

• v\ith thiiikin 



"- 1 re 
that 



;r<. ti. 



IhiKm; 



.'Ce 



triinistr.ition. su, \ 



m r( -pe. ( ot 

1 as it is, !r' nii.cht 

• :; ■! i:'n <.^. !M- Hut il an 

. i,' (he Cj'A ,_ niiiient 

' it! th<,- public in- 

htokcn cp, he 

<•(! t.i t, silly hl-s 

I. ole. . i hue IS no 

ni-et!;..! il! delate. 

belt!;.; 

^! the 

tai |[ litllp ?l. lo lOU- 

'.■I \'-\u^ h may be set 
i.:-e . ;,,!■ IK bate. liiit no 
la ;n aiy-ici.aithed in debate, 
:ie ihoaid be chitken-hcarte>l in 
i have voted ni;aitist Govern 
have been elected to support, 
1:11,' back, I have sometimes felt 
that I did so. Everyone in 
h times must do what he thinks 



Mr. Shinweil (Seaham) : A free vote? 



I iiree 

with the toUowiiiji; ^itiiatjua 1 iie (jcrman 
i'lvaders were advancmt;, blasting their 
way thioufjh Russia. 1 he Russians were 
resiAtinj.; with the utmost heroism. But no 
oni- could tell what would happen, 
wliether F.eninj.;nid, .Moscow or Rostov 
would fall, or where the German winter 
line would be established. No one can tell 
now where it will be e.stablished. but now 
tKe boot is on the other Ivg. We all agree 
that we must aid the valiant Russian 



79716 O — 46— i)t. 1< 



1962 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



593 



H'ar Stluatton 



HOUSE OF COMMONS 



iVar Situation 



596 



[The Priint- Minister.] 
Armifs to tin.- utmobt limit of our power. 
Hi.s ,M.)jt?!v''s Government thought, and 
I'arliiiiiK lit upon roilcction agrt-ed with 
l.iim, that the best aid we could give to 
Rii'-ia \va.- in sujiplics of many kinds of 
raw m.ittria!? and of mimitions, particu- 
laiiy t.iiks and airrraft. Onr Forces at 
h,,ui and alToaU iiaii for loni; been wait- 
iUj.; ihir-tily for thise weapons. At last 
i.iiy Will oihini; tu liand in large nnm- 
bcrs. A; 1h>;ih we liav ahvay^, the danger 
of inva-icn to consider and to prepare 
a.: Ki-t. 1 will speak about the situation 
ill ;l; Ni idle Kast presently. Ncverthe- 
! at i^remicr Stalin -for that ] 

•w 1k' wishes to iv addre-.-i-d: 
ai ,1,1 I, i:i;il is tiie form in which he tele- 
grc.phs to nil- e.xactly what he asked for. 
!''i! wholi- quantity was promised and 
^i ;it. Tlitre has been, I am sorry to say, 
I sni.ill Uv^ due to bad weather, but it 
will he made up by the early days of 
I'elriiary. This was a de< ision of major 
str.;te,'4y and policy, and anyc^ne can see 
thrv. it was ri.^ht to put it first when they 
!i tile wiuuh'rfnl achievements, un- 
!; .! for, undreamed of by us because 
Wi- liiitr ku'w the Russian strength, but- 
.ill till' nsore t^lorious as they seem — the 
woi; hrful .uhitvi-niei:;^ of the Russian 
.•\r:!ii- -. (>:ir ii!im!!i":i> were of course 
only .1 ' "ii'ri!'iitinri to the Russian victory, 
b'lt 111. ■. v,(T" an enrnuragement in 
•••'■■■ :kt-l hour. Moreover, if we 

'■.Ml a loyal effort to help our 
,1; ,1 hi .i\ \- :-a< rifue to our 



the oil which they are beginning seriously 
to need, but it would have involved the 
destnu lion of the Russian Fleet and the 
loss, ol the command of the Black Sea. 
It would have affected the safety of 
Turkey, and it would, in due course, have 
exposed to the gravest dangers Persia, 
Iraq. Cyria and Palestine, and beyond 
tlu).■^e countries, all of which are now 
uiiiliT our control, it would have 
(hreattried the Suez Canal, F,gypt and the 
.N'ik- \all<y. ,\l the same time as this 
nicnicc (jcfinefl itself with hideous and 
iri' rr isini; rcaiity as it seemed, Cieneral 
vol! i\o;nni(l. svilli his array of 10 Ger- 
;!i !i uid It.'li;in divisions rnlren< hed in 
!:;- '.itifHtl positions at and behind the 
Ii:!i'.'\M P.-.--. w.is prepariu'^ to make a 
lit-, i^ive :■.'':• k on Tohruk as a imlimin- 
ar\' in a r'. iiewed advance uy>on Fgypt 
from the West. The Nile \',i!!ey was 
therefore menaced simu!tanet>iislv by a 
direct att.irk frc>m the Wisi .tiul !n' a more 
remote but in some \va\s uiorr deadly ' 
attack from the \orth. In sis h circum- 
stances it is the classic. 1! rule of war, 
reinforced by endless e.x.imples — and 
soific exceptions —that von (irrpare to 
I'lcht a (^elaviui: .-n tion .njain-t one c>f the 
fun attacks and cotKentr.;!!. if possible, 



)MrwlielTTiii: 



• i C 



stren'.^tli 

• tt.i. k. 

•lal Ar.< 



■lin.l 
We 



[una 



the other 

Iherefore 

• for 

..ist 
jn.in Sea, 
1 e\ant- 



^'•.priis to th( ( .' 
I rr).i\- I,. II 111 

. and prep.irip.q in-t-ill.itions, 
ornrnnniv'atioi!- npon which 
.'iihi li: li.i~;(l, .;^ liinr ;ind 

v..-,; On tl'c nthrr flmk, 

! ny u< ■>]:i'. 



tr >.\-.-- Iir. . -- il .1 ail 
.1. .i. We 

.!:■ 1 (he im- 

. :.. ,., '^:].,.-l. H'!t 



!M> Ul- 






a I tu ■ I -Kill we 



v. •■'. wh. M we -11 liiiw i\i-iits, whjili 
']'■'•. r.,^ k and faMt\- hu-n.m effort 
'.<] Ji - jn, have -haped tlu'in-i Ives, I am 
le lliw wa- a ri^^ht decision. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



1963 



597 



War Situation 27 JANUARY 1942 "'«'' 5«'««''<"» 59^ 

much more than doublt- as -troii^. 
Therefore, it seems to m^ that this heroic, 
epic struggle in the (ie-'ort. though there 
have been many local reverse--: and many 
ebbs and flows, has tested our manhood 
ill a searching fashion and has proved 
not only that our men ran die for King 
and country — everyone kiKw that— but 
that they can kill. 

I cannot tell what the p.i-ition ot the 
present moment i- on the \V<-^tern front 
in Cyrenaica. We havr a vers' ilaiin- and 
skilful opponent a.cainst us and. may I 
.sav arnjss th- hav'oi nf v\ar. a great 
Ceiu-rai. He lia., tertainly r.t.-ivcd r<-in- 
fon ein<'iit<. AiK.ther liattle i- ev( n rxnv in 
prijgrts-, and I make it a rule ne\<r to 
tjy and proph.-N\- h.-fnrfhand how h.ttilrs 
win turn <uit. I al\\a\> rejciie tli..! I ha%e 
made tlsat rule. fAs uus. Mimbm;: 
" What alxxit the Skaggerak ? "' 1 hat 
wa- lurdlv a Uattle. NaturalK'. one df, > 
not -a\- iii'a < aM- hk- that that \vi' liavt riot 
a .iian.r, l.iTau-o tii.ii i^ a[>1 to in- vn- 
touiagiii;^ to thi ,:umy and di'pre"in^ to 
tair own fnciids. In the .ctnrr,!! i;|>-hot, 
the tait r>'rn:iit)s that. when, a.- a "-iar a,co 
thr C,frit)aiis svin- tclliu.u; a!i tli-- iiruirals 
lt;at thi \- uotild \>v in Sue/ bv Maw >vlun 



General Auchinleck had demanded five 
months' preparation for his campaign, but 
on i8th November he fell upon the enemy. 
For more, than two months in the desert 
the most fierce, continuous battle has 
raged between scattered bands of men, 
armed with the latest weapons, seeking 
each other dawn after dawn, fighting to 
the death throughout the day and then 
often long into the night. Here was a 
battle which turned out very differently 
from what was foreseen. All was dis- 
persed and confused. Much depended on 
the individual soldier and the junior 
officer. Much, but not all: because tjiis 
battle would ha\T been lost on 24th 
November if General Auchinleck had not 
intervened himself, changed the command 
and ordered the ruthless pressure of the 
attack to be maiiitained without icqarfl to 
risks or consequences. But for this robu-t 
decision we should now be back on the okJ 
line from whi< h we liad started, or per- 
haps further hack. Tobruk would po.;-il)lv 
have fallen, and Kommel miqht he uian h 
ing towards the Nile. Since then the battle 
has deel.ire<] it.-elf. Cyrenaica has bet u 
regained. It has still to bf held. We h.iv^' 
not sucfeeded in d< -troyitig Ronirnil'i 
army, but nearly two-thirdi of it an' 
woimde<l, prisoner^ or dead. 



If of 

the 

-a\' 



Perhaps I may giNc th. Hi^'Ui - :■ 
House. In this ^trani;<\ -rnnbrc l),ilt 
the de.serl, where our nnu i\.t\e mi't 
enemy for the tir-^t tini' ! do no.t 
in ever\' n-^pect. bi-( aii.-v tlii-rt ar.- -"mi' 
things which an- no! .ill that \m had fioj- '] 
for — but, upon tin wlifile, h.t\r nut hiii: 
with ecjual weapotis. we lia\t l<;-t in 
killed, wuundrd and capturtd al:^)::t I'^.ooo 
ofti> ers and men, of whc>rn the Ljrcatcr p.irt 
are B^iti^il. We have in our po--. --ion 
'.;t'»,5no [uiioners. includin- niaiiv 
wounded, of \sb,oni 10,500 air fnrmai!.- 
We ha\a' killed ,uid \voinnKd at iv.t-t 

Itaii.ii!- in 

■ xaMlv. of 

.1 ni.i.-- oi 

i,i\ e 

or to tli.- 

n^.ii.v. <)f 



s'lUie pti'i 
a ( >( rinan 
p> e.ple \N- 
htormvd , 
V.dley. ( 

Ue ]\j\, ■ 

a.:,ai;!-t lii 
w.u'!, iiiti 



),iT!-on, o 

til. in ut 
iulv ha- 1 
!i< i'allli 



alk-d <A 
enl upon 



po->-iliilit\' ol 
iul, and manv 



[m:; upon 



< ;ii ■ t 
1 iiurii 
hitji i 

not ~;i 
u-t 



laid. 



app 



)Ulited for 
lerr- is ai:- 



if wiiotu 



1 1,500 Cierman- 
,.:11 ' .. lota.l, .u- 
(>i,ooo men. Therf- is 
eneni\' wounded, .-nue 
been evai uated to the 
Westward- 1 eannr.t tell 
the forces of which (m rural Ko'iuiiel di- 
posed on i8th November, little more than 
one-third now remain, while ^52 (ierrnan 
and Italian aircraft have been de-troy d 
and 3 ;'j dernian and Italian tank- Dur- 
ing this battle we ha\a ne\t r ii.el in .u ;i' n 
more than .45,o«x) men, a-iui-t .-nemy 
forces — if they could be brou^h.t to bear — 



(ii.ink.- 
Na-. V. 



11, 1- : 

Wiht:;. 

niu-i, li 

!hou-li 

hi;:i)U 

laiuh. 

to th. 

Zeal.ind 

x,Idi. r- 

plaved 

.-,tu!)l 



the 



s 
l-i.. 

JUd , 

their part Hi It 
rn, .steadfast and 



In-, ii.in. 
-,ii!..r-. 



.li-!) 



1964 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



599 



War Situation 



HOUSE OF COMMONS 



War Siituttion 



floo 



[The Prime Minister.] 
of Tohnik by Australian and British 
tro()|i> was an fssential preliminary, over 
s» vtii hard months, to any success which 
nKi\- haw- bei-n achieved. 

Let u-, bte what has happened on the 
()ti;ir Hank, tho Northern llank, of the 
Nilf V'aik'V. What has happened to 
Palestine. Syria, Iraq and Persia? There 
we must thank Russia. There the valour 
(»f the Russian Armies has warded off 
dangers which wc saw and which we un- 
doubtedly ran. The Caucasus and the 
precious oilfields of Baku, the great 
Anylo-Per^ian oilfields, are denied to the 
enemy. Winter has come. Evidently 
We have the time to strengthen still 
further our Forces and organisations in 
those regions. Tlierefore. sir, I present 
to you. in laying tlie whole field open and 
bare and sur\-eying it in all its parts, for 
all are r«lated. a situation in the Nile 
Valiev, both West and East, incompar- 
ably easier than anything we have ever 
seen, since we were deserted by the 
French Hordeaux-V'ichy Government and 
were set \ipon"by Italy. The House will 
not fail to discern the agate points upon 
whi<h this vast improvement has turned. 
It is only bv the smallest margin that we 
)ia\ c -lu CI I'tled so far in Iwating Rommel 
ill ( \i. iiaica and destroying two-thirds 
'I !ii- tnr. OS. E\ery tank, every aircraft 
-qii.ul'i .n was needed. It is only by the 
\ K t' ru - on the Russian flank on tlu- 
r.l.u K >t.i nM«-t that we have been spared 
the (A.mmninu oi all tho^e vast lands 
tioU' {'::>■ I. IX iiii ti> the Caspian, which in 
tiini ii\. .ti.i-> to India, Persia, the 
I'li-i.r.: (.'lil. ih.- Nile Valley and the 

Sllr.' i\'\'..i] 

1 'lu -li !\- nf these 

'' -' ' li ni!i(,'i>. will SCO 

\s iKiiii ".slv 1 ill n^'.'urcrs havr 

i:ic-(i aii'i ti\- V, h i! ;: --iiMn inar^in 

■l l'\- wiial ^Ui'ki - III rurtuiif !"r 

uliii!) \vc ( i Min tin I n (lit wc lia\c --ui 

\ iv ' ' • • ■~\ ' .{ r< >h('iiUl wt h,->\i- 

i I ' : '.i wr had yicltU-d 

\" - isi' h ua> M> loud 

Ihl. .■ ..I l..;i! ; ;ii it v.c vhoidd 

in\ .h;i ! ; ;.> , '. ( oiMiim •-. \\'.- 

C.t;; ■ n:t illr' iipll'll, 

■■ > \\!n. tii.l 11.. t 

ji I ; 'ai! Mli.KjJK' 

V. i; , hi. i' ll \^.' 

\).-,\ .u . ' -^ttl-.O 

l'\. l\ !. 'ntlli.i. 

,\il% a. ; ■ -.!. .■L.:U (ll (HIT 



Ai!n\ 



d .v.A v^ou!d i..- 



fighting for life on the French shores «» 
on the shores of the Low Countries. AH 
these troubles of the Far East and the 
Middle East might have sunk to ia- 
significance compared with the question of 
another and far worse Dunkirk. 

Here, let nne say, I should like to pay 
my tribute to one who has gone from us 
since I left this country, Mr. Lees-Smith. 
who, I remember, spoke with so much 
profound wisdom on this point at a 
moment when many opinions were in flax 
about it. His faithful, selfless and wae 
conduct of the important work which he- 
discharged in this House was undoubtedly 
of great assistance to us all, not only to 
the . Government but to us all, in the 
various stages of the war. His memory 
as a distinguished Parliamentarian ■wifi 
long find an honoured place in the recol- 
lection of those who had the fortune to 
be his colleague. 

Sometirfes things can be done by say- 
ing '.' Yes," and sometimes things can be 
done by saying " No." Yet I suppose 
there are some of those who were vocal 
and voluble, and even clamant, for a 
second front to be opened in France, who 
are now going to come up bland and 
smiling and ask why it is that we have 
not ample forces in Malaya, Burma, 
Borneo and the Celebes. There are times 
when --o many things happen, and happen 
>(> quickly, and time seems to pass in such 
a ua\ that you can neither say it is long 
(II >hort. that it is easy to forget what you 
have said three months before. You may 
fail to connect it with what you are advo- 
cating at the particular moment. 
Throughout a long and variegated 
Parliamentary life this consideration 
luis led me to try and keep a 
wati^liful eye on that danger myself. 
\ .111 IK \< r can tell. 1 here are also people 
>,\1;.. t.dk and hvar tln-insf-ives as it they 
h.td [ucpaH-i! tor this war with great' 
.iiiiiatui lit-, and long, careful preparation. 
P.tit th..t i.■^ not tnu-. In two and a half 
yi.u.-- o| tightuig wc have only just 
ni.'.n.iced to keep our head> a!K)ve water. 
\\h<-u 1 w.i-^ i.dle<l upon to be Prime 
Miii!>t(i. iiiiw iieaily two years ago, 
th. u v., u ii.'t 111. my appHiants tor the 
j'.i). > 1. ■ tii. li, perhaiis. the market has 
in;,':.!^.' Jli spite oi the shameful 

nr.:\''~.< ■■- • . si'.-- niiid'Jtt-.. blatant incom- 
pi-ti ;n ! , 1 1! ipl.ii <-iicy, and lack of organ- 
i-iu-; povMi -.^hich ire daily attributed to 
lis ;iii-l li.':i' whi', h chidingv we endeav- 
nlU ti: ]>!■!!;: \\i- .ife fiecHining tu see 



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27 JANUARY i.j4i 



War Sltudli' 



602 



our way througli. It looks as it we weif 
in for a very bad time, but provided wc 
all stand to^tlher. and provided wc throw 
in the last spasm of our strength, it also 
looks, more than it ever did before, as 
if we were going to win. 

\\'Tiile facing Germany and Italy here 
and in the Nile Valley we have never had 
any power to provide effect i\tly for the 
defence of the Far East. M\ whole argu- 
ni«nt so far has led up to that point. It 
may be that this or that might have been 
done which was not done, but we have 
never been able to provide effectively for 
the defence of the Far Ivast against an 
attack by Japan. It ha.s been the policy 
of the Cabinet at almost all costs to avoid 
embroilment with Japan until we were 
sure that the United States would also be 
engagied. We even had to stoop, as the 
House will remember, when we were at 
our very weakest point, to close the Burma 
Road for some months. I remember that 
some of our present critics were very 
angry about it, but we had to do it. 
There never has been a moment, there 
never could have been a moment, when 
Great Britain or the British Empire, 
single-handed, could fight Germany and 
Italy, could wage the Battle of Britain, 
the Battle of the Atlantic and the Battle 
of the Middle East — and at the same time- 
stand thoroughly prepared in Burma, the 
Malay Peninsula, and generally in the 
Far East against the impact of a vast 
military Empire like Japan, with more 
than 70 mobile divisions, the third navy 
in the world, a great air force and the 
thrust of 80 or 90 millions of hardy, war- 
like Asiatics. If we had started to 
scatter our forct- o\er these immense 
areas in the Far East, we should have 
been ruined. If we had moved large 
armies of troops urgently needed on the 
war fronts to regions which were not at 
war and might never be at war we .should 
have been altogether wrong. We should 
have cast away the chance, which has 
now become something more than a 
chance, of all of us emerging safely from 
the terrible plight m wfn'ch we have been 
plunged. 

We therefore have .lain — I am putting 
it as buntly as I can — for nearly two years 
under the threat of an attack by Japan 
with which we had no means of coping. 
But as time has passed the mighty Ignited 
States, under the leadership of President 
Roosevelt, from reasons of its own interest 
and safety but also out of chivalrous 
No. 24 



regard for the cause of fnedurri and 
denKK-racy, has drawn ever neiirer to the 
conhnes of the struggle. And now that 
the blow has fallen it doe^ noi f.ili on us 
alone. On the contran', it 
united forces and iinitcd u.iti. 



upon 
which 

luring 
mil 
tvcr 



are unquestionably cajiab!'- <■' 
the stn);;;;lc, of retrieving; 
of prcvcntint,' aiiothi-r sn. 
Ix'irtL; <li-li\'ti<-(l a;;;iin. 

There is ,ui ..umhu. nt with ulii. !i 1 will 
deal a^ I p.- .ilong to pursnc n)\- thein<^. 

It is ^;.wl l.\' Mini<-. " If "'iK' \"" ^''l?' 

orii,ini.-.<'.l till- inunitions produitK^n of this 
.nu:itr\- jnopcrls' and had had .1 Mini tr 
of Pn)dti. (ior\ (and that is n<it .1 oi'>"'''"f» 
which >ho,)ld be dn-niatisol uji-;! rithir 
way) it wciuld have made t viivlhiuj.; .ill 
right, 'llun- would have !v. n .non^h 
for all needs. We should h..vc had 
enough supplies for Russia, eno\i:;li well- 
equipped squadrons and d;\ i-ii'H- to 
defend tlie British Islands, to .-n^t.un tlie 
Miiidlc Ea.st and tn ann the F.ir [•',.i-t 
eff'Ttivtly." But that is really not true. 
As a matter of fact, our munitions output 
is g!i:;uiti<', has tor .s(!nie tunc hou \<Ty 
lar;;e indted, anrl it is boundin.: ::;' ;ii a 
m<v-'t ninnrkatile manniT. In t'l. l,t-t 
ye.ir. io.|T, although we were at •>>.ii c- ■-<> 
m;in\- the;ttres and on so inan\ fi";i:-., we 
h.iv.' prwdnccd more tliari doulilc the 
munitions equipment ot the (.'in'ed States, 
wnii!'. was arniint; heavilw tliouK'i r>f 
cour.-»e a lap fiehind on the road. ibis 
conditirai will naturally be rapidly re- 
moved as the full power of Atnerican 
industry come into full swing. V,ai. Sir, 
in the last si.x months, thank- to the 
energies of Lord Beaverhrook m.l the 
solid spadework done by hi- predecessors 
and the passage of unv^ — lie p.irticul.irly 
a ks nie to say that — [An Hos. ME.\i- 
bkk: " Who did? "]— Lord Beaverhrook; 
I should have said it anyway — our muni- 
tions output has risen in the following 
re.spe(!.>. We are producing more than 
twice as main' far more compile ati'd guns 
ever\- month than we did in the p-ak of 
1917-18 war period, and the curve is ri- 
ing. The guns are inhntely more compli- 
cated. Tank production has doubled in 
the last SIX months Small arms produc- 
tion is more than twice what it was six 
months ago. Filled rounds of ammuni- 
tion have doubled in the last si.x months. 
I could go on with the catalogue, but 
these are not doublings from early very 
small totals, they are doublings from the 
totals we boasted about, as far as we 

C 2 



1966 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



603 



War Situation 



HOrSK OF COMMONS 



War Situation 



[lh<- Pririu Miiiisttr.l 
tlarid. six mmiths a^o. There has betTi 
an iinnn use K-.ip forward. In aircraft 
prodiK li.in thfi- is a steady increase not 
only in thf numbers but also in the size 
and <iuality of the aircraft, though I must 
»ay there has not been all the increase 
which 1 had hoped for. 

But ail this has nothing to do with the 
preparations it was open to us to make 
«n Mala\a and Hurma and generally in 
the Far Kast. The limitiuf^ factor has 
not been troops or even equipment. The 
Imutin.i; factor has been transport, even 
assuming we had wished to take this 
measure and had had this great surplus. 
From the time that this present Govern- 
ment was formed, from the moment it 
was formed I may sav, every scrap of 
shipping we could draw away from our 
vital supply routes, everv U-boat escort 
we could divert from the Battle of the 
Atlantic , has been busy to the utmost 
capacity to rarrv troops." tanks and muni- 
tions from this I>lan(l to the F.ast. There 
has l)een a cea.seles.s flow, and as for air- 
craft they have not only been moved 
by sea but by every route, some very 
dangerous and costly routes, to the 
Eastern battlefields. ' The decision was 
taken. a> I have explained, to make our 
contribution to Russia, to try to beat 
Komnnl and to form a stronger front 
from the Levant to the Caspian. It 
followed from that decision that it was in 
our pu\x(, only to make a moderate and 
partial pro\i>ioii in the Far East against 
the h>potlutical danger of a Japanese 
onslaught. Si.vty thousand men. indeed, 
were ( onceiitrated at Singapore, but pri- 
ority in modern aircraft, in tanks, and in 
anu-aircrafi and anti tank artillery was 
ac<ordcd to the Nile Valley. 

l-or this dt■ci^ion in its brcvad strategic 
aspe.t-.. ;uh1 a]^>() in its diplomatic f>olicy 
in rii^anl to Ru>sia, I take the fullest 
personal rc'sjwnsibility. If we have 
handled onr resources wrongly, no one is 
so nil!, h to blame as me. If we have not 
got iarce nuKlern air forces and tanks in 
But nil and Malaya to-night no one is 
more a., oiimabie "than I am. Why then 
should 1 l)f called upon to pick out scape- 
goats, to throw thi- blame on generals or 
airmen or sailors? Why, then, should 
I 1:h" callwl upon to drive away loyal and 
trusti'd colleaguis and friends' to appease 
the clamour of certain .sections of the 
British and Australian Press, or in order 
to take the edge off our reverses in 



604 



Malaya and the Far East, and the punish- 
ment which we have yet to take there? 
I would In ,i>tiamed to do such a thing 
at sucli a time, and if I were capable of 
doiiii.; it, hiii.vc me, T should be incapable 
of reiideiing this country or this House 
any further service. 

] say that without in the slightest degree 
seeking to relieve myself from my duties 
and responsil)ility to endeavour to make 
continual improvements in Ministerial 
positions. It is the duty of every Prime 
Minister to the House, but we have to 
be quite sure that they are improvements 
in every case, and not only in every case 
but in the setting. I could not possibly 
descend to, as the German radio re- 
peatedly credits me with, an attempt to 
get out of difficulties in which I really bear 
the main load by offering up scapegoats 
to public displeasure. Many people, many 
very well-meaning people, begin their 
criticisms and articles by saying, " Of 
course, we are all in favour of the Prime 
Minister because he has the people l:)ehind 
him. Hut what about the muddles made 
by this or that Department; what about 
that general or this Minister? " But I 
am the man that Parliament and the 
nation have got to blame for the general 
way in which they are served, and 1 can- 
not serve them etlectively unless, in spite 
of all that has gone wrong, and that is 
going to go wrong, I have their trust and 
faithful aid. 

1 must linger for a moment on our 
politkal affairs, l)ecause we are conduct- 
ing the war on the basis of a full de- 
incKracy and a free Press, and that is an 
attempt which has not been made before 
in such ciicunistaiue:,. A variety of 
attacks are made upon the composition of 
the Government. It is said that it is 
loniiid ii{x>n a party and political basis. 
But io is the House of Commons. It is 
silly to extol the Parliamentary system 
and then, in the next breath, to say, 
" Away with partj' and away with 
politics." From one quarter I am told 
that the leaders of the Labour party ought 
to be dismissed from the Cabinet. This 
would be a return to party Government 
pure and simple. From opj"»osite quartets 
it is said that no one who approved of 
Munich .^hoult! be allowed to hold ofhce. 
To do that would be to cast a reflection 
upon the great majority of the nation at 
that time, and also to deny the strongest 
party in the House any proportionate 
share in the National Government, which 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



1967 



605 



Wf Situation 



Wmf SituaHo* 



«o6 



again, in turn, might cause inconvenience. 
Even mv litjht hon. Friend the leader of 
the Liht ral {>art\'— [An HoK. MEMBER : 
" Who is he? "]— the Secretary of State 
for Air, whose help to-day I value so 
much and with whom, as a Ufelong friend, 
it is a pleasure to work, even he has not 
escapeti unscathed. If I were to show 
the slightest weakness in dealing with 
thest> opposite forms of criticism, not only 
should I deprive my-elf of loyal and ex- 
perienct-d colleat^Mu.-, but I should destroy 
the National Govt riimcnt and rupture the 
war-time unity of I'arliament itself. 

Other attacks are directed against in- 

liividital AI;!\i-ter->. I have been urged 

!•> rn.ik, u .A.nrplc of the Chancellor of 

till' Diuhv c.\ Lancaster, who is now re^ 

tu;-r.in^ fiom his mission in the Far East. 

Thu-. \\v would be made to bear the 

blame f. .r our misfortunes. The position 

of thr Ch,u;cf'l!or of the Duchy of Lan- 

' i of the Council which 

'.Ml ted to form at Singa- 

'•'•r<d obsi)lete by the de- 

i r. t. iml with the President 

-(.t up a Supreme 

,in ti-iiting zone in 

! lu -.\ ,.i<ic lonceptioii ol 

■■iiiiiuindt ! !■ ih.;t. under the 

<iu I ,. \.. i;u:uul- hi' ^-cfvc-, 

hi !. I ot ,',',1 aiitiiorilie.-- in 

''■■ ' ■ ' iiim. Ihi:? would 



!t; 

«1. ; 
\ 

V. .; 

I.i: . 



,1- 



n!i;. li u..r<. t 
voi:r wis!ie> 

The out?tandu 
tlie Houx- >hoiil< 
tile puq-io- ~ of 



tht 



.■i tin- 

■h.-. 1 

iniialili- 

thtin, " 1 

'•ratifv 



iifion svliii, ii 

j'iiii^THt lit tor 

impending Division 



97 JANUARY i94» 

is whether His Majesty's Govermnent 
were right in giving a marked priority in 
the distribution of the forces and equip- 
ment we could send overseas, to Russia, 
to Libya, and, to a lesser extent, to the 
Levant-Caspian danger front, and 
whether we were right in accepting, for 
the time being, a far lower standard of 
forces and equipment for the Far East 
than for these other theatres. The first 
obvious fact is that the Far Eastern 
theatre was at peace and that the oth* 
theatres were in violent or imminent war. 
It would evidently have been a very im- 
provident use of our limited resources — as 
I pointed out earlier—if we had kept large 
masses of troops and equipment spread 
about the immense areas of the Pacific or 
in In>lia, Burma and the Malay Penin- 
sula, standing idle, month by month and 
perhaps vear by year, without any war 
of( iirring. Thus, we should have failed 
in our engagements to Russia, which has 
meanwhile 'Struck stich staggering blows 
at the Gorman Army, and we should have 
lost the battle in Cvrenaica. which we 
have not yet won, and we might no%v be 
ftghtini; (](ftnsi\"elv well inside the 
Ejzvptiau frontier. There is the question 
on whi h the TTous<- should make up its 
mind. We had not the resources to meet 
all the perils and pressures that came 
upon us. 

But thi< quc-tion, mtious and large as it 
is by itM-lf. (anuot Ix- whollv decided 
without some attempt to an>\ver the 
further question — what was the likelihood 
of the Far F.astern tlu.iln- be^.i^ thrown 
into war h\- a Japanese attack'' 1 have 
( vpiai'iecj how ven," (Ulicat< Iv we vva!k<-d, 
.'i!(l iiow painful it was at times, how very 
lareful 1 w,is evers" time that we -hould 
not he exp-,):, kJ bin.;!ehandi (! to this 
iiii-l o;"ht vvhiih we Wt re iitterl\- incapable 
..:. But it >ee!in<l iM.'tioiia! to 
i'i.it in the la-^t ^^.ix months — which 
1- v-iiii ! a:n prin< ij'ally tieahiiL; with — 
thi- I ipane-<-, having thrown av. ,t\- their 
(ij>p'.r'i:iiii\- of att.ukini; u-. in the 
..i.tiinn; I't lo^o, wlirii wt,' Were >o much 
N'.'.ikii so mui h ]■■-■- will-armed. .ii\il all 
aloMi-. -h'.ii!<l ,ti ihi- peiitKl ha\'e pluir.'ed 
i:it<> ,i <lf -.perate struuj^le a.cain>t tlir (.,m- 
hin. li l-Mrc <,f the Bniish ICn.inr. and 
i'i< I -utrd States Neverthel» -s. nations. 
like individtials, commit irrati<uiai acts, 
•;! th<r<; were forces at work in j.ipan, 
'.:•■'. nt. niiiriKinus, fanatical and ex- 
plosive fortes, which no one could 
measure. 



' ii 


WUn t)(; 


:j!.'.nes 


:u:iK 


>; = - --li. 


ir u Is. 


uiiic 


h \s<.i; 


U be 


Hid 


i:av<- 


t<' W 


.1 ~ 


(uir-s- 


-Wire 


1;; i\: 


:'.'■ i\i>\\ 


.■! t.h- 



1968 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



607 



War Situation 



HOUSE OF COMMONS 



War SituatioM 



608 



On the f)ther hand, the probability, 
since th. Atlantic Conffionce, at which I 
discusM'd thf-se matters with Mr. Roose- 
velt, that thf United States, even if not 
hcr><lf attacked, would come into a^war 
ill the Far Hast, and thus make final 
victorv sure, seemed to allay some of these 
anxieties, ("liat expatation has not been 
falj-iiied by the events. It fortified our 
British dteision to use our limited re- 
.sources on the actiial fighting fronts. As 
time went on, one had greater assurance 
that if Japan ran amok in the Pacific, 
we should not fight alone. It must also 
lie n in- ::i!Hr<-<l thnt over the whole of the 
r ! ihi -1 en,- l)roo(]<-d the great power of 
the rnited States FJeet, (oncentrated at 
Hawaii It seemed very unlikely tfiat 
Japan would attempt the distant invasion 
»>f the Malay Peninsula, the assault upon 
Singapore, and the attack upon the Dutch 
Fast Indie-, while leaving b<>hind them 
in their rear this great American Fleet 
However to strengthen the position as the 
situation s<x-med to intensify we sent the 
" Prince of Wales " and the " Repul.se " 
to form t!u' .sp<-ar-point of the consider- 
able battle forces which we felt ourselves 
at length .ibie to form in the Indian 
Ocean. We reinforced Singapore to a 
considerable extent and Hong Kong to the 
extent which we were advised would be 
sufficient to hold the island for a long 
lime. Beside^ this in minor \^,^\■•^ w. 



took wl-ai prii.n.ti. 

On ,7t!l Hrrrniix I 
-uiiHt-n ittai k. .: 



>p< !1 to l: 



their 



.t Wa- 

lime luiiij. 



f..r, 



the seas, a local command of the air which 
will render their expulsion and destruction 
a matter of considerable time and exertion. 

Here I must point out a very simple 
strategic truth. If there are 1,000 islands 
and 100 valuable military key points and 
you put 1,000 men on every one of them 
or whatever it may be, the Power that 
has the command of the sea and carries 
with it the local command of the air, can 
go around to every one of these places in 
turn, destroy or capture their garrisons, 
ravage and pillage them, ensconce them- 
selves wherever they think fit, and then 
pass on with their circus to the next place. 
It would be vain to suppose that such an 
attack could be met by local defence. 
You might disperse 1,000,000 men over 
the>e immense areas and yet only provide 
more prey to (he dominant Power. On 
the other hand, these conditions will be 
reversed when the balance of sea power 
and air power changes, as it will surely 
change. 

Such is the phase of the Pacific war 
into which we have now entere<l I can- 
not tell how long it will last. All I can 
teli the House it that it will be attended by 
ver\- iieavy puni-shment which we shall 
have to ' :v,!ur<', ruui that piesently, if we 
I -,ii.! ju-t now about the 



perse V. it 

Kiissi.ii; tioiit, th 

odier it ■. That 

" ' . .I'.iselves to 

; place has I 

, ... . Hu- ultimate 



M(i\l(i( il 



boot will be on the 
, win' we should not 
it rattled bciause this 
■en capture<i. because, 
pow( r of th<- I'nited 
! luouuht to b. ar, the 
\i!| be broUL'ht into play, 
orward rt u •<■:.-■. !.-..>ly to 
,)1, pr.Ai.liil tll.'.l we per 
tisat »<■ li.L;hl ^^;th ih. 
1 Ifii.ii it\-, ati:] provided, 
remain united. 

liki to e\prr-N. in the 



to expri 



(Iniir.itiori o! 

(|iia!it\ witli 
.\nny. undt r 
-ti(l l)rilli<uitl_\ 

i.!-. t'l, hor<i.-- 
Iuirl<-1 .:i,iin-' 



t n:;. .1 St.,;.': 
M-(!her, No, 
!!i the iiauie oj 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



1969 



'99 ^"' ^*^*'''*^ 

the House, to the Dutch, who, in the air 
and with theif submarines, their surface 
craft, and their solid fighting troop, are 
playing one of the main parts m the 
struggui now going on in the Malaysian 
Archipelago. 

We have to turn our eyes for a moment 
to the hard-fought battle which is raging 
upon the approaches to Singapore and m 
the Malay Peninsula. I am not going 
to make any forecast about that now, ex- 
cept that it will be fought to the last inch 
by the British, Australian and Indian 
troops, which are in the line together, and 
which have been very considerably rem- 
forced. The hon. Member for the Eye 
Division of Suffolk (Mr. Granville) had a 
very sound military id^i the other day, 
when he pointed out the importance of 
sending rcmforcements of aircraft to assist 
our ground forces at Singapore and in 
Burma. I entirely agree with him. In 
fact, we anticipated his suggestion. Before 
I left for the United States, on I2th Decem- 
ber, the moment, that is to say, when the 
situation in Singapore and Pearl Harbour 
had disclosed itself, it was possible to make 
a swift redistribution of our Forces. The 
moment was favourable. General Auch- 
inleck was making headway in Cyrenaica; 
the Russian front not only stood unbroken 
but had begun the advance in a magnifi- 
cent counter-attack, and we were able to 
order a large number of measures, which 
there is no need to elaborate, but whith 
will be capable of being judged by their 
results as the next few weeks and the next 
few months unfold in the Far Ea.>.t. 



War SitMoHon 



6io 



When I reached the I'nitui States, 
accompanied by our principal officeri, and 
large technical staffs, further impt)rt:int 
steps were taken by the President, with 
my cordial assent, and with tiie best 
technical advise we could obtain, to move 
from many directions everythin;^ that 
ships could carrj' and all air power that 
could be Hown transported and serviced 
to suitable points. The House would be 
very ill-advised to suppose that the st-vtri 
weeks which have passed since 7th 
December have been weekj> of apathy and 
indecision for the English-speaking world. 
Odd as it may seem quite a lot has been 
going on. Hut we mu^t not nourish or 
indulge light and extravagant hopes or 
suppose that the advantages which the 
enemy have gained can soon or easily be 
taken from him. However, to sum up 
%Jb»d and.t^q ^o(^ toggtJiec^ in sgi^jf ^ 



«7 JANUARY .1942 

the many tragedies past and future, aod 
with all pity tor those ^ho hare suffered 
and will suffer, I must profess my pro- 
found thankfulness for what has happened 
throughout the whole world in the last two 
months. 

I now turn lor a short space— I hope I 
am not unduly wearying the House, but I 
feel that the war has become so wide that 
there are many aspects that must be 
regarded—to the question of the organisa- 
tion, the international, inter-Alhed or 
iuter-United Nations organisation, which 
must be developed to meet the fact that 
we are a vast confederacy. To hear some 
people talk, however, one would think 
that the way to win the war is to miake 
sure that every Power contributing armed 
forces and every branch of these armed 
forces is represented on all the coimcils 
and organisations which have to be set up, 
and that everybody is fully consulted 
before anything is done. That is in fact 
the most sure way to lose a war. You 
have to be aware of tiie well-known danger 
of having " more harness than horse," to 
quote a homely expression. Action to be 
successful must rest in the fewest number 
of hands possible. Nevertheless, now that 
we are working in the closest partnership 
with the Inited States and have also to 
consider our Alliance with Russia and 
with China, as well as the tonds which 
unite us with the rest of the 26 United 
Nations and with our Dominions, it is 
evident tliat our system must become far 
iT.oi;- cornpU-x than heretofore. 

1 had many discussions with the F'resi- 
dent upon the .Xnglo-American war direc- 
tion, t specially as it affect., this war 
against japan, to which Rns.sia is not yet 
a partv^ Tlic physical and geographical 
difficulties ot finding a common working 
centre for the leaders of nations and the 
great staff^ of nations wlinh cover the 
whole L'lobc ATv insuperable. Whatever 
plan IS rn.uie will be open to criticism and 
man\' \alid ol)Jectlon^. Tlurc is no solu- 
tion th.it .an t>e fuiiud where the war can 
be .liMU-.^.-d in. ID d;iy to day fully by all 
the le;?d!!ig militarN' and political aothori- 
ti.'. ,.Mh erned. ! have, liowxver, arranged 
with l're^idellt Roo>eselt tiiat there should 
he a bo<ly m 'Washington called the Com- 
biiietl Chiefs of the Staff Connniltee, con- 
si-ting of the three United States Chiefs 
of the Stall, men of the highest di^tinc- 
tion, and three high otliccrs representing 
and acting under the general instructions 



1970 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



6n 



War SiiuattoH 



HOUSE OF CX>MMONS 



Wmr SittuMom 



9xa 



[Thf Prime Minister.] 
of the British Chiefs of the Staff Com- 
mittet' ill London. This body will advise 
thf PR'.^idont, and in the event of diver- 
gfnr«> of vit'W between the British and 
Amcritun Chiefs of the Staff or their 
representatives, the difference must be ad- 
justed by personal agreement between 
him and me as representing our respective 
countries. We must also concert together 
the close-^t as.'^fKiation with Premier Stalin 
and (loin raiissinn) Chiang Kai-Shek as 
wcil .i> with the rest of the Allied and 
Associ:ilt<l Powers. We shall, of course, 
also remain in the closest touch with one 
anoflicr on all important questions of 
policy 

!n order to wage the war effectively 
nL'.iiii^t japan, it was agreed that I 
sIkh'M ]"ropose to tho.-e cotirerned the 
-ettiiKM'ii of a Pacifu- Council in London, 
on (he Ministerial plane, comprising Great 
Britain, \ii-tralia. New Zealand and the 
Diitrh C,n\(rnmeiit. ,^s«isted by the 
British Chit fs of the Staff and the great 
staff> ort;.uiisitions beneath them, I was 
to trv to form and focu- a united view. 
This w.iiilil < iial>lc the British Common- 
Wf.ihh ;,> ;i( t as a whole and form part 
of Ti!:ip- pI.mi- whif-h are at present far 
ad\MM.e'! for r.'.ll.ihorttio'i at the appro- 
priate I«viK ill thi- -pheres of defence. 
foreii;ii Cnr- .in.l .>iM->p]\-. Thus the 
unitrd \ . ■.>. -.f tfic Britis!) Commonwealth 
and thr Dui, h woul'l he transmitted, at 
first, on the Chiefs of the Staff level, to 
f t'u- St.iff Com- 
i""ton. Ill the 
t'vi CM thi rnemhers 

onoot-.. (li.>seti- 




his reply. I am not, therefore, in a pooj. 
lion to-day to armounce, as I had hap«A, 
the definite and final arrangements for Qm 
Pacific Council. 

I should like to say, however, that 
imderlying these structural arrangement 
are some very practical and simple fawis 
upon which there is full agreement. The 
Supreme Commander has assumed control 
of the fighting areas in the South-West 
Pacific called the " A.B.D.A. " area— 
A . B . D. A — called after the countries 
which are involved, not the countries 
which are in the area but the countries 
which are involved in that area, namely, 
America, Britain, Dutch and Australasia. 
We do not propose to burden the Supreme 
Commander witfi frequent instructions. 
He has hi^ general orders, and he has 
addressed himself with extraordinary 
buoyancy to his most dif&cult task, and 
President Roosevelt and I, representing, 
f.>r my pnrt, the British Government, are 
detirniined that he shall have a chance 
and a free hand to carry it out. The 
action in the Straits of Macassar under- 
takei) by forces assigned to this area 
app.ircntly has had verj' considerable 
stKees^, of the full extent of which I am 
not \i t advised. The manner in which 
«.>i.ni'r,d Wavell took up his task, the 
sj). (.1 wall whith he ha.^ tlown from place 
to place, ilie telegram^, which he has sent 
lii-.-ifibinj; the methods by which he was 
i;iappliii^ With the situation and the form- 
infj ol tile ( enlral organism which was 
liiidid to cieai with it— ail this has made 
;i iiiti-l ;a\oiirabie iniprea_-,ion upon the 
hif;li oliiurs, military and poiilicaJ, whom 
I nut in the L'luled State.-j, This is all 
etjiii-; oil. (Mir duty, upon wiiii,ii we have 
t>(.vii I ■- iii.-la!iil_\' eiigagf'd ior some lirue, 
is I., p.i.-o leiuioreenieiu? oi every kind, 
<.-pi' i.iti\' air, inXu the new war zone, from 
iMiv ijuarler and by (very ineaua, with 
tlie liliiiost .".peed. 

Ill i.jiiir to I .Ktend the -)>lein oi unified 
i <..,ii.i. Hti \siiiiii h...-. iKfti set up in the 
■ .\.l*.l >,.-\." .in.;- thai i?. to sa>', the 
\<.l I'atilii — wiieie th.e actual 
1- ;-'oiii< oil. in order to extend 
tli.il ■,-iri:; 1. 1 ail ar^•,(^> ill wliii.!, the 
iMr< I ■ o! i:.'i!c than one oi the I'liiied 
.\.iii.in^ \k< aiiM- th.d is the term we have 
.i-loMN..! will in ..juralint:, the i';a.stvv.ird 
a}ipin.nle- t<. .xu-tralia dwd New Zealand 
h.nt hi t'!i -t\!'d liie An/.ic ana, and are 
under liiitcd State- eoiumand. the com- 
nniuieatioiis lietween the Anzac area and 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



1971 



6x$ r«r SUuaUon tf JANUARY 1942 

America are a United States responsibility, 
whUe the communications across the 
Indian Ocean and from India remain a 
British responsibility. All this is now work- 
ing, while the larger constitutional, or semi- 
constitutional, discussions and structural 
arrangements are being elaborated by tde- 
Hrams passing to and wo between so many 
Governments. AH this is now working 
fciBy and actively from hour to hour, and 
it must not. therefore, be supposed that 
any necessary military action has been 
hfOd up pending the larger structiual 
arrangements which I have mentioned. 

Now I come to the question of our own 
Empire or Commonwealth of Nations. 
The fact that Australia and New Zealand 
are in the immediate danger zone rein- 
forces the demand that they should be 
represented in the War Cabinet of Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland. We have . 
always been ready to form an Imperial 
War Cabinet containing the Prime Minis- 
iets of the four Dominions. Whenever 
any of them have come here they have 
taken their seats at our table as a matter 
of course. Unhappily, it has not been 
possible to get them all here together ?.t 
once. General Smuts may not be able to 
come over from South Africa, and Mr. 
Mackenzie King could unfortunately stay 
only for a short time. But Mr. Fraser 
was with us, and it was a great pleasure 
to have him. and we had a three months' 
visit from Mr. Monzies, which was also 
a great success, and we were all very 
sorry when his most vahiable knowledge 
of our affairs and the war position, and 
his exceptional abilities, were lost. For 
the last three months we have had Sir 
Earle Page representing the Common- 
wealth Government at Cabinct.s when war 
matters and Australian matters were under 
distmssioii and aj.so. in similar rircum- 
stancrs upon the Defeui f Commiltee, 
As a matter of t:tct this l!a^ .ilways been 
interpreted in tin- m<)•^t lirnad and elastie 
fashion. The ,-\ii.-tralian (jnvernment 
have now asked .-jieciheally " that an 
accredited rtpresenlative of the Common- 
wealth Government should have the right 
to be heard in the War Cabinet in the 
formulation and the direction of policy." 
We have of course agreed to this. New 
Zealand feels bound to ask for similar 
representation, and the same facilities, will 
of course be available to Canada and 
South Africa. 1 he presence at the Cabinet 
table of Dominion representatives who 
have no power to take decisions and can 



War Sititatum 



614 



only report to their Governments evidently 
raises some serious problems but none, I 
trust, which caimot be got over with good 
will. It must not, however, be supposed 
that in any circumstances the presence of 
Dominion representatives for certain pur- 
j>oses could m any way affect the collec- 
tive responsibility of His Majesty's Ser- 
vants in Great Britain to Crown and 
Parliament. 

I am sure we all sympathise with our 
kith and kin in Australia now that the 
shield of British and American sea power 
has, for the time being, been withdrawn 
from them so unexpectedly and so tragi- 
cally and now that hostile bombers may 
soon be within range of Australian shoteS^'- 
We shall not put any obstacle to tfci« 
return of the splendid Australian trooj^ 
who volunteered for Imperial service to 
defend their own homeland or whatever 
part of the Pacific theatre may be thought 
most expedient. We are taking many 
measures in conjunction with the United 
States to increase the security of Australia 
and New Zealand and to send them rein- 
forcements, arms and equipment by the 
shortest and best routes. 1 always hesi- 
tate to express opinions about the future, 
because thiujLjs turn out so \er>- oddly, 
but I will go so far as to sav that it m.iy 
be that the fapane.M-, whose game i^ wliat 
1 may rail " to nviks' hell while the .-un 
shines," are more likelv to oeiupv the.m- 
seives in se> urinj,' their litli pri/i- in tlu- 
Philippine-, tile L)ut<. h V„,>< liulu- orl 
the .Malawm .Ai. hipel,)g.i .'IkI hi . ■ : i 1 
island b.i^e,-^ for (i< Icnsive purpo '■■ ' .1 
att;e k M'hi' h ir, (■•l)\i<iii:.'\' < fuu!; 
them ai iv> t.M'e;a i!i-ta!.i . d !; 
nieudfiii- 'iii-:,i-:clil whi.!'. v. iii ■ '.i'a: ..: .k-h^-- 
the futurr in ni\2 and i'<.}.v -^'i H<)N. 
MtMlu-.u: ' 104} .uid 104s? " Ni'. I di> 
not think we i.tii -tret- ii our \ ie\\ - I- ','';!'i 
tlii'-r iI.iN ~. inil. ai;.un, v.e 



ini;-t >i e 
how s\e t^o. I thmk tiie\' aie inia ii in-'p 
like'y t" be atraii.L;!U,t; tlu hi-iIm .- in \\«--i. 
di>tri<-t.^ \shi<h tiii\- ha\ t !ii ,1 la ir.- 
likely to take than m imd. itak-, .1 -e:>'i!- 
ma.-b invasion of Au-traiia. That would 
seem to be a very ambitious overseas 
operation for Japan to undertake in the 
precarious and limited in'er\-.d before the 



IJritish and Anurii 
they must eertainh i 
new building tb 
either rea-sonv- 
mand of the 1',. iw 
everything iti hiiman 



r 



- regain — a> 

ilirough the 

,'. and for 

ble com- 

,'fnwev.r, 

that we '.\n 



do to help Auatr.dia. or pcr-.uide ,\ineri<:a - 



1972 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



615 



War Situation 



HOUSE OF COMMONS 



War Situation 



616 



to do, we will do; and meanwhile I trust 
that rtpro.ichL-ii and recriminations of all 
kinds will be avoided, and that il any 
are niadi.', we in Britain will not take part 
in them. 

Let me, in conclusion, return to the ter- 
rific changes which have occurrtxJ in our 
affairs during the last few months and 
particularly in the last few weeks. We 
have to consider the prospects of the war 
in 1942 and also in 1943, and. as I said 
just now, it is not useful to look further 
ahead than that. The moment that the 
United States was set upon and attacked 
by japan. Germany and Italy— that is to 
say, within a few days of December 7, 
1941 — I was sure it was my duty to cross 
the Atlantic and establisli the closest pos- 
sible relationship with the President and 
Government of the United States, and also 
to de\(lop the closest contacts, personal 
and professional, betwt>en the I^ritish 
Chiefs of Staff and their trans-Atlantic 
deputies, and with the American Chiefs of 
Staff who were there to meet them. 

Having crossed the Atlantic, it was 
plainly my duty to visit the great 
Dominion of Canada. The House will 
have read with admiration and deep 
intertst the speech made by the Prime 
Mini-ter of Canada yesterday on Canada's 
i:reat and growing contribution to the 
common cause in men, in money, and 
in materials. A notable part of that con- 
trihutinn is the litiancial offer which the 
CaMidiaii (".(ivcrnrnent ha\c made to this 
conntr\-. The sum involved in oik' billion 
Canadian dnllir^, about (jjs, 000,000. I 
kiK.w the !li':'-r wil'i wi-h nic to iimvi-y 
tn thi- (..'A ( I !i;:u at of ( aiiada our liv<!\- 
ij'pir. i.itioii di tlnir limi-l\- aiul most 
^(■.I'lii;,- olv.r. Jt i- uiu.ju.dji'd in its 
-. .ir ill til.' wlu'lv hi--iiir>' ut the Brit!-.h 
l.!i:i!iri\ .iIk] It ]> .1 (iiuvinung pruof. ol 
'Av (i< li nr.iMitioii of C'.Uiacia to niai<r lu-r 
:n,'.\!in!Mn (.oatrilMitiort towards the >uc- 
if~--iii! proMA utiiin of tin war. 

!>':riii._; tho-i tlinr nvih'k. uiii. b I -p< tit 
iii Mr. Kt.(i-.-\i ir-> hoiiii- an.l laimK . I 
.-; .r)!:-!u'a \sitli hint ri!atn>;,... ;i>'t <■:,];- .<i 
I ')u;:.' A -!iij>. biii, i iliiak 1 iiiav .-<i\'. lu 
friiii'I-liip. \Vr lai; .-.av aiuthin;.; to ' .n h. 
olh'.T. h"Wr\-(r painful. W lim wi [vnu-.i 
he wniii;; ii^y hand, .sa\;)!-, " \\i- vvill 
tsciit this thmui'li •.. !!),■ bilter end, wliat- 
c\cr the (ci-t iiM\- h.-." I'alntid him ii->-- 
th»' ,i.;i'^,,uiti' atnl 'aithirtn uniiiohih-i il 
gii^antic p<i\srr ,,', thr p..-npl._- ,.f the Cuit. ij 



States, canning with them in their life and 
cieath struggle the entire, or almost the 
entire. Western hemisphere. 

At Washington, we and our combined 
staffb surveyed the entire scene of the war, 
and we reached a number <^f important 
practical decisions. Some of them affect 
future operations and cannot, of course, 
l>e mentioned, but others have been made 
public by declaration or by events. The 
vanguard of an American Army has 
already arrived in the United Kingdom. 
Ver>- considerable forces are following as 
opportimity may serve. These forces will 
take their station in the British Isles and 
face with us whatever is comirtg our way. 
They impart a freedom of movement to all 
forces in the British Isles greater than we 
could otherwise have possessed. Numerous 
United States fighter and bomJ^er squad- 
rons will also take part in the defence o^ 
Britain and in the ever-increa.sing 
bombing offen-i\'e a< liiist Germany. 
The I'nited States Navy is linked 
in the mo.st intimate tmion with 
the Admiralty, both in the Atlantic 
and the Pacific. We shall plan our Naval 
moves together as if we svcre literally one 
people. 

In the ne.xt place, we fr,rmed this league 
of 26 United Nations in which the prin- 
< ipal partners at the prev«Tit time are 
Gnat Britain and the British Kmpire, the 

Uiiited Stat. .-, the Union of Sex i.ilist Soviet 
Ki publics of Ku.<sia. and the Kepiiblic of 
China, tnL,'ether with the <f out hearted 
pit. h-, atid the represent, iti\t's of the re.>t 
of the 2h powers. This Union is based 
<.;i the priueiples of the -\i!antic Charter. 
It ..ini-. at the (ie-trui tion of Hitlerism in 
;,i'i 'I- f'Tins and inanifestatiotis in every 
ii.i::.r "f th.e '.;lol)e. We will march for 
vvar-1 together until ev« r\' vestige of thi-j 
\in;iin\' lias been e.\tirpat< (i from the lift- 
ol the'woric!. 

ThitdiN', as 1 li i\c I \ji!,m:u il at some 
]■ nuth, \\e addn-ssed ourseh'es to the war 
acai'i-t Japan and to the nva-ure- to In- 
t.ike'i to <lefend .-Xu-tr.dia, X' w /• .ihui ',, 
the Netlietluids l'"..i-t Indie-, M.ilaya, 
Pairni.i, ;iMd India a^Miiist J.it>iMi< >. ,it<,i( !; 
or iu%a--ion. 

!• Mirtiiiw v,e h.ive e^taMi~hed a vast 
. oiinno;) 1' .! Ill \se ipit;i~ ;ind minutions, 
of r.iw ••! • r> il- ,iiui oi shipjiim,', the out- 
lii)', of u';:, '1 :i,t- ;>i ( n -it forth in a -< rics 
ol iiii!iior.t;ii|.i '.shi\}i I h,!\e itnlialled 
with th" I're-'il.;!! ] had a talk with 
fiiai la -t nu:h! ■■:. lii'- telephone, as a result 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



1973 



617 War Situation ij JANUARY 1943 

of which an announcement has been made 
in the early hours of this morning in the 
United States, and I have a White Paper 
for the House which will be available, I 
think, in a very short time. Many people 
have been staggered by the figures of 
prospective American output of war 
weapons which the President announced 
to Congress, and the Germans have 
affected to regard them with incredulity. 
I can only. say that I^rd Beaverbrook 
iind I were made acquainted beforehand 
with all the bases upon which these colos- 
sal programmes were founded, and that I 
myself heard President Roosevelt confide 
their specific tasks to the chiefs of 
American industry and I heard these men 
iccept their procfigious ta-sks and declare 
that they would and could fulfil them. 
Most important of all is the multipli- 
> ntion of our joint tonnage at sea. The 
Aniorican programmes were already vast, 
■f h»y h.ive ))een inrreasrcl in the propor- 
tion of TOO to nearly ifx). If thev are 
computed, as completed I bt-licvo they 
will he, \vc shall be able to mo\-e acros.s 
the o-ean spaces in 1043 two, thrf"° or 
even four times as laref annir-s as the 
considerable forces we .ire able to handle 
It SC.-1 at the present time. 

I expect — and I have mnde no s<cr>t 
of it -that we shall both of us re. ei\<- 
severe iU-iis.itje at the hands of the 
• Japanes" in 10^2, !)iit I believe we shall 
ircsr-nflv ret'ain tin- n.ival rf)mm<ind of 
th.- I'.i; ifir itirl l)e;.;in to fst,i!)h"sh an affec- 
tive- supf-riority in the air, and then later 
on. wit!i the great basic areas in 
Au.^tr,il.i>ia, in India and in the Dutrh 
Flast Indies, we shall b" able to set about 
our task in good style in 1043- ^< i^ no 
doubt true that the defeat of Jap-i'i will 
not necessarily entail the defeat of Hitler, 
whereas the defeat of Hitler would <iiable 
the whole forces of the united nations to 
be conrentrated upon the defeat of Jap.in. 
Hut fix re i^ no .j'ustiun of r'-e.irdiiK' the 
war in the P.i< iti< as. a secondary op.ra 
tion. The orilv limitation .ippliecl to it- 
visoroiK proM-i ntion will be the shippiiii: 
available at anv f,'iven time 

it i.-. !no?,t impijrtant that wv should not 
overlook the enormous contribution of 
Chiud to this >trug^!e for world freedom 
and democracy. I{ there is any lesson 
I h,ave brought ba< k from the United 
Statc^ that I < onld ixpress in one word, 
it would be • ( hina '■ f That is in all 
their minds. When we f.el the sharp 
military qualities of the Japltnese soMk ry 



War Stluation 



618 



in contact with our own troops, although 
of course very few have as yet been en- 
gaged, we must remember that China, 
ill-armed or half -armed, has, for four and 
a half years, single handed, under its 
glorious leader Chiang Kai-shek, with- 
stood the main fury ot Japan. We shall 
pursue the struggle band in hand with 
China, and do ever5^hing in our power 
to give them arms and supplies, which is 
all they need to vanquish the invaders of 
their native soil and play a magnificent 
part in the general forward movement of 
the United Nations. 

Although I feel the broadening swell of 
victory and liberation bearing us and ail 
the tortured peoples onwards safely to the 
final goal, I must confess to feeling the 
weight of . the war upon me even more 
than in the tremenilous summer days of 
IQ40. There are so many fronts which 
are open, so many vulnerable points to 
defend, so many inevitable misfortunes, 
so many shrill voices raised to take ad- 
vantage, now that we can breathe more 
freely, ol all the turns and twists of war. 
Therefore, 1 feel entitled to come to the 
Houst; of ('oinmoii!-, vvlio-c servant 1 am, 
and ask thcin iiot. to press me to act 
against my cousin n( c and better judg- 
ment and make s<.a[)<.7^oats in order to im- 
pro\c my own po-ition, not to prcas me 
to do the things which may be clamoured 
fur at tile moment but which will not help 
in our war et'tort, but, on the contrary, 
to ^.^ivc Mir th" ir ( ncouiagement and to 
give ine their aid. 1 have never viiitured 
to prediti the future. I stand by my 
orji^inal pro^^rauniic, blood, toil, tears and 
sweat, which i> :iil I have ever ottered, 
to which I adcird, five months later, 
many slujrtconun^s, rmstakes and dis- 
apjKjintmi lit.-.." Hut it is because 1 see 
the light gleatnui^ behuid the clouds and 
br(/adeninf4 on (jur p..ll;, that I make so 
bold now :1^ to (iifnani! 
t. orilidcni e ot thr }](»!.. -!■ 
aii .uldition.il wiMjii I! in 

Uil inil!( li 11 llll 'I! ^. 



.1 (le< laration <>i 
ol < DinuKJUs as 
tin ainioury ol 



Mr. I'clhick- Lawrence lulinburgh, 
Ma^tj : 'llie I'rinir .Mini.-iet lia- drawn, iji 
Jus own inimil.iiil' nunnu, a compre- 
hensive picture ol what ha-, been happen- 
ing all ovi r the world during the last six 
\\eek>> while he lias been away from us, 
an<l ot all tiie di-poMtimis tiiat have beer, 
made for the major tontroi of the war. I 
have no inteati<in of .itn . i| .:;n.; t(j em- 
l•t■!li^h. ^till Ir-.-, ' , -, • 1 ,t piiture. 

Willi 1 p!(i(>o-i itenipt to 



1974 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

EXHIBIT NO. 93 









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London 


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London 


r 


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•M/C- 


Eecord Section 1 
Messafte Center Dates 


DECS 1941 
















See ft 


ifis i; 





EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1975 

EXHIBIT NO. 94 



WAR DEPARTMENT 

WASHINGTON. D. C. 



Room 4D757 
The Pentagon 



18 December 1945 

JdCRANDim FOR MR. iCTTCHELL: 

Pursuant to your request there are inclosed herewith 
the Magic messages from the Japanese Ambassador in 
Washington, transmitting the documents handed to him by 
the Secretary of State on 26 November 1%1. 



15 1^ 
HARJDN DUNCCMBE 

Lt. Col., GSC 



Incls . 




1976 CONGRESSIONAL IN\^STIGATI0N PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



1 


K '•"r-i ; -L . , ton (.lonura) 
■; To; yok/o 

MoreiBber ^t, 1941. 
': i\xrple. ( n, Ush text) 

,1192. (.art 1 or 4) 

if Orftl . 

1' tricil, ^, 

■ "ov^embcr ,.'l, ly^l. 

:i- rf Tfs.-nt Liv-s >r trc ov.r :iBrat cl t. 


^^W 


HF 


■t.t^«.--.i.-t U. ..V, -.::•,.: ,:..., ,..^, b.crc.r.,i., ■• 




K 


rf/eraJ t>c<nt n l.,for-ai -r ( «>x; Ic- jt«r, c.-.nv.T: ., . 


,■ .,f 


^P' 


arilTlnj; ^t a eeUlencnt if ;x><.Bir 1, oi ^t^sti 


'- . re 


\\i''; 




' r 

. Oltt- 




tl- r! ,-ip^. - • . 


:.3 J 

r> tries: 




1 ■ 1 . •■ 


. MS 


ARMY 


Sfr.RFT 






wLuI\l 1 - • -. ... 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1977 

SECRET 



frmn VMixingUm ( I w wur *) 
Toi Takjro 
Mm— b«r U, 1941 
IlirpX* (AacXii^ T«Kt) 
(.tattrmmHj Orgwat) 

#UM. nurt 2 «r 4. 

It 1* b«li»««4 ttalt in our dia«u««loo» »ow 
yrw BT — > !»• >««D ai^* to r«f«r«M« «• th« o«>or*l prlsalplaa 
wilUh MMtitwt* tiM bMla ar • pmrntrntuX ••ttUMnt •«wrla& 
«to aatlr* H^rlfl* *r«a.. teawttly th* J»pUM»M ital)a«Hutor 
))»• HMit** that tha Jkp«ii*»« OvrvrnHnBt la Aaalrou* ot iitm- 
tlasdae Um a om r ara aticoa 41r«ctod toiMurA a eonprahassaiT* 
n4 pmmttmX tmi^lmmnt ia tt« flMifla araat tlMit it would 
te halpftol taw.rd araatlac an ataaai^rc tttror^hlm to tha 
a a aaa a aful aotaaata of tha ooirraraatlciea Lf a taaiporary 
V w^ w a Tl-vvadll* aauld tw agraad opeu to ba ^ eiTfaet ta^la 
tlM aamraraatlau laak&Bg to » yaaeaful ••ttlaaMnxt i th« 
Main* «ar« aastinuiac. Qb ttmmbmr 20 tfaa MpuauM Jriba^aa^ar 
■ I— iiialiata4 t« tfaa taarwtary of Stata ' prapoaada la fg>fa^ to 
'tan^arafT' a aa ao i<aa to ]>a tmkaa raapaatiTalj' hf tba OovaroBaat 
af Jbyaai aM4 Iqr tka OovamaMBt of tha Otltad Stataa. vhloh 
■MLata^aa ara mdaratood t« hKra haan immig/ufi to aootnpiiah 
tba ywrp a a a abava lJtdlaa.tad. 



AMIY SECfiET 



79716 O — 46 — pt. 1( 



1978 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

SECRET 



Toi Takjro 

fun. part S af 4. 

To ta bmtM.mA la ^iiiimm* ••A*. 

Sm O gr wwKn t of t)M aat«« Mft«M mm* 
•MiiMtly A«ai.r«M to ««B«rl)Mtt« to tsto prmmatlmk tmi wmiMf 
toaMw* af p — ■ aa^ vtobiUty Im tlw ^AlTla WWk, «i4 to 
•Lff«r< tnrary initwlty far tlw ■wtlwiiw «t <i«tiMirti«M 
vith tit* Jh^MMM fliiiii— > 4ir«*tad %mmr* — ittn^ atfk * 
tr— 4 ^Maii prttcru* «f y iti t>irwn)i>Mt tlM tmalXIm ••*•*. 
flw wrop^saXft irtittfh wmtvp BVWMwtoA tar tli0 JhiMMMMi JiriMUMMAMF 
«k IiiiMfcii ■> •oatoiJM AMw f— tfw iridLak. Sa tft» cfdadUM 
•f tlila (liMi— r>, MBfUvt vitki tk» f ■iiiwOrt iV&wtpiM 
«kiak f«« » fHrt af to* gimarml m*fi*\mmm% tmtmr »mta€tm»ttm 
mtt to iriO* CMk DUirMiwI 1mm 4m»lmtmA thn* t% «« •mmtMmt • 
Sm 0«««naHMMk af tto \hi^-rl Stota* toiiavM tlHrit Mm siMtlMk 
•r Mwk fr > ya « mmSU ■■« to litaijr t» mbMIMNi to tlW 
ulttaMto ak^JaatlTn «/ iin— lim y«MM aMMr tai^ iwipr 4NhI 
Jaati** te tto ItMiTta *r«w •»* it m«pmM) Itmk tW'Wwi 
•ff art to ■■*> to rMwlT* ««r tUmrnHWM «r I ' iw ia 






s%4Hi;M (»l 




EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



1979 



SECRET 



Iki 'Salqw 

P«arpl». (2aKll>li t«t) 

#U«t. (lartrMNljr «r«Mrt) (fmrt * .f *) 

■11* tWUi •«>>•% ia ▼!«« tiia OortmuMit «rf Vam QBlted StatM •ff«r« 
ftr «)M tf>mtfUmrmUam of th« JaiMMM Gov«niM«t « fOMM «f « te«wl bat 

nmtm * «ni% dHTLng Mar fiirtiMHe' marwrMUoaa. 

»• iOm k«ar«iji raggMttod i«pr«MMi« *u •! fart to Wldg* %tm fMp 
tetMNMi Mr 4r«f% •£ Jm 2I« 1943 «m1 «• Mptmm** dntf t «f S*ptiirib«r 25tk 

*ar — ftWK « "w »i»pr<»*^ to tiw watl i d preUMc «A4«r]arlii« * ami^vhm- 
tdv* 9wi£l» — M-ltmint * IMs jpXmk ooitalas j«>«nl«im» ^MOii^ «l«[i the 
|««4rtiiMa. Ai^pUeaUai tf ttw fwciMMtfJ. ^rlMdplM «td«li m tmen fern** t» 
me MHnn«»««l«M WMuUtate Uim oaljr anad bfuU f<a- imitMDll* tatMmativMO. 

»»J«IA«wi. •• Imp* tti*t la tfat« way pirAgrMs tomurd r«.««*l!»s a watUc aX 
ifcadii tetwa«i «w im> Qvnmmmit* wmjr %• aa:p«dlt««. 




t l3.Hl^4:l (a) 



1980 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



hr ,;. 1 .•;Ci!n, t-vn ("n'—r-n) 
vo'/e.Tb'r 26, 1'<1. 

»im. C jitr -vsly urc-at) ' %rt 1 of 2) 

.'ie:iar»'y irlr«. 

To »>• handled li. '~'>TTn«^Tit 0'1«, 

' trlctly confidential, tentktlT* and without coaml tar-nt . 

>■■3r^^r^l^r 21, )0/,l. 

'AjU'i* of propoecrl b»8l» for »{r««a«nt b«twe«n Um> 'liTlt«d ?tat«« 
and Ja,jftr.. 

t.ectl'^n 1. 

Draft putM»1 -loclsr-.ti on of nollcy. 

Thr '.>OT»mnBnt of the IM t«d - t«t<i« and tha OoTemaent of JaoMi 
both being Kollcitous for i^'t <)«ae« of tbn I'aclflc afflrr- thft t^iPl^ nation- 
al rx^Ilcl«>a arc dlrvotcd toward Ikatln^; and wxi»nMi.rt peaoa throughout th« 
Pacific ar«a, tlmt thf^r i.bt« ro territorial de»lrn In that area, that thay 
nsvr no Vr.tantlor. of tt-rra-trninr other oimtrt'^B or of ualnp nllltar^ totom 
ai. jjretBlT' ly aealnat any nelghbarlnc nAtlon, en' that, Bcoordln»-ly, In 
ti'f Ir rational j)ollcl«a they will aetirely Kupport and giva practical a{>» 
jilicatlon to the follopr! n, fundaivntal prlnciplaa upon w^-lch their rala- 
Unnii T-lt> ^ach oth»r a-^d with all other Fpr^mnmntr are baaadi 

r\\ -»,,. iTlnclple of Inrlolabllltar of territorial Intagrltgr and 
aovareignt^ o. (<ach and all natlona. 

'?) The principle of non-lnterferanoa in the internal affaire 

of ot!:c>r countriea. 

(3) The principle of eqaaUty, including equality of e«Mar«laI ' 



opportunity and treataeat. 

ARMY SECRET 



Trane. U-?9-^ fl) i 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE IQgl 

SECRET 



li»t r^kym 
tkmmbmr a6, IMX. 

#U». (P»rt 2 (rf a) 

|ir«wnt Ite f>iiiiiw'i—B*i fif Jftpoi «Mt tlw a**wnMMit af Hm tliiitMl 

inwMllBC rMwmBi •atmmAm 9»ll»pm, mkI pranrldlMK » ImmIs ftur immmm, 
UNIT «11X Mrftlvilr MppMrt nrf i«nMitt««U7 *pply tk« f*U*«liig prtJMi- 



(2) TIhi iMrtMStfffai (rf is«4Mmil •cmmwA* WMjwmtLoat mat atelitlMt 
(4) n» lalMlia* af l^iU. pr»1mmU.tm. »t tim latMrMrts «« mm- 



AM! 'PS-'Uir s^KT 



1982 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



SECRH 



W]nMB%(i tkrm^^ fnwMMM 9l tevAa 

••WBtrlMI. 



i&«k «» wUtev tt aU 



fWt a» «MM, 1MI9H1 (1) 



im 



SECKT 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



1983 








SECRET 



ProBs .aahli^ion (NoBur*) 
Tte: Tokyo 
November 2o, 19^. 

f\a-pLe. (rjj^l«h t«xt) 

1119*. (-itrwtly uTEBirt) (Part 1 ot 4) 

S««p«t fir*. 

To b« handlpd In Jommaant Coda. 

Soetlon 2. 

Stap* to b« taiava by the dorartment of the United 'tatea au-id by tha 
GoTartMsnt of Japan: 

Tlie Ooremnant of the United -tatea and tba Oovemaant of Japan 
propose to take step* as foll««ti 

1. The k>Y«rtnaE!nt of the United states and the jortinamnt of 
Japan will endearor to conclxide a saJtUatttral noo-aggreaslon pact aaong 

irltlah ' r.plre , Ohina, Japan), the Wethf^rlanda , the Soviet Union, 
Thailand and the Inited rtates. 

■ 2. ?oUi jorernmenta will endeavor to condode araoag the Aaerioaa, 
Sritlsh, i;hir»8e, Japanese, the fSetherlaad and Thai Oorenawnta an agree- 
aent whereunder each of the oovemaanta would pledge Itaelf to respect ttoe 
territorial integrity of French Indo-Chlna and, in the enent that there 
si.ould develop a threat to tf e t**rrltorlAl Inegrlty of IndO'>Chlna, to 
enter Into L-anedlate consul tatlon with a rlew to takintj: tnjch eeasures as 
sa/ te desaed necessary and adrlsable to neet the tiireat In question. 



ARMY 



SECRET 



Trans. U-29-<l (I) 



1984 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

SECRET 





rnmt «aaiiln«tea ( 
1*1 T»ky» 
mmmbmr 3(>, 19U. 
Pvrpl*. (EacUsii Uact) 

HX<H>. (ExtcwMljr wrwmt) (l>urt 3 af 4) 

T» b« bajkdlcd U 'iiifiiiwt 0«4i. 

SMk ■ art —lit. wa«14 yrovld* •!■• tbM MMh 9t Hm 

U ttM a«rM«wifc Mould mt mtiA or mm]^ vrmiw«m%XMX tvMtaH* to &«■ iMMto 

■•»•■ «i.tii Kraaok ijkd»-CnUw. 

3. Xh* UvMrsMut «C J«»Mi «111 «l«iklrMr aU. alXltary, — wJ ,, 
lOr MMl p»ll«» ifcr>— Xiwi UijUm Mad CnM Iidt CliiM» 

4. ite Ur««tiHMit sr tta* (M.tod &«*«•• mhI «b« Uaremrw« U J^pB 
will o»i Bigjpart » aiUuuriajrt ]WllUo*Ujr> — ow ttalafciiy — »mf Qmtammmt 
or r»«lai i« UblJMt uUwr U«m> Uw BftUoBAl fiftm— t a£ tte wimMta •f 



^^ ^^'^ »««, la^wna a) 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



1985 



SECRET 



rrvmt nMtalactoB (Mmuo-a) 

tktymtibor ;:c, 1941. 
i^irpX*. (ji^atUafa text} 

l'U94. (P»ri 3 •! 4) 

5. Bwth ^ranuMuit* will gir* Ki> all MtrateifTl torl*i rtght* 
1« OslM, iMlndla)! ri^to luwi lJB.t«r»*ta la *nd »ith «gax<l t* i«ter- 
wtlttaAl MitlMBMt* MMf oawMMlMM, MMt rl|»tte «nd«r th« Dax«r tV" 
teool «f 1901. 

8»tli QmrmnmmUM will *iidMTor to obteia Vm acrwMMt •f 
tiMi arlUah and vXixmt OototrmtatB t© alvi, up extmterrttsvrlal rlcihla 
lj» Ghti», lnolwtUii; rlgbt* In iat«rnaU«irt MtU««»i»t» tutd In coiwmmUm 
•»< widsr XlMt Qmmr PToiamX «t 1901. 

*^?M will Mt«r IntD immtUUatm tor %im ootwiMlon bet»««n tte CkHtad 
St«*M *>d J*|)M «t « tnuki AgnMamt. bftMM upon nMslprac*! Mwt 
r«««ra4'.«iaUMi tTMtMHit «iad ntdaaUoa «f inwte bMYt«r» by totti oou- 
trt««, ijMlaOiat M» MdBrt*fcU« by Ui* Balt«d SiatM ta Mad nar «llk 

'• tSw QwrwiMBBrt of *&• Untied '"-UtM ia>4 tte« flowitswrni of 
J^MM will, rw^MtlTOljr, rwMm tte trmming re.trlottotti oa Apimw 
*M»d« la th« United . t«tMi sad <m Mmriam fud* la J»pM. 



AltMY,. 



SECRH 



nww. U«39-<1 (2) 



1986 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

SECRET 



PrMii WMAiiagiMi (ItaBsr*) 
Tti TMqr« 
^hmmimr 26. VHi. 
fvrpU. (SaglUh t«zt) 

IU94. CSxtntmlf vrgamX) (Pwrt A «f 4} 

SMTvt 0«A«14» Vam tmytrimmMA. 

t» te bMkdteA I* Q«T«raM«t 0*4». 

8. B»th aimwii— to win «8X<m «{ioii iqi>p37lac tl»« ct«tollia*tlMi 

&S Um dollKr-TCO rKtw, with tb* •U.«««tl«B sT ^a■Ml• aidwi«*t« f«r lliia iimpm, 

)mir to b* wiypIUd by Apan Nri HAlf br «M tW.1Ml SU«m. 

9« Bottt Orirwi— iito will agrM ttat iw AfpracMnrt «lilete (dtlMr iMM «■•-- 

ttludsd «!•> MiT^ tMLrd pw i w t atMll b* liit«rpt«t*di by It ia mmab « «9 lui t* 

maniet with Um tm ii mi m m i a l paen^oM •< thl« »(pemmma%, tiM —♦■WlrtMwwt 

•nd tj r< — rf tAaa af pM*« U iw uK hwtt Hw Pa«lfl« nrM. 

10. 9«t!] qrwi'i—to wlU taM thalr tiinainM t» ■wiw «tter flwi'— tw 

to adfanv t* mti to stv* prMtlMl «i»pUaatt<Mi ta th* htmim prnXXtlml 

tmt •MigraBi* jirlaBlpStM ••% ftrth 1« this ayi iiw>.. 






EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE " 1987 

EXHIBIT NO. 95 

(Handwritten note:) 

Memo 

Hornbeck is anxious to have you read this. The high ranking oflScer mentioned 
is Adm. Richardson. 

I think the paper is slightly Academic. 

/s/R. E. S. 
I have read. 

/s/ HR8. 

I feel that in the evolving of the thought of which record is made in this mem- 
orandum, I have brought into clearer light than any in which I had seen it before a 
point which is, I feel, of fundamental importance in connection with any and all of 
our deliberations regarding courses to be taken in the field of major policy in regard 
to the Far East : a point which has to do with something that is definitely and 
inescapably fundamental. I am sure that you will not begrudge the time which it 
will take for you to read the memorandum. 

( Stamped : ) CONFIDENTIAL 



(Hand printed note : ) Return to Op-13. 

July 12. 1940. 

In the course of a conversation yesterday with a high ranking officer of 
the Navy, there was put to me this question: Is there an irresolvable cmi- 
flict of interests and policies bettveen the United States and Japan? 

I replied to this effect : There is today a fundamental conflict between the 
United States and Japan as regards major objectives and the policies which 
prevail, respectively, in consequence thereof and in regard thereto. This con- 
flict can be resolved only by an abandonment on the part of one country or 
the other of those objectives and policies which it envisages and by which it 
proceeds at the present time. The United States has as its objectives: preva- 
lence within and between and among nations of peace; prevalence of rules and 
provisions of law ; prevalence of practices of justice ; prevalence of practices 
of order ; procedure by commitments and respect therefor ; prevalence of equality 
of opportunity in terms of fair treatment ; respect for rights of nations and of 
individuals ; and due regard for interests of nations and [2] of indi- 
viduals. Japan (the Japanese military leadership) has as its objectives today; 
spread and extension of Japanese political authority and economic control into 
and over areas outside of and beyond the boundaries of the present Japanese 
Empire (some of which areas are inhabited by independent nations and some 
of which are dependencies of other indepndent countries — but in none of 
which there is a Japanese population at present of more than a comparatively 
insignificant minority) ; a setting up by whatever means, positive or negative, 
may seem likely to contribute thereto, of a Japanese hegemony in eastern Asia 
and the western and southern Pacific; the working out of a "divine Destiny" 
which in the minds of not a few Japanese envisages first a vast Japanese empire 
in the Orient and ultimately a world supremacy for Japan's "Divine Emperor" 
These objectives are in fundamental conflict, globally and in detail. 

In the case of the United States, tlie objectives stated are the objectives of the 
whole American ijeople. In the case of Japan, the objectives stated are those of 
an essentially feudal leadership, the "military element", which comprises prob- 
ably less than ten i>ercent of the naticm, which includes probably a majority of 
those Japanese who are descendants of the fighting men (the Daimyo and the 
Samurai) of the pre-restoration (1867) era, the spearhead among which is a 
considerable number of chauvinists among \S] the Army officer personnel 
and to a le.ss extent among the Navy officer personnel, which leadership makes 
the nation's decisions and carries the nation with it. 

The policies which are those of the United States are representative of the 
fundamental thoughts and beliefs and attitude of the people of the United States 
during the whole century and half of our national existence. Their roots run 
far back into the past. They run back to the days of Magna Charta, the days of 
John Hampden, the days of Oliver Cromwell, the days of the Pilgrims and the 
Cavaliers, the days of the P>oston Tea Party and the Declaration of Independence, 
the days of Washington and Jefferson and John Paul Jones and James Monroe 
and Andrew Jackson ; the days of the French Revolution ; the days of emigration 
from Europe of the German liberals; the days of the Civil War; the days of our 



1988 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

liberation of Cuba ; tiie days of our participation in the World War with popular 
enthusiasm for the ideas of fighting to end wars and to make the world safe for 
democracy : they are policies which in a general way express the thought and the 
aspirations, inherited by and developed under conditions of freedom in the minds 
of practically all of the 130 million persons who constitute the people of the 
United States. The policies which are those of Japan have no such universal 
and no such [4] deep-rooted acceptance in and among the 90 million per- 
sons who constitute the people of the Japanese Empire. 

There is warrant for a belief that the conflict between American and Japanese 
objectives and policies is not irresolvable. There is warrant for belief that one 
or tiie other of the countries might in course of time give up its present objectives 
and policies. 

Where does the greater possibility, as regards relinquishment, lie? In giving 
consideration to that question, thought should be given to the comparative quali- 
ties of tile two sets of objectives and policies. Which of the two is the more 
sound? Which of the two is more fundamental from i>oints of view of human 
nature, of morality, et cetera? Then, consideration should be given to historical 
facts. It is a fact tliat the attitude, the obie<'tives and the policies of the Ameri- 
can people are a product of a long course of forward-looking evolution. It is a 
fact that the Japanese nation made in 1867 a substantial break with its own 
past, and that during the last eight decades the outlook uimhi life of the Japanese 
people and many of the practices of the Japanese State have undergone substan- 
tial change. To make a long matter short, is there not warrant for believing 
that a change in objectives and in policies by and on the part of Japan would be 
much easier and is much more readily conceivable than would be and is a change 
of the objectives and policies of the United States? 

[5] How would (could) a change on Japan's part be brought about? If 
Japanese armed forces succeed in conquering China, taking Indochina, taking the 
Netherland East Indies, taking the Malay States, taking Thailand (Siam) and 
Burma, ultimately taking the Philippines, et cetera, et cetera, no change is 
likely. The conflict between Japanese interests and objectives and policies and 
those of the United States would ccmtinue and become intensifie<l. But if 
Japan's eflforts in China were to fail, if Japan's pff )rts to establish a great em- 
pire in the Far East were to be thwarted, if Japan's military leadership were to 
be in course of time discredited in the eyes of the middle classes and the common 
people of Japan, it is conceivable that the Japanese nation might work out a 
modification or even a reversal of Japan's objectives and policies. 

It should be remembered that three centuries ago a great Japanese leader 
started out to conquer China and that ultimately the Japanese nation gave 
up that idea. It should be remembered that not long after the Japanese 
Army and Navy had witlidrawn from Korea, another great Japanese leader 
decided to make Japan an isolated and secluded hermit nation : l>e forbade, 
to all intents and purposes, political, economic or cultural intercourse between 
Jap in and the outside world. 

[6'] The present conflict between Japanese and American objectives and 
policies is not irresolvable. There is little possibility, however, that the ob- 
jectives and policies of the American people will be given up. Moreover, an 
abandonment of them would not resolve the conflict— for, an adoption, by 
the United States, in substitution for them, of objectives and policies similar 
to or identical with those of Japan would be impossible, and, if not impossible 
and if made, would merely c.eate greater conflict. But an abandonment of 
Japan's present objectives and policies is a thini by no means impossible ; 
is a thing which, if made, would admit of an adoption by Japan of policies 
similar to those of the United States, which adoption, if made and if lived 
up to, would resolve the whole conflict. 

Surrender of the American objectives and policies in favor of Japan would 
serve no useful purpose. Maintenance of the American objectives and poli- 
cies, patient but unremitting resistance by the United States and by other 
countries to Japan's efforts at conquest, has within it the possibility of an 
ultimate resolving of the conflicts between the objectives and policies of 
Japan and the objectives and policies of the United States (and those of 
several other countries ) . 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1989 

EXHIBIT NO. 96 

July 16, 1940. 

It is my thought that you might find interesting the papers here 
attached. If so, and if you should feel so disposed, perhaps you would care 
to send the memorandum on to the Chief of Naval Operations. 

You will note that there are on these papers no identifying marks. I think 
that it woidd be well to give no indication of source. The material stands or 
falls on its own merits without reference to autliorship or location of the 
authors. 

(Stamped:) CONFIDENTIAL 

(Hand printed :) Return lo Op-13 Room 2058. 

Reflections on Certain Features of the Far Eastern Situation and Certain 
Problems of U. S. Far Easte:kn Pojcy. Jui.y 4, 1940. 

I. Ocneral Obser-vations. 

The situation in the Pacific is one in which, on the one hand Japan and China are 
engaged in armed hostilities in the course of which Japanese armed forces have 
been and are doing violence to American lives and property and the Japanese 
Government by official acts is impairing American rights and interests, while on 
the otl^er hand there is constant, though not now acute, tensicm in relations 
between Japan and the United States; it has been and is the policy of the United 
States to discourage and to oppose the course which Japan is following ; it is gen- 
erally agreed that diplomatic representations by the American Government, 
together with the termination of the treaty of 1911 upon this Government's 
initiative, and the moves which this Government has made in disposal of its 
naval forces, have exercised some restraining influence upon Japan ; it is now 
notorious that a strong element in Japan's leadership advocates a move by the 
Japanese armed forces toward seizure of French Indo-China and/or the Dutch 
East Indies, and that the said element has strong support among the Japanese 
populace; it is the estimate of various observers that the presence of the U. S. 
Battle Fleet at Pearl Harbor weighs heavily in Japan's deliberations with regai'd 
to the question of the Dutch East Indies and other new moves of [2] ag- 
gression ; the most effective opposition at the present moment t(» Japan's program 
of imperialistic expansion is the resistance which is being made by the Chinese; 
the Government and the people of the United States desire that the Chinese 
resistance be not overcome and the Japanese effort to gain control of China be 
not successful; and the policy and the acts of the United States during recent 
years have given encouragement and support to the Chinese policy of resistance, 
have strengthened Chinese morale, and have contributed to the facts that the 
Chinese have refused to negotiate a compromise settlement and the Japanese 
have not been able to gain an undisputed control of China or any part of China. 

For seventy-five years the Germans, acting politically and as a nation, have 
given evidence that those elements which exercise decisive leadership of the 
German people believe in and rely uiion force as the most effective and the 
conclusive instrumentality in international relations. For forty-five years the 
Japanese, acting politically and as a state, have given evidence that those 
elements which exercise decisive leadership of the Japanese people believe in and 
rely upon force as the most effective and the conclusive instrumentality in inter- 
national relations. 

[3] Modern Germany was brought into existence in 1870 through Bis- 
marck's success in pursuing his policy of "Ei.>ien uiid Bluf. The present Jap- 
anese Empire has been developed since 1867 by a profess of accumulation under 
threat of force and/or application of force: first, seizure of nearby islands; next, 
war upon China and acquisition of Formosa and the Pescadores; next, 
war upon Russia and occupation of South Manchuria ; next, gradual occupation 
followed by sudden annexation of Korea ; next, seizure of Shantung and the now 
Japanese Mandated Islands in the Pacific; next, the occupation of all of 
Manchuria and Jehol ; and now the effort to conquer China. 

During the last ten years Japanese leadership has given ample evidence, for 
all who are willing to divest themselves of preconceived theories and natural 
prej\idices, of their high regard for force and low I'egard for moral principles. 



1990 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

legal precepts, and/or constractual obligations, in international relations. Since 
lifSS Nazi leadership lias done the same — hue wiih greater intensity. 

In 1931 the Japanese resorted to the use of force against China. Neither the 
League of Nations nor any of its members were willing to take any forceful 
effectixe steps toward stopping the Japanese. Nor was the United Stales willing 
to take any such stepvS. The Japanese went ahead, and, [4] by use of force, 
attained not only their objective but more than what they had had m contempla- 
tion at that stage. In 1934 the Italians resorted to use of force and found that 
neither the League of Nations nor any of the world powers, including the United 
States, were willing to use force to stop them. The Italians achieved ail that they 
had set out to achieve. In 1937 the Japanese decided to take the next step in a 
program to which their leadership has long been committed in principle, another 
step in a program which envisages many more steps extending far into the tuiuie. 
They att».cked China. They occupied considerable portions of China. Neither 
the League of Nations nor any great power has .seen tit forcefully to oppose them. 
The only resistance by force that has been made to Japan's program of use 
of force is that which has been and is being made by the Chinese. 

In 1932 the British Government asked the Japanese Government for a pledge 
that the Japanese Government would respect the principle of the "open door" in 
Manchuria, and, having been given by the Japanese Government that pledge, 
the British Government declared itself satisfied. In 1935 certain British and 
French statesmen collaborated in .secret and were prepared to make to Italy a 
proposal for a compromise in regard to Ethiopia. World opinion ruled that 
[5] proposal out. Had l^iat proposal been made to Mussolini, there is little 
reason lor anyone believing that it would have been accepted. Had it bsen made 
and been accepted, there is little warrant, in the light of subsequent events, for 
any suiiposition that Mussolini would later have been restrained by his acceptance 
of it. In 1938 Mr. Chamberlain made an agreement with Herr Hitler. Almost 
immediately Hitler completely disregarded his part of the agreement and went 
foi-ward with steps in a program which is conceived in terms of force and is 
being carried out in terms of force. 

The Government and the people of the United States are committed by a 
long tradition to the principle of opposing conquest. They are likewise com- 
mitted to the principle of supporting international law. They are committed by 
a considerable number of treaties to the principle of respecting the sovereignty 
and the territorial and administrative integrity of China. They are committed 
both by treaty and by unilateral declarations (of several Administrations) to the 
principle of respecting the rights and interests of all concerned in and with 
regard to China. They are committed by declarations of the last preceding and 
the present Administration to the principle of refusing [6] to recognize 
(i. e. to give technical recognition to) certain types of change brought about by 
certain sperifl-d methods in the situation in the Far East. 

The situation in the Far East, as between Japan and China, has for some 
months past been developing along the lines which tend to confirm the estimates 
upon which United States policy in this period has in large part been based. 
Chinese resistance has been maintained ; the Japanese have been un: hie to bring 
matters to a conclusion at any point ; processes of attrition have been affecting 
the Japanese more adversely than the Chinese ; the Japanese people have devel- 
oped doubts; Japanese resources have become cons^^antly more slender; the 
possibility of a gradual dissolution of the Japanese effort to conquer China has 
constantly ircreased. If the United States and the British Government will 
but permit "Nature" to take its course, with a little help by giving some assistance 
to China and withholding some assistance from Japan, there is more than an 
even chance that the present Japanese effort to conquer China will be brought to 
an end, adversely to Japan, by processes of attrition and concomitants thereof. 

[7] II. Retention of U. S. Fleet in the Pacific. 

The Battle Fleet is at present in the Pa'^-ific. It is based in major part on Pearl 
Harbor. Th^ U. S. Asiatic Fleet is in the Far Eastern Waters. 

An order by the American Government for the U. S. Battle Fleet to leave the 
Pacific would be equivalent to a notification to the Japanese and the Chinese 
that the United States substantially abandons, for the time being at least, its 
effort to influence the course of events as between Japan and China. It would 
tremendously strengthen Japanese morale and (probably disastrously) weaken 
Chinese morale. It would give assurance to the Japanese Army in China that 
opportunity exists for it to go as far as it may be able with not only the Chinese 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1991 

but also American and other foreifjn nationals, foreign properties, foreign rights 
and foreign interests in China. It woulld give assurance 1o the Japanese Navy 
that opportunity exists for it to go as far as it may be able with foreign terri- 
torial possessions in the Pacific. It would encourage the Japanese tovpard think- 
ing seriously even of closing in upon Singapore and of stirring up trouble in India. 
It might resolve such doubts as many Japanese "entertain of the advisability of 
a closer association with Germany. It would make Japan the one and only great 
power exercising effective influence in the area of the [81 Pacific and the 
Indian Oceans, in the whole area westward from the Panama Canal and east- 
ward from Suez and the Cape of Good Hope. It would leave the United States 
exposed on the West Coast ; it would leave Mexico and Central America exposed ; 
it would leave the whole west coast of South America exposed. It would make 
it difficult if not impossible for any countries other than the United States to 
venture upon exerting of economic pressures against or in resistance to Japan ; 
, and it would increase such dangers to the United States as are or might be 
involved in the exerting by the United States of such pressures or resistance. 

But, assume the order to have been given, assume the Fleet to have left the 
Pacific (with the flow of consequences which its departure would have), assume 
that the tran.sit of the Canal to have been made successfully, — What disposal 
would be made in the Atlantic of this Fleet, and what necessary and useful 
purposes would that disposal b" expected to serve? Would the expectation be 
that the Fleet be sent to European waters? Would the etxpectation be that, if 
sent there, itwould be used for combat purposes? Would the expectation be that, 
the Fleet being kept in American waters, the mere presence of the Fleet in the 
Atlantic would in any way deter the Germans and Italians from the courses 
which they are pursuing in Europe or would in any way be of assistance to the 
British in their resistance? Would the [9] expectation be that the pres- 
ence of the Fleet in the Atlantic would deter the Germans and Italians from 
launching attacks in the near future upon some part or parts of the Western 
Hemisphere? Would the expectation be that the Fleet would soon be needed 
for the purpose of defending this Hemisphere against such attacks definitely 
launched? 

It would unquestionajjly be detrimental to the interests in the Pacific of the 
Allied Powers and their benevolent associate (the United States) for the United 
States to withdraw its Battle Fleet, at this early moment, from the Pacific. But 
mere transfer by the United States of its Battle Fleet to the Atlanic would in no 
way benefit the cause, at this moment, of the Allied Powers and the United States 
in connection with and in regard to the present phase of the armed conflict 
between the British and Germany. The German menace to the United States, 
while very real, is not yet direct, and it cannot short of several weeks or months 
become a physical reality. The United States Fleet has been and is needed in 
the Pacific; it is not yet needed in the Atlantic; and, if moved from the Pacific 
to the Atlantic at this moment, it could not in the Atlantic serve purjwses equiv- 
alent to or more important than those which it has been and is serving in the 
Pacific. 

[.9rt] Hitler still has some fighting to do in Europe. It is possible that 
within a short time England may, following the fate and the example of France, 
have to sue for peace. It is possible that the Briti'^h Navy will be sunk. At the 
worst, Hitler may possibly gain complete control of Great Britain and acquire what 
remains of both the French and the British fleets. That, however, will not have 
happened by tomorrow morning and is not likely to have happened by the morning 
of a week from tomorrow. 

The logical course for Hitler and Mussolini to follow is : Pursue to the end 
their armed conflict with Great Britain; make sure, either by diplomacy or by 
armed force, of the security of their rear, that is, make solid their relationships, 
for better or for worse, with the Soviet Union ; consider and deal with what- 
ever problems may remain as regards Sweden, Switzerland, the Balkans, Turkey 
and the Mediterranean; meanwhile, reorganize and improve their battered 
though victorious armed forces ; consolidate administratively their position in and 
over the areas which they have conquered; recondition whatever implements 
and munitions of war they [f)b] may capture ; take care of various economic 
and social problems which are already acute and bound to be more so, such as the 
feeding and the clothing of the people of Germany and the peoples of the con- 
quered territories; make adequate prepnrutions for an ultimate attack upon 
iwints in the Western Hemisphere, which attack, if prematurely made, would be 
almost sure to be challenged by the United States and would absolutely ensure 



1992 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

embarkation by the United States upon an enormous program of armament; 
meanwhile, wage a diplomatic and propagandist campaign, based upon and cen- 
tered in assurances that Germany and Italy are sated and are satisfied, have no 
further territorial objectives, are prepared to maintain peace in Europe and to be 
at peace with the rest of the world, and are in no way whatever a menace to the 
security or the prosperity or the general welfare of the Western Hemisphere and 
least of all to those of the United States. 

Neither Hitler nor Mussolini nor both are going to [10] attack Latin 

America or the United States in the near future — certainly not within the next 
few weeks. If by any chance they should send over some sort of an expedition, 
their having done so would be "all to the good" so far as effect upon public 
opinion in this Hemisphere, and especially in the United States, is concerned. It 
would help to wake up a lot of people who are still only half awake and some 
more who are still sound asleep. From the point of view of general and particular 
political effects, we should welcome the making by Hitler or Mussolini of such 
a mistake. They will not make it. 

Unless we are prepared to take the offensive, in support of Great Britain, in 
Europe, against Hitler, or unless we would expect to be so prepared before or by 
the time that our Fleet could arrive in the Atlantic, there does not exist today any 
good reason, in terms of use to be made of our Battle Fleet, for moving that 
Fleet today or tomorrow from Pearl Harbor. — Should an unforeseen and un- 
foreseeable emergency develop, the Fleet could be moved from Pearl Harbor 
to Panama, at a practicable speed, in 13 days. And transit of the Canal requires 
P^o <lays. 

If and when Hitler and Mussolini finish off England, and if and when the 
British fleet is sunk or is surrendered, the moment will then have arrived for 
reconsidering, urgently, the question of a better (than now) disposal of [11] 
our Fleet. Meanwhile, our Fleet stands on guard, as it has for some time past 
stood, in the Pacific — at Pearl Harbor, a highly strategic point. The presence of 
that Fleet there has exercised and is exercising a restraining influence upon 
Japan, discouraging new adventurings by Japan which would be adverse to 
American and British and French and some other countries' interests and encour- 
aging continuance by the Chinese of their resistance to Japan. Whenever that 
Fleet leaves the Pacific, its departure will not only remove an obstacle to further 
adventuring by Japan but will actually encourage embarkation by Japan upon 
such adventuring ; it will give Japan free rein in the Western Pacific, in the 
Southern Pacific and in the Indian Ocean ; it will give Japan opportunity to place 
herself in full possession of vastly important natural resources and highways ; it 
will enable the Japanese to complete their blockade of China ; it will vastly 
strengthen Japanese and vastly weaken Chinese morale ; it will probably mark 
the beginning of the end as regards China's resistance to Japan ; it will enable the 
Japanese to send vast amounts of material to Germany and Italy ; it will prepare 
the way for full cooperation by Japan w-ith her Axis associates. 

We may have to move our Fleet from the Pacific, and take those consequences — 
in due course. We do not have [12] to do it today. To do it now when 
there has not yet come real need for doing it would be tO|indicate that we are in 
a state of panic, not to say hysteria, that we are driven into that state by the 
mere thought of a jwssible risk of a possible attack upon some point in "our" 
Hemisphere; that we, not having gone to the aid of democracy in Europe, are 
ready to abandon the one country (China) which is "opposing force" in Asia; 
that, although we may be able at sometime in the future to fight, we are not able 
now to hold even a diplomatic position. If we were ready, now, to fight, and 
if we would, now, fight — to prevent the destruction of the British Fleet — ^we 
should at once move our Fleet, move it at full steam toward Europe. Not being 
either ready or willing, now, to do that, we should still leave our Fleet where 
it is until there comes a time when we can do more with it elsewhere than we 
are doing with it now where it now is. 

If and when we do move the Fleet out of the Pacific, we should sinniltaneously 
do something substantial in the line of giving further assistance to the Chinese. 
We might well do some more of that momentarily and frequently. The Chinese 
Government has for several months past been urgently asking us for assistance. 
The President, in his Charlottesville address, said : "* * * we will extend to 
the opponents [13] of force the material resources of this nation . . .". 
We can no longer give assistance to France. We should be all the more in 
position, so far as our resources are concerned, to give assistance to China. 
Only Great Britain is opposing force in Europe today. Only China is opposing 
force in eastern Asia today. In assisting Great Britain — in whatever way — we 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1993 

work for our own security. In assisting China — in whatever way — we work 
toward the same end. 

There is little that we can do about Europe now. But we can still, if we but 
will, do a good deal about the Far East. Unless we are prepared to fight Hitler 
in Europe, now, we practically abandon our position in Europe, now, because of 
our not being prepared to act toward safeguarding it. Our abandonment of 
Europe is automatic. Question then comes : Not, shall be abandon our position in 
Asia in order to defend our pf)sition in Eun pe, but, our position in Europe ali-eady 
having been abandoned automatically, shall our position in Asia be abandoned 
by our own deliberate action — for tlie sake of safeguarding and strengthening 
our position in the Western Hemisphere. 

Defense of and strengthening of our position in the Western Hemisphere does 
not require abandonment of our position in Asia, and the objective of defend- 
ing and strengthening [I4] pf our position in the Western Hemisphere 
would not be best served by such an abandonment. 

The unanswered question which this country must consider today is not the 
question what will Hitler do in regard to the Western Hemisphere after he 
has made himself supreme in Europe. It is what will Gemianu and Japan do, 
if and after Germany has become supreme in Europe and Japan has become 
supreme in the western Pacific and eastern Asia. 

It is an axiom of military strategy that "the best defense is offense". 

The soundness of this axiom is being demonsti'ated on an unprecedented 
scale in what has gone on in Europe recently and what is going on in Europe 
today; in their uxir plans, the Germans have built for offense; the British and — 
even more — the French built for defense ; the Germans have taken the offensive 
and the British and the French fought a losing defensive battle — on French soil 
and with terrific defensive lososes^ 

The vital problem which the people and the Government of the United States 
should be considering today is that of ways and means whereby Germany and 
Italy and Japan can be [l^a] stopped rather than that of ways and 
means whereby the United States and the rest of the Western Hemisphere may 
become prepared to defend this Hemisphere in a world in which, Germany and 
Italy and Japan not having been stopped, those three powers and their satellites 
will begin (in due course) directly to make assaults upon the economy, the 
political setup, et cetera, et cetera, of this Hemisphere — with each of those three 
countries feeling that it cannot be secure as long as the United States remains a 
great power and feeling that the common objective of the three should be to 
render impotent or to dt stroy the United States. 

We should keep in mind the fact that for practical purposes the world's great 
powers are today divided into two camps: on the one side are three aggressor 
nations — in combination : Japan, Germany, and Italy ; on the other side are 
China, Great Britain — and the United States. (Russia is in a sense a, not dis- 
interested and not unbia.sed bystander, temporarily associated with but not 
very actively assisting the three active aggres.sors, and capable of becoming a 
liability or even a belligerent enemy to them.) The United States has not 
become a belligerent, but it also is not an impartial neutral; its interests lie on 
the side of Great Britain — and China; it will more and more give assistance to 
Great Britain — and .should do the same for China ; it is opposed To the three 
aggressors; it will be regarded more [1-ib] and more by each and all those 
aggressors as definitely and distinctly an enemy state: if the aggressors win, 
the United States — whether actively a belligerent or not — will thereafter be con- 
sidered by the winners as having been for practical purposes an ally of the 
defeated powers and as a power remaining to be dealt with and disposed of 
(adversely) as such. 

The United S(;ates has not been able by diplomacy nor by measures — including 
gestures — short of war to restrain Germany or Italy ; but it has thus far exer- 
cised some restraining influence upon Japan and it is capable of continuing to 
exercise such influence. 

The United States is not today in position to take tlie oflfensive (with use of 
force) — in the Atlantic. The United States is today in position to di.scourago, 
and to render diflBcult if not impossible, a move by one of the aggressors which, 
if attempted and if unchallenged, would place that aggressor (which is closely 
.associated with its fellow aggressors) in undisputed control of a huge area in 
which there are very substantial British and French and Netherland and Ameri- 
can ix)litical and economic interests and very substantial resoui'ces — in the 
Pacific. 

79716 O — 46— pt. 16 6 



1994 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

If the United States wishes to contribute with niaxinmm effectiveness, within 
the limitations under which we now work, toward !<t(>pping Germany and her 
aggressor associates, [^^c] and tliereby toward assisting the British and 
improving our own position as regards long swing security, the one area in 
which we might operate at present by disposal or use of force is the Pacific. 

A course based on the principle of merely conserving and adding to our stock 
of weapons — while and notwithstanding tlie fact that the Nazis and the Italians 
win in Europe and the Japanese take iiossession of the we.stern Pacific and the 
Indian Oceans — in order that we may now guard and later defend the Western 
Hemisphere, will not make the world safe for the United States. It will merely 
mean, if the British are defeated, that we, not having gone to their aid in the 
Atlantic or the Mediterranean, and not having safeguarded their position and 
ours in the Pacific, we, having let the rest of the world go under to Germany 
and Italy and Japtin, will in the not distant thereafter have to take up arms 
by ourselves (with possibly .some aid from some Latin American states) on the 
defensive, against as.saults by (»ne or two or three — but all working together — 
of the successful aggressor nations, those nations having then at their disposal 
unlimited resources, vast mat<?riel, and a combined population of their own of 
200,000,000 men and reservoirs of supplementary man power in the countries 
which they would have subjug.ited. 

The best defense is offense. The next best defense is preparedness to use such 
weapons as one may possess toward preventing one's enemies from being strength- 
ened and prevent- [14d] ing one's friends from being weakened. The 
poorest strategy of defense is that of simply building fortifications while per- 
mitting one's position to be completely encircled by a hostile combination the 
various units in which are daily becoming stronger and the combined forces of 
which will ultimately be overwhelming as regards re.sources and man iK)wer. 

The United States could today either throw its forces in on tlie side of the 
Briti-sh toward defeating the enemy combination in Europe or stand guard in the 
Pacific and prevent Japan from gaining control of the western Pacific, eastern 
Asia, and the Indian Ocean. If it does neither of these things, and if G''rmany, 
Italy and Japan win. the victorious aggressors will have before them and will give 
their attention to three tasks: they will have Russia to dispose of; they will have 
Latin America to dispt)se of; and they will have the United States to dispose of. 
If they attack Russia first, the United States will do nothing about that. If 
they begin assaults upon Latin America first, the United States will not be soon 
enough and full enough i>repared to ensure against aggressor successes there. 
If they attack the United States first, we will be poorly equipped to .stop them 
without initial and substantial losses to ourselves — and we would have prac- 
tically no help from Latin America ; we would be fight ivg alone against a combi- 
nation which can attack both from the east and from the west ; and we have only 
a one-ocean Navy. 

me] This country could today make a substantial contribution toward 
making the world safe for the United States — and for other democracies. The 
United States can do little today toward preventing Hitler from becoming supreme 
in Europe. The United States could do much today toward preventing Japan 
from b'^coming supreme in eastern Asia. The United States can (may), of course, 
fall back upon and fortify its pf)sition within the Western Hemisphere. If it 
chooses to do this, and only this, the probability will be that, before long, weak- 
ened economically and ciit off from valuable markets, especially those from which 
various essential raw materials are derived (in the Far Eist), the United States 
and its American associates will be confronted bv material pressures, including 
those of armed force, not from the east alone but from the east and from the 
west — not by Germany alone but by Germany and Japan. 

Net being ready and willing now to fight toward stopping y51 Hitler in 
Europe, we surely should refrain from giving him the aid and comfort of making 
to him a free gift of assured access, through Japan, to the natural resources of 
the Far East. 

III. "Making Friends'' with Japan. 

On May 30 the Chicago Daily Tribune published an editorial entitled "How to 
Double the Fleet in a Week" in which the idea was advanced that the United 
States and Japan can and should "come to a friendly understanding". In this' 
editorial the Tribune said: "The best defense iK)licy of the United States could 
be written within a few weeks in a renewed trade treaty with Japan. ... In 
effect the strength of the fleet would be doubled by cutting half its problem away." 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1995 

On June 3 the Xeic York Daily News published an editorial under the same 
title as that of the VliUayo T/zT^Mwe's editorial of May 30. In this editorial the 
News stated that, while it by no means always agrees with the Chicago Tribune, 
the hitter's editorial under reference "interests us greatly". It expressed the 
opinion that "by making friends with Japan" the United States can avert finding 
itself "menaced with urgent trouble in the Atlantic and Pacific at the same time" 
and "would in effect d-^'uble the strength of our (its) fleet". 

[16] Oa June 6, Mr. Lippniann in an article of that date advanced the 
view that the United States and Japan should "enter immediately into friendly 
and conciliatory and candid negotations . . . for the avowed purpose of preserving 
peace in the Pacific." 

On July 1, Rear Admiral Yates Stirling (Retired) expressed in an article 
of that date the view that the interests of the United States "lie in reaching a 
friendly understanding with Japan, if one can be attained." Admiral Stirling 
said that "history would indicate that they (the Japanese) can be stopped only 
by sui^erior military force". He advocated the beginning by the United States 
of "negotiations for a new basic treaty with Japan" and an attempt by the 
United States "generally to normalize Japanese-American relations". He con- 
cluded the article with the statement that "it would seem but the part of wisdom 
to assure the safety of our Pacific flank if we can do so with honor." 

The fallacy in the line of reasoning which leads to the conclusions thus 
advanced in terms of suggestion or proposal by such analysts of international 
relations as propose that the United States should pursue a policy of appease- 
ment toward Japan lies in the assumed — but not stated — major premise. What 
such analysts assume is that a country which is bent upon and is engaged in a 
major [/7] program of predatory acquisitive activity (Japan) and a 
country which is opposed to and is menaced by that kind of activity (the United 
States) can merely by the conclusion by their governments of an agreement become 
"friends" ; and, further, that if the United States and Japan would thus "become 
friends" the United States could expect Japan to respect and to safeguard 
American interests (and principles) in the Far East and the Pacific. — The 
authors of this suggestion — and assumption — apparently believe that two strokes 
of a pen on one piece of paper by two diplomats will transform a predatory nation 
overnight into a contented, peace-loving and peace-supporting power ; also, that 
a treaty can take the place of and do the work of a Battle Fleet. — In the case of 
Mr. Lippniann, we find a writer who on June 4 had expressed regarding "the 
conquerors" (Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy) the view that ". . . we cannot 
buy their good will by tryiiig to appease them" expressing two days later with 
regard to Japan the view that we can not only gain Japan's good will but can 
make of Japan a friendly and to-be-relied-upon associate by a process of appease- 
ment. Query : Do any of these protagonists really believe that Japan's objec- 
tives and methods are today so unlike those of Germany t^at the United States 
and Japan could be "good friends" whereas and while the United States and 
Germany [18] cannot possibly be friends; that the United States must 
in the interests of its own security oppose Germany but at the same time not 
only should not oppose but should aid and support Japan? 

Mr. Lippmann affirms that "Japan and the United States have nothing to gain 
and a very great deal to lose by going to war — or even by standing opposed as 
if they might be going to war" and that "it follows that there is no conflict 
between Japan and the United States which is not reconcilable by diplonaacy", 
whence — that the United States has nothing to gain by opposing Japan. By 
the same tokens, there were not long ago those who, notwithstanding all of the 
evidence which was available to the whole world regarding the objectives and 
the methods of the Nazi leaders of Germany, contended that Great Britain and 
France had nothing to gain by standing opposed to Germany. By the same 
tokens, all conflict between Nazi Germany and Great Britain could be recon- 
ciled by diplomacy. (An effort based on that principle was made at Munich.) 
By the same tokens, all conflict between any "have" nation or nations and any 
"have not" nation or nations could be reconciled by diplomacy. By the same 
tokens, all conflict between capital and labor, and all conflict between political 
parties, and all conflict between the law-abiding members and the predatory 
members [19] of any con>munity could be settled by diplomacy; the con- 
flict between Japan and China could be settled by diplomacy ; Japan's desire to 
possess the Netherlands East Indies could be disposed of by diplomacy ; and 
"fifth column" activities anywhere and everywhere could be disposed of by 
diplomacy. 



1996 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

The essence of Mr. Lippman's proposal is that the United States should enter 
upon a "negotiation which might lead through a new com/mercial treaty to a 
political understanding", which would leave the American and the Japanese 
navies "free to maintain order and stability in their respective spheres of 
influence". 

From 1911 to January 26. 1940 the United States and Japan had a commercial 
treaty and they had a nun>ber of other treaties — including the Nine Power Tx'eaty 
and the Kallogg Pact — which collectively were intended to regulate contacts, to 
ensure fair and equal treatment, and to maintain peace. Nothwithstanding the 
existence of these treaties, Japan embarked upon a procedure of conquest and 
did all sorts of violence to American nationals, American property, and American 
rights and interests in general. The American Government protested and pled. 
Japan went right on. Finally the American Government denounced the com- 
mercial treaty in order that it might have its hands free to take, [20] if and 
when it saw fit, retaliatory action by measures short of war. For the first time, 
the Japanese becamie alarmed and began to show some respect for American 
rights in the Far East. Treaties had proved ineffective. Entreaties had proved 
ineffectual. Fear of possible material pressures finally had, and has been 
having, some influence. What the Japanese leadership today wfints now above 
all things is to be relieved of all possibility of pressure from the United States — 
in order that Japan may "go the limit" toward completing her conquest of 
China and taking possession of various great storehouses of natural resources 
in eastern Asia and the western Pacific. The conclusion of a new commercial 
treaty at this time would be of tremendous advantage to Japan and would give 
the Ignited States nothing comparable in diplomatic or economic value. 

A division of the Pacific into a United States "sphere of influence" on the east 
and a Japanese "sphere of influence" on the west would, it is true, leave the 
Japanese Navy ''free" in the thus-created Japane.se "sphere", but it would not 
in any way ensure that the said navy would "maintain order and stability" in 
the said "sphere" or that Japan would respect in that area American, or British, 
or French, or Netherland. or Soviet, or Chinese rights and interests. 

In passing, attention may be called to the fact that [21] the Japanese 
Navy was "free to maintain crder and stability" in the Far East in 19.31; the 
Japanese Navy has been "free" to do that thing ever since; it is "free" to do it 
today ; and it has not done that : it has done just the opposite. 

The Japanese have today no higher regard for a diplomatic arrangement, an 
international commitment, or a treaty provision than have the Germans. Some 
of the Japanese leaders may talk of or may make commitments, their Foreign 
Office may negotiate treaties, but the objective of their real leaders, the Array 
and the Navy within the "military element", is expansion of Japanese political 
authority and economic power — and Japanese armed force will move on and 
will take where it can, when it can, and as it can, being checked only by opposi- 
tion to it of material obstacles which are or which it fears to be too great for 
it to overcome. 

It is not "the truth" that "there is no conflict between Japan and the United 
States which is not reconcilable by diplomacy". The United States stands for 
peace on a basis of law, of order, of security, of justice, et cetera. Japan is bent 
today upon driving occidental interests out of eastern Asia and the w-^stern 
Pacific, and is bent upon establishing in eastern Asia and the western Pacific 
by whatever processes may contribute thereto a Japanese hegemony or a 
great and constantly greater .Japanese political empire. 

[22] There is no need or occasion for the European war to come to the 
Pacific — unless Japan chooses to bring (put) it there and the United States 
permits Japan to do so. There is no need or occasion for war to come between 
the United States and Japan — ^unless Japan goes further than she has already 
gone (which is too far) in moves of aggression and of general disregard and 
destruction of the rights and interests of the United States (and of the world 
at large). While the United States is in position to use economic pressures 
against Japan and to use a Fleet against Japan, there exist material obstacles 
which tend to restrain Japan's leaders. If the United States were to conclude 
with Japan, now, a new treaty ensuring Japan against economic pressures, 
and/or if the United States removes its Battle Fleet from the Pacific, one or 
both of those obstacles will thereby haA-e been removed, and the temptation to 
Japan's effective leadership ("the military") to make the most of the oppor- 
tunity thus presented will have been increased. Mere concluding of agreements 
at this moment will not suffice to convince the Japanese leadership that "friendly 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1997 

relations" [2S] with the United States henceforth are preferable to the 
gathering in of s^wils rendered, by the coneludinji of agreements, the more readily 
available now and immediately available. 

We should, of course and by all means, try to prevent consummation of a closer 
association by Japan of herself with the axis powers. But, we should do more 
than that, we should try to prevent advance by Japan toward further acts of 
aggression and acquisition by herself on her own account and for her own 
advantage — all of which acts, when and as engaged in, will contribute toward 
the working t)Ut of the plans of Nazi Germany. We have already done much 
toward restraining Japan. Simultaneously, ourselves exercising a great measure 
of self-restraint, we have been endeavoring to lead the Japanese to see that a 
course of aggression will in the long run be not profitable where as a course of 
procedure by peaceful means could be highly prolitable. We have talked con- 
sistently and constantly of the imjwrtance of principles. Should we now make a 
wholesale abandonment of the said principles — thereby conceding that, not force, 
but mere frar of force is mightier than principles and mightier than professed 
devotion to principles? 

Reduced to simplest terms, what the advocates of an appeasement propose is 
that we abandon our Far Eastern policy [24] of a hundred years' standing, 
that we abandon the idea of the integrity of sovereignties in the Far Bast, 
that we abandon such responsibilities as were and are ours under those which 
remain in effect of the Washington Conference treaties, that we give up the 
idea of befriending China toward resistance to Japan and thus toward defense 
of various of our principles and interests, and that we accord Japan, deliberately 
and by process of agreement, what would amount to a free hand in the western 
Pacittc and eastern Asia. Now, if we wish to make these various abandonments, 
and if we wish to give Japan a free hand, we can do both very easily and without 
going to the trouble of or incurring the disadvantages which would accrue from 
doing so by concluding an agreement ; all that we would need to do would be 
to announce on our own part that we abandon the field, to withdraw by our 
own orders the few ships that we have in Far Eastern waters and the few 
marines that we maintain at three points in China, and to move our Fleet from 
the Pacific into the Atlantic. 

Assume, for the sake of thorough exploration, that it were granted in principle 
that we should negotiate some kind of an agreement with Japan. What might 
the provisions of that agreement be? What should they be? By answers to 
these two questions the appeasement thesis might be and [25] should be 
tested. These two questions should stand at the beginning of Mr. Lippmann's 
statement of that thesis. They should be answered before he proceeds with 
the contention that the problem of Japanese-American relations can be solved 
by diplomacy alone and that the action for which he contends would produce 
the solution. 

The whole of the appeasement contention rests — for whatever else it may be 
worth — upon an a.ssumption that, promises having been given by the United 
States and promises having been given by Japan, the United States could there- 
after assume and e-'pect that Japan would live up to or perform within the limits 
of her promises. In the light of the history of the past forty-five years, no 
such assmuption could with warrant be made, and reliance upon any such 
assumption would be folly. 

Japan has it within her power to ensure the peace of the Pacific. The United 
States does not have that within its power. Japan needs only to desist from 
certain courses in which she is engaged and to refrain from certain courses 
toward which she is inclined — and there will be peace in the Pacific. This means 
that the problem is a problem not of giving pledges, it is a problem of action, 
a problem [26] of behavior, a problem of performance. Action gives 
evidence and proof of intention. Assurances of intention constitute neither 
evidence nor proof. 

The conflict which is raging today is between two great groups of major 
powers, is between two ideologies, is between tho.se nations which have and 
which wish to hold and those nations which are out to "take" — and this conflict 
is world-wide.' On one side are China. Great Britain,. and the United States: on 
the other side are Japan, Germany and Italy. The conflict is raging not alone 
in Europe but also in the Far East. The three powers of the to-have-and-to hold 
group are menaced not alone in Europe and on the Atlantic but in eastern Asia 
and on the Pacific. Whatever any one of the to-have-and-to-hold group loses is 
a loss for all members of the group : and whatever any one of the "take" group 
gains is a gain for all members of that group. 



1998 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

The United States, as a party to this conflict, must function not on one front 
only but on tivo fronts. In the event of our "abandoning" any angle of our 
western fi-ont (that is, the western Pacific and the Far East) — and of Japan's 
gaining thereby, and of China, Great Birtain, et cetera, losing thereby — bj' just 
so much will the position [27] of the "have" group of which the United 
States is a member be weakened and the "take" group (Japan, Germany and 
Italy) be strengthened. 

"We cannot buy . . . (the) good will" of the Nazis or the good will of the 
Fascists. Nor can we buy the good will of the Japanese military leadership. 
"We can (could), however, earn their (the Nazis' and the Fascists') contempt" 
and we can (could), by like efforts of attenipt to "appease" them, "earn the 
contempt" of Japan's military leadership. And more, we could also earn the 
contempt of the British, the contempt of various of our own "neutral" associates, 
the contempt and resentment and bitterness of 4(X) million plus Chinese, the 
contempt of the whole world of today and of tomorrow. 

[28] IV. Encouraging China to Make a Compromi.se or Adverse Settlement 
with Japan. 

The Chinese do not wish today to make peace with Japan on the basis of any 
compromise which would leave Japanese armed forces in China. The Chinese 
are war weary, but no more so than are the Japanese. The Chinese are not 
confronted with any imminent necessity of making an early peace with Japan. 
Given a free held, the Chinese have at least even chances of outlasting the Japa- 
nese in a struggle which is highly burdensome to each of the two countries. 
It has been demonstrated during the past three years that the Japanese belief 
and representation that Japan is capable of creating in China conditions of peace, 
law, order, and stability are not well founded : the Japanese have shown them- 
selves psychologically unqualified for the performance of that task. A "peace" 
settlement concluded between China and Japan now and under existing circum- 
stances would have no solid foundations or anchorage. It would be inconsistent 
with American relation.ships and with U. S. objectives in relationships with the 
Far East, and it would not on balance profit the United States. 

[2.9] Excerpt frym letter by a Chinese business man to Mr. Walter Lipp- 
mann, dated June 6, 1940 

"Carried to its logical conclusion, your thesis undoubtedly means that China 
should surrender and, like Denmark, Holland, Belgium and Norway cooperate 
with the aggressor. It would also signify that China's three years of desperate 
resistance in the name of democracy, with its unprecedented sacrifice of human 
lives and property, should be halted because of a European conflict which may 
affect America. In ca.se any ('hinese leader follows your logic and leads his 
people into the arms of Japan, what assurance woiild America have that the 
Japanese war machine, with the cooperation of 4r)0,(X)0,000 Chinese who have 
proved themselves sterling fighters, would not wage war on all Pacific countries? 
Does such an eventuality relieve America? 

* * * * * * « 

"As I view the desperate world situation, there is no easy short-cut to a peace- 
ful settlement. Short-cuts no matter how sincere and well-intended, as amply 
demonstrated by the Munich agreements, only prolong the agony. The United 
States cannot fight aggression in one ocean an4 condone it in the other. To do so, 
simply destroys America's traditional foreign policy to no practical purpose. 

"The Chinese during the past few years have successfully [SO] resisted 
the aggressions of a mechanized army considered second only to Hitler's in 
striking power. They have done this with little else but their human flesh, 
indomitable spirit and courage. Thus far, they have demonstrated that vitality 
and spirit can count for ju.st as nmch as mechanized material in modern warfare. 
They have kept the Japanese so occupied and exhausted that Japan today dares 
not move as rapidly as she would like in the direction of the Allied and American 
possessions ill the Pacific. Japan, I assure you, cannot be placated by momentary 
measures of appeasement, and she fears nothing more than the Chinese will to 
continue their undying resistance. America's greatest assurance in the Pacific 
is the maintenance of this Chinese will to resist." 

[31] Excerpts from Chicago Daily Netos editorial, June 10, 1940. 

"a deal with japan ? 

"In order to make a deal with Japan today, we would have to condone, openly 
or covertly, its treaty-breaking invasions of China. We would have to betray 
not only our Chinese friends, but also more than a hundred years of American 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1999 

policy in the Far East. We would be imitating, in effect, the worst and most 
dangerous aspects of Britain's 'appeasement' efforts. 

"And once we had made the deal, of what use would It be? Japan has de- 
liberately broken one solemn treaty with us. Why sliould it l<eep another, any 
longer than its own interest required? What guarantee would we have that, at 
the first opportunity, Japan would not gang up against us with the rest of our 
enemies? ♦ 

"No, there is only one way for us to be secure. We must make ourselves able, 
by combined sea and air power, supported by a sufficient army, to wage war, if 
need be, both in the Atlantic and the Pacific. No diplomacy, no scheming, no 
wishful thinking, no device, nothing whatever can save us now from this painful 
necessity, sl;ort of a miracle — the miracle of an Allied victory over Hitler." 

[32] Excerpts from article by Raymond Clapper, published June 13, 1940. 

NO DEAL WITH JAPAN 

"Because we are afraid, we should try to appease Japan. How? By selling 
out now. By turning adrift to the tender mercies of the yellow race Australia, 
New Zealand, the Philippines, the Dutch East Indies and all way stations. 

"In ord^r to buy Japan's friendship and supiwrt, we would put the seal of our 
approval upon such a betrayal. We would scuttle on every. international ideal. 
For our treachery we would gain nothing but a Munich, to last until the day 
when Japan wanted something else that had not been included in the bargain. 
Then Japan would take whatever it was that she wanted and pay no more heed 
to her deal with us than she paid to her treaty pledges wlien she went into 
Manchukuo, into China proper, or when she fortified the mandate islands in the 
Pacific. 

"If Japan is determined to extend her domination in the Far East, at least 
let it not be done with our approval, as part of a deal with us. Let us not be a 
party to it in a craven act that would instantly be a tip-off to the totalitarian 
powers that we had lost our nerve as completely as the British lost theirs in the 
early 1930s, when [33] Japan went into Mancliukuo, or as the French 
lost theirs when they permitted Hitler to reoccupy the Rhineland. 

"Don't think that a deal wiih japan would not be recognized as a tip-off to all 
Latin America, a tip-off that the third great democracy also was on the run. 
Are we to invite every Latin American country to begin saying of us, as the 
little nations of Europe did of Britain, that they cannot depend upon us? Are 
we to give them that encouragement to rush into deals with Hitler as the new 
rising force that is to replace the United States as the protector of the Western 
Hemisphere? 

* * « * 41 « * 

"When France and England have been crushed, only the United States and our 
system on the Western Hemisphere, plus what we may take over from the 
British Empire, will be left standing in the way. 

"In this situation we can trust nobody but ourselves. We can trust only our 
own force. We want none of the false sense of security that a deal with Japan 
would give us, a deal that might prove as treacherous as Munich. Japan is 
playing the same game as the other crowd and we should be foolish to deceive 
ourselves. We must make busy b?ing the strong neighbor in the Western 
Hemisphere. No neighbor now is a good neighbop unless he is strong. We need 
guns, not treaties." 

[34] Full text of Chicago Daily News editorial, June 17, 1940. 

"THE APPEASEBS 

"The agitation for appeasement of Japan's ambiti<ms in Asia by American 
concession^ is growing among those who seem determined to force the United 
States into the fatal course taken by Britain under Neville Chamberlain. 

"The proponents of this idea seem to think that Japan wcmld be reasonable 
in its demands, and that, having signed an agreement with the United States, 
Japan would abide by it. Chamberlain had the same delusions about Germany 
and Italy. We have had agreements and treaties with Japan before. But they 
have been honored in the breach rather than in the observance. 

"The philosophy behind this agitati<m is exemplified by a thoughtful editorial 
that appeared in the Chicago Tribune of May 30. Excerpts from it are cited here- 



2000 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

with. Accompanying them in italics are excerpts from the speeches of Neville 
Chamberlain : 

" 'The United States aiul Japan can come to a friendly understanding. There 
is no obstacle in the way except the determination of some Americans to domi- 
nate Japan's policy in China. • 

" 'And yet whatever differences there may be between [S5] us and other 
nations on that subject, do not forget that we are all members of the human 
race. . . . There must be something in common between us. 

" 'Japan needs peace with the United States. 

"'There is not a country or government that wants to see a European war. 

" 'Japan would be disposed to be more reasonable if Chinese ports, and forts 
were not in European hands. 

" 'If we can bring these four nations into friendly discussion, into a settle- 
ment of their differences, ice shall have saved the peace of Europe for a 
generation. 

" 'The Japanese are more willinjr now than ever to come to settle.iient in 
China. * * * 

"'Before saying fareircU to Herr Hitler * * ♦ he repeated to me icith great 
earnestness what he had already said at Herehtesgaden, namely, that this was 
the last of his territorial ambitions in Europe and that he had no wish to 
inHude in the Reich people of othn- races than Oermans * * * that he wanted 
to be friends ivith England. 

" 'America may be able to aid China a great deal more effectively if it isn't 
quarreling with Japan than it can by keeping up a futile bombardment of threats 
and hard words. * ♦ * 

" 'What we did was to save her (Czechoslovakia) from annihilation and give 
her a chance of new life as a new state. * * * Therefore I think the govern- 
ment deserves the approval of this House for their conduct of affairs in this 
crisis which has saved Czechoslovakia from destruction and Europe from 
Armageddon.' 

"The italicized paragraphs exemplify the Chamberlain philosophy of appease- 
ment and delusion. The alternate piiragraphs exemplify the philosophy of 
those who would follow the Chamberlain program here. We know how falla- 
cious the (^hamberlain philosophy was in the case of Britain. We should know 
liow fallacious it would be if applied to our own affairs." 

[37] Excerpts from letter by Carl Crow, dated June 14, 1940, published 
in Lynchburg, Virginia, News, June 17. IIMO. 

"No sensible per.son can disagree with the argument of Mr. Walter lappniann 
that peace between the United States and Japan is highly desirable. But in 
his contention that we should hasten to conclude an amicable arrangement 
because of the dangers which threaten us Mr. Lippmann ignores consideration 
of facts which must be better known to him than to most Americans. 

"The most important of these is that, as has so often been -emphasized by 
Japan, the oidy basis of friendship she will recognize is based on approval of 
her iK>licy in East Asia, involving the (•on(iuest <»f China. Unless we are pre- 
pared to do that anything else we might do would be as futile as Mr. Cham- 
berlain's appeasement policy at Munich. Any move we might make toward the 
conclusion of a new trade treaty woidd be interpreted by the war lords who 
rule Japan as an evidence of weakness and instead of making relations better 
would only make them worse. It would only encourage them to further aggres- 
sions and would be a disservice to the Japanese people who.se progress is halted 
by their own war lords. 

******* 

[38] "Mr. Lippmann appears momentarily to have forgotten that Hitler's 
attack on Europe, Japan's invasion of China and Mussolini's sword rattling were 
all preceded by the so-called "anti-Comintern pact" whereby the three became 
partners in a program which was not officially disclosed but has been made 
clear by actions. It was as a result of that pact and supplemental agreements 
that Mussolini is helping Hitler. The only reason Japan is not playing the 
same part is that she is bogged down in China and the American fleet is in the 
Pacflc. Give Japan a free hand and she would at once abandon her policy of 
non-involvement — a policy that has been forced on her by her inability to carry 
out any other. With the open or secret aid of Japan to Hitler the chances of 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2001 

an Allied victory would be greatly lessened. Indeed we might face much graver 
dangers than those which inspire Mr. Lippmann's fears — a victorious Germany 
on the Atlantic, a victorious Italy in the Mediterranean and a victorious Japan 
on the Pacific, all bound together by a secret agreement and each inspired by 
the same conviction that democratic government should be crushed. 

"Faced by a menace of that seriousness, what further measures of appease- 
ment could Mr. Lippmann suggest?" 

[39] Excerpts from article by Major George Fielding Eliot, published 
June 27, 1940. 

"major E3LI0T TAKES SHABP ISSXJE WITH MOVES TO APPEIASE JAPAN 

"There are some voices in this country now raised in favor of an American 
'understanding' with Japan, as a means for freeing our hands in the Atlantic. 
Why there should be any more virtue in a Japanese signature on a treaty 
today than there was on certain previous occassions of historic note it is 
difficult to understand. 

"If we are compelled temporarily, or permanently, to abandon certain of our 
Pacific or Far Eastern interests by the necessity of concentrating our strength 
in the Atlantic, then we must do so. But let us be perfectly clear in our minds 
about what we are doing. Le us be sure that what we are abandoning is not 
worth more than what we can save by making any drastic changes in our dis- 
positions. 

"We must do the best we can, with a critical situation and inadequate military 
force, but let us not commit the crowning folly of again putting our faith in 
scraps of paper bearing totalitarian seals and promises." 

\40] Excerpts from Oakland, California, Tribune editorial, June 19, 1940 

"firmness in the far east 

"What the United States' policy will be in the event of new Japanese aggres- 
sion we do not know. But this much is patent on the basis of past experience : 
Any appeasement of Japan on the part of this country will defeat its ends by 
encouraging the Tokyo chauvinists, by giving the impression that we are weak, 
and by undermining our prestige with South American States who look to us 
for protection. It also is clear that we cannot stop Japan imless we are pre- 
pared for a protracted naval warfare in the Pacific and unless we use the great 
British naval base at Singapore; Whatever happens, we must be uncompromis- 
ing in our opposition to the pilfering of Franco-British territory in the Far 
East." 

\41] Excerpts from article by Barnet Nover, published June 28, 1940. 

"china fights on" 

"The spirit of appea.sement is not dead ; it has merely shifted its habitation. It 
is being urged that the United States come to terms with Japan in order that our 
fleet might be free for any eventualities that might occur on this side of the 
hemifjphere. It may be that, faced by threats from botli Asia and Europe, we 
shall have to abandon Asia and concentrate our force to resist incursions from 
the other side of the Atlantic. 

"But let us be under no illusions as to what that would mean ; it would be a 
capiti^lation to Japan and a capitulation which, in no sense, would add to our 
security. 

"At the moment when she is still very vulnerable we would be permitting 
Japan to become invulnerable: at tlie moment when Japan is still at our mercy 
we would, b.v a policy of appeasement toward her, be placing ourselves at Japan's 
mercy. And at no tiive can we for a moment forget that the German threat from 
the Ea.st is paralleled by the Japanese threat from the West. 

"As long as Great Britain fights on, the Nazi danger to us is limited; as long 
as China fights on, we have relatively little to fear from Japan. But China, 
like Great [^2] Britain, is fighting our battles which is why out of selfish- 
ness no less than out of sentimental considerations, we must give whatever aid we 
can to both and desert neither. 



2002 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

"It is always the counsel of wisdom when facing grave emergencies to limit 
one's risks; but nothing is gained and much is lost when, in an attempt to limit 
risks, we stand a real chance of multiplying them." 

[43] Excerpts from La Crosse, Wisconsin, Tribune editorial, June 22, 1940. 

"no appeasement heee" 

"Loss of prestige is one of Great Britain's chief liabilities at the present 
moment. With each concession, with each step backward, with each attempt to 
stave off danger, England lost face. In the case of the island empire, ill pre- 
pared as events proved, there was little else to do. 

"But the United States is not now in a situation where it need proclaim to 
the whole world it is afraid. The nation is unprepared admittedly to fight in 
two oceans. But there is no doubt that if this country gears itself for defense — 
and it is gearing itself for defense — It can meet any challenge. 

"It will not do to announce to the world that the last great democracy has 
lost its nerve. South America must have faith in the integrity of the United 
States and in this nation's ability to back up the Monroe doctrine. Japan will 
be less a menace if she fears America that if America fenrs her. Any agreement 
with Japan which revealed this nation's desire for protection would be tantamount 
to an invitation to attack. 

"The Fascist nations put practical considerations before [44] ideals or 
principles. A treaty based on the fright oof the United States would remain in 
effect only so long as Japan found it profitable. 

"The world has been shown with terrible clarity the effects of such a peace 
as the Munich peace. Let not this nation make Great Britain's mistake." 

[45] Excerpts from an article by Robert North in Amerasia, July 1940. 

"AN AMEBICAN-JAPANESE AXIS IS PROPOSED 

"Appeasement of Japan and withrlrawal of the United S^^ates naval forces from 
the Pacific is urged by the Chicago Tribune, the New Yo''k D^Uy News and Walter 
Lippraann's column in the New York Herald Tribune. They propose negotiation 
of a new commercial agreement and diplomatic alignment with Japan. 

" 'Be nice to Japan now, and we may well be able to double our fleet's effective 
strength by making friends with the Japanese Navv,' says the News. 'It seems 
to us the time has come for us to try to shut our back door, so to speak, before 
sending our best fighting men, guns, planes and ships out our front door to try to 
win another war for the Allies,' it says editorially. So it recommends that we 
'insure ourselves against a two-front war if we can. by renewing our trade treaty 
with Japan and soft-pedaling the moral indignation over Japan's aggressions in 
China for a while.' 

"These proposals, if carried into effect, would leave the defense of our Pacific 
coast to the Japanese Navy, instead of our own. San Franc'sco, Spo*^*^'*^. Los 
Angeles. Portland would be protected by Japanese promises. So would Hawaii, 
the Philippines, and our trade and investment position in [46] the Far 
East, not to speak of Alaska and the Pacific approaches to Canada, Mexico and 
all points south in this hemisphere. 

"These newspaper strategists give us for defense against Japanese aggression 
the Japanese Navy. On its decks will stand J-ipanese admirals, beaming friend- 
ship because civilians at home have signed another treaty. 

"Why not go the whole way, gentlemen, and shut the front door on the Atlantic, 
also, by making a similar agreement with Hitler? Let bygones be bvgones with 
him. as with Japan, and while we are at it treble our navy by adding the German 
and Italian fleets to ours along with the Japanese. Then with Hitler protecting 
us against Hitler onthe East, and Japan protecting us agairst Japan on the West, 
we could get away from all this bother about national defense. We could use 
our new trade agreements to strengthen our new allies for our own protection. 
We could build them up economically, just as the Allies built up Hitler, and hope 
for the best." 

• •••••• 

"If Japan should emerge from this war with her industrial machine intact, she 
would no longer be a competitor merely in knick-knacks, toys, light bulbs and 
other small consumers' goods. She has shifted the center of gravity of her pro- 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2003 

duction from ligbt to heavy industry. The capacity of her heavy industrial plant 
has more than doubled since 1931". 

• •••**• 

[.^7] "Chinese resistance has not only prevented the proposed development 
of Chinese cotton, but has compelled importation of foreign growths for Chinese 
mills. But if, with the help of a new American trade agreement; Japan should 
succeed in subjugating China, or even in establisliing a firm foothold in North 
China alone, the first condition for complete independence of American cotton will 
have been met. China is the third largest cotton producer. 

"Success of the New Order means not only that Japan would be lost as our 
third largest customer by obtaining new sources of supply of the things she buys 
here; it means that she would be equipped for cut-throat competition in those 
very price markets, Latin America and Asia, which offer us the only opportunity 
for substantial expansion. At a time when the European market appears about 
to be closed to our goods, this would lead toward American export strangulation. 
The effects on our entire economic s.tructure are incalculable." 

[48] Full text of article by Walter Lippmann in New York Herald Tribune 
of June 6, 1940. 

TowABD A Peace With Japan 

Although the attention of the Americas is fixed upon Europe, they must never 
forget that the American continents are a great island set amidst the oceans 
of the world. On the west the ocean washes the coasts of Asia and of the 
island empires of the east. 

The only Navy which the American hemisphere possesses is now in the west- 
ern ocean. In that same ocean there is the Japanese navy. As betweea the 
United States and Japan, two nations which have never been at war, there has 
developed in recent years a growing opposition of policies, interests and diplo- 
matic principle. Their relationship today is obviously unstable. The naval 
treaty has lapsed. The commercial treaty has been abrogated. In respect to 
China the two countries have taken positions which are in theory irreconcilable. 
In respect to the Netherlands Indies their public declarations promising respect 
for the status quo are ambiguous, and in the light of conceivable developments, 
exceedingly precarious. 

To put the matter more plainly, the two countries confront each other across 
the vast expanse of the Pacific, each having taken a position where untoward 
circumstances or an uncalculated overt act might plunge both of them into 
a prolonged and exhausting struggle. In such a struggle l-iSa] neither 
Japan nor the United States would be serving its vital interests. Both nations 
would be sacrificing them. The Japanese, already suffering from the Chinese 
war, would by engaging and exhausting themselves still further make them- 
selves vulnerable to the only great power, namely Russia, which can strike by land 
and by sea and by air at the very heart of the Japanese empire. The United 
States, by drifting into, such a war, would be engaging the Navy for years to 
come in a confused and indecisive campaign on the other side of our world ; yet 
at that very moment the security of the American continents may require the use 
of the whole Navy to guard those strategic points in the Atlantic Ocean which 
must be held if this hemisphere is to be defended. 

It is now a kind of suicidal madness for the two nations to contemplate even 
the possibility of letting the existing tension and the existing conflicts of interest 
and principle de^'elop into a war. For in such a war both would be sacrificing 
much greater principles than they were upholding and both would be jeopardizing 
fatally interests which are infinitely more important than those they were 
defending. 

♦••*••• 
Some, perhaps, will feel that to express this candid view of Japanese-Ameri- 
can relations is to display a deplorable weakness at a time when only strength 
and firmness are good currency in international affairs. I do not think it is 
weakness to make the plain truth the basis of national [48b] policy. 
The Japanese know their own strength and their own weaknesses and they 
know our strength and our weaknesses ; and we know the same of them and of 
ourselves. Neither they nor we can afford to bluff. Neither we nor they can 
afford to provoke the other. This is the truth. And on the truth we shall both 
do well to found our policies. 



2004 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Lest this opinion be ascribed to a sudden fear engendered by the critical state 
of Europe, I hope I may be pardoned for saying that many of us have held 
and expressed this view for a long time, ever since the outbreak of the European 
war was manifestly inevitable. For it has been clear to us that whatever our 
sympathies and interests in the Far East, a great European war for the domi- 
nation of the Western World would affect directly and vitally the security and 
the independence of this hemisphere. We have held that, by comparison, our 
interests in the Far East would prove to be secondary, however important they 
might under more normal circumstances appear to be. We have, therefore, 
l;e!d that it was perilous and in the highest degree unstatesmanlike to let develop 
an irrec(meilable conflict with Japan, to conceal from ourselves the immense 
gravity of such a conflict, to exacerbate the tension by threats and by declara- 
tions that are too absolute to be negotiable. 

* • • • ' • • « 

We have held that this provocative attitude was downright folly especially at a 
time when the country was doped and duped by a notion of "neutrality" in Europe 
which might compel it to stand by and risk the collapse of Allied sea iK)wer. We 
have argued that the policy of the majority of the Foreign Relations Committee 
of the Senate during the month of Jul.^' a year ago was a classic example of how 
misguided men can imperil the security of a nation. 

For in that fatal month the committee challenged Japan in the Pacific by sup- 
porting, and even by inciting to, the abrocration of the commercial treaty, and by 
brandishing the threat of an embargo; in the very same weeks when it was pro- 
posing to risk a war with Japan, the same committee was refusing to lift the 
embargo on the sale of arms to the Allies on the ground that what happened 
to them was no concern of ours. It was a most awful case of not letting your 
right hand know what your left hand is doing, an almost incredible case of being 
blindly provocative in (me ocean and blindly supine in the other ocean. And 
unhappily the Administrati(m, which knew better, acquiesced in this utterly un- 
statesmanlike policy of challenging Japan in Asia while we were forbidden to 
support the Allies in Europe. 

******* 

The situation today is, of course, worse than it was then. But still the funda- 
mental interests involved are the same. It is still true that Japan and the 
United [4^d] States have nothing to gain and a very great deal to lose 
by going to war — or even by standing opposed as if they might be going to war. 
It is still true that our interests in the Far East are secondary to our interests 
in this hemisphere; because this is true, it follows that there is no conflict be- 
tween Japan and the United States which is not reconcilable by diplomacy. We 
should, therefore, recognize this truth and shou'd, I submit, enter immediately into 
friendly and conciliatory and candid negotiations with the Japanese for the 
avowed pur{)ose of preserving the peace in the Pacific. 

• ***•** 
This is not a time for bluffing and this is not a time for indulging that false 

pride which causes men to cling to an untenable position. We know that we must 
defend our security and our very independence in this hemisphere and in the 
Atlantic Ocean. We know that Japan has a greater interest in Asia than we 
have. Let us recofnize the fact. On the other hand, the Japanese position in 
the Far East is at least as difficult as is our position in the Western Hemisphere. 
Japan is at war with China. Japan has Soviet Russia for her nearest neighbor. 
Her commerce with this hemisphere is of critical importance to the standard of 
life of the Japanese people. 

In these considerations there are the essential elements of a negotiation which 
might lead through a new commercial treaty to a political understanding based 
on the principle [-'fSe] that the European war, which is also a European 
revolution, is not to be extended to the Pacific. We should aim high and aim 
far — at a new order of things in the Pacific in which, having adjusted our 
secondary cor.flicts, the two navies will cease to confront each other as potential 
antagonists and will be free to maintain order and stability in their respective 
spheres of influence. 

******* 

I have no way of knowing whether the Japanese nation will respond to such 
a change of American policy. My belief is that they might, that they do not 
regard themselves as our enemies, that they respect the power we are capable 
of developing and that the best of the Japanese leaders and the mass of the 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2005 

Japanese people desire peace with the United States. Even if this is not the fact, 
we shall never, I believe, regret having tried wholeiieartedly to preserve the 
peace in half the world. 

U9] Full text of New York Herald Tribune editorial, July 7, 1940. 

"japan's appeasement" 

It is rather amazing at this juncture, when the character of the totalitarian 
response to Mr. Chamberlain's appeasement policy is so familiar to every Amer- 
ican, and seems so inevitable in retrospect, to note that there is some agita- 
tion in Washington and elsewhere for the appeasement of Japan. It is suggested 
that we make concessions to the Japanese point of view and negotiate a new 
commercial treaty with Japan, so that we can turn our backs on the I'acific and 
give all our attention to the menace from Europe. These suggestions, which 
have had Senator \ andenberg's support, must be borne of ignorance of the 
Japanese point of view, of the workings of the Japanese military mind and of 
Japan's record of bad faith. 

It can be stated, without condition or reservation, that no price in terms 
of appeasement which this country could pay would buy Japanese good will or 
good behavior in the Pacific. 

To get even an empty promise of security from a Japan whose policies are com- 
pletely controlled by the uniformed expansionists, this country would have to 
recognize the justice of Japan's alienation of Manchuria and the martyrdom 
of China: recognize the legality of whatever position Japan can acquire in 
China through a campaign of indiscriminate slaughter and bestial savagery; 
recognize her police rights and special interests throughout eastern Asia, the 
adjacent waters [49(t] and the East Indies; and agree to withdraw all 
armed forces f : om that part of the world and leave to Japan's discretion what 
access we should have to markets and sources of supply between Hawaii, 
Singapore and the Aleutian Islands. And what would the pledges bought with 
SUCH concessions be worth in a crisis, if the fleet were withdrawn from the 
Pacific and if Nippon's militarists discovered that it was Japan's heaven- 
appointed destiny to expand in this direction? All pledges would then become 
as "in applicable" to Japan's mission in Hawaii, California, Alaska, or witherso- 
ever weak defenses invited her, as the nine-power treaty of 1922 is to con- 
tinental expansion. Remember that among Asiatic totalitarians, as among 
Europe's Asiatic-minded despots, a leaning toward appeasement is irrefutable 
evidence of weakness and fear; and remember that, when the gods have de- 
livered the weak into the hands of the strong, it is a breach of faith with divinity 
to keep faith with weakness. 

Those who contend that we should buy security from Japan contend that the 
President, Mr. Hull and the Senate's Foreign Relations Committee have made 
a bungle of our relations with Japan. This is untrue. The powers of the 
United States government to check Japane.se aggression and to resent flagrant 
breaches of faith have lieen limited, because of the nation's aversion to over- 
seas entanglements and its fear that strong measures would bring reprisals, 
and reprisals, war. [-i-^h] With such powers as it has had, Jiowever, it 
has put the only effective check on Japan's intense craving to profit by British, 
French and American preoccupation with the European situation. 

The denunciation of the commercial treaty a year ago brought to an end the 
campaign of persecution against Occidentals in China, just when it was being 
extended to American citizens. Japanese presistence in that campaign would 
have meant war. The .Administration's refusal to renew the treaty, since its 
expiration in January, and its retention of the right to impose disabilities upon 
Japanese trade which would have ham.strung the Japane.se Army have kept the 
militarists in as placatory a mood as any influence could have short of the pres- 
ence of an overwhelmingly superior army. The presence of the fleet in the 
Pacific has been the only sedative in the world that has restrained Japan's naval 
expansionists from adventures that would have brought the war into the 
Pacific. 



2006 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[50] Full text of Chicago Daily Tribune editorial May 30, 1940. 
"how to double the fleet in a week" 

We are talking excitedly of armaments and congress is voting the money in 
billion dollar bills. War material is coming out of the mills on Capitol hill, but 
it is not coming out of the factories, and for a long, long time it will not b^ com- 
ing out of them. In the meantime we are neglecting to improve a situation 
affecting our Pacific frontier. The opportunity is there, and if this nation would 
make u.se of it it could double the power of its fleet and do more in a short time 
to increase the strength of its defenses than it can do in a year of production, 
even on a 24 hour day and a 7 day week. 

The United States and Japan can come to a friendly understanding. There 
is no obstacle in the way except the determination of rome Americans to dominate 
Japan's policy in China. Japan needs peace with the United States. Japanese 
statesmen may be looking at the future with as much uncertainty as prudent 
Americans. In a world rapidly changing from its old historical trends and 
whirling off its old historical foundations, Japan may feel quite as dubious as. 
the United States. Many overtures have been made by Japan for an under- 
standing which would deal with what is real in the relations of the two countries 
and avoid what is superficially confl'cting. 

[.Wa] The United States at this time cannot afford to conduct its foreign 
relations wholly on moral preconceptions. America may be able to aid China 
a great deal more effectively if it isn't quarreling with Japan than it can by 
keeping up a futile bombardment of threats and hard words which have done 
the Chinese no good and can do America a great deal of harm. 

This country cannot afford to have an enemy in the Pacific. It is not necessary 
to have one there. Peaceable trade can be resumed and a peaceable understand- 
ing can be had. That understanding would rest upon material advantages which 
Japan would obtain from friendship with the United States and therefore would 
have the promise of an enduring understanding. 

Japan need not be driven into the German-Italian camp. If events progress 
as they have been doing in Europe the British and French interests in China will 
be canceled out. Japan then will have won a major campaign. Its policy has 
been, in a way, a duplicate of our Monroe doctrine. Japan has objected to the 
entrenchment of powerful European nations off its coast, just as we would object 
to the same thing in relation to our national life. 

Japan would be disposed to be more reasonable if Chinese ports and forts were 
not in European hands. China itself will be better satisfied to know that the 
foreigner [oOb] is out. The Japanese are more willing now than ever to 
come to a settlement in China which will relieve them of a protracted and expen- 
sive war. That may not be possible at once, but an understanding between the 
United States and Japan might do more to conciliate the Chinese question than 
can be expected from the present bellicose attitude of the American government. 

If we intend to keep our Pacific front bristling with threats the Japanese will 
look for their associations in other quarters and we know exactly where that 
will be. If the people in Washington who are rushing to arms in fear of a 
danger to the eastern front are sincere, if they mean to take precautions and 
provide against the future, they'll protect the western flank by making a friendly 
arrangement with the power which controls the far east. They won't so manage 
American affairs that trouble in the Atlantic will be accompanied by trouble in 
the Pacific. While they ai'e passing a billion dollar appropriation for the American 
navy they won't continue to make it necessary to keep the battle fleet on its 
Honolulu base. 

By accepting the Japanese overtures they can double the strength of the fleet 
immediately. The best defense policy of the United States could be written 
within a few weeks in a renewed trade treaty with the Japanese. That peaceable 
treaty would immediately enable the United States to use its [50c] fleet 
in the Atlantic if that's where it is needed. It would not be tied as now to the 
Pacific. In effect the strength of the fleet would be doubled by cutting half its 
problem away. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2007 

EXHIBIT NO. 97 

DEtPABfTMENT OF STATE, 

Adviser on Poutical Relations, 

September 21, 1940. , 

Mr. Welles : You state that both you and the Secretary feel that at this moment 
it would be undesirable for the Department to oppose the plans of the Navy to 
which the underlying memorandum relates. 

Vou ask for my reaction. , 

The proposal is susceptible of discussion from two points of view: (a) policy 
in foreign relations or (b) policy in relations between this Department and the 
Navy Department. 

There arises in my mind at once the question of which is more important, 
service of our objectives in the field of foreign relations, or service of some 
objectives particularly regarding wnich are not known to me in relations between 
this Department and the Navy Department. 

On the face of Mr. Chapin s memorandum it appears that the Navy Department 
is advancing merely a tentative proposal and that it is seeking in good faith 
our opinion of the proposal on its merits. If there exists some particular and 
good reason why we should regard this as a definitive "plan" of the Navy and 
why we should advance no expression of view unravorable to it, I am not aware 
of such fact. Again reverting to Mr. Chapin's statement [2] of the prob- 
lem, I am compelled to assume that Admiral Stark will wish to discuss the 
matter with you on its merits. 

The proposal calls for a withdrawal of the Fleet from Hawaiian waters and 
its engagement in maneuvers southward from San Diego for a period of approxi- 
mately 60 days. The objective is stated to be Fleet training. The problem 
involved would be apparently a problem of defending the Panama Canal against 
a naval attack. 

As you know, I have contended constantly and consistently during recent 
months that, the situation in the Far East having been and being what it is, the 
most advantageous point at which to hold our Fleet is Pearl Harbor. I believe 
that the presence of the Fleet at that point has rendered the Fleet more useful 
that would have been its presence at any other point, so long as disposal of the 
Fleet is simply for guard duty and general defense. I do not today share the 
view which I heard expressed a few days ago that the presenc*e of the Fleet at 
Honolulu no longer exarcises any restraining influence as regards the situation 
In'the Far East. I believe that withdrawal of the Fleet eastward would diminish 
our diplomatic influence as regards that situation — even though it be announced 
that the withdrawal is only, temporary, et cetera, et cetera. 

[3] That the Fleet must have training exercises is axiomatic. Announce- 
ment that the Fleet is engaged in a problem relating to defense of the Panama 
Canal against a naval attack would tend to emphasize the fact that our policy 
is essentially a policy of defense in our own waters (only). The suggestion is 
made that the problem be kept very secret. I do not believe it would be so kept. 
Whether there be or not be an announcement, and whether there be or not be 
secrecy, the Japanese would learn enough about the Fleet's whereabouts to enable 
Japanese naval experts to draw inferences, and their inferences would be that, 
as always suspected by them, we have no intention of having our Fleet operate 
in the western Pacific. 

I doubt the need at this time for training on a problem of defense of the Pan- 
ama Canal against a naval attack. In my opinion the Japanese have no thought 
whatever of any possibility of a launching by them in any near future of p. naval 
attack against the I'nited States or the Panama Canal or any part of South 
America. 

In Mr. Chapin's memorandum it is stated, presumably as an observation ad- 
vanced by the Navy Department, that there might be an alternative: "a minor 
Fleet problem could be conducted if necessary in waters adjacent to Hawaii". — 
In my opinion it would be preferable at this time that training of the Fleet be 
achieved througli such [^] an exercise than through the Pacific Coast exer- 
cise under reference. 

The Navy is at present engaged in an operation involving the sending of the 
vessels of the Fleet, one-third at a time, from Pearl Harbor to San Diego and 
return. There arises in my mind the question why, in the light of that fact. 



2008 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

contemplate at tEis time a bringing of the whole Fleet again back to the West 
Coast at about the moment when that operation will have been completed. 

In principle, I would always doubt the advisability of sending the whole pack 
of one's watchdogs to a hospital or to a training school at a time when there are 
an unusual number of ugly prowlers in one's neighborhood or in the neighbor- 
hood of one's outlying estates. My mind reacts adversely to suggestions which 
seem to me to involve such a procedure, just as it does to suggestions for the 
making of gestures without the accompaniment of definite and decided-upon 
objectives and at least tentatively decided-upon intentions. 

In these days, we have almost ceased to give consideration to questions of ex- 
pense. I would point out, however, that Fleet movements cost money. I for 
one would rather see such money as may be spent upon the Navy and its opera- 
tions spent in greater proportion upon construction of new planes [5] and 
of new ships than upon maximum possible expansion of training operations. 

/s/ SKH. 

PA/H : SKH : ZMK 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



2009 



Department of State 
the under secretary 

September 20, 1940 



PA/H - Dr. Hornbeck: 

Tlie Secretary and I both 
feel that at thle moment it 
would be undesirable for the 
Department of State to oppose 
the plans of the Navy which 
are obviously baaed on what 
in the judgment of the Navy 
is required by national defense. 

Please let me have your 
reaction. 



U:SW:IJ 




79716 O— 46— pt. 1( 



2010 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 




Department of State 




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EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2013 



2014 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

EXHIBIT NO. 98 

November 26, 1941. 
Memorandum for the President: 
Subject : Japanese Convoy Movement towards Indo-China. 

About a month and a half ago we learned through Magic that the Japanese 
Government informed the Vichy Government that they proposed to move ap- 
proximately 50,000 troops into Indo-China in addition to the 40,000 already there 
by previous agreement. 

Today information has accumulated to the effect that a convoy of from ten 
to thirty ships, some of 10,000 tons displacement, has been assembled near the 
mouth of the Yangtse River below Shanghai. This could mean a force as great 
as 50,000, but more probably a smaller number. Included in this ship concen- 
tration was at least one landing-boat carrier. The deck-load of one vessel con- 
tained heavy bridge equipment. Later reports indicate that this movement is al- 
ready under way and ships have been seen south of Formosa. 

The officers concerned, in the Military Intelligence Division, feel that unless 
we receive other infojmation. this is more or less a normal movement, that is, a 
logical follow-up of their previous notification to the Vichy Government. 

I will keep you informed of any other information in this particular field. 

(Signed) Henry L. Stimson, 

Secretary of War. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2015 

EXHIBIT NO. 99 

Department of State, 
Office of Far Eastern Affairs, 

September 26, 19U- 
Top Secret 

There is attached a page from the Congi-essional Record of September 21, 1944, 
in which there is a statement by Congressman Church in respect to the delivery 
of a message to the State Department on December 7, 1941, by Lieutenant 
Commander Kramer of the Navy Department. 

Our recollection of the matter is as follows : At about 10 : 00 a. m. on Decem- 
ber 7 Mr. Hornbeck, Mr. Hamilton and Mr. Ballantine came to the outer ofla.ce 
of the Secretary of State to discuss the general situation of relations with 
Japan. They were shown by Mr. John Stone, a Foreign Service officer then 
serving as an assistant in the office of the Secretary, a document the contents of 
which were pertinent to the subject of what they were going to discuss with the 
Secretary and which had then been delivered to the outer office by Lieutenant 
Commander Kramer, then on duty in the Navy Department. Lieutenant Com- 
mander Kramer was present in the room. The document contained no reference 
to any Japanese military movement Mr. Hornbeck, Mr. Hamilton and Mr. 
Ballantine are positive that no statement was made in their presence by 
Lieutenant Commander Kramer, as alleged, to the' effect that "this looks like a 
surprise attack upon Pearl Harbor and a midnight attack upon the Philippines-" 

The conversation in the Secretary's outer office was intermittent and scat- 
tered among those present in the room- In other words, each person was not a 
party to all of the conversation- Mr- Hornbeck has a distinct impression that 
there was brought up Japanese naval disposition with specific mention of most 
recent advices of Japanese naval movements in the Gulf of Siam- 

Mr. Hamilton recollects also that Lieutenant Commander Kramer remarked 
on that occasion, in reference to the matter of an appointment for the Japanese 
Ambassador to see the Secretary of State at 1 : 00 p. m. on December 7, that the 
naming of the hour might mean that it was the hour for some Japanese move- 
ment. No mention was made of Pearl Harbor or of Hawaii or of the Philippines. 

With regard to the statement that Lieutenant Commander Kramer then went 
to the White House and delivered the message, they have no knowledge whether 
this was a fact. 

/s/ JWB /s/ M. M. H. 

FE : Ballantine : HST 



2016 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

EXHIBIT NO. 100 



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^u««u<oae av akd nvr la o«na a* lUjUo J.JUL«JU of OkJl/a.^ iT«f*a*.ur - 
*;;'" «» 'ad lv»-. e* ct a ooo* at two In a ub'airlcia Milcttt had nir. ■«.«.. ore 

'3f* ^ < raaf u. .rTOKtsMtai: ao« nXl* r>t~t UaJUa . .'laid. Hki atatatf ua>t 

'^» ' - le t.ia JoAAOillr.: . ."loer of the a ana tha BaTlitKtor •lh-. 

V.^.l ..la a.l.JAta wds t a «u_lne»r— •; t !■ - -«» oocjiistatl cf .1 i' » 
and »!.« sMpnata. fia Motilttad that t.ia » .outxiat y«s of > tt.i.. 
x^ioh oparnxad r««a • nA:iar ahl^ tait rafuaad U> .l«a Uw imww oi 
'.^nika,:* o. t„r. lotl^r a:.!; or tha Aiatanaa at aaa ot Ma .Uaaiittor ;- 
atliM. tix. . .. «' ..uUior 3:.lp. .<:•& )i«bt...uei! ns to «^iet ^r t^ . . .- 
oxlte »4j 4«1,aal or aieolrlo proTwlia-i i^e rer.^oj to ruiawcr. < 
•t itad .lit m .ui! uavi i>fca4 *r>ore V.hu ..-~re<l r.tlaa' nraii. is.!^^ 

li t..c '. ;..tiueo Kara aa lus^ aa or>e . .in^rad llaa. Tco ouoA «ra>^e. c« 
' ould ..ot be : iaoad li> Uila aAaaar n» le oiiTii.ual ra«i.la*d j« ■%&> 
belli- :uapad. .ia atatcd t&at .« wlal^ tc oocaiilt auleltla mt& .laA w^x. 
'..■U-. M, at tt» tina at laodla.: oa auura '^ecuuoa of Uuri ;.«aalblJfty *. Isl. 
re V. l.-.ts>i I.', jiuxiz^ !i1j o3«a>>« aad rrJ«l£.Lag t.^ic Ji>;«Qeaa haCTj . -.jt 
:>' <.<!j . '.V >.c tad new baan dla.;raaa(! iu4 did i..ol v.aat ila nwaa or ils 
> i. i._ur.ntlc:; aact baas to Ja^jon. .li^i. uoe^jkll '«ntod au \,tm tiuooaaj 
ul I Ic. .Id l.aT»Ll oocxHiUtj hm! u^Jc t«v1r nttaak, .le ataVad tliat It 
.^vl teoi. ..iich lesa auocaasrul t. iir. \>my Uau antlol>at«d. R« ax^-raatyau 
<.ur: rlaa ut I.. is aixi i<e vaii aiiiicd « .at thay orl .l->all, axpaatad to 
RCCk,., llau, lo ra^iila.1, 1;. affwat, a loioalc-out blow tc y.-xir Iiavy. 

j. .It .ted t .at off .alloMS ~i«lu ti.itt «nil&g 

■j<:«'. -x ,ru..a-.x/. . ca ttnl litlp but t...it \.:gs dur^saaa aaa »o 
. ;.o -. . t .. T ..'. fcraad to ojiaii t.ls ouucib: tooor and ataol m 



c. x:^..^^ 



2018 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



In th« opao .Atah ».tl« iMmiln- haif mutmtr,;»A ii/m^rA* hi* tnro 
;«t. »a a raault of VU« aMwaTar In t2i« ahAirpy •••, Urn abippad o 
-;r*at d*al of wnUir doaa tha !Mti«h Alah trlpplod hi* notor «d4 t'<i» 
•otor fallura r««ili*4, of sour**, lo Ui« loMi of atjotrvl of t)i« 
•ukaaLTtiM) HiU ala balA« d»«x>«4 liit<. ■ fmt oT«r /.mi bIIo froi 'wl- 
lov* ricid. »!• Aiul hlM r«llo* of near strls'Fad, 4iv«4 lat« t .• 
o«*«n aaa aVtcayibNl t« vflA ashor*. 'I* ataiad ii«t ft* Xa«t ••■ 
hi* ahtpKata lo Uia :iaiv aurf. ■!» a'lnlttad ti.a .oaulblilt/ that 
Ul* i*mrj aVcikt anr>liu» t..a sulxnarlua, kMelt <iit^1 run ob U-e rnof 
(baoauaa :io aua not axare L. nt •.•ivai : liutaa .uk^. mibae ; ;aritly 
t w had and auiU lita miUnarlimi , ■>» atatad tiiat U.T9 <• ra no 
papara In tUa aabHarlDn <«,] aJultfcad t.i«t t.ila t> pa of auboarUia 
rapvaaautad oaaaatiaili> a aort of arilars^ad v^rlatloo of a oaa 
nan torpedo. :!« atatad ',j :roa«iA -.iataka was baUu? aapturad. 
Thla la tha rirat llii« 1 lave ftll».. j-irasc >. . ot adTliie Ja.'i;. 
about tiild. i I> a^c .;;il o.* Jurll: ' t .n c^^uriMi -! thta ^a^tlon- 
liiS, aiUoit aaa It* -uu b^ ti<o ui>l of L^o eaapoXtuX, lotar. .-''tara, 1' 
davalojiad Uuit t..l« <uu..,. ofilcor Ad txiaa knoHlad.ra of i^ac^Xla.., 
atiloii iia at firui dU oot ilacXoae. Latar on ba axplaluvd bla 
L»ax;^artaaaa L:. thia Uii..-ua. a \jj aayln-. tual., K.'.lla la tha .iiMIa 
aahool, bm h>^ jtudla<^ .r. ■.■ui, but In tha ^i^adangr, la axpaetatlor. 
of duty in tlia Ciilna ^aaa, 1m mi aalaatad Siilaaaa. 

i.. ^ .;raj»lj>', of a pattr offlaar'o : ht. rUot'a 

l&alKUla wad iaada b/ al.. aat :ia ox lalnad tina altailf Icanca uf Via 
trarluua iatalXs ct V..ia tlarlaa. 

'j. Ti4.are re.jalua tiia ix^iulbillty , If tha .'^aval 

autUorltlaa ii Vttjlra, t.ml I. la aubnarloa uiy /at ba loeatad aod 
ralaad ''or a»n liwiLlti, or ^co _.uloiil .latalls, av.c. 



-. J. 0. 






EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



2019 




Subject I 

1. 
hundre('. /urda fro; 
KolJ. At the tt, 
p.ncej ».ero eaju •' 
'Ive 3r fifty pou; 
ilr«ot hits v.er" i 
to 1 .-..l within ri: 
jub.'.frliie eld not 
jj>03ltlon» 

2. 
irxoTvieyifl -..'■ <' 
oil clic< . 
jli.ce 



■rm^ 



HUHtABOni SQCAIMKIIf ftXni 

U. a «. AaOOHADT. Wniti» 

Dfoemb^r 8, 19^1 

•i-A-l 

n«tt Intrllije:.ce Or'ioer. 

Invodtlgttlon of Japsinete 9uln^ rln« ^Vcirouad In 

?.i>3 .^b..r'nc w.i»ii Tir.-'- iljijt.?:.' •■vaB Lbout nix 
i \'.\et b«B:!., oft" -'e e.T^ c ." t' e run-way ut B«llows 
ie o.- n;^' w ;•: 1 ' ' ■■ ^i^' '., tiJ-e« Nary Utility 

.•" la 'r:- ,'1 _ ' ' -. ' - *- 7 be clth*r f..e-.ty- 

. ; b-'. ■■ ■ ■ : .^ftfl in pu1r ;. Ho 

•*. Tv • ^ . ,. ■♦-,*„ ...j.ullnj; ^^e 

t , ••' . • feit-rred Its 



The . 



l:.e 



•:.r. 1:: .. I-. -. 

oo...€ . i' . i.. o t 

ao dia*-! ._uis; i 

ft.-.d ubc..: ro-<r . 

J«)eti 

Tlie c 

..■u3 u .-...- „ : 

v,u3 .:..;\.;. l^y .. 
of W'..'. : .:■... . 
frOj 1 ■» e 1 DC u '. * " 
be stfcu fro.i ■>... 



" ^1 ^ .. :- - /i 3?' t .'iC 

.. ■' t .... - I ,-i3 .bl- v3 

. ■" ' .-- -j .11 blaci: \.-ith 

.hftr "eet ii. leujtl., 

^.- ■ 11 j.eriscope pro- 
;;e'-rta * : te periscope 3ha«r8. 
■ " Df all '^ub;j '-i:je'i anl there- 
o. . At Lhe tlue, the subioferlne 
. -.-l3C'i.;e she; V- coiil.i^ out 
•, L."ti;-a of 1.16 \.i,ves. Jud^ln^ 
T I .--.■ .:.rcl bottom, v/hloh could 
1...: .,ye re: to be drlftinjj in to- 



ll.' "^.-t '..ll.: :..e xjialaw. auour.t of 
towed in uwi lefec'.ed. 



l/J^ 



Li€Utn:.i-;;t, U.S. ITcivy, 



^, jT'-^.yZ^^^ 



2020 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



£ 2 £ I 

To • i;©m-r.. rfVctri 

nroa JspmcM Sawl Offtow 
lUUOO SAIUIUKZ 

I th«i»W yau for thm klndlj wUlt of y»tmr6»y . torn I 
will write low:, jrour r^q^awat* of :y««t«rda7 In Japan«»«. ri«««« 
{mrdor. ay p joif vrltiog and oOMposltl^n. 

1. BhI-.K Prihh^NAL !?:?TORY 

In A'CHitt XJ¥) X «•• gra<lu«t*d from th« Naval Acadvqr 
and toacaaa a rldahlpiMn. In April of ti.la yaar I «aa com- 
■lial .n«c1 a rJ^- Ilaatanant In Uia navy, my praaant rank. 

8. REOiX li' PATTI E 

To^oT Monorab'. o "^lave" • ;ntry InatltutoJ; en acDnoMlo 
blockada ui" Ja;«n, ■ "hiiva njt" country, rafaaln.- to aall ua 
otl, cottar. a:i3 t.io ".Ike, until wa had no choVoa bat natural 
eollai;ao. Socauio of thla »• ^ai^an aioloaatVo na^:otl:iU lona 
wltii yojr cjuntr'. ^t tinto at^dad In /alxura. 7:er-iroro, 
wltn a frland, I aat out : or Venri iiarosr wltn *.!.»* pur^/oaa ol" 
• li-.ltlnp a battloahlp, &ut a la to « ccU:ent. althou-h 

ae ••!■« abio to raucn tha ■oath of tha ftar&op cy oraaplnrf 

ondameatn yojr boaba falling ilka rain, a Inca t;.-: 

BCCl>:ent waa I'ltal to taa aubmarlna, we detar»ln«:' • • F^ceecT 
with^jt •sealt.ation on tha aurfaca of tha watar, m. .'.•. 

li)t<j t'.e aarbor, and cllJi*tn« the iran^-way laddar, ."O •. 
lea; - t t:ia aaok a«3 dla almultanaoualy with bl^w:-. i 
ar.airj ..-rahi? Juat a* In oLdai tUwa, dorli;- -ho ko- • 
alor. , rir Ta lya Kawano lowerad tha laaat lt! r. nrdad t-" 
anamy Bt.ip •lt^: It. HowaTsr, oecaaaa of t;;»j a- -Vdont 

a'uiT«ioa s. t t^l«ll hsrb.r •• o t\ . *« struO k roar wfeich ijlvan 
tor. »«, . s »e w, ::d ve safoly claared. Ky first atrntn em 
;.»... t"n'.l<-C.. •••'■,^ t..l. 'irforei.ce oi" ter. ^oc r.-ts the f«te wo:, 
deo'.ce , > r.a j;.e >. t:.e warohlpa of your c5-;.try »aa Ba«*d . 

L^oli-.f- tr.fi auccesB of o ur t.l»t ar— Jutautflnea .nd tha 
aplar.dltl ro . le vementa of our air forca , I If ^ the MOg th o. 
U.e hartor, compelbid to do ao dua to my ai^marine *^eI3vg dls- 
• hiad. ',ator, finally being unable to do anythln.; with the 
•^i-^rrarlne, I saaa. tnroui^ th* ooaan and raachad a-. snMiy 
airrort. :>Jt.» to my axhauatlon, I aaa captorad without haTln- 
tliBB to even flpht. And thua my aeU fate haga.i. 

Due entirely to my Inaxpart navigation and strategy, ^y 
honor as a aoliiler haa fallan to the ground. T-iua : !>atrayad 
the 9X7«ctatlona of our 100,000,000 (paopla) and bacpne a aad 
rrlo'irier of war dla loyal to my country. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



2021 



■• 9m talk I had with an jnrl*rBt«juUn. n«va! orCXcmr In th* 
hoa> of an aniy oaii In ^otiol Um' ••• rmry pianaant. 9a««'.ta« 
I thouftit about tha tr<ou)>la I aoaXd oauaa your otaitry latar ■■li, 
and bacauaa : aaa 'uMt^l* tj aiidiira nij ahai •«, ; -mi t. t'ur, ' ilclda 
or balrxK ahot to daat)t ^mcnna '.mpoaalbla, ..i» ' ,aa 'jarni; "• • "'^ 
llf* m» m prl aorjar oi war. tlom tiiot t'lln « . n co-»io to ni-.)-. 
• paaa^ I huvm atartad tha lire a paaca.' tl J« •. ^.b-i naval '. : t c 
abldlntt by tha rulaa of tntamatlc'iiai imm. 

Za Old*n tlMsa, Makul and Itukuaai j> ^.tuu. rarualnr>; to 
oat oilllat or • furalt'n land, want Into tno mjuitalna ht.-^ ata 
KTaaa (T) untl i they atarvad, but :, al-i.e I '.«,•*'•. <»atli. • y>ji 
oountry 'abraad, h«i»» thou^t w»,»t < ;a iu« .' .;■ ..r.H-'o «••.• ir)» 
tt la. 

Althoii^ I ^uiT« oauaad y .>•: mauti m. 
thins r'^t^it aio;. acoordlti^; t j ih'iitoj 
Inoldants aa Uiat Miloti happanad yaatarda? wMcK 



ny« 



/tjr, aaoii 
rjT.. t t« 
has »->»>an cont'nuad. Uy 
r yjar c ' ^ntry with .ra» 
bL aa or,.". r.Bf'.o t f ,:"ru'. 
u rtaatii wtilc. t :■-.': i.c 



atandp.lnt oT your oointr;, n tiatt tr.ln 
rlc^titaounaaahaa nada ao^r«a oC lae:. >. 
•11 day lox^ «ltti Utalr ma p ilntod 
but aa a raoult or t!ila, I mu^t . .ica 
too plaaalng. 

My •lllltvJ'.oka to ..l« iwad t.o', hft awntion*"* : t < ?; ::i';d 
by ona or y^jur bullets oi' ;• .xr c>^jntry snail mar.o aio vin- a;;?. 
I pray .or y >ui- r. .antry'? i«>atlng nllltMry -uccasa. 

An uprli.-, ite> is i^latol h«a baaf. iiln»od at ma. T;'.? In ly 
and. Oood-bya. 

•5. To the Japariiisa pa<p"3, as; u -. n ^^ .• ', ■• -> ir- 

aalvaa, baojmln' a prisoirtr o: *m. ; .. '..;oa,. 'irae, 

•hethtir or not there Is ii r.;c^ra >;' t.ie ViCluor.v .--t, I 

will coBuilt talclda a.x»n r (•jtam ■ r.j n/<tlv*. Inr.... '^Tr*n 
thou^'ti wo ara ananr.ed, to ■ '■ wit.. •; ■. * aiv*. Cl,:^it to ti-.« Inst 
la tnm Jipa-iasa aplrtt. 

I pray t:i>t a.y ..e«tr. »:,. . ,,.• •. .,-. -._• .ell'juroa 

tnd I pray *^ir.t ■■ ■_• .»■ li-lt wll. o« a..., ,i • .c. ^ ■ .• ' m^ ^cunl 
U'yu'lnai . 



j'iaaso :'oi- 



1 s tr :c - . . 
; arr'. veJ Mt « 
I ."LB va : . oA , 
tunlt 5. ^t^■.; 

rit, .t'. 



-.1 



Buval ■>*ib-lle itene' 



2022 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



rem covFosB) amowq vu uxma (oa m vwraKTiriUTx iw 
BBCAMc k naaonx op mar) 



nhttrry bloaaoaa r«II, 
Ut thWB CmXli 
Dr«noh«d arc th« Ita branohaa and Isavaa 
With tha aorrov of today! 

9« I Ilka b«»t "DOW* -ms TORPSDO" astX "AMOWO THK ; riOTS 

TtlROUan ns K/IJOAKKT*. I axpar l.*tio«(l all tbaaa things In thla 
Ourr«nt battla »rvlah la tha (oal oC all naval aan'a ambition, 
and I aanlfaatad tha Yasato 0«Aaahll (Japanaaa aplrlt). Laat 
oll^t, acain aooraa or bayonata and aaissT'ja vara pointad at 
■* fro* tha front door and froai t'le window and froa abova 
1^ baad. Soaavar, rlght*ouanaaa won. And alttiou^ as a raault 
of thia a raerattabla altooatlon >- n« about. I b»p« th«t all 
•ould ; a forglwan with wf da«th. On tha •«• of- my "fairly 
daath' laaantln^ tha laany aaortfloaa oT your ooantry dua to 
^ 'oall of rljhtaouBnaaa', X aarnaatly hopa Uhat thla will 
b« olaarlT undaratood, that aupraaa daalra and Joy In dying 
aa a vldlar by your oountry'a bulXata. 

I appraolata your many Vclndnaaa ahown ma up to now, 
and I pngr for your aucoaaa In tha war. 



Roapaotfully , 
Kasao 54 



COPT 



e. X-^2^ 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 

EXHIBIT NO. 101 



2023 




2024 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



AVI 




LOG OF THE UNITED STATES SHIP 

At ':i-\'-,- rard.lga rl llar bor. 
Passage 

lone oescription - 'a , ^8 av? 



it6_ 



fS! 



II! 



OOVMt 

Or* — 
u» — 



SASOVmB 




TKUrCSATCM 






: 'Vh;fe.. 



.'iffiu^.^. 



ji I.iMJgftjdt 



h 


Lnil((it..> 


'l{ 




c 


V p. ' 




r. 






«.E 

Srror__ 

Dovlniioi) 



MAGAsuta TzMreai^rfx'*: 

















« 






1 . 

















IfVriiKiaal <rt tjtiryni ^«H** "' tfalfi T»--<r* '-"^ '^^ tv??* 





1 


























































































m 


'Sa,vltfAt!<)U n^oi^tblr) »..jiii *~%^M||ttii^^^H 


1 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



2025 




79716 O— 46— pt. 16 8 



2026 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 




EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



2027 



UNITED STATES SHIP 




l(/W^.- 



^Ort^i'vAl i,»ji»{vjrt 



2028 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



Pagt 



^-UiC 



LOG OF THE UNITED STATES SHIP 

ZONE DESCRIPTION ~—£lJyl—l£9 






4 '. Ixiogitwig 






o-S^-f^jr ^ 



K 11 288-50 






^ fi g' z 



^3.Tr,a. -a2»Q_t= |L2fi_e.c. 



j rE*Mtv«i 

"1 loalaod- JJ&^Ui.. 

__Ji. 




Miaiimiu 



I [gyle !- j 82178 1- rio_. 




-TV — nr*r 



ti •< \C iSBliil 1 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



2029 



ft./' 



ADDITIONAL SHEET 



XlB {Coutln««d) 

|0osBn«n4iii|i Offio«r, LECO.'OTON, the following naiiftd uen rooortftd aboard for dut 
■jsportation lod tessporary d:jty on LEirroT-:; In ocuBectlon vrtth g«tter»l court 
Ufti It oiMBi;>l««*d. CCAZXXt, v",H,, a-;l ^0 74, 36a.23,'j.j.:-'., ana oocsKR, «r.y,, 



/?^ ^/^,^L*n^»^f 



ve. 16S5 iAiiii'S •iiidorway. i'",iO i-oc«iivea ou board for us«) 
IJ.owlaa fr*«a prc-visions: from Harmon Cc, Ltd.; Hoaolul'j, 

,' sdX. laOp«Cte4 s.B to Cuant.i1,v t" A«ting i«y Cleric .7_ ' . 

;i as to quality ty j-i^sutf, ■ tower, (ITC 

.;iAH •tandlag in. 1823 BIU . -s, ia. 



•ra, £805 3C1D*4<&^*, U.I-., B.-,S»,v'«ji^;, Wqb rat.uiTivc* tf tu«| 
-■.*fira under ol»6.r4;os of oreaticg a distttrbaaoe, figi(tir*s at 
OJjarges to tolJnw. h<u rj-'ipMer at large by order of t5i< 
writer* ease 231:9, s,i?,, ?■'- rapoytsd aT>oar! upon conjlotlc 

Says leare, an tiiae. 



A 



f, psj^orara . Srsi 



ir.n.r.; 





2030 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 




EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



2031 



UNITED STATES SHIP 



R\ZM, 



.1 starboara. side to bertb 3-S, Kair/' Yard, Pearl 
!i.-A;.Xiu. iin.>8, 5 wlrft breftsts, and 2 wire cables. ^ocoiviHg li 
j telephoas. sejr/ico iroa. the doalc. Ko. 4 boiler in use for aval 
IjMte presert, Trjirleus •iri.ts of thw '.'.S, Bleat-. dlst.rlct aw? y 




,.C? .^/j;i^. V, ^„ ^ ,'^^:« 



es btf^-re. ;-'!S:^'i rec-'vt-o Oij board 

BvtSlone • -•-.t.loE, ita 

by ^t .-.teoer, t". 

"HigJitower, ^oris gruiSe 

S. SteYfpJt returned frcoi aine days lea^- 






•HOC ii._i,^. ;..i.:^,ti5Siib'a:- 
liji aooord-r.c* v/ith 3-a'^aV 

'lit.;.. : ..- -ijtritt ?oi- te 



■.andant 




16 

L'oor«d 6S before, 

gton, U.;;. 

""aval I>i; 

iiiaiidant 1 
Qttarfl Tenter, v 
report Ootadt. 1 
pureiiant of<av":- 
left tbf ■ 
385 79 6^, 
atood la. 

>^ctober 20, 1041, i-. 
E.'ti. , 295 52 56, 3©- 
ori . ajj d 1 sig Otric&r . 
1345 aeoured ic 
pursuant ordajb 



Jiego, Culiforr/ia for torsporary dat/ arS farther traasfe-ij 
Oistyict, -iftr .rsiiiilf , "\ J" . -"s * • * , ' ..ra-ea 
and, Calif v'l ilft. -".u 
junats as xesTs,. i: 31 



t&^^i.iiaj (Hbteofj) Mt/r of i^j« j;».«r ro be »cr,t tu aur-o 



2032 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



Pate 



LOG OF THE UNITED STATES SHIP 






f !i!lf|jl!!|i&^| j [i'l il il!j4l*fii| 

T "! II ! . t a i> 



s=|[ 


1 



^i !vr^iil-| 






0-. 



t On t».i 50,COC 



.S Di»Kf«'4.. 
I Drift •»!.__ 



• r. f 










^: tiiia jwae »o ti« &*»? t<j Biii-v*f 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



2033 



ADDITIONAL SHEET 



.-..SSfSO-if- 



- to 

, aooxe* e9 1>9for«. 16C5 CHAVES vnderway, shiftier berthd. 1613 F. 

W*rw(V wiA standing out to ae.a, 1025 ORIDLSy »}sde-n»ay tfwl standing .■ 

ktacCKT ttnd«r*«y. 1735 C»^ai<v5o iu'ervi-y. 1745 pujsuant, to orders of «,&« 
!,£>iSing arricei' datbd £7 r j7«i.ber l^.: :jJ<TIH, j., Jr., 265 <3Q 09, lUAtt.ic, 
V.3."> was roleasad fr«a ooufla«j,«iit ond jlacoS uiiaisr araea guar'l foi- transfe: 



■ t& lEXISfliTOK 



TTT to KavsU. I'rJ.coB 



1600 Ttift following liea l»f 4 
iDXta. ;■,'! 337 V; 

i£«, :{., Jr., '%v' • 



. iiarw Veu'S, ■ijt'e ialunft 
5. tbo siilp with OT'd'sra t,i 



0«i.f> 
1 r«i ort 






;« for oo!iflne-| 

the «L-ra2ie.u4- 



JHTBOTJa. F.C, i07 £1 ?.C, G,k.£c>, '. . 

scnxiTAjT. W.P., c5o t', £1, cai.r.lia. , 

SXSKASD, S.C., Z'i'/ Oi 90, *,} .,;,2c, ' 
VHIilPOTf, i.S., ^,74 5U3 CC, T.-.Ss, :. 

ffi-wiSKiDOi, a.:.. -i74. ?i PA. ».s:.ss, ' = 
\ .. (.:■ IP, c.i:.^. (ii) 



'.'tie fcLiswlK^ -.ei. 




:. .FM to 

.i%"j?T to 
:: Jisgo, Caiif, f^r 



2034 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 




EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



2035 




' phontj s«r?ic6 from too 4oo>:. Kc. 4 boiler in i\3o for auxiiiaxy purpos-; 
ar!^ i;<j41c5l •'•.sfsrd it- this shin, Sl4p8 jvyftsfiiit- fir« various WKlts of TF.. 
SOP io c- ""- ■ ■ ,' -- - — ........ .^»->-... ...... ^ ... ' 

A., 0S5 • ~- •--'. -.-;..~^ 

259 30 . ^ ^ 



{ 01soruc 



:v3.as? pcffj 



\ ^m^% 



2036 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 




h\^h\i^\ f^i p 



■ 



IH-f-fhH 



M^M^; 










ijl jQ ' -E-^ 



Sttjtotao \LkQ. Coj<>«' 

s. K._ L_jaa'_ 



Dnfl for'c' 



g. --[ ?ifll J. 







13 J.S-ii' 
■ 14 ISfciV 

17-lfifi^i; 
to 5iLjiiis-i 

i :i ICO. o' 1-3. '^ 



■i .OIL ._BS- 



I 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



2037 



f'.EET 



..mtsssKi&i 



ttouM* to 2'7&*T. snd pdcj. iiS7*,S «»«, end ££^".3 psto. Ohaiifed . 






2038 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 




EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



2039 



2040 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 




_jxza 



or THE UNITED STATES SHIP 








f lllljfllfi^l 1 


f! h i^i 


"lilillll I J^H 


e: 




"^^^^^^^1 






EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



2041 




79716 O — Hi — pt. 16 9 



2042 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 




EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



2043 




■-. oojETiaJiy witii Task ?cr^ 
i'^"" nsvG la oruisiag disposition 3-V. •iTifci.aAr-i t-i-'SiiC i:j :a;o.^ = , c^^i-tiii-a; u 

m"?: ne,tsp«^ 18 toots. Plaae'g«ara3Tr^rT-j «a ax?- in i'-.?*':,««t':- 
.Barlna 8or«eii 1-A. Jdl v»ss«l3 stealing ^t. 
T«88Ql. ATerege steaa 4iO, Avei-sies rpta 1 



prep. 
last 



i 



{ icto 
} Appr*. 






It.. 

wind. 

1000 ju;^^r!<J, orw.- •;• 
0100, " ov3jfc«r 7, 154: 
^, 1941. 'lada daily • 
ndit;i,3na noraal. 1x5 
•ers.p;e rpB 156.9. 



■ Aircraft, kgv ■ 

.939 first r.l'aa?. 
r.g i"or plaao tf.- 
landed on boar: 
psBd t.j 13 knc 

.Y, IM... 3sa.£o,t!. 






left to 
St9&di«5 

Sea. 2c, 

3(? r<.',^,'- 



Joia fleet 




.'.(': R- iOa lislited fire 

_ 1540 . J socurad. IS*.'" 

«p«i€kd» to Icji'/j'.! ond ";ard airorai't. 1-iOi; 1', 
to S'/o'S. and pec, «Se' x>so, 253' ?■«■""♦ Cljssagsi 
r©ll6T€Jl nX!?? en otn^i-u Ic. : - v- a:;-^'. -^ ;:■>;-&? 1: 
the E 

Bud ?■ 



1, wn * 




V' 



a. w. 

Li si; t, -v. 



a/ ti!U oiM« t« h» Mint tt> »l»«>a d ^fll»lS»tSon 



2044 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 




LOG OF THr 



— ,2lt 3(aJiL-45'S4i3SSL 




•f^--aS#--^»^i^*«-^' 




isfseAuMi <i«i^.__ 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



2045 



ratf 



ADDITtONAL SHEET 



PO - 84 



14 




2046 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 




EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



2047 




steaming on cours© S70*?, aad pga, aSS" nst-eo. i55S' P-io, at 18 toots, iu 

■^aay with Tafllc ?cro« Kight in oruieiag ftisposltion 6-7 : V'.i\t\: «zia 270'f . , 

.PRISB guide. Ships daT!j.6as4. Boiielw IIos. C, 4, 6, ' ' use. 

■■ra I?08. 1, 3, 6, one! S liglkte^J off anfl ii strjiA-'by - lard oposd 

j.>y «..aots. Tiro oontrol, siiip control aai air ooatrci ''. "■;>A;'iir.*"-!)i 
III. liatorl&l Condition "B" set below aeooua d«c:<. 
Averat^e rpja 160. ^ -,^/h / 



„„--^. »!.,;, «s before. 
pr«j>ftnitory to launohiiis « 
last plane, rssuoed 1)886 < 
set 2ou4itioa of Seaiiness .. -. . 
Average steaia 410. Average rta-a \bX>.- 



:fe4 froa ?,enor:<. 

„4 flr« -..-.r.1-.-.^rl . 



^: 



e - 12 

Steatili-g aa before. OSot 
ing aircraft, Stearaipg s^* vaxi-.^.^ ^e,--*--* 
laaQotad lest plane. 095? laiLdwd first piase. 
oouree tc E7e°T. an«l ?go. 207°. 5 peo, 256° psto - 

16C rjlB. ••^.'^r- '■f'f • n«-.P,-. ••-.: r,.i p ..-r.>»-.f>-.c5K n 

Gor.ditioEG 



IS - 16 

ctea . , 
itiga arii _t.c-" 
Senteroe: '"auf 
Eostij; Ki^^', 
of his ;%, f f 

guilt:'. '■" '-«- 

ST2r?2>2, '.0., 



S03 /i Ji.i^'jJ./, 

Ive dwys jtid 1 



'^c 0-' to "i.osr^stV 

"Jays and to lose ^9 a aoath of uls pay lo 
Of Coaiiaaading Officer, .STSVa^S '.C, iea, 
0,3. r;, were oonflaei for a poriod of five j,. ^ j, . 
Court, isai) o^&agsd course right into wind treparii 
Approxisiate oourse 062";'. Ave. speed 15 tacts, 134 
XM« landed last plane. Ohftnged speed to le fe.^"*-- 
^, 1352 ohaoged eourse to right iato wind :■.■ 
plane lauded . 1400 laat plane landed. V 
■■A hsne course 270*T. i"-.,— ~- -,r^,... .-,-, 



le - IS 

steaming as before. 1653 Boil^ 
oo;4aezioed steeming on various oouafl^^ ... -.^ 
plane landed. Changed eoursa -co left to :; 
Changed speed to 18 toota. 1735 ehanfed e 
1750 dariiienea eI-Itj. ii-npr-.-je atean 410. A' 



readlnees 

hoar to L 



aoured frrf. 
'■trol and :' 



..i^, li.S, Ha-pj , 
>ndla«. 



-^ <liMMM3u oapy of tKit- pa>tfi> tu Vc 3<r: 



2048 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



HC UNITEtJ S-^ATES SHIP 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



2049 




2050 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



iE UNIT'.D 
bewail la: 



f '^!V!!!?fen""l"^Y'!^l^iT^^ f i 



!«j^=' i I 






Lflg&.'Si S7PI SSE'ia' 



li I 



















pT-lj-sii. 



•:»iieig« 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



2051 




pre I- ji rai- 
ls JmotB. 
rijgJi 6 to . t % 
Quarters. I'/J 




2052 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 




EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



2053 






>r.'- 1 a.~ ,t 



^^-.y'^Zy^ 



2054 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



THe Un!TEO STATEg «i-.-. 



w 




11 






















' ifh ' i-" 



viijti jew LJ» iU~. ) Jj, , , -..ii..., i» 






ri n 4 "/O 1 <■ , -X, ' 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



2055 



AODITlONAt, SHEE 



18 - 20 

.Steanilag as 
rw^dtHsas thr«9, wai..^.: :.u.... 
tiae, Avara^« steara 410. Av- 



/.J. 0. I-. D(Sa??T, lieut-r 



f 



• 




2056 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



2057 



0^ 









79716 O — 46— pt. 16 10 



2058 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 







1.00 OF THE UNITED STATES SHIP 
I xoMt tMawwimow. Mlaaa .XL 



rr 






IS' 5 £«L4JBSS{ie .JS0fi4x=_l«llM4■ 
"' i!«, i .084.... ,X-.-,4Jja -socai- f flfi I'S 







EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



2059 




2060 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 




EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



2061 




2062 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



LOG Of TK£ UNITED ST*iTES SHIP . ,..M2S^^SIZ£ 



&X* 



r ■ ' 



,ah 






1 ^ 






f f|i ii iPW'i^itii f ! -" i^! lip Hit 







j -niifi fJ^- 



S5ia 



^sssrutMcTI 






j» |LsauE|?-k. '.'imisliafl- . 



■•:Ji«.,*3art,.«3i .Tliiht %nsJtiiT:' 



^-Mj^QQ^- 






'" Bja^. 



Ji-M 



■ mai% ;v> a»»»«.ij trf K»vtKt«*euii iaaatJrty 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



2063 




2064 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 




EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2065 



fage^JHiShL. 



UNITED STATES SHIP . g>TOgH.I3B: , Jriaay 5 ae^^^i , 19 41 

zoNec>e«!mPTioN„lIiSa§-J2 RE: MARKS 



0-4 

3tea;..iiig on course 084'T. and pgc, 076". 30' psc, 079*^ pstgc, at aD kr.ot3, 
186 r.p.~. in conpany v/ith Task Force Sleht in special cruising disposition 9-7 
(niKht), course and axis 084'T, Plane guards T^:'^:ii:o and OJUVa; in iiner ar.ti- 
subniarine screen. Boilers L'os-. 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, and 8 in use. Ship daricer-ed. 
Ship control, fire control and air control in condition of readiness III. 
Condition "^i" set below second deck. Avera^^e stean 410. Averase r.p.s. 166.0 

',;. C. K£.3tJHY, lAgntCjg), O.3.:.. 
4-8 (J 

Steaiiins as before. C500 sounded flight quarters. 053c sounded ,^>eneral 
quarters. 0500 changed course into wind to launob aircraft, steaiiing at various 
courses and speeds. Approx. course 095'. C605 xirst plane launched. 0516 last 
plane launched. O^iaaged course to 064°T, speaid 20 laots, 186 r.p.a. 0035" secure^ 
fixnii general quarters. Set condition of readiness III, '.;atoh II, ship control 
ard fire control. Lighted ship. Average steasi 410. average r.p..-. 182.7, 

A. HOUSS, iiisign, V.3.: 
8-12 

iteajilnii as before. 0922 steaiiing on various courses and speeds to launch 
aircraft. C925 launched first piano. 0924 launched last plane. Changed speed 
to 15 lOiots, lo5 r.p.x. . 0932 landed first plaae. 0940 lbx.ded last plane. 
Changed speed to £.0 ;aiots, 189 r.p.;-. Changed ooiorse to OSCT. and pgc, 080" psc 
084' psto. ;:ade daily vi^sual exaj-i:i:ition of all magazines and apoiieless powder 
aetiples. Conditions nor_;al. ;..ade v.'eeicly test of Eiagazine and shell rooa floodinj; 
and spriniliag eyst^a. Conditions noraal. Averase steaa 410. Average r.p.r..l64 



Lieutenant, U.SJi. 
12-16 

Steasing as before. 1215 secured degaussing coils. IX 313313?, v.S. , Sea. 2c, 
U.3.-'., 3rd. Division was injured vjhile standing in s.ess line for dir.ner, when he 
fell dovm unguarded hatch. Diagnosis: Hesiatoaea left shoulderj was ad:iitted to 
siol: bay. 1300 went to flight quarters. 1338 changed speed to 10 Isots, 89 r.p.: 
Chan.-^ed course into vdnd preparatory to laiinching aircraft, approximate course 
oeo'T. ApproxiKate speed 10 knots, 89 r.p.ii. 1341 launched first plane. 1346 
launched lest plsme. Changai course right to ogCT. and pgo. 1550 changed coiirse 
left into vdi-d to laiid air group. Appror.ir:ate course 080°?. Approxinate speed 
10 kiiots, 89 r,p.:i. 1353 first plane landed. 1354 last plane landed. Changed 
course right to OgC'T. and pgc. Changed speed to 20 imots, 1S9 r.p.n. 1413 
crave; and DlCriA? exchanged stations in disposition. Averuce stear; 410. 
Average r.p.-.. 181.5. ^;^ 

.^^^f^WSSSTV , Lieutenant, -.i.:.. 
16-16 <y 

Steaaing as before. 1632 oorr^.enoed steaaing on various courses and at 
various speeds preparatory to landing aircraft. 1634 first plane lar.*"i. .1640 
plane 6-5-4 crashed into barrier, no Inijuries to personnel. 1554 last olane 
landed. Changed speed to full speed, 20 Jcnots, 189, r. p. w. Changed course to 
090'T. and pgo, 080' psc, 084" psto. 1710 sounded general o^uarters. 1715 
darkened ship, average stean 410. Average r.p.E. 175,7. 

^^ ##^4r^t(..g). U,a.l.. . 

5teai2lng as before. 1617 secured fror. general quarters , set cc.:.iiitiou of 
readiness throe, v.-atch two. ..ivera,;e steaE 410.^^AverQf:e r.p..-. 189.0. 

/yj. A. hCL;.33, -nsign, U.S.I. . 
20 - 84 (/ 

iStcaning as before, ^vverage steaii 410, ^ej^e r.p.a, 169.0 



18 - 80 



?i3v2fr 



Approved: 



Car-tain, Z.i, havi^ Lieiit-Ooadr. , 

Co J. a;.ding. 



r. 5. .V...VaW/«tM>. 



(Original (ribbon) oopy of Uii« pas* to be aant to auraau of Narlaatlon monthly) 



/3 



2066 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



Pate i.J|i4 



LOG OF THE UNITED STATES SHIP 

•awali an OperatlOK Area ■ 



Passage 

zone description-- lus 12 



p aft.B-tw^ r. J. Ml*. CommmdiKi. 




artujoaKv mix mt»— «o»iiiSii«»« 




• I 


I 


1 


4 (S 










- -— • 










GruaUat ilcptK 




. 







(OrlKliuil (ribbon) copy or thla page to be spnt to Bureau or XAvlgatlon moutttl;') 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



2067 



NITED STATES SHIP 




c,er.-ar".l luerters. 
l745 fli -ht :-jarteiv 



R E: M A R K '- 



lo'".a:i2aa spead to i^O 



^^^f^tt^' 



"'44.- 



"ol -^uid iire 'ooa 



Senteact 
.dollars. 

o:saax.dgr .. 
to iaucct 
^rin;: to ". 

p-e.iercano;,' 



IS - 15 

Stei. ., :-rore. IE 

tuelve rxilcs. IvOg aaaeu- - 
Sioldlns? flight oparation;.. . 




stea:- -ilO, ^., 



^^ 



"7 y^ ^-■•/V 



1 first plaae. 

..•j^re rail- --j-j 1 



z/'/a,*- 



a of^ Navtgwtto 



2068 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



LOG OF THE UNITED STATES SHIP- 

At :-Ia wallaa Qparatlng Area . 



ZONE DESCRIPTION 2i?ii_ii_ 



PRISE 



.„ ^576 _ 



Crdmnawttoa Nazatw^ 



. p. U3R5AY, ga ptaln, r. a. *«», eo»».««ito((. 




1 1 1 BMcrind 

i( uutodo SJJ ZZ'^ 45" H .| ?| Exi-uwi SI, 074 



rs^ 



0* 10' w 



BsroftK LduviMO PoftT 

Draft foi'd 

Draft aft 



CompM. Na__J54£24 

S. H O??" 30» 



m 



Dniftlor'd 

D?mft«»t. 




(Oricm<^ Crtl>lx>n> copT ol tfcta pttse to b« s»ixt to Boreaa ot Narlcstlon loosClUy) 



y/ 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



2069 




UNITED STATES SHIP . 

ZONE OESCBIPTION i lUS^JJ- 




re:marks 



0-4 

3teo;iine darkened in company v/ith task force eight in sj/eoial cruising 
disposition 9-V on course 09C'T. and pgc,077'°.5 psc, and 060° pstc. 3peed 15 
;aiots, 139 r.p.r.;., using tioilors "os. 2, Z, 4, 5, 7 and 8. Fleet course and axis 
OgCT, fleet speed 15 knots. Fleet guide, i.O.V.A., and C.T.C. in tiis vessel. 
Task force iii condition of readiness three, a-ver-jce stea:a 410. Average 
139.0. . 



CV23, Lieutenant, ...5.. 
4-6 

-tea' ir.c as before. 0525 went to e^neral quart srs. 0632 lir.iited ship 
secured frou general quarters; set condition three watcU four. 0'?40 siifte 
steering units. X-ort unit nov/ in use. ^i-veraj;;© scea;ui 410. .^vavj-ie r.p. .. 



O^lti^UWa*^ 



JORSiilT, Lieutenant; ■-. 
12 
otecing as before. 0600 ..uatered orevj on staiions. Absentees :3iiS0L, ' 
gea.:io,'..3.. . , ACL fron 0100, ;;ove:.iber 7, 1941, and STACEY, 'P.L. , Sea.2c,"J.3.... 
aOL fron OICO, .oveiber 0, 1941. .lade daily inspection of magazines esnd s~okeli 
po',.-der sajj-'les, conditions nonaal. average ateaii 410. -average r.p.i.. 159.0. 



12 



16 

Jte 




eut(Js), 

fore. 1200 Eoimded flight (quarters. ISSCynaneurering prepara-' 
ir^:raft. 125u lauaolied first plane. 1304 launched last :-iane. 
alont;."'.de starboard' side for fueling. 1343 passed first line \o 
enced psri^pinf: fuel oil to i:C CALL. 1443 stopped p'^aping fuel 
C CALL. 1452 ::C CALL cist off; all engines ahead standard 15 iiots, 139 
1505 ::aneuverinc to regain position in center of foiciatioa. 1516 ch 



tory to la'.i:ic:..:i,j 
1340 '-'C CjilX ca-;in 
..C ^ALL. 1S49 00:1; 
oil to 



course to 093*T. and pgo; all engines ahead 2/3,(10 knots, 83 r.p. 3.). 1530 
sounded flight quarters. 1532 all engines eihosd standard, 15 knots, 139 r.p 

Average stean 410. Averase t.v-u. S9.5. 



16 



■.. HOLl.Sa, 2nsign, U.S.r. 

18 " ' 

•ate- 'fore. 1627 stea.:ins at various courses and speeds Dreparatory 

to landi:. .. 1635 landed first plane, 1755 changed speed to 15 knots, 

139 r.p. . : course to cgO"". 1710 sour»ded general auarters. Ihsaged 
course to liiid aircraft, reduced speed to 7 knots, 66 r.p.:.;.' 1716 first plane 

landed. 1716 last plane landed. Changed course to 093 'T. and pec. ;hin--ed ssead 

to 15 knots. 1710 riect a.-.d ship speed changed to 18 knots, 166''r.r..:. 

.kver? :c stesc^ 410. , 127.1. 



Z. E. OTCH. 1 



E. OvSH. Lieutenajit, r.3.".;. 
18-20 ' 

Jteaning as beCore. 1618 secured froa genersil quarters; set condition 
r»toh four. 1835 Stationed fire v/atoh for blovdns tubes, ^..verage steaa 41Q 
Averaee r.p..i. I08.O 



F. DOHSETT, Lieutenant, 



20 - 24 

c>tea;-ins us before. 2000 changed to Zone plus ten and one-half tine 
oh3j;ged SDeed to 16 icnota, 149 r.p.-;. average steam 410. Avera,5;e r.p. 



:i:. 



2200 
J. 44. 2 



'4^<:d^^ 



Approved: 



Captain, U.S. Navy, 
Cau.uiiding. 




'X>rt«lnal (rlbboo) eopr of till* pace to b» Mnt to Buraku of N«*%itUcm monthly) 



V7 



2070 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



LOG OF THE UNITED STATES SHIP 











3CC 
090 


- 



1 On hjn.1 




EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



2071 




16-18 

Steaaing aa bsforo. 1610 sighted unknown vessel boarins 071"!, distance 
18 miles. 1018 sighted ComTask Foroe 3, 3-CA, 1 CL and 12 DD's, broad on port 
bow. 1631 sounded flight quarters. 1640 observed anti-aircraft fire on port 
beam. 1641 changed course left into wind preparing to launoh aircraft, approx. 
course 061*T., average speed 16 loiots. 1642 first plane launched. 1G59 last plai 
launched, 1702 first plane landed. Submarine reported bearing 305", distance appro- 
«,C00 yards. Chan^,ed oourse right to 120*1. All engines ahead flank. 1704 
ohaaged course left to ogCT. 1706 all engines ahead standard, 15 knots, 139 r.p^ 
1720 sounded general (juartors. 1721 set material condition Affirm, Task yoroo 
Sight leas S!TSRPRI3E and plane guard a0"s joined 'Task Force i'hree. 1735 first 
plane landed. 1726 last plane landed. 1736 reeumed landing aircraft. Gi;3LS 
joined tills vessel for soreening. 1743 all engines ahead 1/3, 5 knots, 47 r.p.n. 
1744 changed oourse left to avoid tanker. 1747 all engines ahead full, 20 knots, 
169 r.p.Q. Ch6uiged course left to 270''T. Average steam 410. Average r.p.ia. 146l9, 



'. A. HOuaSS, £ns 



I, ir, 



18-20 

jteaBing as before, 1803 oo:jaenced steaming at various courses and sjieeds 
to l*ud aircraft. 1609 landed one plane. ISIO changed oourse to 270'T. Chani-;ed 
epeed to 12 knots, 1813 changed speed to 15 knots. 1827 secured from CJeneral 
<^iarters. Set oonditlon of readiness II. Set material condition Baker. 1904 
changed oourse to 180*T. and pgo, 1981 changed oourse to 090°?., and pgo, 079*30' 
p»tgo. 1948 planes sighted bearing £00°T, distant 5000 yards. 1951 flight 
quarters. Average steam 410, Average r.p.a. 181.9. 



;{jg), U.3.K, 

20 - 24 

Steaming as before. 2004 turned on lights required for flight operations. 
2009 changed course left into the wind to recover aircraft. 3teai.iins at various 
apeeds as necessary. Approx. oourse 075*1, 2010 turned on breakdovjn lij^.ts, 
2017 first plane landed. 2036 6-T-13 crashed into ::o, 1 barrier, no dair^ge to 
plane or personnel. 2044 sighted IIULL bearing 142, 5*T. 2045 iruiL joined 
fomation. 2113 last plane landed. Changed speed to 15 knots, 139 r.p,m. 
2115 oo;:inenced zigzagging according to plan :.o. 6. 2116 changed speed to 20 loiots 
189 r.p.a. 2117 changed speed to 15 knots, 139 r.p.ii. 2114 stopped all engines. 
2119 changed Speed to 15 knots, 139 r.p.a. 2125 turned off running ligiits. 
Average steam 410, Average r,p.a. 122.7, 



A. II0Xi33, Snsign, 



fim 



>^*^ 



Captain. 'J. 3. Kavy, 
Cocnandlng. 



R. V/. HL"B1J-;, ■ 



(TIUs p«a« *o b« WBt io BonwB of NkTt(»Uuii znoothly ot1U> Loc shveCa} 



2072 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 




EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



2073 




UNITED STATES SHIP 

ZONE DESCRIPTION i'l'J'i Ip? 



1941 



REMARKS 



0-4 

3t;ear..lr.G in c ■ -eaU i'orce 9-Y on course 093 T. and pgo, c 

062° psto, under bo.^ ...; -r 2, 3, 4, 5, 7 and 6, at X6 kaats, 149 r.. . 

Fleet course 093'', fleet -axis 020, fleet speed 16 ia;ot3. Plane guards VC :*J.L -iXid 
ti'JIJLir in iaaer-anti sub:aarlne Doreen 1-i. Fleet guide, C.T.C:., aiid 3.&.P.A. in 
tuis vessel. Tag): force in condition of readiness three. All vessels of tils 
force steai-iing darkened. CS15 cticxn.jed s^^eed and fleet speed to 16 knots, ie9 rya. 
Avere^^e steas 410. a.-jeru,,;e r.i- — i5£«5. ^ „ /O/^ / 



C4 



;;ci.: 
oe 

3tea;.i.ii: es before. 0415 c:ia.\$ed speed to 20 itnots, 189 
;eaeral cuar*ors. udlii cnaii ;ed spaed to 15 iaiots, 139 r.p.Si. 



■iSign, 



r.p.n.. 0525 sounded 
C615 oiinjad -course 



j into tiie ' " ■ '-..•■..--.»-■-- *r ■>■■ 

I ^622 oiie:, 

i launoiii.-- 

! speed to k,.. ._.l.-j, ^,r i. ... .. 

I of readiness ■cares, vetch tnrse 
! 0716 chan.~ed spoud to £C iaiots 



-■.ill-: aircraft. 0618 first plane launoied. 
.'jai-lns at various courses and speeds v&ile 
•3 launched. Changed course to 093'?. ahi::S9d 
.. secured from general quarters, set condition 
070£ o;--an.5ad speed to 22 iajote, 2C8 r. p. :-'..• 
1B9 i.^.-z. C730 Canged course to 090'?. ar.d p o, 



«<« 



078' 



079'. 5 pato. ^vcrace steaa 410. Av9ra~s r.p.a. 183.5 



/ :/. ?.. CTiE, Lieuten 



enant, ^'.j. . i 

.rse C-7t;'. ^^-pproxiiiate speed 14 .-2iots, ! 

...ic^.^i. .... v^ jauji-j^^.,.^ .i.iOi«.ii,. ..^vw lauf.ched first plane, 0603 launched last ^ 

i plane. u«ie landed first plane. Obl9 6-2 reported siip bearing 320, distant 7& sUjles. 
jce22 ship reported bearing 050, distant £5 i:.lles. 0834 last plane landed. 0835 
i, „. ,„A , ._,, . ,. .,, r,c ::-.an3ed STieed to 12 iaota. 0647 Cliocsed course to a:>proz. 

ft. CH350 first plane landed, 0851 last plane landed, 0$55 
OSCO On radio orders from Seoiravy, executed '.('ar L-lan 
•aiprovoked air raid on tearl Harbor at 0800 this date. 
. C90C changed speed to 15 knots. 0952 sigated s_;oj£e 
; and JAH7XS joined foriJAtion. 1022 ceased zigzagging, 
approx. to launch aircraft. 1026 launched place. 1032 
1049 oo:;i'.ieDoed zigzagging. 1055 ceased zigzagslag. 
jChanged course to OtSO'T. to launch aircraft. 1101 laxmo':ied first plane. 1103 
launched last rlar.e. 1125 la:iQed first pl2j;e. 1128 landed last plane. 1151 
c: .i;.;;ed ccur.-e ^; l.O'-', '..7-' psc, 079°. 5 pstc. Averaj'e steas 410. Average 
;r.r ico.i. 



0904 03 ^leiicei 
jboaring C15'7. 
jjteadied on cou.nc ^ov^ j. 

changed to course gcO'T. 



J. 0. F. 30H3STT, Lieutenant, V. 
12-10 

taai-in-: as before. 1229 oo-.:enced steaning at various courses and speeds 
to la'wuach and Ixid aircraft. 1^54 last plsne landed. 1257 changed course" to 120'T 
and pi;o. 1511 c;:i;.".2ed course tc 170'T. and pgo. Oaan<:ed speed to £C Imots.. 
1321 chrji.^ed course to 120'.\ and pgo. Changed speed to 15' knots. 1543 co;..;eneed 
steanin,^ at various courses ..nd speeds to launch aircraft. 1347 changed course 
to C90'T. 15£: - ■-'■ nouree to fleet course ISO'T. 1358 co..,.er>ced steaiung at 
various cours-- is to land aircraft. 1406 Itst pli:ae landed, a'-.^nged 

course to CfC .:^n;:,ed course to 107'T, 095' 30' psc, 007' 00' pstpe. 

1424 secvjed .- I iuarters. Set condition of readiness II, 15vo oiianred 

coarse to 07i.' .enced oteaiiing on various courses and speeds to launch a^ 

land aircraft. _.ched last plane. ISr.o set ::;aterial condition 3ajcer. 1532 

last plane lar.uca ;ed course to 120'T, and ngc. 1540 chan.t?ed course tc 107'rt 

and pgc, 095' psc, OSS'- pstgc. average steaa 410'. .average r.B.i. 141.8. ' 






Q 



eut(js), ".3. 





Appn 


vou; 


txamined: ^,» ^ 








(Oriftfnal (ribbon) copr of thla pn«« ta be «cnt to Bur«4U of NavicAtlon monthly ' 



3/ 



79716 O — 46- 



2074 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 







H- 




tdJ: 



(Original (ribbon) copj or thl» psg« to bo scat to Biireau of Navigation luonthly) 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



2075 







\ y^-> -^ 



po.y,c^^cyy^<^Y 



2076 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 







AppTv 


red: 




i-:»wi)ued: 


' 


" S.X.Xantolt^ 


- -4 






-"■ 


"" 




(Tills pase tf> be an 


nt to Kar«^u ofNttviffatlf*!! tn 


ninthly.) 
























5/ 


»-,. ,. 



















EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



2077 




UNITED STATES SHIP 

ZONE DESCRIPTION .'JJ JS 10 , 



acc jra. 

pStC, £'. 

read ice 
oourso, 

accorti ■ 
0230 o: 



ip in con 



ced zi/^za 
>.vera~e r.:: 



4-6 

336' pstc. 
aooordir.~ to 
quarters, l..^ 
a/prox. l?^.. , J 
aircraft. «. prox 
launched. obl': 
20 l-anot?, ■ ' 
220'?. 

aud Pr':o, 
r.?.:-. 
Headine. . 
6.4 , 1'- 
lo '.'j-.ots . 
?gc. C:. 
alroraf I , 
^vei\L :-j- r.. . . > 



■■fore. 0405 oiiOn^sd course to 350'!. 

:i course ri;-,;it to llO'T. aiid pgo. 0.04 a; i 

0455 souiided fli{;J:t quarters. C515 so;^.' 
..rial Jo.:aition J%Stira.' 0545 Task roroe L.-. . -e 
. '.^uit IC .uiles, 0555 chaased course loft into v,-ir.d t: li-js-c;-: 
course 036' r. 0657 first plane launched, 0559 last plane 
;i '•zag O'Sursc, 0605 c^ia;.~ed course to ri^^ht to liOT, s'ifced 
1 coasod zii5za;;;ins. "OSIO sighted destroyers bei-rir.i 
j-;royer 'oe=irir.2'£40'?. 0020 ciianged course left to ;._ 
G79.5' pstc. All eagiaes ahead standard,' 15 imots, 1: r 
!.p. 0630 scoured froa Jeneral Quarters, set Qoaditioa of 
. oet ;.<.terial Condition 3a:rsr. 0635 Joined Task Force 
..Ispositien 8-7, fleet course 090'T. and pge, fleet speed 
.;: ruide. 0746 changed oo-arse and fleet course to OOO'?." a /. 

■ J© DoSaussing sqs.t. 0755 cl.ansed coarse into v/ind to la -:, : 

■ jiirse 07&'T., approx. speed 14 knots. AYarase steaja 410, 



ri:.| 



a.Q^U^ 



[^.' J. A. HOI-jS, inaisn, r.S.-. 

■ as before. 0603 last pljine launched. 0634 last plane landed, 0635 
aajfcd opeed to 12 :mots. Oi.anged ocorse to 000*^7, 345' psc, 345' patge, 0847 
;^.enced steajr.ing ^;t various courses ar.d spseds to la:;d aircraft. C351 last plane 
landed. 0655 ch'^njed course to SiiO'r. -md P3C, £68* psc, 269' pstgo. 0904 ooii:.eiiqed 
ziSzaG-r'n- acoordiiic to plan ;;o, 2, Changed speed to" 15 laiots. 0938 3LUS and 
JASVIJ Joined fon^ation. 10i2 ceased zigzagsing. Changed course to 060'?, 045'. 3C|' 
psc, 049' pstgtt. lOi.3 oo;_jeno©d stea:-.!!!,- at various courses and speeds to launch 
aircraft. 1032 last plane lau, : i-T-od course to £80'?. and pgc, £68' ?so, 
269' pstgc. 1049 oo:-.-:enocd z;. ;oordir.,5 to plan "'o. g. 1055 oasiiged cours 
to 060'r. 1057 co.-.enced ste;- .rious courses and speeds to laxmch~^aircraftj, 
1103 launched last plane. 11C5 o..an-ed course to 050'?. and zigc. 1121 oo-^enoed 
steanin^ at various courses and speeds to land aircraft. 1126 last plane landed. 
Changed speed to 15 .a-.ots. Oliunjrel course to CoO'T. and pgc. 1151 changed ocurse 
to 090'T, 076' psc, C79°5C' pstjc. :.ade daily inspcctlon"of magazines and s:i0ke- 
less ?o\vder saziplos. Conditions norL-.al, .v/eraje steaa 410. ...verage r.p.::;, 129,2, 



^^^^^■'-'-r^O^^C::r\ 



ifore. 1219 oa-.enced zl~:: 
12£. lUoad full, 20 iaiots, 189 r. 

course left tc C2C"i', and pgc, 1241 ctianjed c; eed t.o li -..qIs, -- 
1247 changed course into \vind to launch aircraft. .1. pr.-ic. course 
various speeds. 1249 first -..-lane launched. Icl7 last vlane landc 
strean paravanes, uslrig various sreeds. 1413 atreaned paravanes, 
streajied unsatisfactorily. 14_2 chan-ed course right into v;in4 t_ 
recover aircraft. .%;;■;;:. :;; a'?e j7u'.. , -...-ing vi'.rious sreed?. : 
landed. 1444 1447 cut 1: 



Approved: 



^. 



Y.\ 



,:/ 



Oaptaiii, I . 

Oo;. . XtTtdir.^' ■ 

(Oiifdnal (rtbboiu 



I Burrau of Na 



Si" 



2078 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



LOG OF THE UNITED STATES SHIP 

AT i;.A.S., .'-,.:t1 ":x:'b r, :". .. . 



ZONE DESCOIPTION 



H. 



D \ P-.RO> 






! ■ ' i. r 



7 &&a^f£i 

9 535.1 15 V l".a C£: 



10 14£'.XJl&. 
1! 'liilc'lG. 



14 4 
14'_5 

1516 



54C 
020 



020 






, ; -e9_7§i,..35. ., 

,: CO. ?41-.^_Ea^ 
7SL C n^ a c 



h-,1'- 




1=1 



D«ll_l_S AND EXEHCISETS 



;l Longitudi- 157- ■ 23 '. A5" 



I IxjiKjr.id,- 157° OP.'- c>a - 



1 Tarpeao 3ef anae, :'ll.^;^itl quarters 



jo' 33' C0'1 it ! lonhniid 



U !i^.[v«H . .. P ' ■ 3 Plight auartgra 



—40.716 
132, 6Sg- 



StA.VOilU 


D sua, Cour 


"" ' 


S. H. 






trm 


VuiiatKl. 


Deviation 


-l: -iX'- 


_., 






Uraft fur'l_ 

Di»ft »<t._ 



:J164_5P.C!1- 



i1 



■ 15- uiifeiaxi&Lijiia .ja-Li- 

10 J.40,4iS-^P^3L5L! QS.- 

1- lK'.qit!Sil3.E! OC-.- 

18 J.25*3J.i,.2|l2,3J 02'- 

19 JISJ .Aj( J.4 . 3 1 12 3i C£C 

■1,- I 1 ",- r, • _■ ■:'•.. ■ r '• 



500 -| 74 '/Q'TSi^ a eu 
2001., - !75_ _70=,76( _JCj^ L^ou 



(Original (rlbboa) copy of IUI» pa^e to Ti* i 



L or NavlguUon. niouiUly) 



-r^ 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2079 



Page 



ADDITIONAL SHEET 

Pale 9 -a»o«Bttb»r w. ...41 



12 - 16 

3tea-'.lag as before, 1£06 oeased aigzac irn;. ..esuiiied base course OUO'T. 
aiid pgo. 1224 foKued cruising disposition lOV, fleet course 020'T. and psc, 
fleet spijed 13.5 iciots, li;6 r.p.u.. K.Ti:KPRI3E guide. 1226 submarine reported 
sigiited bearing C30'T, 1^27 TxnlSr. attacked with two depth olmrKes, l.'i29 
all eiigines aiiead full, 20 icnots, lu9 r.p.m, 123C all engines ahead full power. 
1233 all engines aliaad 13,5 knots, 120 r.p.x.;. 1303 co. .-.euoed ziszac'-itxc; ttooord- 
ing to plan '.'O, 2., speed 15.1 loiots, 140 r.p.a. 1315 subnarlne reported dead 
atead. 1316 ehaa^ad course emergency left to 355"!. All enginow <i -=• 'i r, 1 1 
20 knots, 139 r.p.u. 1318 all engines eUiead eriergenoy. Ceased . 
1320 cl.anged course loft to 020'T, and pgo, All engines ahead 
14C r.p.;i. 1330 ooaiienoed zigzagrlng according to plan "o. 2, 1.^,^ ..^\,.,.^x. 
dropped a depth charge bearing from the ii.T^ru-KJdS 159' relative, lb3'/ sounded 
flight quarters, average steam 410, average r.p.is. 139. S, 



-.). C. IXilHY, Lieut (. 



;Y, ^eut 



-.tea.. ins as before. 1508 Chciced speed to 10 knots, 93 r.- . -i 

: course rij;;t into vdnd to recover aircraft. ■. ^-^ -, '■.-.. "„a ,..-.,:■ 
j plane landed. 1012 last plajie landed. Ohi.. 
I Ohanf;ed speed to 20 .aiots, 1S9 r.ju;.. 1617 
j 162l'o' - ■ ---rse to 335" ?. c:;-^ --'■. .aoti 

1631 e rse left eaerge:; - 1 r.?.- 

" 1655 .. rse right to 345 . . . , IB45 

j returii'- ^ ... , course, 020°?. u..^ ;. .. .^^..^ i,^ ..^a .lui^. .-^.juji.:. • 

course 0^0" i. 170C Task Toroe One It .. ^'ask 7oroe ^-isht for.ae.l 

j cruising disposition 9-V, 1710 couad „uarters. 1711 darkened s;.. 
I Av^r6!;;e steaii 410. avut?. -e :•.'-.•., l-ii..... 

, A. hoi;.':3j,' liisigii, u.s.i,. 

18 - £. 

::.„^.....v _., before. 1812 SBCured froa .general Quarters, set condition \>t 
readiness II. 1823 secured boilers :;os. 2 and 4. 1825 secured boiler , j. v. 
Aver'i;-;e stean 410. average r.p..... 126. 

... C. :i:.:;!^",/Lieuti,':: , , ... . 

.20 - 24 

jtoaaing as before. 2030 Observed long oil .. j aboard port side. 
S052 warning report surface craft h^r^v'--'- '• ■'-'•. aii^a.i.,-^ ^.5 -.iles. • .; " 
ocs.;»encea zigzagging according to pis,-. .'jif.ed spelh to 15 kr.o . 

1 r.p.ra. Avei-age stean 410, .kVor.^--e r. . . 

J, A. "a'0L.2J3, Jri:;_ . . 



^- 



i r , , u. B. jf.. yKHt»t9r. 



unttaly wltb Log HheoUi) 

^7 



2080 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

iff '" ^ M j-'f*. 




EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2081 




UNITED STATES SHIP SlIT^iR} EI3E 



20NF DESCRIPTION .lU:^ iC, REMARKS 

. oorcd starboard aide to r^erth F-9, learl liarbor, -.. ., v;ltn 5 ..aaila : 
2 wire oaoles and 4 breast wires, joiler Vo. 2 in use for a'oziliar;/ purpo:. 
boiaers on two "aours notice. Jhips present: various units ol ^he 1.3. nsc„. 
SOi'A is Cii;oi-ao at subuarine baee. 0015 coriMnced fuellas ship. Draft for-.vara 
23' •J" aft 38' 5". 0055 00 j^enoed receiving gaaslir.e. OSCO started preparation* 
for sett ;- underway. 0315 stopped fuelins, ar:ount received 463,000 gallons 
fuel oil rd 61, LOO callona of ^asolirje. 0353 :;e03:-;0 uader.'/ay frozi alongside. ■ 

^'}. "^ "\ lieuteaant, V.o.:.. ^ 

4 - c 1 

-jr..d as before. 040S boiler .":,. i out in aara line. 0410 boiler i 

oc -aaiii staa., line. C4CS tir;at rart re .r.v',i f roa along port side, ■ 
fro.u berth F-9, ; earl Harbor, ;.-., for operatit-.cs as directed. i 
, 1 to ;,o. 9 inclusive in uee. standard speed 15 knots. Oaptais, i 
'^xec -Xi'.'e ,.rioor, i.avisjator and pilot on bridge. Captain ooiuiing. :t&terfal 
Condition ,iaker set. oii;5 tugs oast off. Co:ir..snced steaEiag on various courses | 
a:.d s'.eeds, oonforriii,:- "^o Oiia.-nel to clear aarbor. 0520 Torpedo defense. 0551 j 
"left ship, 0550 passed ei.trar.oe oi.&nnel buoy ::;. 1 abea^i to port, 3'aan-ed 
to IS*'!* ^OJiansed speed to 20 iaiots. 0600 ciiaasei oouxse to 14C'?. 
jueral ^viarters. 0o£C o.^a^sed course to OOO'T. 0629 lighted sirip. C53E j 
3-oured fron (Jenaral Quarters. 3et condition of readiness II. 0535 c;.anged couBse 
to 070'T. 0640 chained course to 160'T. 0640 ohaaysd oour«e to 07C'T. 0649 
ojianssd cour&e to 130T. 0055 ohangod coiirse to 070*T. 0727 onanged ccurse to 
OSO'T. 0745 i'ligjit q.uapter3. «vera£e stean 410. .^-verage r.p.a. 121.2 J 

itiis). ''.-5.;: 

12 
3toa:_iug as before. 0fc02 liestroyer on starboard quarter reported a sub:".arin« 
sis'nted bearing 190* trcsa tliem. 0815 changed course right into v.ind to recover aip-.a 
craft, approi. ooi;rse OoC'?,, steaizing at various speeds. 0618 first plane 
landed. 0820 last plane la:ided. O&il fQSJse4 »5«oiai cruising disposition 9-7. 
0827 ohan'-,ed course, fleet course and fleet axis to Cf.C^T. ouid pgo. 0S37 changed 
spared to 10 imots, 9C r.p.a. 063B cr.anr-.ed course rij^ht into wind ^o launch airoratft. 
n various sp.cds as nfccei.sary. .-vrpros. course 077''2, 0840 first jiine laonched.t 
0641 l^st plane larjichedi (>&42 first plsne landed. 0917 ceased lajiding airoraft.l 
Choji^ed speed to 20 imots, ISO r.;.:-.. -h'^r. ~ed csurse to right to 170"^. and ?gc. ' 
Subr.arine contact reported b; . '. .-' changed course to left into tte wind 
to resune recovery of planes. contact reported false. 0?25 last 

plane landed. Changed speed . ~ .' r.p.... Jhan ad course left to 

02C'T. 0950 OHIDLST reDoi-ted sub.:.:riuf, contact." Ohaaged course left to 290'!. 
0959 cUant;ed course left t« 015*T. and pgc. 1003 chaiiged course left tc Z-iS";. Ib04 
BSi'jj; reported fi~."ited torpedo. 1010 ohan;-.ed ec'urse ri,--* int; ---■ -.■ir.i t: iaunop 
aircraft. Ct. various s^eodK as necessar:'. .■>. :ro:u;. o:u;- "'". xClC 
LjiLCil report -inc on her starboard bow, 1017 z^C:: a;.:,.. 
1016 launohc, .n.e. 1019 ll^t plane launched. :^-u".r2il s- .;2ots, 
189 r.p.;:. .• turaeti to base course C2C'T, aaj .ggc. iO:.r " -e tc right ' 

into \iiiid to recover aircraft, at varloua apeeSs as ne . course , 

083'r. 1027 first plane landed. 1C34 observed pi£j;e . leas Ic. to i 

water. Changed speed to Z5 ^r.ols, 1236 r.p.:;;.). J.;Dx.i-Bd course ij r-ght to 175'?^ 
1041 cnanged speed to 20 i;iots. Ohai:.:ed course to ri.:iit to 21C'T. 1C42 o.an.jed ' 
course into the v/ind to resa-ue recovery of aircraft. 1045 G-j-1 ^irorjua ..essa^e j 
on deck. 1046 :;icy Control reported, Aif^^NAS *"i»fcl"»e ^laaa (sussy bo:;iber; bearing 
345'T., distance tfpprox."' 20 sill«8. 'ib¥9 first plane landed, 10c2 last rlane ! 
landed. _ C-.un <^d s; eed to 20 .:..ots, 1S9 r.p.~., C2i.'T. .ind p,;c. 1053 o..an:;ed 
speed to 15 knots, 15; r.i ,_. 13 C' ' ^peed to fleei. bpeed, to 13.5 i>.ot3, I 

1126 r.p.a. Co._auoed zigzasr:!:;'- -.j ;ia:. 2. 1107 0i;an6«d s'-^eed t; IG i 

toots, 140 r.. ..-.. li.rc ;■:-'. -i :ie bearing OiC"?., d^stir:o 14 ".iler. 

j Average Jte " '. ■. -^ y^ C "i ^ ^ 



Api*rv>v«ii: 



■ Exajnioed: y^ jA 

0, D. llJBHiy, . -~ S. ',/. ."•.r..L„, 

Ja-..tain, U.S. i:nv>-, Lit-ut-Cor^ur. , ■ 

Co..™andinG. 



copy of tM» pa(c to b« •••>< to Bureau of NiMi«Btion monthly) 



i-f 



2082 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



LOG or- THE. UNITED STATES SHIP 






,.i!v,. 


,':,.. 






! 






'-'» 


hi 


■•;-..,. 


i 
















*^ 


4 : 







i; CO 


14 


l->\v 


lat 




13fi.O 


14 


7 


,13 i 5 


fcv'. 




140.0 


15 




14 U; 


:,>.c 


^ L, 'd'O 


140.0 


IG 




14 ? 


iiUt 


£:k 27 


140. 


15 




1:5 19 


;>00 


i ;,4 


143.0 


lo 


i' 


14 '9 


Cl>5 


ii ii.6 


147.9 


16 


8 


14 1;: 


£00 


i^.i; 124 


141.).i 


10 





}\^ 


020 


i:,ii I23\ 
i [19 


137. S 


15 


5 


C^O 


14f:.l 


16 ■, 


15 i; 


0<..0 


H *29 


15; .7 


15-7 


14 t. 


020 


h: 125 






4 


li) 5 


004 


. ? . 18. 




df u.it«to 23l.5,§' .0P"„ i; 



J( IdUtudn ii5 ' 5t ' 00 " 

XI i-m«iii,.k- 166' 00* 45" 



bJ LAitlut^. 



1^7" .-.4', X-O" '.f 



I On liand 

KtpMKlRl. 

On luin.1 

UKFMKi: Li 

)l«ri torM. 



11,0; 



3:., 100 

,75,00c 









i 

5 


2c 

k5 
-•- 










.-o,e 


■" 1 



1 :'iiiiiL.,jiartcri; ' 
•I - Oiiii tion. _;-.;;i;r 
7 jtueral. .^uarterl 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE • 2083 



ADDITIONAL SHEET 

> liecamtiar , /». .4JL 



18 - 16 (Oontiiiueii) 

1356 oeased zigza^J.-jiag ar.i lOt jr;.t;-, to 1;»:!P c.nurr.e or .'■lC :'. !':■(, •" >'.- .-rt-.r 

hydro v:'. one oontaot of e | 

ahead flank, 25 icnots. i 

left rudder to oourse Jv _, _ ,., _ . - - ^.^- .a ' 

fleet oo'irse tc SCCT. and i'leet cipeed to lo ^ois, i-iio ocuurod ixxju viejieraJ ! 
Quarters. 3et aonditioa of readineaa 'ft/o, viatoh tv;o. Set .>nteriol Condition i>.'"j;eb. 

1421 oo.-.euced zlgzaesiag aocordi!\3 to plan;..:-. J;. >^i i 6-<-:.,r. .. „-.„ ,i r;,ii r .[^^ 

189 r.i).... 1508 surface lootouts aft report. bg 
ahead flank spaed. Jhan-sed course rigi*t to 

left to raiU" ;■. anri r:;.-c;. 1520 Ohanreti s .►•^':i 

zigza(- ■ , sd oouroe ;-' i 

rijtht 1 ver airorai 

1527 i-i... , -;. lB.i:^ o., ^^ 

sigiited 3'j.U.<»i'ijj>3 'ceari ipsa 

i left to C45*?. and ?go, 



k-i.ots, 108 

•arious ooursea aiid speeds, lu.v. 

r.-o.i... 1558 chaiined oourse lei 



/L-C^,i/4nfX>^ 



10-18 

j 3teanilng as 'before. ICCC subiiurine sif^hted dead ahead, 

emergency full. Ohanged course left to iiSS*^!. and '^'-•, i.- 
{full, £0 laiots, 168 r.p.n, 1606 chause^ course 1-: 
I zigzagging ascordiug to plan !«o. 2. 1640 oeased ; 
I'o.-'.'p, -,-.rt r -f. . r-,H::.red speed to IS iar.ots, 108 r. 
.. sounded General -.uartei-s. 
course right into tlie vd/i-' 

il'/\.V Sii) Cv'Uurui .' 
iei^errenoy flani. 



... :, . z:r^V'SSi, lAout(jg), u.-i.". 



; jt-: _ --i;orsj Set cou.iiticn of 

readine.- . , - ■ . ;. 1850 or.t . ■; l-oiier 

lOff t.'ie aaiu stox. liftt . boilers off th'- ". line. 
'Average steaa -Ht. AV'.-. 



to be •< 11 1 !■. liur.'aa of NavlgjiHon montblx with Log »lie«t») 



2084 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 




EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



2085 



UNITED STATES SHIP 



REIMARKS 



2086 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 








LOG OF THE UNITED STATES SHIP 








i 


At 










zoNe 






1 CS 


pit jllf 


Mm- 






-.>. 






K-IN-IJ 


«AK"-.:tlER 




is 


1 f 


jp , :? s' i~ 1-5 ' 1 '»" ' fvI?- 
















, 1 

4 

fi 
6 
7 

a 



Id 


l; . 












XGt:.0 
ico.o 


i; ■- 'i- 










la em 








ifrHfiv 












iCr..O 

1V1.5 


1. ""■ 




- :? •;i 7;: 


L-C 1. a_c-j. : - . :; 


•-,1;^ 




-T C9_ GO 74) 33 j a ou . rz _ 1 i 251 


to 01' 72! ''0 ' 1 ou '.~ 2 ' S5' 


lu6.1 
17i.7 


le - ii'" - 


IOC 


^ IK ^ " "^ '" ' "■ ' 


19^311B-T 


' C90 


'^T-'Hti- 


i::i'i--5 


TOCT 
















-', 71 C5 '.':■. ::c 1 - ■ 










- 71 55 73 C 3t 










III 


„. „„, ;^.,.., 


DRII-L.S AND exERCisea 




' • 
































if-4j.90§.. 








■ i.vr. I'.'urr' 




t'jr- 


""' , UrJt. 


Diafl 


'■j"- -^ -^ 






Ermr, 


a/t. 










Com 


lldSM ^l■ 








I>rc 


J. 














































P., 


1 






















































































































































































































i 


> "' 














\ 




Cr,rr,!.;t .l.-,,iL 


















i 
_J 



(Orjjjii.ui iriiilKjiii copy of this p&ge to Ixi sent «o auroaii of Niivlgatloii momhl.v) 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



2087 



Pat, 



ADDITIONAL SHEET 



IJ jecemlieE... , /9.,il. 



1^ - 

iS before. 1235 co;2a6aceii ;.aiieuv 
to avoid yei-drteJ subnarine contact. 1229 chan.^od. u„:r.-o tj 'j'.O".'. x:l 
oaansed speed to IB knots. 1256 cj. -ionced luaneuveriji^ at various courses 

speeas tp" avoid i-oportoj s'b:r;r'-e ccnt:ict. lE-1.? c'va— -ed c;r-T;e to CCO"'.,. 



course t,: ,9C'.'. i;^.d ; .;c . J:.ii;.;ci s_.<Ljt3a to !■- 'ji-;.. 

eccordlnn to plan ; t-. 2. 1439 oouieuced ;.an6UVoriu- 

speeds t.3 av^ld roportod 3 .';. .-.r'ne o:^r:tc3t, 1413 c: 

pgc. -;.<eed to lb - 

145i .aneuveri:.; 

i^ri;. .... 1500 oiia:: 

1507 c- e..c€Q zigzagi^ing aocc;-d:..,;; Cj ^i 

i.ounts by firing, 1552 ocsji.enced jlaneuvtr 

avoid i-eported subi^arlne contact, jiverar.c 



-^ft^^.^^-, 



report i- :; 
acoordi;:^' 

Jtead.-l.-i 



.i::ed course into 

Ici^ded. J.7C1 ac r 



,i to 
. oours« 



(:<-■-, e xz- JJ>^' :. 1M5 SAJ ■ 

;.■- OaLL. .:c ;all attackeo - . . ■ . , 

Co:.:.;-eLoed zigzagc.ijag to avoid roEiiblo tori-edoe^. 173S retunioU tc 
C9G'T. Chai'.:ed speed to 18 knots, 166 r.p.». ISOO -secured froia ;eii 
iet condition of readiness 'IHvo, v.'atoh one. 3et ijsterial ocr.">itloii 
Average steeci 410, /..vera^Je r. . . 176.5. 



le - 2C 

jcea- ir.,~ a3 before. 1600 
readiaeas -'".;o ai.d ;..att3ri.ai coai 
IQlcj secured boii V .. ;. ... 



1 /:Z' <2,^ZtJi.<i^ 



/ :. 




:;aT,taln, 






front of dlspo 

.■•iccd front of : 



„ ,_ . u-„ .Cuir. , 0. 4. A-.A-artfaair. 



(Thl« |mxt- ( M b ■ 



1 or Navlgsclon ujoDtbJ; with \ja\i Bb««ta) 



^.^' 



2088 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 




EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



2089 



UNITED STATES SHIP 



REMARKS 






, 1941 



''.4. 

. k/3t plane . 



■4 . 0f-.2(J 



1 opeeJ to 



^i xu^j^ui,^- 



/- 



^.^^^.^<'. _ 



»r.iiiii<vl .ril>t>ot«j copy of thU pAgr to »>«• •ent to Bur««u of NjivlgMtwn nvmthly* 



79T16 O — 46 — pt. 16 12 



2090 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



At 

Pas 






- 


























r 









































v 

^Sm 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



2091 



ADDITIONAL SHEET 



i la 

I ace 
j tut. 
roc 



15:v 



.-Ill 
Xi5£; 
fife. 



y. ^ /j^ 



'i^€.i / 



%^ ^'JlU 



ct 



2092 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 




II 



C S. ^.., Xmii^i^o' . 



^nckXa p»«<? to be sfnt t« Bureaa ot Navtgat ion ontnt Wy.) 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



2093 




UNITED ST A' 



ZONE DESCRIPTION . . '. X'ili- - 



REMARKS 




0-4 

Jteu::ir^ 
tion 0-7 in 
course i;.d c 



-)n course 





ea 




-, 237° 


Juide 


.1 r -.e; 




'.r.ots 

in Co 

(.•C&4 c 


'.-iiti 


..varc 


-e 


r 


;..'., 1 


:'i-.. 



leut, , . 



speed ti 

; routine 

aooordi. 

410. .-.-. 



,154 



'0 sounded Oeneral <.uarter3. 3et .;aterial Condition 
^ior on tae :.ain stea.. line. Qv5E c.un-el course 
^Ii'oraft. atea-.inc at various speeds as necessar;.-, 
, lane lauiichfcd. 0613 last plane lauriCl~.ed. 
'^ r,D..... Ciian-ed course right to 250*T, and 
. ._ _ . jordine to plan "o. 2. C534 32;rjw; re-orted 
■bo£.rd. 3ii£ji,;ed speed to 25 Idiots, Z5b r.?.:j. >jir:eavering 
an^ed oourae ri-z'-vi to i;90'T. 0635 Cfsanijed course to ^50'T. 
T c.-'.^-n-.ed course to 14C'T, 0541 returned to 'oasc oourae 
.::-0t3, lot r.:.--. - io .-ed froc general quarters. 
■,:c, vKitca ti;o. 5: . itcrial Condition 2a;;er. 1646. 
to plan : , .. .7.. 3 ceased zlssaggin;, rs3;.-ii 
; disoo6-ti,ji^ ri -.lit to 34C'T. ti:;d ?gc, ?:7' r-so, 
■.t of disposition r;,;iit to CcC^l'. and p^c, 
. .^; reported torpedo v.'a^e to r.er star'^tard. 
^36 r.p..... :;:-.:in;:ed course to left tO' 270°r. 
r.p.i... ohaii^ed course left to 030'?. and 
; units. >ort unit now in use. Co;^.encc'- __ _- 
Chan'^ed speed to le Ixots, 16o' r...... .^^V-ri -6 ;--.ejO_ 



■ . 9 . 






8-12 

otoa.ing as befcro. Z'&Zi, 00 .i.cKced stea-ding at various courses aad speec 
to avoid reported Ei;"^--arine contact. ^B38 o-ian^ed comrse to 03C°T. and »go., 
OlG'.:; ' ■ '^ , 'In' ' .r. :-n. ; ,;:.-er' s . eed to IS i:nots. 0646 o-anged course to 

CeS4 5o_..enced i;aneuveri:i~ at various courses 
.irine c;ntaot. 0902 o.-.ar-ed c-urse to 12C't". a.-. 
' ■ " ■ ■• ^-'"- ••1^'' " ': •' . ' ^ '■ ' ;.~ed oo'urse - ■ 
. occ, 1C7' 



Oft: 



CO.;: 

10; 

var 



id ro-ori 



;3. lOoo - 
.e contact. 



steau.n.p at 
;erir.g at vario 



,ods. 1114 last piaixe la:iaed. 
■ s, lliiS CO. ..er.oed zigza/;.:in? 



u'se 
-lanj 







'Jcb<^ 


^ 




1 

\ 
\ 
\ 


1 ■ i;ain, ' . :. P...p 


Kmi: 


""■' 


iieut-;.x:-.ar'. , 


r. j..v,.v 


;■,-,•■ :• 



(Original Cribbon) copy of thU fmo to >>■ Mat t* BuTMUt of NaTi^stion moottity) 



7} 



2094 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



Pair 



LOG OF THE UN 



ZONE DESCniF 



le'o 



lis"! 

IIP'! 



.6 \:: 



« i-- 


^-. 






i.. 


q 


l-C 


io 


... 


IV 


10 


ICc 




It 


9 


17 


1) 


ceo 


i' 


cZ 


2 


21 



^4v 



:,22 '- 



Itjy 



090jj 

o&oj ; 



170 '..X ... 
170 CO :?•. 

Ivo ei 74 

?4 
70 a 74 : 
- ,^1 c2 74 . 

; __,_h\ jc^^ - '70.r>il .^ii y^- 

3Q2g_J-_T7J^j62_?AJ._y.. 
3021 -171 :01 74l,C 



;t. ■- . - I?: 



if Uliudc-- 


15?^ 45' 


50" ;: 

30" V.' ■ 


II' 






ijj htM\.i>A< 






*llx>n|rlt« i 




"■•' 





( IUc«ivcd_ 






r Outukd j?t^,9Q4 

ij RetfJtcd 

*| El|«fnd«i ,52 , 069 
lonh.nd .l&2,55t 






8. H _ 



i. c.g 19 


C 


16-. 




■• :rc ir 


^ 


1? : 







































































Run No. (Sci 
TillU! I.) »iil.r: 



(OrS^lluii (rlbbou) copy of tUls pugo to l>e stnt to Huronu of Navlj^llou J 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



2095 



2096 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



Pa0« 




EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



2097 



UNITED STATES SHIP 



ZONE O68CRIPTI0 




qS^Tl^ 



r iolj.or -.0. i. -— •! i^.^^^a , 

;r boiler :'o. 1. 0535 ier.eral 1 
ilers 1 to 9 inclusive on aain 1 



'.' :::i.3t'HT, /Lieut (JG, . ..-,.-. 

. O':^' -^-- loft fjr^ation to investigate 

■" - . -.3 L-:;-rii. . it^'^T, oroisiii; fr'-" "*---.--=-; to 

-Joined. c9o9 i:.!.!.-,? reported .;:■ .licatell 

•:-ed flank, ?5 rtiots, 23 5 r.p.:-- i to I 

Lit.. : - --■■ •■.-:•:::.---■•■- accordiuG . . " . ■ 
:tei-s. IC. :' iaiots, 2l 
■:":ed, ^3- course le'"" 

. ocurse u-^i ' ■' • - . - - 

,;t plane 1 :■. " . . 
t to hv-.S': 



-ug acoordl 



/%W^/t^ 



^^-^^ 



1-: 
1 

1 '" ■ > 

:.ove..eiits oi' cru- 
otea.ainr ".t vari 



ifc <-■/-,:. <■ ^• 



(Oriabutl (ribbon) «af>y or thi* pace to b« xnt to Burcaa at Narlgntlon monthly) 



2098 CONGRESSIOXAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 







{DljtlOed. 
RKKit-nl Q 
o«b.nj, 73^000. 

BsrOKS LCATIS-O POXT 

DraCfoc'd 

Drift aft 



Error _ ^ 


'__„0_C' 30" 2 


^TAXnjkMD 


Bi*o. Coiiru« 

54C94 


« H 


346' 


Errr* 


14* Z 


Vftfiatioji 


13- 15- i. 


DtyiiMix 


C 45' 2 



Arm Emut 

Di»fl tM'i 

Dmft a/t 




Ttoe to 81. ; 
Onatwt d : 



(Ort(limi (ribbon) copy o( tikis pace to be »eiit to Btu«au of Navlestloa xuomthly) 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 




2099 



ADDITIONAL SHEET 



14 liiicoiuber ,. 41 



£0 - C4 (Coutinued) 

1:.:' pao, 191'30' pstgc. Average staaiu ilO. Average r.p..-.. 168. 




L'HY^^.leu-.i 






aptaln, I'.?. - 
Co;..';ar:dlr.c:. 






(Ttala paffe to b« seat U> Bun^a of Nav1ar»tlon mouthly wltb Ix>f Nh««Ui) 



r;^ 



2100 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 




EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



2101 




.!! course CCOT, ^nd pgo, 346" jisc, 54V* pato, In oonpany v/lth Task 
special cruising disposition 9-7. C.r.C. and for:;:stioa guide, 'Jid 

.ISPrJSE. otar.dQrd- speed 15 knots, 139 r-p.n. Jteaiin:; at stoxidard 
^..^v.^ v..^.. .,-ilers :;o3. a, 5, 5, 7, 8. Ship darkened. ."' - •I'f-o;. of readiness 
i'wo and .^terial Condition Baker. Avei-ace stean 410, .^v . 139. 



^■•fore. 0515 soxk^o' 
:on Afirm. 063; 
Ji designated". 

.^t,ion of readiness 



3UBx.^. 



ieut( jg). 



4-6 

3tea-- " 
jSet „;at<:. 
, executed 
. quarters, . . 

■ C653 oo._enced zis/M-s^lns to hold position on ori|i3ers durinj fueling prepara 
j;:o definite plan used. 0749 oiiSEjed course into v/ind to launch aircraft. \: 
'course 505'T. jpeed 15 knots, 139 r.p.:;. Ayerage stegn 410. .»vera.;;9 r.p.- 



quarters. 0540 sounJe'i 
urse left to 29C'T, :,■ 
ed ship. 0650 sooure;', 
;:i two. ..ct r aterial c^, 



/^ • :/^>^^iZjeo- 



luar-tters. 
44 

ral 
..airer 
ti ons , 
prox. 

139. 



£ - la 
1 :tea:.i;!,; as '.t-fore. C-^^ c" ar.Red speed t 

course left to CIO' T. and p^c, to close 6aXii I-^... -.-^ --.- .^.. . . . ,,».... . 
(1115 3tea.;-nc at various oo^xtsgs to rejoin position ane:-;: oi cruisers, .jpuod 
!l;: .n.ots. lliC co.-.ei.ced zi=;za,- inc to hold position or. cruisers during faolinc-; 
jOper-tlcns. -tcu-.ir.c on various sourses at 12 sxo-s. 1200 counded fli;i-.t quarters 
|:;ada daily inspection of cagazines and si^okelecs pov^fier sa'-iples, condition r.orjaal. 
Livera^o steaia 410, .-jvera;;;© r.p.H. 123.&.. 



.-.'. i. H2S.3USY, 



5Ut(Jc), 



X2 - --•■ 

s before. 1E44 secured i:o, 9 boiler, 1249 secured ;.:.'. 1 b'.lic-r. 
1£5' :. 9 uoiler. 1251 clanged course left into t:.e -v.-lnd to recover 
eircr— -. ,.,,.i-jx. course 340'T. and pgc, approx. speed IS loiots, 11£ r.. .. 
1252 landed i'lrst plane. 1ES7 DU'LAP, seven uiles astern, reported contact •.vlo). 
subiiarine. leased lar.din^T -iircrcft . is,5t olianf;;ed speed to 10 ioiots, S5 i- . -.-.. 
1302 sent the f,-.'o rey.aini- - - -' — '■ »• • - - -.^ oir to aiR ^'^ ■ ■ "Vi in attao.':ir.'- 
rcporttd s •:>. -rine. 130" . 13C5 C--< ' to IL .aiO'^;;, 

112 r.p.. , liji ceasod '.. ,urse left . to recriie 1. , 

rcraft. .o:ri:c. course ^^.^ .. ~ .:.^\,... _.,„i;d 12 laiots» ^^^^ -^o^aaed landir..", 
aircraft. 1359 last plane landed. Jaanpod course ri -.ht to 065"T. 1347 changed 



course left to 160'?. 1358 ezecuted si^-j.al 
left to 15C'T. and ppc. 1405 forLeJ = -■:-■ i 
tfront of disposition rivht to ItC'T. 
speed and fleet speed to 15 loiota, _ 

changed speed and fleet speed to 16 ■^^, ^ 

speed to 15 iaiots, 139 r.p..-::, Averace steat- 



16 - 18 



Sl'.it. 

152. 



cease present ezerolsfes". Zi-.-.i:. :<i<x coutse 
Tuisi-.-; dis.iosition 9-V. 1407 'c:.?n'op 
lie,' pso, ...J i:.7' pstc. Ohan'^ed 
1453 . jcur'-a 0. 6 boiler. 1;>::.9 
V. r.p.r... 154-i oaanred speed and fleet 
41C,. .ivera-j^^.p.:,. 125.8. 



?fore. 1700 general quarters, set ^ 
- speed to IP laiots, ICB r.p.r . .-.vor- 



itea-. 'ilt 



mW^^^--^ 



lo - 

^*v, --3 before. 1608 secured fro::: ,-eneral s^-iurter. 

readiness Vw>, v;ato;; tv/o. 3et i;:aterial condItl«kn .jaiwr.^^veriicc -t,v;»... 
ivsraie r.p.:.. Ica. V- ^- S^S^^ifxit. 

(^. . ^, J-;Ci;X3, Ir^l-::, 
- :;4 

Jtea,..inr; as before. 2o0C oL£.r:i;ad course to fleet ccurso, , ' '. 
(uriTTTT?T) .[; .rinTTTOIIiiT vr,;Yl4^. 



Sxunioed: 



Saptain, ..5. ;''uv; 
3o avding. 



R. v/. .iu-^a., 

Lieut-Oo;;idr. , 



V. I. jr., Xtetlnttr. 



(Origiiwl (ribbon) Ban •* *>><• P»W to bo Mnt to Bonaw of N«Ti«*tton monlhlr) 



11 



2102 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 




(Original Cribboa) copy of this page to be nant to Bureau of Navtgattoc monttUy) 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



2103 




9/9;.^^ 



-lit. 
1727 



before. IS? 

oa one. S-. 

boiler. .. 



<i$ 






loB' psc, ajid 
PGO, 126 psc. 



J .yj.; --ry,; ,:■■-,.... port to 
■So ^40'''?. ..e.r.euveriag 

2C34 returned to base 
00 ohartged front of 

33C0 olianged front of 
:3to. flkVerage steam 410. 



'/C.Qmr.^ 



..xitv. 




>. jr., ffnttof. 



t.> Horeaa of NsTlaatkm mouttal^ wttb Los >Imk<u) 



2104 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 




EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



2105 



RfcfviARiKS 



18 :-?;?fr;,,fl:- 



. In this r3sr<~ 
■-rags r.i 



79716 O— 46— pt. 16 13 



r>««n «r MMtfuHon i 



2106 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



-ES SHIP- 






i>. 1 



] 'if'*" 1 . "" 



bfcBuU:fct;jl. iIfcWj-i*lAtv»» 



!jilNll,iiJ_^KlU 



t utmNft 



U- 



,.5.15 ^3l 




might auaxtoal 



, Urr.l »ll-_ . 








•.i.^ J-..v,!.,i--,. 




■ •f,b->'jai •. 









HH^^^^^^^^I 






■Sriimiti^t^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^B 






"^H^^^l 


^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H 


:>l^^^^^^^^l 


^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^1 




^^^^^1 


^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^1 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



2107 



EXHIBIT NO. 102 



rW?ti* 




2108 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



UNiTXe flTATES SHIP ».fi..S. UTTSTtCiV. ^^ fl « > gj^ — »««1lter " ' '""* 



lOMOMimaM-llfil REMARKS 



00 to 0^ " 

ItoorAd port .side to aoorloe flmttoraa >-9-«, wil F-9-S, For* Island, l>««rl Har- 
bor, T.B., In 7k fathoms of wat«r with th« followioc lines In bs«: Ax 10" asBlls 
htrwssrs, on* B" *inlla baw»«r, four 1-5/8" wire hswsars, and throe 1-5/8* wlrs 
brsests. Boiler Uo. *% and rorward nMohlnery s^cae ^Ln use for ts tulllarjr purposes. 
SitlpM present: a<i;.i:cfiH:,<» (SC?^>Con3atFor) and rarlotis units of tb« U.S. l>«oirlo 
fleet and yard and district oraft. l^resb enter taitt: telapUone -serrloes being re- 
selved frota the shore. 0020 Plsoonr.ected fresh water line i'ro^ shore. 00)0 The 
fcllcwlne nen returned titosrd having completed tei3!>orary duty with shora ostrol 
detail at Honolulu are*: HEILLY, J.a, , TClc; VHS^SR, W.O., mac; XJUIMO, ::•.>'.., 
30««, and Oli,',, s.h., vJClo. 01?o a;'3;o, /.;., J^felo, having roturced from llbtrty 
ta a drunken end disorderly oonditlon, was plsokd in e^.flneaent for 8ttrekec;tiine. 
0035 tJDXX, •'.E., Co*, was re* -ne'J to ship under ari'est by shore patrol aiid ess 
Bade a prisoner at Inrj-e by order of tht Cote, r.' Inf Officer. Ohbr^rL.; Dlsotedianos 
of safety orders of beaoh eoard patro-j^ 

1.1. Eoiiaaa, oayum, vsn:. 
04 te OB 

0^05 BiiOHO, F.J., je^2o, returned t»^3«nt ov-rr' leare jsIb j > ■ '■ - J«<t», sad* 

a j^rieouer at Iwrfe by order of tJie Cots* aline Oftiosr. 0/,10 jrur9u«at"V> iS«WiaT ' 
orders of 7 I^vember, 19i»l, 'lodlflcl, l-leoteaant C.U«£. UjAkOSaH, MiM. was de- 
tstchod ana uidircc to duty at UaTal ^ir ;»t<ition, ;)uoas«tt I^iat, khods Xslaad. 
04J,} i.islit«a Ilres uo!' r toilers lios. 1,6,10,12, -tnd 15, <y>t>i:ittuM*=d ■«arnln,£ up 
**• atid "J" units; eotx:.er.oel preparations for (^ettin^j u/jdurway. iJji,5 Tested laala 
sngiottH, hll departncnta ready for gettizi£ uadsxvajr. 06^0 iilot OTi'Tft.JCll aai.e ^ 
aboard. 0705 i»erelzed deijBunsl:^ oulls. 0726 4ot underway li; aoeora«noe with *j|i- 
roTed opei^ting ashedule. Japtaln coOLlnfi, i^xeoutive Of. lo«r, and ^vi^atort ana. 
Pilot on the brl'l^. . 07J5 Joii;.on;L;0 ateeria£ various oourses at varloue speeds, 
standing uut of JPearl Barter chsnael, 07$0 Went to tor;»do del«DS« ^usrturs. The 
followlne ship r.ovenent3 occurud during the wstoh: Stood out: foSBnOt, Ituk^U, 
40PKI»S. SClTiiiJUS), DBATruti, ZtaCJOO, lOKlij^'VLXK, AUtOaiA, rORTUMD, aad UMAM- 
jBOLIS. ATor.C'- stes'i: 2f5 . ^vera^e r.?.B. 54^0. 

W, Lieutenant, U.a. Hayy 
0« to 12 ^ 

0006 Fasaed ohannel entrance buoye abefni to port end starboard. 0610 CttMSgad 
apeed to 6 Imota, $3 r. p.m. 0?12 3treaaed paravanes. Jteaislng on various courses 
at various speeds to olear deiensive sea <>r«a at ohannel entrcnoe, 0S27 3eour*d 
froa tornedo ^afensa, sat oonditlon 111 in the anti-airoras't tettary. 085? tt»' 
trlaved -aravaneB and aaoured for sea. 0900 Xent to JT^i^t qunPtara, 0901 All 
an(;ln«;. stoopad, shifted to low apewd U. pole ocabioatlou . All engines aheaA I/3, 
6 toots, 5? r.n.B. Steanlnc on various ooUrses at various speeds fcr fU^A ^9*^' 
etlons. 0937 ill en(^liie« stopped, out Out tht two aiboard shafts, all •*Bglft«s 
ahead i/3, 6 knots, $3 r.p.s. 091,0 i,«nded eisbteea VSB planes of lk>rlu« Sooutio^ 

ruadron 3SI. 1011 All ei^laes stOPiWd. Cut In all stiafts, all ecelnes Atead t/3, 
knota, 61 r.p.a. IO30 LiXU.OlOM Joined /Task lorce 12 In disposition 12|J as ft>r- 
aatloa e^lde with the following units of the I'uciric ileet: CHIiJAOO (OOBi£aojPorl» 
fMOUND, A$TCiiU, sad Destroyer Division Mne plus POffnS on fleet oaurae UTO* M 
apaad 1? loots, 149 r.p.a. IIO3 teft fonoatlon to land elr group. Coajenos'! aaC* 
auverinc on various eoursaa at v^^rious speeds fcr fligbt operations. 112i %rf'15 
erasiedflnto the barrier: aIXAJC, J., AlS^lc, ;l'v<t of the pl&ne reoelvbd ell^cnt 
facial lacerati«M. ^^k.^^^Sh^T*^'^'^ 

12 to 16 

1202 Changed speed to 6 knots, $S r.p.a. 1210 Having aoiapleted landing IXXlh^^-^U 
Ult Oroup ehan^fed eourse left to 270* T. , 25i,* patf, 253* pao. Changed spaed to 1? 
knots, U9 r.p.a. 1220 HI anginas stop, out out "C* unit. 1221 All m^m* «*••#.. 
I6j knots. 145 r.p.a. 1222 Co:3aeuoed zigzag In t. record totoe with ataJMlare slfaac 
jii^ plaa. 1^ Cbaneed spaed to I7.6 knots. IH r.p.a. Averaee staas 18$. Av«ra«a r.j 

^ U.^^'^iipji£r^1SkAl)«llt ConsBod^ 




Captain. Q,s. Bavy, 

i^oamuidlngA 



..siiKiB^ 




^i^^^ JiSt 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



2109 



^ 



¥ 



m:msm 



AOOITiONAL SHEET 



i 



..LJiOhJluU... 



Datt ...ptcarahw — -$ <■" — 4X' 



lo to 18 

X62i. Caused zlgwi.cglnij »nrt r«8UJaed base coufs« 270* T., 255* patg^t 253* mc. 
Bhnngea dpwd to 16.5 Knota, 14; r.p.u. 1623 oi^ii^Bd Jloet «xie to 285* T.^o}? 

Coatsr.cec zlgiiu^riiio li aO'oraance wltL staudarci plan, baa© course 27C* T. atblias*> 
sp*ed to 17.5 knots, 154 r.p.m. 1732. D«irkt.r..>fl b-M^. Average ate&a: 285. *van»g« 

H.-.». iiOSi*D, Ueutaaant ijg), li. J. Kavy. 
to 20 
._. 1800 C<»tir,e<3 zi:'zaftCin^ t>uc. rKr,\x:^fL '-aac i;ourse, CliLi^oa speed to loi kaots, 
lU r.p.S. 1930 CJiaoeed oouras to 265' T., and Pd^, 274* pat^c, 274* pac. 19J5 
Hoottrla«, oonraenoad zlgz«ei"lar; changed spe«4 to 1?^ 'axota, if>} r.p.jn. At 1400 
this date nXHTSMH, L.S., 250-46-31', Flo, surfer«d -i eoaix.und lr-..-lure, third 
r !»)<!•'*• *«lien th« roll of tno ship aaused a door to flioflfl v6 tti« i'lnj^er. Trafttad: 
with Soott'3 solution, »a3(ill;i« t^nuze itjPaastrif ,itic <5-'->Uot. P»»t-i'^fit w^^ ■%,* ..■•■itt-i^ 
t« the alak ilet. Avoraee ateea; 2S5. Av*--- ' , . . 



• •• Intersiltteiit li^tfBt rela SiuaUa. «."' ■ • -.; 2o,'. uvaj-«g6 




«Mluuuiar, u.irr K ^v** * 



>«««BttiMi aMMhlr vrttk tog ah* 



2110 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



ir.lfoir «• / 



LOG OF THE UNITED STATES SHiP -. 




12 ii:. 



r. 

10 
17 

18 
16 












1:2. a 1 ' 























Hub No. tlianalj — 
TUm to Mt>a»it« 



(Oi<<lMa<i«>lKm}«o|^orUiteViNI«toM«WK»laB«rMMiofM*<i(|»a^ «-«> ... n. m m 



H 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



^111 

,, 1285 •^ 



UNITED STATES SHIP i^,.. ...i.: 



iONf [>t»CM(PTION .*l;Oi.„_ 

,i)0 to 5/. 

3t8".Bln« under tellers Nob. 1 . ' 
-^r.bln«tl;,r. , 00 bei8«> oour«e 285* 
-.nots, 153 «".>•■•, enroute fotirl . 
rusk Foroe HI, ?«oiflo Fleet, CU 

i.'lpet ffulde la UtnUOTCN; aXl »h! 

!: renorl^ ed plan, A««rft«e etea;:! 2t 



REMARKS 



iCW to 12 
o«r>n ijuater 

^ - ■ .r9« -?^- ' i . , .;■; •' . - 
1 zlfZHg lr.£. ChHiigf"- 
■*n»s and 8tici<?l«8B JK 
...w-rv- r.p.T.. 15). 



|12 to 16 

12;jO Ceau'd zl; i«»i;i:lne, r 
,«;, "liS fle^t «p*ed 10,^ 'it» 
■;c. U20 >/. 



17J-; I>«srkisi.«'1 all,. 



18 to 2 

! No r*! 



.r. r 



i20 
I !.- 





•i^y^!!!:^-' 






AitprovMi: ^SJmXUmU^ (t_ 



Kith 



T. . snd Mi, ., 

slder.tif led 
J cur 3 9 to 
, ar.,'. pgo", 



sr, U.S. BaV] 



Rsvy 




YBZDS«ICK C. SHXaUB, 
CapUln, C.S. ItaTy, 
" Bdlae. 



■^ ***Mt Mvr «( au» *^i» *• to iMt *• 



2112 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 







EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2113 






UNITED STATES SHIP JJ.A^. UmOKTCJ: ^pikS^..^..JhMmi^ I9ja 

lONB o€»cRiPTioN .-_*lQi_ REMARKS 

00 to 04 



StMUtlM in OOTipany with Taak force III in apoelal cruieing fllaposltloc 12S, 
vaAmr boU«r« Hos. 1,5,6,10,12, and 15, "A" \mlt, at etondard apacd l?.i knota, 
153 *'.p.«-. on course 285» T., 271* petge, 272* i»o. LSHNOTON i» r< raatlon guida i 
oantar of roraatloc, OTC and ComTaaltKoroe XII i» In CHXC^'iO (SCFii-CoaOmScoror ) . 
Sbtpa darkaned, condition of readiness HI sat In the antl-alrtwrt battarlaa and 
danaga control, Ararage ateaa 265. ATeraga r,r,.«i. ^2« 

sTlRESjriJajiEns Ign , V.a. fciTjr 
04 to 06 ^ 

06W Want to £enar«i 'i««rt«r8. 0645 0'BHYA.K, P.M., 287-26-70, SC2e r«oe!v«d eoa- 
tuaion rl Hbit fourth finger while woriciiig on powder hoist In No. II turret, wtitn 
f lager w&a caught between two powder ease. Z-ray showed no fraoture. Tiaoture of 
»«rtblolat« antiseptic and dry dressing applied. Im not stoitted to sick li»t. 
07i0 Set condition, of readiness III in the antl elrorait batteries aad daiwe^e ooQtjft 
ATsrage steam 2t!>. Average r.p.B. IJJ-ii-^^-'^ " / 

-^i^Z^ECoC^^lMt^ot iW, U.S. Kary 
08 to 12 ^-^ 

0615 Mustered crew on sttttions,^>(![Os'bsentees. 0621 Went to geaer«l quarters is | 
or^er to aet oonditioD IX, on sigimi Iroa OTC. <XyO Hecelved signal froa Cin^ao, 
"Bostlllties with Jfapan ooa.^enoad with air raid on fearl". Coanenoed zig£ag,^lc£ ' 
in aooordance with standard zigzag plan on signal froa OTC. 0«I35 Went to fli^tht | 
quarters. 0830 Secured fros general quarters, set oonditios II, starboard «Kt«A. i 
0915 Lighted lires under boilers Kos. 2,4,9.16,5,7,11,13, •»« 14. 09*1 Msneuveriis^ • 
on rsr ious courses at various speeds Into wind iaunohiie scouting grdup sad cn^ii'ii 
sir patrol. 0925 Cut in "B" usit end boilers Nos, 2,4(9,16, on ti^e aain steara lU^- 
0936 Completed riight operations, reauned zlgzagrring. 0951 Weat to gwueral qasrt* 
on signal froa OTC. 0953 Cut in "C" and "D" unit*, boilers Hob. 5,7,11,13, *Pd :.. 
on the aaln ateara line. 1012 Changed speed to flenk, i24 knots, 210 r.p.m. on el.- <■ . 
froa OTC. 1013 Maneur«>ring on various courses at varioua SpiMds laun«faiuc air «■ 
1020 Coapleted flight operations, resvsaed ztgzaggiDg. IO43 Maneuvering am tnuritii.. 
courses at various speeds launching air group. 1059 Coaaletad flight operation*!, 
ehan^ed fleet course and axis to 102* T,, 094* pso, 093' stg, on slpaal from OT 
1115 Secured froa general 'Quarters, se](^onditiori HI, section III . Average stmtM 
265. Average r.p.a. 174.7. 




V. 
fl to 16 

i2l6 Xnoreased speed to 20 knots, 17^ r.p.a. , full speed. U - -sk 
lag at various speeds on various ooutms to leuseb alreraitt. i> 
•l«3»^ed on flight deck and right la^tfiag gear gave awajr. Pilot 1 . 
'OMtcleted flight operations and '^i^t ahead full speed, 20 knots, x/> 
|102* T., 094* stg, 093* pso. 1320 iXOSSfflleft foraBtion to lovostl^ 
|r«»uit8 negative. 1353 aH engines stopped.- Coouenced BMki.euverirv «' 
ma various courses astern for stern aircraft operations. 135? Coai-.^. 
jslz relief and ooabet patrol over the stern and went ebmtd on course 
jst«, 093* P«c, at 20 knots, 175 r.p.«. I4OO Secured boilers Kos. 3,<. 
•j*«, ' on 30 ainutes standby. 1427 Slowed to 15 knotn, 130 r.p.a. ant 
eraft. 15i4 Coapleted aircraft operation, havir.c launched aeoond' day 
,Md went ahead full speed 20 icnots, 175 r.p.a. Uide dally Inspection 
■nd aaK>keIes8 pointer sui^lea. Conditions nornal. xremgo stet^a ^s5. ATersg« 
162.9. V, ' "-^'"^ A a . _ 

LTSt 'JTcJiBTT, £Ml«n. O.S. K»vv 

l« to le 

1*20 Changed course to 210* T. , 197* pstgc, 195* P»«. 1633 Ooaa6i«n.!e<5 nt . 
various spetrds on various courses in eonnectlou with rsQovcrla^ 
Osesed night oper&tlons, caae tc course 210* T. , 197* pttgu, ;. 
knots, 193 r.p.a. 1720 «8TH>, «.L.- 3«l-27-68, ^3«, reo«lved j -^ 
fourth aetecarpai. Injury sustained when petlent fell rrois boa »•!... 
readlivR and cauctt linger in looker door. Traatasnt: l*»fcbillah-; = i- 

Ireaslng. X-ray ah^wa fraoture. iSTEF was net adaitted to siei i ■. - ''■■' 
lltion Toke on and belo* tLe stcu^ iiv.:u, ve;.-. tiation systeaa t 
9smer, ^«.? steaaing on various oouMes ao^ speeds Xor recovery 
Stee a 2 85. Aver»ye r.p.a. iai.9. ' ' "' 

F&iDiKlOK C. BBXmt2'., 
Captain, O.S. Kavy , 
ZatmaAioe.. 

■ rftllsli I OOtiieJ mwy ml 




2114 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



ADDITIONAL SHEET 









Ap^..« HI,^^, 






EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



2115 




~T*^.. •• 


— .— 


.• 


• 




« 


%Mltek •kW) 








'.f 












_iL_ 




^«M«>» 




, 






; 

















^l9m0tM ( i tf» M ) . •ofr of t>to p— • <» »<M|> » I fc w ^ »r |Ui»itf»«ton moiMaNin 



.jnu^ . ittsnumz/aa 



2116 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



.mmjsat. 






UNITED fTATES SHIP . 



mrrtiftTnH 



*i*i^ 



:}&Q«c.b«r . 19 41 



«iM»c»«c"<»^toH — rum~- REMARKS 

00 M 04 

StMDBioc M yert of Tksk 7oro« HI 
ISaXA* OH •osrw 170* X., X63* P«to, 



, OTG (ComCruSocior-aOPA) in CHIOfcOC. LBIBraTOI 
162* psc, spe«d ii krots, 193 r>P.B. Hollars 

iios. i,Sl,4,5,7,9.11,13,U, »nd"l6 ial vmits "A","U"7C", and "D" on ttje 11m. 

Stilp In «ondltion of rMdiiMM II. A^ertt&a ataaci 26^. Avertigo r.p.a. 193. 

04 to 08 

0$1$ Uj^ted rire* under boil«ra Ros. 3,6,^,10,1^,15, «nd out XL^u In od the mill 
at««lB line at 05 30. OJJO Want tc ni^t quwtars. 0.-1 1 W'siit to ganeral ;jertar». 
0642 ContMoead 9taaalu£ en varlcua eouraes and apeatta lu conaectlou «lt:> launchine 
a*>rnlcg air patrol. 070O Caasad flight operatlonr. anl aet course 170* T. , it>«.* 



pateo, 163* pto 

aaetloD I. 0728 Soimeucad BBneurerlti^ or. vtirious covu-aes eai 
oraft. 0735 -*aa»«3 lUrht oparutl'-ns and :i. i oourae 1?0* T. , 
foil apa«d 22 Knots, 193 r.p.a. Aver i.' »r^5'ioam^.;e'>._Ajer«e* 



0715 {Joeurad fron genaml quertara; sat condition of raedlDaaa UIJ, 

apaads tc raaOTar alr- 



■r.a. i"v.o. 



16? 



pso. 



d. tXIiMMrilU), clualcn, U.6. Navy 
06 W 12 ' 

OSOO Kuatarad oraw Ob atationa, oo absentaas. ;S04 CLuj&cad apaad to ii, uiota, 
aw r.p.«. and •ouraa to 174 T. , lo7* stf, 16«» pec, 0840 llbna 2-o-7> iHD-3. 
UautecABt (J<5) J.^. ffCHTER, IBK , pilot and lANO, i..y. , 326-61-48, AMiao, craslied 
lato tba «aa. Latitude 15 30' North, Uineltuda loo* 50' Weat. Fllot and paaaeogar 
took t« c\xXi^*f collapslbla bout. Di<AY70M lai't formation tu tUalr aaalatazioa. 0935 
Bl^tad IKDIAMaWUS, dlataut 15 allaa, 194* T. 1010 iiOIiUii»yoU^ Jwtned ton...tioo 
kdA tocA coaaand of Task Foroa £U« ,1050 oat all oloolia back ^ nour to &caa *l\ tiai 
1027 iilowad apaad to 22 Ksota, 193 r. p.K; and coastanoed zle;£at;tcli' 
atafidard plan on basa ooursn 170* T. , 164* stg, 163* pae. 1110 Cet - ii ,n<j 

lod slowed epead to 15 knots, 130 r.p.H. 113^ Jonaericwrt rtiifuver li., 
s<&uraas lor launol-lng aircriiit. 1142 CoEs>platad launcbibs ulrcroit and j,r«ip«.-»' to 
4siid airaraft. 2toda dally In&^aotlon of ua^azlnas and auoKaleai pow'«r J.^aplae. 
PotJ'V.rjona n^raual. Avara/t staaa ■iP5. %JK(f«gefjf.pji. 19^^.6. 






ljU7 Ccwplatwd rligut optirationa, all planas returned ejieapt 2-y-7. lUta pl-iua ' 
Was reported down 200 r;llpv Jpoq the BUi,\ ^ilct slid radloaan were rwpcTtad aabark-i 
aid safalf In roboar boat b;. tic^onpSny .i.*- pl&naa. Case to couraa OoB* T., 055* stg, 

f>4* j»c. 1250 iCitidi ui«l ?0H7L»»HD lei t the tornutlor. but took courst to weatwnrd. 
130 Oo signal froa O.T.C. (soaoanoed zigzagt^^lng in aeoordtinae with staudaird zlij- 
>,'«« plan. 1352 ItAHAN raportnd sutoRarine. iitMtCi I'iXi. lorR'l^lor,. to sanroa toe aub- 
aM.,rlna. Hant to lllrut ju- rlars, aentiwd all rotrmti^ statlon*i*Xxaeut*d aaargency A^MI 
tlg.Tal from O.T.C. I4O3 Secured boiler Hy. 5. 1405 On signal fr-ju O.T. . raauaad 
riset oooraa 068* flaat apeid if* K,!.ota. 1411 Cn sl^nsi frciia u.T.C. r«8-«i*?d il^;- 
M#«lni<t Vi saoordanoa wltli standard plan. 142'j v^neu7«<rlne: or^ various oouraes at 
jrarlous speeds launohln/f aritl-subasriao patrol and pl'ines of fh-^ to i'»«lat la 1 

faaroh for p* ' '"-' ' ->7. 15u5\yAHAJI rejolnei foraatlon. 152o Coapietad fllglJ^ 
per&tlcjic. Aoggtng at lo kosta. 15?9 Ceased ?ir?e?jFin« - "'.-t,?.! fro« 

t.T.v, , otan • 15 M»t*, 1 ■> .' r.p.a. 1537 iomt& orulsinn Uiapvaltl..o 

fl2S* on sigttrt* *. - .I.e. l';39 .'ff-' ■- rll^bt qu'iptera. 154" Ke'-ftvBd ra-^-- 
tr pla»a« reported as e. r.^ froc. " : '.i^, V>44 iif^iH-:"^ 1 1 •- * f"*!' 
s&l. AvanMTS e'ei- .<!-". ATera,-- r. 



|»t<?sa 



.rt< 



Hfe- to 18 

i6lj «?9D« to g.-u-jrai 
1 640 aaeurftj fr-ja ganaral ^u 
JLoa Toka below th»- pac^nd d«- 
lor l*UAohlnf - " ■ - " ' 

.'-^#ji<»*.d to 

loiilBf • 

l^lOQ and .iis«;i>.i-^o . -• •• ' !■ 

tor the pnrvlvor.i of i-i-',", i-iaut«i(«nt 




^VJr.enoed wneuvi.: . ~. , . -...,.. .*. . 
•. :.Jltloii of reeainesp n. 1722 «m; 
r von* P •loR. l''4i, Co:'.t,l»:tv i ~-»nev. 

tc .>ofc T. , ^5S* pstc, ;; r^. 
:.d K.'TSK i-.iv'-d tearing ^ f,, 

1,13, Anrt 0HI;,9C f! tha f..r- 
i.»- »<- Hi ' ■ """ ' r raft 

iji*{). J.C. 



JS uns<fc«asful. \Vfrir-- staausi, i'>>'-. Av«r«~'e 

Captalu. U.S. S«yy. CcactsOKSfer, U.S. navy. 



kv. 



Jl 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



2117 




2118 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

EXHIBIT NO. 103 



./ 





I ; • 
) 


' ■ ..(■' 1 . '.■.' 


..ial 


Frwn: 
T ; 





At J-,'u 



: . .'v; .• Z-.Tvii'iP.d.SS Ail- Gnnu. • 

Sv.oi ■.•',: .(..-jrt of A'^tii-r. •.it;i .]-\finna kxf force 

Ht'oa-V.. T.?l., Ducof..u.ir 7. 1941. 

.iiu'jrarice; (a) Artic^. s ll'i and 874. U.S.». Begulations. 

1. At ot.lj DjcwJiber 7. 1941 I took off fro..x 

ENTZiiPRISZ, wnosc (.osition at that ti.^ was approxinately 215 
:iilaa •■ue v.o5t of Oahu, with n laission of searching a sector 
^.58*-095* tru« fv.r i distance of 1^0 n.ilei, and then to 
proceed to ?ord Islin-.i. Ensign P. L- Tuaff, U3N in airpl&ne 
'■ -S~2 accoapaniwd .ne. ky passman ,«r was Liout"*Cc»adr. Bror^ield 
r^icnol, USif. Tictical Of.'iser attached to tJw staff of Co-^iander 
Air-^raft, Battle Force. >(ho hiad been ordured to report to the 
>'or- in-Ci'itf. P^oafic Fleet Ju.i..ediat6ljr after lay arriiral 
' ■ .ni Islanri. 

At about 0720 I sighted a tanker to starboard, 
. roceoding on an eastorly coursj. which upon investigation 
provod to bt the "PAT IXXE»v*Y" of Los Angelos, belonging to 
the Hichfiold Oil Go. Continuing on i.-j track of 09*3' 1 
si^atvd and passed the U*S-3. THr6£S;i£tt acconpaniod by tho 
' -S-S. LITCHFIELD at about 0740. At about 0810 I passed iUt^na 
Point abtja.. to .cort aistanc-j 20 nil-is. At 0820 paasod 
Barbjr's Point to seaward and .at this tijjo I noticed apprcoc- 
L'-Atoly a 8 .uaJron of planes circling Swa Field in coluaa%. 
aclioving thoii to b. tj. S. An-/ pursuit pl«»sJS i gars theo a 
■.'ido borth, d.!cr*.asin^ kv altitude to about 800 fowt and 
■otitlnucd toward Ford Islvad Fi-ild. At a point mid-way 
D-t„.,-n Ewa Field and Ford Island I notic<3d considerable "AA" 
fir..- in.jad. At ■iL..ost the- sa..^J instant i was att&ciced oy 
J tp'^n_st wlan.,? frot:. the mar without warning" ftaoognizing 
-1' omj plane; tivat had ccupl-ted a dive on tm - 
.. jv ; tov.'ard the ground zig-zagging. ky 
:n.». .lav,' ::urf iciont ti^.ii to . lan tho f ivo ^n- 
■ cr; lo-.dcd and ohar^wd out X had no opportunity 
T.i-.. .l-Tiyj tnat attaCKod r.w appearoa to be loi«- 
i fi ..torfi with nitmotablc landing gear. ..y 
'.ttack«.:d at tao s-u*. ti^c but v%s not hit -ind 
.^ ..-.;! wi'^h -.J, circlin,:. low ovur a cano fiald to the Morth 
>: •■-".rl C-ty. It was ioac;di".toi;.' evident that I was under 
AA Tiro r'-gardl^ss o: v.hich direction i • .nu. 1 did not have 
sufficient fuvi.to return to tho ship had I bean able to get 
• ..• - CtrOiT, thy ialareJ. Hoping that I would bo rec<^ni»ed as 
fria-.-ily J docidod to .-akj -. lew appraach to Ford laland field 



th. 


in/^i ■ 


r. I \ 


I -.-•. 


, . di-r 


L-.iIy 


f>ai.s 


'-■'('.'-•' 


:.i.- 


U, f 


ix.j 


,;uns 


to U30 ti. 


i;;:.. 


i.'ing 


nonopl -jY 


'■in.-" 


;.ian 


'.^'as 



i illULU 



-i- ssTsaPHisE jon <mm> 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



2119 



..•*>»;■ rt ( (• 



1 »;^ 

In:-. 




7S-6 and VB-^0 1 ..is ^irdev 




2120 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

CaAG/Al6/Pb/ 

(S7v) 

Go:"Fi :/-.. :-iAi, 



^^•■: i:' r >u-i-. , ' '*:•.■ A , ■ , . : ' .... I.: ;'i r- . i • 

:.::.•.;->:' !-•■ 

i Lui'.-L'. iiKJ t;.f ii< i.:^ LT .U-or., ... 

onl^ -..ii'icor detaiiedi to dut; 

o2 the tr insiiiitter iii tiw tc'..c. » .-.^^ .u ..- ■. .. . '-•• 

with, cither. Tiie licK of proper joza'-iutuc-itio.-: ;"ic i 

telepiione nd mdiOi wore • contributory cuU86 to<t.. 

4 lirpl inos of VF-o, which were shot down by our own AA ^xr... 

during the night. I atteupteu to tr.insndt liiidinr Ins t r.! -t ions 

to then via the towor, but they wore umblo to ne ^r. Jt v. 

necess^rj- for thoa to land due to the Lack of x'uel. ? - 

bIx 1 inded safely. I then itto..pt«d to cum..unic:ite -..iti. t..,.; 

2OTEHPKISE via the tower voice set in order to rocorjnond ■•. :. .t 

no ;nore plin«s oe sent in to Ford Isi'\nd, withoMt suoc-f- . I 

then learned that the reiaainder of tne sji^uj' i:..' , . 

launched had returned to the ship. 

5- Lack of irufonaation that hosti.;.it i.. , .- - 

ed with Japan, proper cofjriAinic itions, th^ ina:; i 
ground and ohi board forces to reco^^nize I'ric! 
know the proper r>icognItion signals uerc the ooiit,riaui.wr., 
causes for the loss of jjeraonnol ind airpl"nes of the Jlcri;.%i".'J.w^ 
Air Group. 

6. No pi »nt,s wero e-u^pp-jd ..it.i s^lf ik;LJ... •. .-i/;.-; 
or an/.or - \11 :'yir\s were fully -ni-cd. 

7. The suddcness and laagnitude or t..- ^•. .-'■,. -^.'ix:,: 
caused such a stunning effect u^on ^round an<J ^..i .-.r. :i-.';I 
Uiat all aircraft were fired upon regardless of i.ieir ;'>>..>. 
friendly. I was under fire until ray wheels twiclx-j •..;•., ■r-.-unc 
on ford Island - soiae of the oms boin^ not r.ore tiian !!-•.■ 
yards distant frcsti ..ic. The ijuportance of soi.ie :.ieans oi 
positive identification of own airplanes, other \,r.\:: visual 
signals cannot be over emphasized. Tho loss o:~ 

fi^nters of '/F-6 triat ni-jht is a .:oo<:; sxaii^ple -. .. .^..-.s 

unless proper cooiaxmications anu oieans of controlxi;. ; \.id 
identifying aircraft in tno air is available-. 

8. I then received <jrders to rejoLn t.ie SilTE.-'J.dSE 
at sunrise the next n.ornin^ viith our reraainias pi.n. r. Just 
prior to the tis.u of our sc.viduled take-off, i uti.,../ . lar;. 
(JRS) toolc off, and w^s iruiaediat^i;/ x'irea on b,-.- 5.. is ru 
other sliore batteries. I had n'sviously arran-i.-u "...at v- ry 
means available be taken to notii'v all hands of our s^..r;Juied 

->- 



. i,?*!' 



5 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2121 



Su:\=vct: 



it Oar.u. 



nocoss.-ixv t^ 
continuous 



10. : 






........ 






oJg-., 












JV"- 








■ -iS 




for: 






:■ :; ..t .". ; 










;", "'. r^ ■' 




•;>:, :.^:^ .-./ to 












t;l ;'. .-x.-iiiLui 




another .'^ ..;. ,n,. 


/' A ' ■ ■ 






^►'■•rv;.: i <. •- ".t. 




At this :.x.M .... . r 








rr. .'r- r.' t Kiiovm 




to iiis su x:rior:) . 








■ ..!.■• - .■ M-: 




to iiiyone at tne •- 




■ IS- .1 


■i/lr..' ■■ ■''. 


. )- ,;.ju:-t .-, 




St in.ina. devotior, - 






: logic -ui 


; .-o^'^:;-. :^3 in 




action. It is r^j 






rficvT IX' 


.V •:. in fri.:i-il 




couiiondition for ._ 






H. L. 


YulIXi 


i 


.. .££M»».:y&^^i& 


i^UtiU. 








!i^in«B£I«<IS»i>',- 



79716 O— 46 — pt. 16 14 



2122 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

EXHIBIT NO. 104 



from 4>'ari ' wr jvv , 
r.l If p fro/t yidwi) '. 
(riarehi:). ^ 

-.roll •' , ' < "• 



powi tloi urn 1" • . .. 
course ^i'" m-.I "f" 



;>i Otv. ■: g 



To c i : 

mer.c <•(' 

cscc 






At, OMC ■'■ent 



K . or CO 

t 400 



01 , 



.HOC 



-' -C 'of 



Tttr:; 

in. 



ti roceol t- '. T' threap*. ". bfl or«"".'. 
<?or.;-vt -fi tro 1 . .'it 1 Ifl lav.; cJ-f-ii 11 



•e ' rod 



■ocee ■■ 



p •■, -_(--(■>■' . , 



■a detfl.j.- were , ' ;. war 
t,r. .■.-.-^- .. ;\Rf,^ "ctor to 



Lcn •; tude It 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2123 




SKCH.T 










Dc ■ - 


» i i 


^•41 iC4iit'dJ_ 






1 1 i_ 




' . A- 




042 

Scouts a i. 

Latitude .L - ;' ,, ^ 

at estL .ated ap^ed ■">» 

with a red i :•.>!« w' 




' ,. 


•k" 


. 1 1 r 1 li 

.•3« 2.30" 

:• "K" on StB 


Task Fo.'ce T(.LLVL .. 


■.•ce; teO 


^\ic.h . 







prottitle :,,osit! );t,h 

jf ^Mirl at n.).... 

n^axlauia apped of L': .-,.. •,. j an^i aireu:. :, ,.;;i ^'O.. 
to intercept anl dti?^. r ; t'lon. 

At 1630 C , . )r;^-tij!. . '^rst t ■ :'1(!^ a i. 

At 1840 (dusk) oo:;.ileted . .uC.u.- ill riunes. At Ih44 
formation courat v*is cViastjed tc 170^. 



FRi.CER Cr- C . y .. . AK , 
Captain , , J. .. . , 
Cuu^rjund i; - . 

Dftce .-'-r '',, --'4^ ' 

Stea- - ander 

orders t : 

as tanie ". ■^■ 

approi 

jf i ea: 

.vL ...... - vy (f ; -..-r •>■■ ^_ .; , 

to 31L r_il'-s. , . , . r32 rort 3- 

that -, . ..t "2..^ • 

'•L:j'7-' ; L..jt . 

Pilot .1:- ras ei,;8r r V bl^er DO-xt. .!ie 



2124 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



fd) 



For 






A - osa.! -e .' ^- 3.'. yorcr ' '' '_ • * nt 

'ui\ iae'' " t;:'t' .rawn fi ' r 

^- ■ . *. ; ,e 

At 1140 relieve • " 

At IZLl ron.pl eted i : VJ .rr 

At U.3v set C'.n.rsf 068*^ at 15 knots. 

At 12.^1 J. oat 3:^-;:l of 0RT1A^■T snd . 'In.? 2680 

(T), PORTLAND lein»- delayed wiilie hDRinf :■: .ft. 

A«- T>j.o 'V-- ■-•''raed by OTC that CinC ,. . .xA^erei 
s. r.w' retirer.ent towar - 



'• V3 aiTied with 
-autriBriiie natr 



in- er 



"Kany 






EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2125 



UNITED MAUS PACIFIC FLtEl 
AIRCRAFT. BATTLE FORCE 



sr:-. ' r. a •' 

10 -n. 

At ig: 
cruiser di. 
Ovm ^i.';hter 
f ^ r ed on bv 



i> _: I 



A 174G c 
subnwrine putr 
raa e uj.succes; , 
took course Or 



At ::055 the report o: 

At 2140 L'" , ■ - 

raa t ; ; to ,' 'ir 
227 ;;. rv/'^er 



.>ecer. : ei 



rrJDiA-'APt: . . 

were about 25 
and LJIiO?' were .-« 
south southwestwer 
070" speed 20 k:o' 

At 0617 1" . 'it patro . 

DTDIAIIA? LIS, CIICAX. A. TC;-. ..;. , K)HTi..'J D ar.r; Hv. .Jir 
bearing 260° 



2126 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

U.S.S. LSXIKOTON iiAR DIARY 



3ZCTU-:T 



D^ce tu acr 9. 194X (Cufit'd) 



At 0624 launched IC V8B and 6 V7, Scouts to search a 
circle to IBO r.llea rndLua. 

At 0755 lliLIJC MvLlij and cniisers irtiv.ou ly 8igh*44 
joined LKXItNOTON and t:i« force took oraiair^t-; disposition 12V, 
ooume an axis 070°, fleet spead 15 iciinta, zigzagging. 

At 1£11 launched 4 VF relief combat fatroi and 14 VdB 
of Bombing Squadron TWO to •earoh a ••ctor frori 1250 position 
bearing 083'' to 117° to 180 miles. 

At 1230 landed 4 VT of corabat patrol, and 12 73B of 
first scout group one of which (2317) wnet oTer the aids to 
starboard and orasi.ed, slrkint; Im^.sdiately in Lstituds 
19O-00l5» N. Loneituds 163O-40.8* W. Pilot Snsign H.J.H. 
Wslnzapfel , U.a.N.R., not recovered, iasser ,;er reooYsrsd by 
U.S.S. FLU Siffl. 

At 1326 landed last of rirst search. Results of sesroh 
nsfiutlTS. 

At 1610 landed 14 V3B of second search group. Rssults 
of seai^h rersal-jd onlj one ship; the Coast Guar', vessel 

At 1830 lan<led coirbat and intl-subrjarins patrol 

ncDracK c. ^imirAS, 

Captain, U.S. Navy, 
Coonanding. 

DecefflL s gr 10. 1941 

Ctotinued stear,in^ us part of Task Force TVfELVI, operating to 
soutnwest of OAJH; wW'^Ifcstruotions to intercept and destroy any 
•osmy ship in the vicinity of Pearl ilartor. 

At 0130 set all clocks ahead j hour to zone plus 10| tioi. 




r 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2127 






At, ,'j..; laur.c.-itjd -i VT ua ca,. ii', ^^11-0!, 4 vai- ua inner 
:iir T,".'.r I, i^ V-...; as so., 'it 3 : s«a;-c 360*^ (T) to 60 :T!il«8; 



831 



VT to 3. 
A* 

ml ; 



aitt .-a.. >ir 



At 060 V lu.UwC:.e!i 4 Vlii' "is ir.:.«r 



til 



'415 



2128 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



UNITED STATES PACIFIC fUfcET 
AIRCRAFT. BATTLE FORCE 

U S. S LEXINGTON 

U.S. 3. I.- ■■■ • - 

SBCRgT ' '— ■ . ... .„,. ...... 

Alr.a78 *149, 1ft, ; '1 were receive' 
And Itflly hi^f" ''ftplfi'- *•,^.A ' ,i' ted 3tti',.-; e 

Rrvv was to exeri t« • ■/ L 4ri ap'>'ir?t German:' an 
addition to Jaor . 

At 062fi irSO:::;:. .-—..-.. aud DesRon ONE Ibp- \ : : ....;t 
alighted bearinM C70°. Foraiatlon ^uide wi»s 3>^f*e(' to :t;:caGO 
and fueling disposition "ISF" was taker vHh a*- OSn n./i 
course 070°. 

At Oftifl launched 14 VSc for inner i^'l lnt«»rin»'11"5te ^ir 
patrol, Inndin- the dcwn patrol of 4 7S" at 0707. 

At 0713 took course 06C<5 ^^^^ fCSOGl'C 
aloupside. I^e nea wrjs vfrr rou^Vi an-l ■' ' 

Icnots frofl! OfiP°. A speed of (3 knott- on oour<5e 0'35° w;i^' '.aKen 
and, although -1 attempts were raade to ?«pn th»» tov lin<":, *>e 
weather prerented completion. T^re*» time:; tho "-.oorcr-er 
parted and on the fourt! attempt the tcwin-r lino -^^s ja '*<'. ' ut 
the towinff block tuJtbled anl could not be richto(3. 

At 1140 oT'lers were recexv6<i to poatpone T'.:nl in ■ e.'!' rts. 
NXOS'O cast off towtnsr line and ships 9e'7''-q*'»d . T 
12 knots. Orders were intercepte.^ froc C3nCP< r> to 
toward Midway pending more tnvovfbXf v/cath- ' . 

At 1247 launched the relief lir patr Is, A .'5, for I' ner 

and 10 \'3 3 for icterc-ujoi ■•i»'. 

At 1321 lande-l the forenocr. - (14 BE ed 

course to 390° (T) e>t 15 ki-otp. 

'• At 1800 Ct'lCAOO reported si'♦^ tinf two '- 

liQoreasec spet- '" '-.i 

to invest iga ^ . 

At 1832 resumed fleet speed. 

At 1908 changed fleet eourca to OOC^ and a^ 
and ^RDKK rejoined from the routhecst. 

At 210C changed course tc 2900 (T) from :,1"0 to -147 
received Radar reports ol one avrchaft w' ' c^ passe*? to eastward 
of the force on reported course about 2£0 at 165 knotr. 



FRKDIRICK C. SFEHMAi'.', 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2129 

U.S. 3. LEkD.'OTON WAH DIARY 

Jece.i.ter I^^ 1S41 

Cvontinued operatii:?- aa part of Task Force T'^VELVB in 
a general sxithweaterly direction frju. OA.iU , withdrawing 
toward Kidwav While secLing suitalie weather and sea 
conditions tJ refuel the force fro:a NSOSMO. 

At 0547 .anged fleet course to north. 

At 0616 launched 14 VSB to form inner and interaediat* 
air patrold voaiie fuelirig. Fueling course 050° speed 8 knots. 
Took radic direction finder oejaring on a patrol plane 
reported landed on the water southwest of Barbt-rs Point, At 
0745 ASTORI4 and DRaYTOK left the formation p rooesdliig toward 
south southeast V At 0«13 CalCiGO ecanmencsd refuAllng from 
IvTSOoHO. 1006 launched relief air patrols, 12 VT, and landed 
first patrols at 1100. At 1151 IKDIAKAJOLIS reported sighting 
a torpedo wake, maneuvered to east at flank speed for 9 
minutes when vesuaed station. At 1210 PORTLAND rsportsd 
sighting a submarine bearing £00 from LZUNOTON. Hsaded to 
east at flank speed for 5 minutes to avoid area. A searoh of 
areas by destroyers and aircraft failed to locate any subaarins. 
At 1235 attenipts to refuel the force were discontinued due to 
temvorary damage to fueling gear when CHICAGO cast off hurriedly upon 
report of submarine activity. 

At 1334 launched relief Intersediate and inner air 
patrols and at 1350 landed second patrol grou!>a. At 1530 
PORTER, lAllSOK, and MAHAN proceeded toward Pearl Uarhor. At 
1749 landed all planes (14 7S3) of third air patrol group, 
the force withdrawing to southward and »outhwestward. At 
2310 course was changed to 135° and at 2535 to 080'*. 



raiDIRICK C. SaSRKAN, 
Captain, U.S. Navy, 
Coibmandii^ . 




2130 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



UNIILD blAltb PACinC FLEET 

AIRCRAFT. BATTLE FORCE 





-,^ -g , U 

: ' • ,.• r.ic of T's.^k .'orce I'-.^LVE operatLnn to 

v,-o.;t. oT . .roo**- n-' tnw«rd Tearl Jarbor at 20 kr.ota, 

..t 0615 l«iu'.ol ad 14 T atd out«r air patxol. 

At 1138 ooaraenood l^vmch'nr the air <?TOup aroad with 
GOO 111. jonba on ". ;, to^^e.'ofls on '.'^, «nd I'O lb, boabo on 
for ferr;' to Ford Islat^d, coapletlng 'launch at 1211* 

Ti'9 ". was nbout to anter the swept ohannel to th« 

ex.'r«nce >• - ^ • re 'ere raoeiveu not to enter and to renala 
to southward. T! e forca proceeded southward and westward .jitil 

14r^0 vfhen tie approach to enter was oonnenced at 25 knots. 

At ICiil plane on patrol Lndloated a subnarine about 2 

rjIIks to eastward of Ll:.7.II rjTD.' » Destroyers dropped 6 depth 

cr^r as in tl is area while IJ»XIJ;oTO?I oor.tlnu«d at S5 knots to 
eiitrpinoe. 

.'it 1549 pnssed entr' nee buo/ to Pearl llarbor, proceeded Id 
Jerth y-9 w^rere oonpleted noor, crt aide to nt If. r^3. 

;t 1930 a subnnrine alarni In harbor Caused some disturbance 
out lo.?Istie refuellr.;-, -ind re-plenlalin,^ ?nsoline tanks, and 
rev iotunlllr. - oontlr.u*' 1 . 



f.liI)ERlCK C. ;:rEKliAK, 
Ctptaln. V.O, f-avy, 
Comr-.andlng 




EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



2131 



UMH 1' SI \!l N i Vv II It t i M I 



SECRET 



At i:.. 
pre«9ui-a on ..A- 

7^x ;■ ■• 

:..ei 



3 -se 



■rt rtvei, f orce- 



in, f^ 
or t ..- LI.:.; 

3£ ^ 

Shi, . . 

to font T:^3k Force 



: , 1 -ir.dedi u . ,-1 

t3 Ircluded , 

' '745 wh«ji u.^e 

i ng Shi pa 



IICDIAi;. 
ooiv.a- 

rORTL-..X' 



. h'ewtur; , USN) 



1] 



2132 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



UNITED blATtS HACiflC FLtET 
AIRCRAFT BATTLE FORCE 

U S ^ I tXIN ,roN 



I-;41 



Cor.tinued •«-»*» •^a t "n,- v.lrh T- v -^orce 
t.^ the aouthwenlvv . I. from o;jl . .cronr •■■<.' ' e t 

with interRlttent rain e^iuails snii vflrlp: . . t 

0618 Inucched 1? "S • to seorcJ. the aerai-f.r •; • - 

forxnation to •» distnnce of IOC r.lles Letveer 
and 330O. 

At 0757 n contact re. irt -m.: recelve'l r- ■ 
Ensi'^c Wittier pilot, that eneiay cnrrier bore '10" l: •_ 
95 .T'iles from tie 0745 porltion of ;.olnt o^tl' . . 'o 
aaiplifyirwr reports were receied and it w '.e 

in oontact had been ::yot down. A.t 0.*;13 "1 
patrol and at 0924 launched Bttflifik ^^roup - 
7 \T 'inc' 13 VT. \' 093" landed 2"j£ ^ni ': 
course about 205 at very slow speed. . iio* 

lb, bombs but outh niissed. The po-sitior • ' 

Lonfltude 165O-10":. Furtl er luestioninr - 

vvB ro "nti-aircrr.ft fire tl.at nc ixr' tl 

s^lp seemed dead in tl.e water. it v.f e 

olrjert rej.>orted was probnbly a bT'-e " it 

reported Adrift or. Decenjber 6, 3-" - of tie 

oor.tpct . ■?-'■■■ attack <?Toup failei: ject, 

returne -. .d wi^, recovered at 13' roup of 10 

YZ'l 'Are^-e : ^r.cheil to locate Iho c , - ;■ cont-jnt e'! but 

wer<= ."• ■ Ir; to 1 r-' '.e '.t. A f'r.'Tfr > 
'.!:'*■' i ■•- ', V o 1'. ..^-.iv.'j -er: "r-'^rj- ' ■ 

diute air -^atrol ^ro'i j.;jOO unt : l : t 



rpon eontnct the NKOi; C had been oruerec 
courrte .";40<^ ' t V3 kiiOtrs \-* -lo ■'-'^ e ron'^in-'er 
uper'Bitft. on e^' ..tL'' *in!,l sou-warlv courses. .. coirt^e to 
the K£0 :; wf R *,iken at 120 ki.uti'. 



••^'i 



FRSD^RIC:'. 
i;a?t«> i: , ' 
Cot and ii.. 



H 



EXHIBITS OF JOIXT COMMITTEE 2133 



i!LRK7 



we.' 



08S0 ^-1 'T' '; : r.e-Fn e ■ o. : • i 

VmsilO. : wa? adviped ha j"e P.IV' 

41 nlles. 10 VS- took j ...ate air 

At !,.<. laur,c;.:)a If VS. ■ -c;. a ?.f.C^ - 

ffiile.'» for • ;,e :;.-X>Si:0. a* 1"1'' landed ••■ 
re:^orteJ no y-i ■).■! oi" !:n !;0, 



Deoenber l?--. l.---.! 

Con' l'^:'-"^ ■^'ith 7n?k Fcc^ I V.:; 'ov.a d po-!-'-*- <-'»(rd. 
At 061S - , HCTtO on . .--m bea:'ln ■ 01 I-IO 

launch-.^ . '.o searo'. r. pen.l-ciT-rl "n 

'--©arlngs l-O''-' and 260*^ -"'00 "ook courr-e llO'' 

into wina Vor fuelin' a:. cr- •■ lor. -ri 'lo 

Btarboard • I j.9 for fviall-. . ;.• O..'' 
and '.'Ok In'emedia'e al" -a'rol. .x 1 ■ 1 

a f iu I u rxae i^ i e ■ " ' •■ f; - " . « - . 

100 .'•.11 8 F re 
took ; laoe < 
caet o r "^ a \ 

patrol ■*f\-= : . . 

Ja?ane.«f- a.i o c - iu -. a in ■ 

inland La' a "Yokal.nna" ■ JOO 

t-cn „V • . at . ut a -•'•-■•'. . '• - « 

Lave bee .;d; -^o' 
at Jalai ;i - 
and CarDiv ix ,, oi^ . "; • -''.I'". 



. -.avy, 



2134 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



*• " ■ AIRCRAFT RAT i 

aiCRgr 

Laoaii. b«r l'>. 1941 

Continued Alti. Taar. yorct ilEVai vaatward from 

liawailtii. lil^nd*. Lau.-.c. ed 11 VoI> to .e ««8terQ 

»«j:.i.-clrcle to 300 11 ■ ^ reHfter i\nin'viiiiied Intenaedlate 

air itatrol. At •an:' took cuurae 100° Into wind 

wl'.lia PORTWfD flu* C ICAGG refuJed froir MXjSP.C . At 1300 
launched 12 VSH tn search t! e weatam aard-clrcl e to icO milea. 
Thtf r ad Ionian ui nne plare re.jrted aighting. w^^t iie ti.cxitht waa 
a strance jlune In 1 itltude 7*^-L0«. K, Longitude 170°-50« W. At 
14D0 zone ; laa 11 tlma on c-iuraa about 255°. T'lls report was 
unco-xflmied by the pilot and was conaidered unreliable. At 
1553 dlacortinued air patrols af.d landed all ;. lunes. At 2C30 
refueling of tb.e forcb havlutj boen coiLpleted, jroceeded to 
west-8out!.westwhrd at 17 i.nota; :,E0S}10 left rr,rr..ation. 

Received '*brnln<j as to fishing veaaela rendering aii to 
eueny forces, with dlreotioxia to oia.i.ine, del^e or alr.k veaaela 
entagir.^ ir. such activities, A ceasage was received t:.hit Task 
?oroe SIGHT (iKTSRPHI^) left Pearl liarLor at 1000 to /roceed 
to westward of Jojyiston Island as a support group, 

FRliDERICi: C. ^.:SRi-^, 
Csptuin, L.^. wavy. 
Coi;^.->andixig, 

Decen.ber ^0. 1941 

Contiauad v«i.tf. Tuak Force ELEVSN ] rooeedlng to west 
south, est for conducting raid on Jaianese fjroea in karsLull 
■.. j/or ailuert Islands. At 0616 launched ! vs„« t^^ search to 

rd between uearint^s li>C to 330 , .i.es, ai.d to -.ct 

.:-e4i.te ,ir iutrcl. At 1340 lu .. .i .:terr...jn fiit^iit 
«dinte bir latrul tuiU ascircu of iu9 v.e8L«rn 
..iiea. 

At 1600 a 2;e33at;e : Force LIEVEN 

;n-;.: -.^.A \» Inteutioj.^ . . v ,-.,'. . ....I „.c«ok plan "A" at 0500 

.a on Londay, 2*; Dacecber 1941. This involved 
i'anesfc foroes tit Eakin and Tarawa Islands by 

iJ.^Ii.-ii'Vi. ^i;- virovir. .-.• orders vvere received ti.at preaent 



SBC RET 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2135 



UNHtU SIATLS I'ACIHl H (LI 
AIRCRAFT BAini I JHCL 

U.b.3. LEkl NGTON nUi DxARY 



Peoer.Ver .,0. l.<41 



mission •.*«8 cancelled and t\at present tt ick orde- .. ^-,< 1.0 
longer in effect. A later despfito!! adviswd that ClncPac 
reported strong air reinforcbn.ent« possiti^ Inoiudi.v two 
carriers were being sent to the Larshulls; tiiat. the ^oagiMllti 
of surprise attack ty tl.ls force was iniprobable , and t.iat 
CinoPac ^ad directed t .is force to proceed to a position to 
support Task Force roURTEEK (S.-AATOOAJ^ . 

The afternoon searoii group was recovered at i7b4. Fleet 
oo^rBe was set 350''(T) speed 16 Icnots at 173f). Chaiiged clocks 
to zone plus 12 time at 1900, 

rSEDKRICK C. 

Captal; , '".■.. Nmvv, 
Coffina; , , . 

Decer.ber 21. 1:11 

Continued with Task Force ElEVSJ," to north-northweatward 
to reach a posit lor. to «<u|>rort Tnsk Force FvL"RTE]^c . 

Weather at i&w: ■ ■ ..nguil-ible fo,- 
usual 15C E-ile searo.. .. ,3 r.odified to 
patrol wiiich was niair.tained t'-roughout 



}-r;derick C. 

Cocj-iandi^ 



2136 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



UNIICD STATtb H\CIHC H-EET ^ 

AIRCRAFT BATTLE" FORCE 

U '- 

. . . :^Lai:^-. 

GECP.irr 

Continued uS tetzTO. k> ' 400 <■. n.e8Stii,;e fro:.. Cor;.i»axider-iD- 
. iaoific edvised -^r •- ttacked by carrier type 

;rt at 13 X on Decc: - i . 0544 fleet courae was cuaxv;e<l 

rro;- o:-t>" to 297° t:rA speed was iiicreaaed to IP knots. At 0622 ;^ 
twelve VoL were launched to 3e£:.rc;i the -Aeaferri aerdi-circle to > 
It' r.jles, results recative. 

At 0€!5C a r ea3H<?« wag recelTOd f]?or the Tusk Force 
Conaandor t!:at the Force wiia directed to retire toward Tearl. 
Upon tLe return of the forenoon search group at 1000 the Force 
rd course to 004° heading for a rendezvous with the force 
. , t.:.u;,;:0, and escort WOPJ)EN, in latitude leO-OO* N. 
io;., :?. ide !'■ 0-00' W. 

A sii jluno co'ubat patrol was 2iaintalned between 1030 and 
1400. At 1340 twelve V3B were launched to search the northern 
se/i.i-clrcle to IL" -lies. These returned and were landed at 
1700, results of search: NEOSHO and WORDEi; located to ZNE, 



FREDIRICK C. 3;:KRliAK, 
Captalfi, 'J.>. lavy, 
Co.-'.: andlng 



y 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2137 



UNlUD biAll 


• M„IFIC fLtET 


AIR. ' •' 


ML FORCE 




• 'N- li^N 



JSCUE^' 



1941 



Coi'.tinvied 'vitli Msk }• rce ;: "." t.- no: * 

rendezvous wlt'r. ?']*■•. i T^rker, ' ■ ^ , .'- Cf 1 

VS"< for seHTC) , f ir- • '^T.C repo:*- ' •'''•en t. 

cover tie noTtycrr. - • . 10' mil , rrturi 



- • - 1100 

v.''r ; "'■•■■Inr, V"v;l'! ' • ■. ■'-■ -f left, c^arT'e'i vO C7C° 

to In.unch nnd lar.d :1 :" . _ ...c'.ed '■' j'.i > edJate 

".nd '" 7T a<? inner nir .'itrol nul landed the . ■'enrch 

•lid f^»itrol '^•rou;;. At 1.00 ta-llne to .'-".^031'' ' ;p to 
ro'.i -^ Vr^ather. Dl;ico;.t '. irued effort.! to ref - • 

At i:51C received report that rlnne ;: -16 ,-a. cr-iFl- 
about fourteen nilen to r.orth of LIT'IiriT' . 

(Jfc') J. A. Davis, jr., ".. ).!.'. and :ki ?,?-«;.'■(. ■■ 

R.M.3c,, r.r.!.'., were not .ti"' • «' ■ "» 

-sank. Tosition of cms! l.st : * -4;" . ; 

177'"-22' v.. Accompan • I: -• : " •• i- ret i 

2 '16 -, pg testing it? - -' :"\ 

on 3 i. ive ; t^ at n; •<:■ . , 1 - 

tre w-ter. The plar -^ t.ir t <-; ck ■ 

nJnutej ••'*>, no r:'~r occuvnr 

with i .. • ; ,ii( 'j11 si Of.. 

crash, foimd i.othiap ani ; -ration. 



* , - ' ■ 


'■-t. 




;t, 


itude 




orte.^ 


that 




-f^r 




-hed 




• fe 



At 1400 r.tit Flee 



o 



Laurohed 8 VS.: for inter: ^rd r" "' -.trcl, 

".r.d at 1440 l-nc'" ■ ' 

At 1640 landed af terr.o!.': ' ; . 



FREDERICK C. ::!:K^:.'Al. , 
'Captain , ". ' . *'rv;- , 

Corrriard ' : . 



79716 O — 46 — pt. 16 15 



2138 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



-"h .'^ .k 

J : a sic : 

L9»nch>icl 12 VSt', I'or reerc!. o. jlrcul'. niler fror 

firtev ce:.:,er. La-xricl-.j: )i:. . &;:.',6ir. air 

.fti'rol * .'.rouf'hou' •;..' -ar.e -e 'c .-f afer 

.T.alr no or on ^1 ahb. -. >-..aiie . o an 

Of"tiffi.a*ed 30 kr.o'a. Flee coL.r.'« 0-: elr.- 

•Qinfcd. A" 1000 launc:.ed : '.T sf Ir. 1 

h.-. > lat. ded .'.orriir. • EearcJ. r.u . /%• 1: do/, ar. 

ev-i>^ln- JO ». re ^o ".he rou'r. for 4 ril' or'ed 

s ..r.eri-od o jecl loca'ei ;., bu. er^o:. '. -c 1 

.■^•iarcJ.oc v.i'', no.-a" Ive "eB-i'.p. Ar 1 ¥3. 

for seercl. of clrc-ilar area 'o IOC z.L a: 

A IvOC • ;.e force r.ook ar. evj;. co . • 

4 r.iles w.er. i il.XI'S repor'ei ; . .f:r- f^ 

F.;er?orilc. Inner air jatrol ^enrr^.T : 

s.'narlrie. «• IVuO landed • r.e aT'err 1 



\ i 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2139 

... i.:i:xi!/v:x)r; .a , di . .t 

SJSCRET 

^cd:.:.ar 25. 1j41 

As before cruslni' wl;.. .apk Jforce 
085° af •» roachin..: Jt oorl Harbor. At 0:-30 re io r - o 
plus 11 t-lne. At 06';4 launched 12 VSB to ."ua;- . a jir 
area to 100 r.iles. At 1022 a PbY v,a« ?i -^ ' el 10 • 11 f 
weptwar-: r, -lUf' from sou'h '.-o rior'L . air.'al;. i v.. 
Internie-lia* e ai- va'.rol usin;- VF fron 1030 'o 1''00. I^ 
iearch grou; a' 1100. A meppare fror. Cor.r.an.dGr-lr.- 
OpNav war In'erce 'ed anno'aiij Ir, • ' .\e a- rival of r.e" 
C, V.'. Nini'z. a* . arl ilarbor. At lb4'J. took evr 
4 sllef no'., dui. 'o a pw. or r nic. cor.'ac* r-j or 
At 1830 flee' co.-rpe v.ap c':ian^.-i;; :i 'o 110°. 



frsdsri:k 

C a . ■ a i r. , l 
vO:. •■ . 1:. 



2140 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

EXHIBIT NO. 105 

SECRET 

Paeaphbase of Code Cablegram Received at the War Department at 
14:33, October 21, 1941. 

London. Filed 19 :20, October 21, 1941. 

JAPAN 

1. It is thought that Japan will not advance southward, except possibly into 
Thailand, because of the danger of becoming embroiled with the United States 
and Britain, especially in view of the tirm stand taken by the U. S. However, 
Japanese troops will be strengthened in Indo-China as follows : 36,000 there 
now ; an estimated 20,000 enroute, and an additional 20,000 included in Jap- 
anese plans. 

2. Agreement among all previously divergent opinions in the army and 
navy in order to make certain of their assistance in any future projects 
launched is one aim of the new cabinet, which is unquestionably geared for 
war. The new Premier is wholly pro-German. It is believed that the Japs 
will advance on Vladiavostok and the Maritime Provinces the minute Soviet 
disintegration appears imminent. In the mean time, speeches by the new 
cabinet should be viewed as obscuring their real intent. The Russians are 
still believed stronger in Siberia in spite of possible transfers of troops to the 
other theaters, but the Maritimes and Vladiavostok unquestionably could be 
captured by the Japs. 

3. The above comments were received from the Chief of the British Far 
East Intelligence. 

RUSSIAN theater 

1. The head of the British Mission is now stranded in Kuibishev and is not 
well in touch with the situation. 

2. Budyenny is apparently relieved of command in the Ukraine if news that 
Marshal Kulik has been made commander at Rostov is true. 

3. The Germans have extended their front approximately 12 miles north 
of Taganrog. An advance from Kalinin toward the north has been begun 
by the Germans, possibly directed at Vologda and the railroad running south 
from Archangel, according to dependable secret reports. Otherwise, there are 
no important developments in this theater which have been verified by British 
official sources. 

4. The above cable is for General Miles' personal attention. 

Lee. 
I. B. #5, 10/22/41. 
Distribution : 

Under Secretary of War State Department (2) 

Assistant Secretary of War for Air Director of Naval Intelligence (2) 

Assistant Secretary of War Record Section 

Chief of the Air Corps (3) Section File 

Chief of the Army Air Forces Situation Section 

A. C. of S., G-3 EE 

A. C. of S., WPD CB 

G. H. Q. FE 



Paraphrase of Code Radiogram Receivho at the War Department at 14 : 09 

NOVEMBBai 9, 1941 

London, November 9, 1941 (filed 5: lOp) (1045) 

The most likely spot where Japanese may be expected to strike is in the 
Netherlands East Indies. This opinion, from the British Ambassador to Tokyo, 
holds that as Japan already controls what she needs of the resources of French 
Indo-China and Thailand she will not proceed against the latter country. To 
attack British Malaya would be a difficult operation and the rumored Burma 
Road drive would also be too much of an effort. The Netherlands East Indies 
could be assaulted secretly from the Mandated Island, and would provide the 
oil which Japan needs. The source reverses his previous view and now believes 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2141 

Japan no longer feels that she must make every effort to avoid war with the 
United States and this contemplated <)i)eration would confront the United States 
and the British with an accomplished fact. 

Lee. 

IB #4 11/10/41 
Distribution : 

Secretary of War China Mission 

Under Secretary of War Office of Lend-Lease Administrator 

Assistant Secretary of War G. H. Q. 

Assistant Secretary of War for Air State Department 

Mr. Lauchlin Carrie Chief of the Air Corps 

Chief of the Army Air Forces Situation Section 

Director of Naval Intelligence British Empire Section 

Assistant Chief of Staff, (J-3. Far Eastern Section 

Assistant Chief of Staff, WPD 



G-2 Comment on November 9 Cable From London 
(IB #4 11/10/41) 

1. Gr-2 is of the opinion that while an attack on the Netherlands East Indies 
is a possibility, it is by no means probable in view of: (1) the action to be 
expected of the United States and Britain before even a surprise attack could 
be driven home: (2) the great danger to Japan of trying to by-pass the Philip- 
pines and Singapore: (3) the knowledge Japanese uuist have that the Dutch 
have prepared their oil installations for immediate demolition, so that it would 
be a year or more before they could get the oil anyway. 

2. It is significant that the Ambassador has reversed his former view and no 
longer believes that Japan will do everything possible to prevent war with the 
United States. Such a development is not unexi^ected. 



Paraphrase of Code Radiogram Received at the Wak Department at 22 : 42, 

November 21, 1941 

London, November 21, 1941 (tiled 0045 p. m.) 

In order that the source may be protected do not reveal to the British that 
you have received the following information. 

The estimate given below represents the con.sensus of all British intelligence 
services as to Japan, on the basis of all information availabli? up to November 
18: 

Whether or not the government at Tokyo has decided once and for all to take 
the chance of war with America and (Jreat Britain is still n(»t certain, but 
Japan's economic situatitm is making it necessary to cinne to such a decision. 
By initiating the present talk, Japan had hopes of discovering some soluti<m to the 
problem. Now that she has sent her special envoy, the conversations are com- 
ing to a head and the chances are that she will make a basic decision of the 
policy she will follow. 

As things stand now, the only action .she can take without danger of war 
with America and Great Britain is to settle the China incident and her alterna- 
tives here are (1) block the Burma Road; (2) come to a peaceful .settlenient 
with Chungking. Fr(»m the best available information at present, it does not 
appear probable that Japan will launch an offensive against the Burma Road. 

In the event the current talks come to nothing and if .she then makes a deci- 
sion to go ahead without regard to the con.sequences of war with the ABD 
powers, Japan has the altei-natives of offensives against (1) Thailand. The tin 
and rubber producing areas are in the vicinity of the Kra Isthmus which would 
no doubt be defended by the British so that economically, Japan would not get 
much by occupying Thailand, and she stands to lose much of what she is already 
getting from that country. 

(2) Malaya. Japan will'certainly occupy Thailand before attacking Malaya, 
but any drive on the latter country would certainly involve Japan in war with 
Great Britain and very likely with America also. 



2142 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

(3) Netherlands East Indies. It is estimated that Japan has enough oil 
supplies to last for only nine to twelve months of large scale operations, so that 
seizure of the Netherlands East Indies would solve a most urgent problem for 
her. But such a move would not be sound naval strategy and furthermore 
Japan must know any such attack would bring on war with America and Great 
Britain. The British believe Japan would occupy Thailand before moving on 
Netherlands Borneo anyway. 

(4) Soviet Siberia. Here the main consideration is that Japan is not yet 
strong enough to start an attack which would undoubtedly cost her plenty in 
casualties and materiel, and might take a long time. In spite of her offensive 
preparations, including increa.se of troops in this area from eleven to 29 
divisions, Japan will probably not attack the Maritime Provinces unless and 
until Russian strength is considerably diminished there. 

The estimate concludes that : 

(1) In the event of failure of her last attempt to get America to come to a 
general agreement, Japan will have to make up her mind as to whether she 
should chance the war which would likely follow further aggressive action on 
her part ; 

(2) Japan will probably not attack Siberia at pre.sent ; she will wait until 
Soviet strength is decreased ; 

(3) Japan will continue the war with China except in the event of a 
general agreement with the United States ; 

(4) Japan's movement of troops from Tongking to the south indicates that 
she does not intend at present to try cutting the Burma Road ; 

(G) From the Japanese viewpoint, her best move, the one with least chance of 
bringing on a general war, would probably be occupation of Thailand. Securing 
bases in Siam would al.so pave the way for later movement against Malaya 
or the Netherlands East Indies. Furthermore, a Japanese drive into Thailand 
is indicated by her recent movements. 

Lee. 

IB #18 4 : 15P 11/21/41 
Distribution : 

Assistant Secretary of War State Department 

Assistant Secretary of War for Air Mr. Lauchlin Currie 

Chief of the Army Air Forces Office of Lend-Lease Administrator, 

Chief of the Air Corps O. E. M. 

Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3 Director of Naval Intelligence 

Assistant Chief of Staff, WPD Situation Section 

G. H. Q. Air Section 

4th Army British Empire Section 

China Mission Far Eastern Section. 

[Pencilled notation :] Return to C of S. HLS. 

[Pencilled notation :] To Secretary of War. GCM. 

British Embassy Annex, 
Ohservatory Circle, Washington, D. C, 22nd November, 1941. 

Subject : — Japanese Intentions. 

Sir: The Joint Staff Mission has received from the British Chief of Staff the 
following telegraphic summary of an estimate by the Joint Intelligence Committee 
in London of Japan's probable intentions. 

We are instructed to invite you to draw the attention of the United States 
Chief of Staff and Chief of Naval Operations to this appreciation. 
Respectfully, 

(Signed) R. D. Coleiridge, 

Commander, R. N. 

R. F. G. JAYNB, 

Major. 
Joint Secretaries, 
British Joint Staff Mission in Washington. 
Commander L. R. MoDoweli., 

U. 8. Secretary for Collaboration, 

Room 2724, Navy Department, Washington, D. C. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2143 

Enclosure 
Summary of Estimate by J. I. C, London, of Japanese Intentions 

1. It is not certain that Japan has reached a decision to risk conflict with 
Britain and U. S. A., but events are driving her to early decision. Japan hopes 
that present conversations in Washington may provide a way out. The climax 
of the conversations now reached by KURUSU'S arrival and fundamental decision 
on policy is likely to follow their outcome. Meanwhile only course open to Japan 
which she may think would not involve a risk of war with us and United States 
is to try to finish war in China. 

2. To end China war Japan must either make peace with CHIANG-KAI-SHEK 
or stop his supplies by cutting BURMA ROAD. Two routes of attack possible. 
Shortest is from TONGKING to KUNMING, but terrain makes this a very diffi- 
out operation. Longer route westward of KWANSI province feasible but oper- 
ation would take longer time than Japan prepared to give. Latest intelligence 
indicates that soutliward movement of forces from TONGKING and CANTON 
suggest major operation against BURMA ROAD unlikely at present. 

3. If Washington conversations fail and Japan decides to proceed irrespective 
of risk of war with Britain, U. S. A. and Netherlands Eiist Indies, she may 
attack — 

(a) THAILAND, 

(b) MALAYA, 

(c) NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES, 

(d) MARITIME PROVINCES. 

4. THAILAND. Japan's infiltration into THAILAND and building of com- 
munications in Indo China, construction of aerodromes, work on Naval base 
at CAMRANH BAY, indicates preparation for move into THAILAND. Japan 
would consider this move least likely to involve action by ourselves and U. S. A. 
Main strategic advantage only gained if KRA ISTHMUS occupied simultane- 
ously with land move from INDO CHINA. Little economic advantage to Jajmn 
in occupation of THAILAND but object of attack would be to secure important 
bases for further move south. 

5. MALAYA. Occupation of THAILAND leads logically to attack on MALAYA. 
This would be certain to involve ourselves probably U. S. A. 

6. NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES. Capture of Dutch BORNEO would rem- 
edy Japan's most urgent shortage i. e. oil. Operation would however be stra- 
tegically unsound from naval point of view and Japan would think it would 
involve conflict with us and U. S. A. We believe attack would be preceded by 
occupation of THAILAND. 

7. RUSSIAN MARITIME PROVINCES. Since beginning of Russian campaign 
Japanese forces facing Russia increased from 11 to 29 Divisions. Only interest 
Japan would have in attacking Russia would be the removal of traditional enemy. 
Operation would be long and expensive if Russian resistance were maintained. 
Japan now lacks sufficient superiority to make offensive operations against 
Russia probable unless Russian forces are weakened. 

8. CONCLUSIONS. 

(a) Japan will make last effort at agreement with U. S. A. Decision whether 
or not to take aggressive action involving major powers would follow failure 
of conversations. 

(b) If such decision is taken THAILAND will be first probable objective 
involving least risk of major conflict. Occupation of bases in THAILAND includ- 
ing KRA ISTHMUS is a sound strategic preliminary culminating in operation 
against MALAYA or NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES. Recent military move- 
ments support opinion that THAILAND is next objective. 

(c) Action against Russia likely to be deferred until position of Russia in Far 
East is seriously weakened. 

(d) Operation in China will continue in absence of a general agreement 
with U. S. A. 

(e) Early attack on BURMA ROAD is unlikely in view of latest information 
of diversion of forces southward from NORTHERN INDO CHINA and CANTON. 



2144 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

EXHIBIT NO. 106 

Section A: Admiral H. R. Stark's Letters to Admiral H. E. Kimmel (Pages 
2144 to 2225). 

Section B: Admiral H. E. Kimmel's Letters to Admiral H. R. Stark (Pages 
2225 to 2257). 

Section A 
Confidential 

13 January 1941. 
Deae Mustapha : There are things to be said in here which are strictly entre nous 
and therefore I suggest you destroy this letter after reading. 

I have given you a few days to let sink in the news of your becoming CinC, U. S. 
Fleet. I would have given my eye teeth to have seen your expression and to have 
heard your exclamation when it happened, but instead I was just sitting behind 
the scenes congratulating you and the Navy. I confess it came sooner than I 
had anticipated but that it should come, I liave long had in the back of my head 
and while rejoicing with you I realize fully the enormous responsibilities placed 
on .your shoulders in one of the most critical periods in our history, and where the 
Navy more than any other branch of the Government is likely to have to bear 
the brunt. 

I would give a good deal to sit down and have a chat with you. I am hoping 
J. O. will turn over the personal letters I have written him. They give all the 
slants here that I know and they show the urgency as I see it. In my humble 
opinion, we may wake up any day with some mines deposited on our front door 
step or with some of our ships bombed, or whatnot, and find ourselves in another 
undeclared war, the ramifications of which [2] call for our strongest and 
sanest in*agination and ulans. 

I have told the Gang here for months past that in my opinion we were heading 
straight for this war, that we would not assume anything else and personally I 
do not see how we can avoid, either having it thrust upon us or of our deliber- 
ately going in, many months longer. And of course it may be a matter of weeks 
or of days. I would like to feel' that I could be perfectly complacent if some day 
some one opens the door of my ofiice and reports that the war is on. I have been 
moving Heaven and Earth trying to meet such a situation and am terribly impa- 
tient at the slowness with which things move here. Even though I know much 
has been accomplished, there still remains much to be done. 

My estimate of tlie situation — J. O. R. can give you this — McCrea also has a 
copy — ^which I presented to the Secretai'y and Rainbow 3, both of which you 
should have, will give you fairly clearly my own thoughts. Of course I do not 
want to become involved in the Pacific, if it is possible to avoid it. I have fought 
this out time and time again in the highest tribunals but I also fully realize that 
we may become involved in the Pacific and in the Atlantic at the same time; and 

to put it mildly, it will be one H of a job, and that is one reason why I am 

thankful that I have your calm judgment, your imagination, your courage, your 
guts and your head, at the seagoing end. Also your can do — rather than 
can't. 

In King, I believe you have the very best possible man to handle the situation 
in the Atlantic and that we can give him a free rein. He will lick things into 
shape and he knows the game from every standpoint and of course in this war 
it will be [3] fought from every standpoint. On the other side — in 
Tommy Hart — I feel equally confident. 

I believe in Walter Anderson you have a good man to handle the Battleships 
but I do not commit myself one inch beyond that. Any future advancement 
beyond that position will depend largely on your recommendation but he should 
fight a good fight right there, whether or not he goes up. It is unfortunate in 
some ways that we could not get the additional stars and rank we wanted in the 
Atlantic but we could not and consequently the accommodations had to be made 
in the Pacific. With this you are familiar. Of course Andy feels disappointed 
but he is a good soldier. However, when we mentioned the possibility of his 
i-elieving Snyder next June, I informed him that I would not commit myself and 
that I could not think of committing you, and incidentally, and very incidentally, 
and in all cases, the White House finally decides. This, of course, is White 
House prerogative and responsibility, and believe me, it is used these days. 

I hope Wilson Brown does well. He is fine fiber, as you know. Frankly, I 
had some misgivings about his health and had him brought to the Navy Depart- 
ment for a thorough checkup by the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery. It is not 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2145 

necessary that anybody, beside you, should know this. Medicine and Surgery 
gave him a perfectly clean bill of health but I do think he should be watched 
while under strain and if there is any sign of his not being able to stand it, he 
should be relieved. Again, I am giving just you my tiioughts. The President 
knows that I initiated this physical checkup because of my doubts, but beyond 
just a few of us, it is not known. 

[^] What I'eck Snyder's final reactions will be, I don't know. We wanted 
to run this whole schedule differently but our hand was forced. I have always 
regarded him with a good deal of admiration because of a feeling that above all 
things he was loyal and would play the game in the last analysis as it had to be 
played and as you and I have to do. Here's hoping. 

I am sending you Savvy Cooke and I feel like I am losing one of my arms. That 
boy has one of the best brains I have ever run into. I put on his eflBciency report 
that I would make him an Admiral immediately, if I had the authority and believe 
me, if he were one, I would not consent to his going. I am sending him to sea 
to protect his promotion chances and am sending him to the Fleet Flagship be- 
cause of his intimate knowledge and personal handiwork in all that we have done 
in War Plans and in all that we have been thinking. I feel that he should have 
a year in command, although were I going to sea myself I would be strongly in- 
clined to take him on my staff. Where we put him he should be available to you 
in both capacities. His capacity for work is almost unlimited and in addition 
to all his other fine attributes, I have formed a very strong affection for him, as 
we all have. He is just as likeable as he can be. Siiould his ship go to the Navy 
Yard and you would like to keep him with you during any such periods, it could 
be arranged. 

I am also enclosing a letter to you which I wrote to Tommy Hart and which I 
am pleased to say he stated gave him a clearer picture of his own situation than 
even he himself had formed on the spot. That is my excuse for sending it. 

Murphy, who is on Richardson's staff, has been with us on three different 
occasions and is likewise pretty familiar with [5] our thoughts back here. 

I have directed McCrea to stop and see you on his return from the Philippines 
although he can probably add little to what Murphy can tell you. On the other 
hand I would be glad to have you have a long talk with McCrea that we may get 
from you any first-hand material you w^ant to send. 

Nimitz has written J. O. with regard to several matters which explain them- 
selves so there is no need for repetition on my part. 

J. O. has been thoroughly acquainted with the personnel situation. He knows 
that it has been one of my first thoughts ever since I have been there, as well as 
Nimitz, and that I have put more time and struggle on it in the White House and 
on the Hill than on any other one subject. 

I am home at the n)oment laid up with "flu" and have been busy with Mrs. 
Hull a good share of the afternoon, it now being ten minutes of six and Charlie 
Wellborn just came in with the mail so I will close. Were I to write you volumes 
and I feel like it, I doubt if I could add much that you will not realize without 
my writing. 

Just remember that I consider the only I'eason for my being alive and kicking 
at the present time is to do everything within my powej" to serve the Fleet, and I 
want you to write me fully, frankly, critically, and just think out loud on all 
subjects wherein the Department can be of help. Nimitz and I are absolutely at 
one in our common desire to serve and I wish you all the luck in the wide world. 

[6] Finally you will be glad to know that there is a great deal of fine and 

favorable comment on your selection from all sides. I have had letters from 
Admiral Senn and Admiral Craven among others, not to mention the reaction 
here in Washington. 

Again good luck and keep cheerful and God Bless You. 

Betty, 

You know how I believe in conferences — keeping your key people informed — 
taking them into your confidence, and thrashing out common problems — no bulk- 
heads — and here again, I know you will accomplish much. 
Again good luck. 

Rear Admiral H. E. Kimmel, USN, 
USS HONOLULU, 

c/o Postmaster Fleet Post Office, 
Pearl Harbor, T. H. 



2146 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Dear Mustapha : The following Is a te/ephone call to one of my Aides when I 
happened to be out : 

"Admiral Train said that the Navy Belief has received no money from the 
Fleet during the Year 1940. He wondered if it might not be a good idea for 
you, as President, to ask CinC whether or not a sum may be expected, in view 
of the necessity of making up the Society's Annual Report." 
Can you give me the answer? 

Of course you probably have all the "ins" and "outs" by this time of Snyder's 
stand with reference to his being detached and on which he insisted. 

It is over the dam and I won't say anything more about it. 

However, you have Pye in his place. I hope the change is an acceptable one to 
you. Personally I think he may be of even more assistance to you and I told 
the President you might even want to keep him on after July. 

I have always thought Pye one of the soundest strategists we have and when I 
worked under him during my last cniise. which I often did at one end or the 
other of the line, I thought his handling of tactical situations outstanding. Par- 
ticularly were his orders a model of clearness, brevity and effectiveness. 

Who gets the Battle Force next .Tune will be largely dependent upon your 
recommendations. Of course Andy is much interested but I told him flatly that I 
would promise him nothing, that he was getting a great job where he was going 
and that the future was largely in the lap of the Gods and Admiral Kimmel. 

It always sort of hits me with a thud when people are planning ahead and 
looking for something in advance rather than giving all they have to the job 
iu hand. Andy happens to be one of those fellows who does give all he has 
to the job in hand, but my feeling has always been that the job should seek 
the man rather than the reverse. Thank the Lord that Nimitz agrees with me 
and if people understood that it has to be that way in the last analysis, it would 
save a lot of corresixjndence and delicate situations here. 

One of the biggest kicks I got out of your present job was that it Was a 
complete surprise to you and has the overwhelming approval of the Service. 

I confess my own job here was something I had not dreamed of. Incidentally, 
I told Bloch when I expected to stay at sea and he was talking to me about 
getting three stars' or more, that if I was of use anywhere it would be another 
year right in the billet where I had trained for a year, and as far as I was 
concerned the only thing that should count was the best interest of the Fleet, 
that was also would be my best interest, and that I would serve cheerfully 
anywhere under anybody. That is the kind of a gang I hope you have around 
you. 

Started this just to send you Train's remarks and have gone into something 
else. Lord, I wish I could see you, or better still, that I could be with you. 
I would take most any old job down to the lowliest division in the outfit. 

Every good luck in the wide world and "keep cheerful." 
As every sincerely, 

/S/ Betty. 
Admiral H. E. Kimmel, V. S. Navy, 

Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, 

USS PENNSYLVANIA, , 

Fleet Post Office, Pearl Harbor, T. H. 



In reply refer to Initials and No. 

Navy Department, 
Office of the Chiep- of Naval Operations, 

Washington, 29 January 1941. 

Dear Mustapha : This is really a P. S. to my note of this morning. 

I just want to let you know I am pressing all I can to take over the Coast 
Guard and that at last pressure is beginning to tell and I am hopeful I may 
be able to after the Lend-Lease Bill is out of the road. Please don't mention this 
to anyone but just keep it in the back of your head as one of those things which 
might be coming along. 

The above is incidental to what I did want to tell you and which you might 
mention to Bloch and that is I have asked Waesche to exert unusual and con- 
tinuing vigilance in searching all fishermen, both on home coasts and in the 

islands, under the guise of looking for narcotics ; actually to insure against 

any secreted Japanese mines. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2147 

Am still fighting for personnel — I shouldn't have to — but I am — 
When I think what I have to go through for almost every additional man 
for the Navy — and the Army building up to IVa millions — it just doesn't make 
sense — 

/S/ Betty. 
Admiral H. E. Kimmel, £7iSA', 

Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, 
V8S PENNSYLVANIA, 

Fleet Post Office, Pearl Harbor, T. H. 



Navy Department, 
OflBee of the Chief of Naval Operations, 

Washington, 30 January 1941. 
Dear Kimmel : Take it for vi'hat it is worth. 
Copies also to Admiral Bloch, Blakeley, Hepburn, Freeman, King, Hart. 



KD 

Tokyo 

Dated January 28, 1941 
Rec'd. 7 : 10 a. m. 
Secretary of State, 
Washitigtoti, 

131, January 28, 8 p. m. 
Press reports radio address yesterday afternoon over station JOAK to Japa- 
nese in North America by Admiral Nobucasa Suetsugu. Concluding sentence 
quoted as follows: "Japan dislikes war but if United States persists in its mis- 
understanding Japan is fully prepared. I ask all of you as Japanese subjects to 
serve the country in your various positions." 

Grew. 
TFV 



Secret 

In reply refer to Initials and No. 

Navy Department, 
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, 

Washington, 10 February 1941. 

Dear Kimmel : Thank God for Sundays. It is my only day for quiet study and 
work, and even then I have to kick somebody out of the office, because they long 
since have learned my habits. 

First I want to congratulate you and J. O. on your perfectly splendid letter of 
28 January, serial 0140. It is extremely helpful to us all and I hope you will 
continue in future communications of our similar searching analyses. Just for a 
moment refresh on your paragraph 3 ; and permit me to say "check and double 
check." 

I continue in every way I possibly can to fight commitments or dispositions that 
would involve us on two fronts and to keep from sending more combatant ships 
to the Far East. I had a two hour struggle (please keep this absolutely secret) 
in the White House this past week and thank God can report that the President 
still supports my contentions. You may be amused to know that the Secretary of 
War, Colonel Stimson, has been of very great assistance to me in this connection 
in recent conferences. Mr. Hull never lets go in the contrary view and having 
fought it so many times I confess to having used a little more vehemence and a 
little stronger language than was becoming in fighting it out this last week for 
the nth time. Present were the President, Stimson, Knox, Marshall and myself. 
I mention this just to show you that the fight is always on and tiiat some day 
• I might get upset. But thank God. to date at least, the President has and con- 
tinues to see it my way. 

Here's hoping. Replies to your letter of the 28th (0140) and to J. O.'s letter 
of the 25th (0129) are just signed. 

I continue to press Marshall to reinforce Oahu and elsewhere. You now know 
that he is sending out 81 fighters to Oahu, which will give that place .")0 fairly good 
ones and 50 of the latest type. I jumped to give him the transportation for them 
in carriers when he requested it. I hope too, you will get the Marines to Midway, 
Johnson and Palmyra, as soon as you can. They may have to rough it for a time 



2148 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

until barracks are built, and the water suppo, if inadequate, will have to be 
urovided somehow just like it would be if ♦^hey hod captured an enemy atoll. 

Speaking of Marshall, he is a^ tower of strength to us all, and I couldn't 
conceive of a happier relationship than exists between him and me. He will go 
to almost any length possible to help us out and sometimes contrary to his own 
advisors. 

I am struggling, and I use the word advisedly, every time I get in the White 
House, which is rather frequent, for additional men. It should not be necessary 
and while I have made the case just as obvious as I possible could, the President 
just has his own ideas about men. I usually tinally get my way but the cost of 
effort is very great and of course worth it. I feel that I could go on the Hill 
this minute and get all the men I want if I could just get the green light from 
the White House. As a matter of fact what we now have, was obtained by my 
finally asking the President's permission to go on the Hill and state our needs 
as I saw them at that time and his reply was "go ahead, I won't veto anything 
they agree to". However, the struggle is starting all over again and just remem- 
ber we are going the limit, but I cannot guarantee the outcome. 

Regarding the MK VI Mod I Exploder ; we have distributed them to the outlying 
stations and will leave the decision up to you as to whether or not they should 
be put aboard ship. 

Every good wish in the world. 
As ever sincerely, 



Admiral H. E. Kimmbx, USN, 

Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, 
USS PENNSYLVANIA, 

Fleet Post Office, Pearl Harbor, T. H. 



P. S. I just realized that a letter I had roughed out in reply to yours of the 
27th had not been sent so here is just another Sunday cleanup job along with 
one or two other things. 

First, I had another hour and a half in the White House today and the Presi- 
dent said that he might order a detachment of three or four cruisers, a carrier 
and a squadron of destroyers to make a cruise to the Philippines; perhaps going 
down through the Phoenix and Gilbert or the Fiji Islands, then reaching over 
into Mindanao for a short visit and on to Manila and back. 

I have fought this over many times and won, but this time the decision may 
go against me. Heretofore the talk was largely about sending a cruise of this 
sort to Australia and Singapore and perhaps the N. E. I. Sending it to the 
Philippines would be far less objectionable from a i>olitical standpoint but still 
objectionable. What I want you to do is to be thinking about it and be prepared 
to make a quick decision if it is ordered. 

Spent an hour this afternoon going over your personnel situation with Niniitz 
and Kilpatrick and the Doctors and you will hear from Nimitz on this. A couple 
of weeks ago. even before I got your letter, the President told nie I was over- 
crowding our ships and that they would be neither healthy, happy or sanitary 
with increased complements so we may have to ask for the doctors' opinion 
regarding the new complements. 

Regarding your setting up a place on shore where your staff can do planning 
work ; anything that you can arrange with Admiral Bloch will be perfectly satis- 
factory to me. I don't know just what the Submarine Base facilities are but you 
may be able to put up some additions which would eventually be needed because 
of the expected increase in the number of submarines. I will have Moreell go 
into these additions if you will forward to me a sketch lay-out in case you need 
our help. No one could say just what the public or political reaction might be to 
your shore arrangements, because it might be misrepresented and might be 
misunderstood. That is the reason I suggest any additional facilities be labelled 
additional facilities for the Submarine Base. It would not actually be a mis- 
nomer because undoubtedly they will be when the Fleet some day bases back 
on the West Coast. 

I also take it that you can arrange satisfactory communications with Admiral 
Bloch. 

Regarding a set of quarters for yourself, it would seem that the best solution 
and perhaps the only one would be for Admiral Bloch to divert one of the new 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2149 

sets of five houses now building to your use. Will you please communicate this 
to Admiral Bloch? 

I want you to know that we are doing everything possible to reach full agree- 
ment with possible Allies. If and when such agreements are concluded we will 
inform you of them. 

I wish we could send Admiral Bloch more local defense forces for the 14th 
Naval District but we simply haven't got them. If more are needed I aee 
no other immediate solution than for you to supply them. I am moving Heaven 
and Earth to speed up a considerable program we have for small craft and 
patrol vesels for the Districts but like everything else, it takes time and "dollars 
cannot buy yesterday". 

I think I previously wrote you that I hope to be able to take over the Coast 
Guard after the Lend-Lease Bill is on the Statute Books. Of course if war 
eventuates Admiral Bloch can commandeer anything in the Islands in the way 
of small craft and I assume he has a full list of what would be available. 

All good wishes. 
Keep cheerful, 

/S/ Betty. 



Secret 

In reply refer to Initials and No. Op-10 Hu 

Na\'y Department, 
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, 

Washington, 25 Fehruary I94I. 

Db:ar Kimmel : I suppose by this time your staff is working smoothly on the 
beach. It is most important, as I have indicated previously, that as soon as 
possible you get your Operating Plan for Rainbow III in the hands of Admiral 
Hart and your own subordinate commanders, including those in command of the 
Pacific and the Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontiers. Then we can get ready the 
subordinate operating plans and the logistic requirements, the latter being of 
special importance to you in your advanced position. 

Particularly in connection with your logistic planning, some of us here have 
wondered as to whether or not you might also put the Commander Base Force 
and his staff ashore in a status more or less similar to your own. However, this 
is your job and I just mention it en passant. 

Even if we fight this war according to "Plan Dog," we have so designed Rain- 
bow III that a shift to "Dog" (.see my despatch of January) will (at least at 
first) require only minor changes in the tasks of either the Basic Plan or your 
Operating Plans. The force we would move to the Atlantic possibly would not 
go at once, and the force left with you will still be great enough to perform 
both the offensive and defensive tasks assigned you. Of course we all could 
wish for more. 

In making your plans for the more important offensive raids. I hope that 
you will not fail to study very carefully the matter of making aircraft raids on 
the infiammable Japanese cities (ostensibly on military objectives), and the 
effect such raids might have on Japanese morale and on the diversion of their 
forces away from the Malay Barrier. Such adventures may seem to you un- 
justified from a profit and loss viewpoint — but, again, you may consider that 
they might prove very profitable. In either case (and this is strictly SECRET) 
you and I map he ordered to make the, so it is just as well for you to have 
considered plans for it. 

I hesitated to take the chance of upsetting you with my despatch and letter 
concerning a viait of a detachment of surface forces to the Far East. I agree 
with you that it is unwise. But even since my last letter to you, the subject 
has twice come up in the White House. Each of the many times it has arisen, 
my view has prevailed, but the time might come when it will not. I gave you 
the information merely as a sort of advance notice. 

Secret 

The difficulty is that the entire country is in a dozen minds about the war — 
to stay out altogether, to go in against Germany in the Atlantic, to concentrate 
against Jai>an in the Pacific and the Far East — I simply can not predict the 
outcome. Gallup polls, editorials talk on the Hill (ami I might add, all of 
which is irresponsible) constitute a rising tide for action in the Far East 
if the Japanese go into Singapore or the Netherlands East Indies. This can 
not be ignored and we must have in the back of our heads the possibility of 
having to swing to that tide. If it should prevail against Navy Department 



2150 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

recommendations, you would have to implement Rainbow III, and forget my 
later despatch concerning "Plan Dog". This would mean that any reinforce- 
ment to the Atlantic might become impossible, and, in any case, would be reduced 
by just so much as we would send to the Asiatic. And that might be a vei'y 
serious matter for Britain. 

I am perfectly delighted over getting some modern Army airplanes in the 
Hawaiian area and jumped at the opportunity to transport them. I wish they 
would make me a similar offer for the Philippines, in which case I would also 
make available a carrier, properly escorted, for the duty. 

I know little of further interest to bring up for the moment. Our staff con- 
versations (and thank the Good Lord thei'e has been little no public leak that 
they are taking place) are nearing their conclusion and we hope will be finished 
in about ten days. Of course we will make you acquainted with all decisions 
reached just as soon as we can. 

I am sending copy of this letter to Tommy Hart, whose mind you now know 
pretty well with reference to his job in the Far East. I have been out of the 
oflSce for a few days and I haven't seen Hart's "Estimate of the Situation", but 
I do know that War Plans is delighted with what he has sent, and of course I 
alway.s have been because of his grasp of the entire picture. 

I am enclosing copy of a memo which is self-explanatory showing you our 
best estimate of the Far Eastern present situation. Please note the governing 
sentences where it is stated that a reestimate may have to be necessary at any 
time, but it still looks to us as though this estimate, at least for the moment, 
were sound. 

Keep cheerful. 

All good wishes and Good Luck 

Admiral H. E. Kimmet., U. S. N. 

Commander in Chief, U. 8. Fleet, 
U8S PENNSYLVANIA, 

[s] Betty 

[1] Sent to W. H. by Capt. Callaghan 

Draft 
Memorandum fob the President 

11 February 1941. 

Since your thought yesterday morning of the possibility of sending a detach- 
ment to the Phillippines via the southern route consisting of approximately 4 
cruisers, a squadron (9) destroyers and carriers and jterhaps to permit a leak 
that they were going out there just for a temporary visit and then to return, 
I confess to having pondered a good deal on it last night during the wee small 
hours because, as you know, T have previously opposed this and you have con- 
curred as to its unwisdom. Particularly do I recall your remark in a previous 
conference when Mr. Hull suggested this and the question arose as to getting them 
out and your 100% reply, from my standpoint, was that you might not mind 
losing one or two cruisers (we have 2 out there now), but that you did not want 
to take a chance on losing 5 or 6. Frankly, I breathed a great sight of relief 
and thought the issue pi-etty definitely closed. 

You al.so called it a "bluff" and questioned it from that standpoint. Obviously, 
if we permitted a leak about their coming back, there would be even less, if any, 
bluff, and again if we did not permit a leak with regard to their coming back, 
we would then certainly look like turning tail and I'unning if somethng hap- 
pened and we did come back. I beliete it pretty thoroughly agreed that we do 
not want that force in the Philippines in case of sudden attack, and that even 
were we to consider in emergency increasing our forces in the Far East, we 
would not send them to Manila Bay but rather to the southard or into Dutch 
East Indies where they would be better supported and not so open to attack. 

[2] As I reported yesterday, recent letters from Hart state he is simply 
up against it for facilities to care for what he has and only recently have we 
acquired a vessel to make available to him later on to help take care of his 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2151 

submarines which are in urgent and inunediate need of a Mother Ship. Likewise 
he is taxed to take care of his Air Force but we are improving these facilities. 
Sometime after July I want to send him another squadron of bombers. We expect 
to send four minesweepers (bird class) out in March. 

Specifically : — 

Sending a small force would probably be no deterrent to Japan and would 
not increase Japanese difficulties in advancing southward. I feel we would be 
exposing our force without compensating results. 

There is a chance that further moves againf Japan will precipitate hostilities 
rather than prevent them. We want to give Japan no excuse for coming in in 
case we are forced into hostilities with Germany who we all consider our major 
problem. 

The Pacific Fleet is now weaker in total tonnage and aircraft then the 
Japanese Navy. It is, however, a very strong force and as long as it is in its 
present position it remains a constant serious and real threat to Japan's flank. 
If any considerable division is sent to Manila it might prove an invitation to 
Japan to attack us in detail and thus greatly lessen or remove our serious naval 
threat to her for a considerable period to come. I believe it would be a grave 
strategic error at this time to divide our Pacific Fleet. We would then have 
our Fleet divided in three parts, Atlantic, Mid-Pacific, and Western Pacific. It 
is true we only contemplate a visit out there but we might find recall of this 
additional detachment [3] exceedingly embarrassing or difficult. 

If we are forced into the war our main effort as approved to date will be 
directed in the Atlantic against Germany. We should, if possible, not be drawn 
into a major war in the Far East. I believe the Pacific Fleet should at least at 
first remain strong until we see what Japan is going to do. If she remains 
quiet, or even if she moves strongly toward Malaysia, we could then vigorously 
attack the Mandates and Japanese communications in order to weaken Japan's 
attack on the British and Dutch. We would also then be able to support spare 
forces for the Atlantic. 

Right now, Japan does not know what we intend. If we send part of the 
Fleet to the Asiatic now, we may show our hand and lose the value of any 
strategic surprise. We might encourage Japan to move, rather than deter her, 
and also we might very well compromise our own future operations. 

I feel we should not indicate the slightest interest in the Gilbert or Solomon 
or Fiji Islands at this time. If we do, the Japanese might smell a i*at and our 
future use of them, at least so far as surprise is concerned, might be compromised. 
The Japanese could take steps to occupy some of them before we could because 
she has had long training and is ready for amphibious operations; we are not. 
If we lose the element of surprise or begin to show interest, for example in the 
Gilberts, such previous warning may delay our later operations because Japan 
would well consider nullifying our efforts in this direction. 

I just wanted to get this off my chest to you as I always do my thoughts and 
then will defer to your better judgment with a cheerful Aye, Aye, Sir, and go 
the limit as will all of us in what y<m decide. I do think the matter serious. 

[.'/] The establishment of Marine Defense Battailions at Samoa, Palmyra, 
Johnston and Midway is now in progress. I have not authorized any leak on this 
because I have questioned such a procedure but if you feel it advisable we could, 
of course, do so. If Japan occupies Saigon, I am considering recommending 
we plan our mines in Manila. a.ssume a full posture of defense in the Philippines 
and send the Fleet Marine Force from San Diego to Hawaii. 

Finally I want you to know I am notifying Kimmel to be prepared to send a 
force such as we talked about yesterday to the Philippines, in case your final deci- 
sion should be to .send them. 

I have just read a paraphia.se of a telegram of 7 Feb. from the American 
Embassy at Tokyo, which the State Department has furnished us. In it appears 
the following: 

"Risk of war would be certain to follow increased concentration of American 
vessels in the Far East. As it is not possible to evaluate with certainty the 
imponderable factor which such risks ccmstitute, the risk should not be taken 
unless our country is ready to force hostilities." 

You undoubtedly have seen the entire despatch and obviously I am picking out 
that portion which supports my view. 

[s] H. R. S. 



2152 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Op-12-CTB 
Secret 

Febbuaby 5, 1941. 
Memorandum for the President. 
Subject : Analysis of the Situation in Indo-China. 

1. The despatches from the Naval Attache in London concerning prospects 
of an immediate crisis in Indo-China and Singapore seem to be a re-hash of the 
story by Douglas Robertson in the New York Times of February 2d. I have 
been watching this situation with extreme care and see no present reason for 
alarm. We knew in advance the Japanese were sending some ships to Thailand 
and Indo-China to enforce cessation of hostilities between those states. This 
has been accomplished. The transfer of peace negotiations on the NATORI 
to Tokyo indicates to me two things. 

(1) The demands by .Japan will be far-reaching and 

(2) The February 10th date is too .»<(>()n for an attack, as the negotiations are 
likely to be rather long-drawn out in Tokyo. 

2. A careful study, including an evaluation of information from many sources, 
leads me to believe that the following is the general plan of Japan : 

(a) She has some fear that the British and the United States will intervene 
if she moves into southern Indo-China and Thailand. Therefore, she wishes 
first to obtain a full legal right to enter those countries, by getting the consent 
of the governments to give her concessions in the ports and on shore. 

(b) The size of .Japanese land forces in F<)rmosn and Hainan is insufficient 
for occupying Indo-China and Thailand, for attacking Singapore, and for keep- 
ing an exi>editionary force ready to use against the I'hilipi)ines. So far as 
I can tell, an insufficient number of transports is assembled for a major move. 

Upon a successful conclusion of the peace negotiations sfie will assuredly 
occupy Thailand and southern Indo-China, establish defended naval, land, and 
air liases, and get ready for further eventualities. She may build up her land 
forces in Indo-China in readiness for iiftion against Malaya and British Nortli 
Borneo, or may retain them in Formosa and Haiiuin. I question her readiness 
to attack the British before .lune, but this belief is subject to levision. 

(c) Japan desires to move against the British, the Dutch and tfie United 
States in succe.ssion, and not to take on more than one at a time. At present, 
she desires not to go to war with the United States at all, in order that she can 
continue her imports of materials useful for war and for her general economy. 
If Japan gets a favorable opportunity, and believes the United States has then 
definitely decided to remain out of war altogether, she will move first against 
Malaya and possibly Burma, hoping the Dutch will not participate. Her pres- 
ent economic conver.sations with the Dutch indicate .she may be playing for time, 
and even may intend to conquer the Dutch primarily by economic and political 
penetration. 

(d) Japan is unlikely to undertake hostilities against Britain until she sees 
the results of Germany's next attack on the British Isles, and of Germany's 
success in the Balkans. If tlie Germa^is succeed in conquering the British 
Isles, Japan will at once move into Malaya, and possibly into the Netherlands 
East Indies. If the German attack against the British Isles fails, I believe 
Japan may await a more favorable opportunity before advancing beyond Indo- 
China. 

3. The above are my present views. They will change if we get information 
that will warrant change. So far, everything leads me to believe that Japan 
is playing for a secure advance without too great an expenditure of military 
energy. The recent reenforcement of her defense in the Mandates indicates the 
seriousness with which she views the threat by the Pacific Fleet, so long as it 
remains strong and apparently ready to move against her eastern flank. 

H. R. Stabk. 



Orriginal set by Clipper Lock Box — Confirniation by Capt Lammers 2/28/41 
Secret 

27 Febbuaby 1941. 

Dear Admiral Habt: Admiral Stark is leaving Washington today for a 
short trip to the Caribbean, expecting to be back on the job about 13 March. 
I have just brought to his attention certain information which he has asked 
me to give to you. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2153 

As you know, we are having Conversations here in Washington which we 
hope will be completed in from two to four weeks. I'pon completion of these 
Conversations Rear Admiral V. H. Danckwerts, R. N., one of the participants, 
will proceed, I expect by air, to Singapore and possibly Australia and New 
Zealand to inform officials there and also British CinC, China, of the results 
of the Conversations. 

Admiral Danckwerts has expre.ssed a willingness to stop in Hawaii to talk 
to Admiral Kimmel and in Manila to talk to you in regard to the same. Admiral 
Stark thinks this is an excellent plan. He wants me to inform you of this 
fact and to say that I think Danckwerts is very clever but honest. IngersoU 
says he thinks it best for you to listen and talk little. 

The Department will inform you of Admiral Lanckwerts' movements and 
prospective date of arrival in order that suitable arrangements can be made 
for meeting him. 

I expect to return to London as soon as Conversations are finished. Will 
you therefore acknowledge by radio to Admiral Stark receipt of this letter? 
With kindest regards, I am. Sincerely, 

R. L. Ghobmley. 

Admiral T. C. Hart, USN 

Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet 
U8S HOUSTON 

(Duplicate to Adm. Kimmel) 



Nav-HH. Navy Department, 

Burb:au of Navigation, 
Pemwuil and Conftdentinl Washington, D. C, 3 March 1941. 

Deab Kimmel: Your letters — references — 

(a) Confidential, official— #P16-3/(0217), of 7 February 1941, subject- 
Recommended Complements. 

(b) Secret, personal, of 18 February, 1941, to Stark, on various matters, 
and 

(c) Confidential, personal, of 16 February 1941, to Nimitz, re Ordnance 
P. G. and various matters. 

have been read carefully considered in the light of the situation which confronts 
the Bureau of Navigation. No enclosures were received with Bunav copy of 
Reference (a), nor have such enclosures been received in C. N. O. office so far 
as I know. 

The Bureau of Ordnance is so far behind the requirements of ordnance 
materials, and is continuing to fall further behind, that drastic measures are 
necessary if our. fieets, even at present strength are to have the necessary ord- 
nance supplies to carry on a war. That drastic measures have already been 
Initiated may be surmised from personnel changes already made.^ 

Soon to be superimposed on our Navy ordnance problems through the 
administration of the Lend-Lease Bill is the task of procurement, inspection 
and delivery of enormous — almost astronomical — quantities of ordnance sup- 
plies for the British Navy and any allies which may survive to fight the Dictators. 
I do not know if you have been informed of all the new ordnance plants that 
are being erected in various parts of the country to start from scratch the 
manufacture of various items of ordnance. 

Furlong can give you some idea of these developments when he reports. He 
should have had the help long ago of many of the Ordnance postgraduates in 
the Fleet, and he endeavored to obtain their services but was denied by my 
Bureau on the weli-founded theory that even though many of the Ordnance 
P. G.'s in the Fleet were not working at their specialty, they were usefully 
employed, and the Fleet should be saved as much as possible from changes. 

With the appointment of a new Chief of Bureau of Ordnance the Secretary 
directed me to give Blandy all practicable aid in the form of competent officers 
to assist in producing ordnance supi»lies. The Secretary is fully aware of 
Blandy's requirements in personnel and the necessity for taking a considerable 
number of ordnance post graduates from the Fleet. I will add also that Stark 
is fully informed on this subject. 

In a recent dispatch to you I informed you that Crawford would soon be 
ordered to the Bureau of Ordnance. He is specially needed to synced up torpedo 
production, and it is unfortnaiite that Py^ nnist lose this office from his staff. 
The designation of the remaining forty or so officers is being left to you with 

79716 O — 46— pt. 16 Ifi 



2154 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

the idea that you will so arrange detachments and re-allocations to minimize 
the damage to fleet efficiency. 1 will be glad to approve such reassignments 
within the fleet as you consider necessary. The Atlantic Fleet also gives up 
a number of Ordnance P. G's. 

I note your warning against the detachment of considerable numbers of 
qualified oflScers from the fleet and the enormous risk therefrom. I yield to no 
one in my anxiety to have the fleet i-eady at the proper time and you can rest 
assured that I am always ready to bear full responsibility for my acts. I am 
fully cognizant of the great responsibility which you bear and it is my firm 
intention to support you to the maximum extent possible. 

As you well know, this country is confronted with a most diflScult problem — 
that of determining just how much of our total output shall go to Britain and 
her allies, and how much to keep for ourselves. A wrong guess may well make 
our own problem insoluble. The minimum help needed by Britain is, of course, 
that which will keep her actively flghting while we are building up our strength. 
No help at all or too little help to Britain resulting in her defeat will greatly 
increase and complicate our problems of the future. 

The situation i-egardiiig aviators is not unlike that of Ordnance P. G's. 
In order to build up our aviation we must of necessity have the services of qual- 
ified aviators to get all our air training stations going. We know the new 
aviation officers lack a great deal of being ready to serve the fleet when they 
first report, and we also know you will do your best to provide the additional 
training and experience needed. 

If you will grope backward through your memory as a budget officer you will 
realize that the serious shortage of aviators which now confronts lis can be 
charged largely to our failure to operate Pensacola at maximum capacity during 
those years when we used only a fraction of that station's capacity to fill the 
pilot seats in the Fleet. I remember also our efforts to obtain funds to give 
active duty to a few hundred naval R. O. T. C. ensigns. While it is idle to 
speculate on what might have been, the present situation is not without its 
ironical aspects. 

Now for a discussion of the enlisted personnel problem. You are no doubt 
aware that Stark and I have fought stubbornly and constantly to increase the 
authorized number of men in the Navy and to bring ships' complements not only 
to 100% but to 115% in order to train in advance of the readiness of new or 
acquired ships the key men for them. 

[3] Just about the time we thought we were well imderway to that objective, 
the President received information from several sources that our ships were 
being seriously overcrowded. It was obvious that his informants were in or 
had been in the Fleet. Recently, the Captain of the TUSCALOOSA reported that 
his ship was overcrowded and asked for detachment of about 50 extra marines 
which had been placed on board. His Division Commander, Pickens, by endorse- 
ment confirmed this opinion and further stated that the same comment applied 
to all heavy cruisers. 

As the President had cruised in the TUSCALOOSA fairly recently, both 
he and his private physician. Rear Admiral Mclntire, were definitely of the 
opinion that there were too many men on the TUSCALOOSA for health and 
comfort. I have taken steps to ascertain how many men were on board during 
the President's cruise and at the time Pickens recommended the removal of the 
extra marines. 

Recently some bluejacket wrote Senator Downey, of California, a complaint 
of intolerable conditions in the PORTLAND due to overcrowding. When the 
matter was referred to me I asked CINCUS to investigate and give me data 
upon which to base a reply. CINCUS's, reply, which you should get from your 
files and read, confirmed the overcrowding in the PORTLAND and further stated 
that the number of men in the PORTLAND at the time of the complaint was 
less than was being proposed by the Fleet Personnel Board. 

You will agree that if the President also receives such comments (and no 
doubt many bluejackets or their families write him) Stark and I will have 
a hard time selling him the idea that ships' complements should be increased 
as you recommend in reference (a). 

Our recruiting may be prejudiced by similar letters from afloat as indicated 
by the following quotation from a letter written by an Inspector of one of our 
Major Recruiting Divisions : 

"From underground sources it appears that the ships are so crowded that 
men hesitate to ship over. I have had personal letters arid contacts from good 
men to that effect. A relative of mine — a farmer boy from Maryland whom 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2155 

I advised to join the Navy six years ago — is a patternmaker first class on the 
ALTAIR. He writes me for advice about sliipping over as living conditions 
on the ship are almost unbearable. I mention this because it seems to me 
a matter of concern even though it's none of my personal business." 

However, to offset the above unfavorable picture of overcrowding, Commander 
R. W. Gary, U. S. N., recently executive officer of the CHICAGO, gave me a 
memorandum of changes made in tliat ship to increase her living accommodations 
without apparent overcrowding. I enclose a copy of his memorandum, marked 
"A", and 1 will urge on the C. N. O. and Chief of Bureau of Ships to [4] 
provide the funds and equipment you ask in paragraph 11 of reference (a), 
not because I believe the President will approve increased complements to fight 
your ships, but primarily because I believe that every combatant ship should 
be ready to carry on board as many excess men as possible for training for 
new construction. 

The President now feels so strongly that we will make our ships unhappy 
by overcrowding that Stark and I will need every bit of assistance and assurance 
that you can give in order to obtain his consent to carrying more than the present 
100% complement on board. 

I recently sent you a draft of a proposed letter which should help a little in 
retlucing unexi^ected detachments. I enclose another copy, marked "B" and 
request your suggestions. 

The failure of many of our men to reenlist when discharged from ships in 
Hawaiian waters is understandable but very disturbing. While many men 
may leave that area with the intention of reenlisting after leave in the States, 
I am afraid we lose a large number of trained mechanics to industry when they 
come home. The remedy for this is both y<)Ur problem and mine, and I welcome 
your suggestions ^'or increasing reenlistments afloat. 

I appreciate receiving your letter re broadening the employment of negroes 
aboard ship. Your suggestions are sound and will be followed here as long 
as we can withstand the pressure. Two negroes have been appointed to the 
Naval Academy for the class entering next summer. 

Legislation has been initiated asking for 232,000 men in the Navy during 
normal times, with a limit of 300,000 for emergency. Prospects for passage are 
favorable. Stark and I wanted to ask for about 500,000 but were turned down 
by the President who insists on a year by year program. Present Operating Force 
plan for 1942 will require about 290,000 men. 

Legislation has been initiated for going to three-year Naval Academy course, 
commencing with the class of 1&43, which will be scheduled to graduate in 
June 1942. The Class of 1942 will graduate in February 1942. Pro.spects for 
passage favorable. 

Before closing this already too long letter, let me assure you that when we 
get the report of youf Personnel Board with its recommendations for increased 
complements, we will give it serious and sympathetic study, particularly if 
your Medical Board of Survey of Living Conditions on hoard indicates that 
more men can be accommodated without prejudice to health and comfort. 

Referring to the large numbers of young Reserve Ensigns being ordered to 
duty afloat, I know that you will do all in your power to continue their naval 
education and training. These young men will be useful and valuable in direct 
proportion to the effort made by our regular officers to train them. [5] We 
must lean very heavily on them to help meet the requirements of new construction. 

In order that the Fleet may comprehend the personnel problem confronting 
the NaTy as a whole, I shall publish to the service in the near future a circular 
of information as to how we plan to meet the personnel needs of our two-ocean 
Navy. In spite of anything we may attempt to do ashore we realize that it is 
on board ship that the most important training must take place. 

If you or any of your officers have a formula for manning new construction 
with nuclei of ship-trained men without getting them from the Fleet, — by all 
means, let nie have it ! 

With kindest regards and best wishes, I am, 
Sincerely yours, 

/S/ C. W. NiMITZ. 

End. 

Admiral H. E. Kimmet., U. S. Navy, 

Commander-in-Chici , U. 8. Pacific Fleet, 
U. S. S. Pennsi/lvania, 
Pearl Harbor, T. H. 



2156 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Navy De^'abtment, 
Bureau of Navigation, 
Wtishirifftnn, D. C. 28 Fehruary 1941. 
From : The Chief of the Bureau of Navigation. 
To: Comiuander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet. 

Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Fleet. 
Subject : Transfers to Shore Duty. 
Reference: (a) BuNav Manual. 

1. The Bureau will furni.sh to the Commander-in-Chief. United States Fleet, 
Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Fleet, Commander Base Force, Pacific Fleet, and 
Commander Train, Atlantic Fleet, the waiting lists for shore duty maintained 
in accordance with reference (a), Articles D-7024t6). (7), and (8). 

2. The shore duty waiting li.st will be revl.sed and issued quarterly. It will 
contain only the top men on the list who.se transfer ashore may normally l)e 
expected durinj; the succeeding twelve months. Fleet Reservists will appear sep- 
arately on this list as the Bureau will continue to give preference to Fleet 
Reservists for transfer to shore duty. 

3. The Conunander-in-Chief, United States Fleet, and C<»mniander-in-Chief, 
Atlantic Fleet, are requested to place men in training as reliefs for men on the 
shore duty lists so that the latter can be transfeired on short notice. 



In reply refer to 

Initials and No. Op-30C-MD 

Navy Department, 
Office of the Chief of Navai- Operations, 

Washington, February 20, 1941. 

Memorandum for the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation 

Subject : Accommodations for Increased Complements of Heavy Cruisers. 

1. In accordance with your request, I am supplying the following information 
gained from my experience as Executive Officer of the CHICAGO in regard to 
acconmiodating the increased complements of heavy cruisers. 

2. When I left the fleet on December 21), 1940, a complement required for heavy 
cruisers of the CHICAGO class had not been worked out to the last man, but 
it appeared to be very close to llOO men necessary to man the additional batteries 
installed, and maintain the rate of fire required by modern war conditions. I 
note, since my arrival here, that the Fleet Personnel Board recommends 1099 men 
for this class of cruiser. 

3. To meet the berthing, messing and other accommodations necessary to 
accommodate our estimated number of 100 men, the CHICAGO obtained addi- 
tional bunks and lockers while at the Navy Yard — a sufficient number to bring 
the total up to 996. This installation was done principally with the ship's force. 
The arrangement for installing, these bunks and lockers was done entirely by the 
ship's personnel under the supervision of the First Lieutenant who gave it his 
careful attention and succeeded in getting these in without violating the standard 
spacing between berths in any one tier of 21", and without finding it necessary 
to utilize any of the messing compartments. To accomplish this it required an 
almost complete rearrangement of berths and lockers in each compartment. 
When this installation had been completed, it was found possible by utilizing office 
space and other miscellaneous spaces large enough to take from one to three or 
four berths plus what space was left available in the berthing compartments, to 
install 113 additional bunks and lockers. This number had been requested from 
the Bureau of Ships, but I am advised that no action [2] as yet has been 
taken on that request. If it is approved, and the bunks and lockers are installed, 
there will be a total of 1,109 bunks and lockers on the CHICAGO. 

4. Up to the time that I left the ship, we had had a pt-^ak load of some 1,050 
men on board. The cafeteria system of feeding this large number of men has 
proved to be satisfactory. The over-all messing time for this number of men 
was less than it had been under the old messing system for a lesser number of 
men, but the actual serving time was slightly longer, amounting in all from 
30 to 35 minutes. The mess hall space required was reduced to two messing 
compartments in place of three as previously used, by the fact that the rate 
of serving corresponded very closely to the rate of eating by the men, so that 
as the latter part of the line was served, the earlier part of the line had eaten 
and cleared the tables. The important feature of the satisfactory operation of 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2157 

the cafeteria system on any ship, but particularly ships with complements con 
siderably larger than originally (lesigned for, is the organization for the service 
of the food. 

5. Additional washroom and toilet facilities are also required for an increase 
in complement. This was accomplished in the firemen's washroom, while the 
ship was at the yard last summer, by a rearrangement of existing installations 
which permitted the installation of two additional showers, two additional bucket 
troughs (acconnnodating about 8 men each), two additional head tnmghs (approx- 
imately 5 sejits each), one additional urinal. A similar eliort was underway in 
the deck force wash nxmi at the time I left the ship, but I do not know the 
extent of the additional facilities this would provide. 

6. We found it essential in the tropics to take steps to increase the ventilation 
of some <tf the berthiufr compartments and the mess hall where the steam tables 
were located. This was accomplished by the ship's force, but it is probable that 
additional ventilating equipment will have to be installed in view of the recent 
decision to blank off all air ports on the second deck and below, as well as some 
on the main deck. 

7. The effect of the increased number of men in thei berthing compartments 
on the health of the crew was consideied by the medical officer not to be a serious 
menace, up until the time I left the ship, provided that we were a little more 
meticulous in the observation of sanitary measures. This involved a careful 
watch for the aitpearaiice of bedbugs, cockroaches and other germ carrying pests 
and special care in the sterilization of mess gear after meals. It also included 
the prompt segregation of personnel showing signs of colds, flu and other 
nose, throat and chest diseases. Although there were two mild epidemics of flu 
in the fleet during the past Fall, tlm <"HI('AGO had comparatively few cases in 
spite of the fact that I believe it was more crowded at the time than any other 
ship in the fleet. 

•S. From my observation of other ships which have had additional berthing 
facilities installed together with information received from the First Lieutenant, 
before I left the ship, we were of the opinion that they had not been as successful 
in the arrangement of their berthing .space as we had been on the CHICAGO. 
This appeared to be due to a failure to plan the arrangement with the same 
care that the CHICAGO had used. 

/s/ R. W. Cart, 
Commander, U. 8. N. 
♦CHICAGO Complement 872 

TUSCALOOSA Complement 876 



[1] In reply refer to Initials and No. Op-lO/Dy. 

Navy Department, 
Office of the Chief of Naval OPEaiATioNS, 

Washington, March 22, 19/(1. 
Secret 

Dear Kimmel: Your letter of February 18th was Handed to me upon my return 
from an inspection of N. O. B., Norfolk, Fajardo, Vieques anchorage, Pillsbury 
Sound, St. Thomas, San Juan, Guantanamo, various Bahama Islands, Key West, 
Miami, Jacksonville, Pensacola, Charleston, and Parris Lsland ; — literally, a 
flying trip. 

Ingersoll wrote you to acknowledge receipt of your letter. We have now 
received answers from the interested individuals here in the Department to 
the "questions you asked. I will take up your letter, paragraph, by paragraph, 
here goes : — 

The Checks for the Navy Relief and Red Cross have been received. You must 
have had acknowledgments by this time. 

Chester Nimitz in his letter to you of March 3 — a copy of which I have — 
seemrs to have answered all your questions on personnel so that I need not 
comment any further on that subject : except that, with regard to the Bureau 
of Ordnance requirements for post-graduate ordnance officers, I can fully under- 
stand your point of view in not wishing to have those officers detached from the 
Fleet. The procurement situation in the Bureau of Ordnance is critical. We 
made the best decision we could with the picture confronting us. You may 
expect a similar effort to get legally trained officers in legal jobs. 



2158 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

With reference to the Marines at Palmyra and Johnson you must, by now, 
have received my confidential serial 019612 of February 26th on the subject of 
permanent Marine defense force at Johnson, Midway and Palmyra Islands. 
Of course personnel stationed at Johnson and Palmyra islands should not exceed 
the number provided in paragraph 4 of the letter of the 26th until satisfactory 
arrangements are made for providing the minimum requirements of food, water, 
and other essential supplies. We concur in your recommendation to send 100 
Marines to Palmyra and none to Johnson for the present. 

No comment seems necessary on paragraph 8 in view of the fact that the 
detachments have already gone to Australia and New Zealand. 

[2] In paragraph 9 you request one Squadron of PT's and one of the new 
PTC S at the earliest possible date. At the present moment I can not give you 
an answer to this question because the demands of the British are such right 
now that I can't even make an estimate of the number of PT's and PTC's which 
might be available to be sent to you. I have an order now to give them 28| 
immediately. 

You also speak of the probability that the Coast Guard will be taken over 
shortly. I hope to do that as soon as the 7 billion dollar appropriation is passed 
by the Congress and signed by the President. 

Completion of the quota of small craft allocated to the 14th District is being 
pushed as rapidly as their conversion and readiness for service can be accom- 
plished. You probably know the TAMAHA and an Oil Barge are now en 
route to Hawaii in tow of the KANAWHA. 

With respect to paragraph 10; Admiral Blandy furnished in his letter to you 
of March Hth, the shipment dates of the remaining bombs to be supplied to the 
Oahu area. It will be noted from Blandy's fetter that all requirements will be 
completed either in the May, 1941. voyage of the U. S. S. LASSEN, or the 
ammunition trip about October, 1941. With respect to the bomb supplies in 
Oahu, a letter is about to be signed increasing the bombs designated for that 
island and a.sking you to assist in transporting them frons the mainland to Oahu. 
Dump storage of bombs in Oahu has already been authorized in advance of the 
availability of magazines. 

I believe you have received information on the incendiary bomb situation ; 
5,009 are being procured from the Army and delivery is expected shortly. 

The answers to paragraph 11 of your letter are contained in our confidential 
serial 05038 of March 18, to the effect that it is the present intention to substi- 
tute PYRO for LASSEN upon the conclusion of PYRO's next voyage to the 
Fleet. 

As you know, the Department has taken steps to acquire two more vessels; 
Class C-3 cargo ships (Now building at Tampa, Fla.), for conversion into 
ammunition ships but it is impossible to tell at this date when these vessels may 
be ready for service. 

Referring to paragraph 12 of your letter, need for destroyers in the Atlantic 
Fleet right now is such that we probably will not be able to help you with addi- 
tional destroyers for sonse months, if then ; in fact we may have to take some 
away soon. 

[3] In connection with your comments in paragraph 14 and 15 relative to 
complements recommended by the Fleet Personnel Board, the following pertinent 
comment from the Director of Fleet Maintenance is quoted : 

"(a) The Bureau of Ships for some time has been calling attention to the 
continued weight increases, which have been taking place on all t.vpes of ships 
since commissioning, having reached such proportions that effect on military 
characteristics is now serious. The recent weight additions, made necessary by 
improved A. A. defense, D. G. equipment, splinter protection and increased 
ammunition which could not be compensated for by weight removals in accord- 
ance with the policy established several years ago, have greatly accentuated the 
overweight situation to such extent that no further uncompensated weights 
should be added until the results of the weight removal survey now under way 
ore obtained. 

(b) The Bureau of Ships estimates that for each additional man and his 
personal effects 300 lbs additional weight. To provide bunk, locker, mess gear, 
sanitary and other requirements, the total additional weight per man is approxi- 
mately one-half ton. The average increases recommended by the Fleet Personnel 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2159 

Board over the Force Operating Plan represents rather sizeable weight additions 

as shown by table. 

Over RfKuUing 

increase men weight added 

BBs 286 143 tons 

CAs 228 114 tons 

CLs 136 78 tons 

DDs 57 28.5 tons 

(c) While the decision against reconnnended increases was based on weight 
and stability conditions more than on space and cost, the further restrictions 
on berthing space introduced by sealing of airi)orts on the lower decks has made 
the space component of more importance than formerly. 

(d) The Operating Force Plan has taken into consideration and has allowed 
increased complements for the additional Ax\. batteries installed. 

(e) The Operating Force plan represents the policy of the Department on 
the number of men which can or should be assigned to the various ships by types. 

[4] (f) On a comparative basis the coniplenieiits now allowed are 10-15% 

greater than those assigned by the British on similtlr types of ships. 

(g) Correspondence is at present before the Bui-eau of Ships requesting com- 
ment on the maximum niuiiber of men which can' be accommodated on the various 
types of ships within acceptable limits of space, weight and stability considera- 
tions. The reopening of the case deiiends largely on the Bureau of Ships reply. 

P. S; The report of the Fleet Personnel Board is now in. It Is anticipated that 
it will be reconnnended for approval to maximiun extent permissible within space, 
weight and stability reconinieiidations of P>uShips. 

Paragraph IS of your letter referred to the supply of modern types of planes 
throughout the Fleet. In this connection Towers states the impression that the 
Bureau of Aeronautics is relegating fleet aircraft needs to a position of lower 
priority than the general expansion program, is in error. He says that the Bureau 
of Aeronautics has exerted and continues to exert every jwssible effort to provide 
the Fleet with new replacement airplanes for the old models at a rate oidy limited 
by the productive output of the contractors and diversions instituted by specific 
directives to the Bureau of Aeronautics. It is believed appropriate to point out 
that the Navy Department in the face of long and determined opposition has been 
successful in establishing the highest priority for the following types and models 
of naval airplanes now on order for the Fleet. This priority (A-l-b) is higher 
than that accorded any Army aircraft, except the temporary priority given the 
P40B's which are being sent to the Hawaiian area. 

VP PBY5 197 

VSB SBD-2 & 3 202 

VF F4F 324 

VSO S03c 260 

VSB SB2c 70 

VTB TBF 108 



1,221 



Your paragraph 18 recommends acquisition of two more "sea-train" vessels. 
Acquisition and conversion of 4 APV's. 2 New .lerseys. 2 Manhattans, was recom- 
mended. The President cut out the Manhattans. Acquisition of the 2 New Jer- 
seys as you probably know was appi-oved by the Secretary of the Navy on January 
15, 1941, but funds havemot yet been made avdilahlc. The New Jersey type is 
now used for ferrying lodded freight cars from the East and Gulf Coast ports to 
Havana. The conversion contemplates the removal of numerous [5] 
stanchions and use of three decks for the loading of aircraft. Capacity of this 
type after full conversion is estimated to be approximately 60 assembled air- 
planes of the .scout bomber size. No flying on or flying off facilities are involved. 
I might a<ld that "plans" for the conversion of the Manhattan type contemplating 
the installation of hangar and flying off deck with an offset island bridge and 
stack arrangement are being pro.secuted. No provisions will be made for airplane 
landings aboard the Manhattans. Estimated carrying caiwcity for the Manhat- 
tans is 80 planes of the scout bomber class when the entire flight deck is loaded ; 
under these conditions the planes could not, of cour.se, be flown off. 

In answer to your connnent in paragraph 20 on the necessity for additional 
stores ships and transports, the following obtains : 



2160 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

On 15 January. 1941, the Secretary of the Navy approved recommendations for 
three additional store ships (AF). The I'resident cnt it to two. The status of 
legislation authorizing and appropriating moneii for these two vessels is indeter- 
minate at the present moment. It is hoi>ed these vesels will be acquiretl some- 
time during the current fiscal year. 

The six transports intended for assignment to Base Force are being converted 
and made ready for use on the West Coast. It is expected that all of these vessels 
will report for duty by June or July, 1!)41. In addition to their intended employ- 
ment for training Marines in landing operations, it may frequently be nece.ssary 
for forces afloat to u.se one or more of those tran.sports to meet ti'ansportation 
requirements between Hawaii and the Island Bases. In addition to these ships, 
negotiations ai'e being completed now for the charter of the Matson Line ship 
WEST CRESSEY. She should be available within a short time and ComTwelve 
is being instructed regarding her loading. It is planned to keep her under charter 
for transportation of supplies to Hawaii until the CAPE LOOKOUT is completed 
and ready for service. 

With refer<-nce to your postscript on the subject of Japanese trade routes and 
i-esponsibility for tlie furni.shing of se<'ret information to OincUS, Kirk informs 
mo that ONI is fnliy awai-e of its responsibility in keeping you adequately in- 
formed concerning foreign n.itions, activities of these nations and disloyal ele- 
ments within the I'nited States. He further says that information concerning 
the location of all Japanese merchant vessels is forwarded by airmail weekly 
to you and that, if you wish, this information can be issued more frequently, or 
sent by despatch. As you know, ONI 40 contains a section devoted to Japanese 
trade routes, the commodities which move over these trade routes, and the 
volume of shipping which moved over each route. 

[6] This chart was corrected in the Spring of 1940. The dale appearing on 
the chart is the date 15)39, which was the last complete year for which export and 
import data on conunodities was available at the time the chart was revised. 

Every good wish as always. 

Keep Cheerful. 

Unload all you can on us. 

Give us credit for doing the best we can under many conflicting and strong 
cross currents and tide rips — just, as we do you — and. 
Best of luck, 

/S/ Betty. 

Admiral H. E. Kimmel, USN 

Commander-in-Chief. U. K. Fleet, 
U. S. S. PEWSYLVANIA, 
Pearl Harbor, T. H. 

/ 



In reply refer to Initials and No. 11932 

Secret 

Navy Department 
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations 

Washington, 4 April 1941 

Dear Kimmfl: It has been sometime since I liave dropped you a line, but like 
.you, have been literally .sawing wood seven days a week and there has been noth- 
ing of real importance that I could tell you until the Staff Conversations were 
over. Yesterday I sent an official letter to you and to King and to Tommy Hart 
covering this subject. 

I made a two weeks in.spection trip in the West Indies and our activities in 
the Ignited States South of Washington, and just abcmt as I got back the President 
shoved off, so I had had no close liaison with him until his return this week. 
Spent over three hours with him day before yesterday and another hour yesterday. 
My official letter on the staff conversations had some thoughts in it as a result of 
that Conference. I may tell you and Hart and King, in the strictest confidence, 
and I mean by that, nobody but you and Hart and King, that I read to the Presi- 
dent the official secret letter which I mailed you thi-ee yesterday and received his 
general assent to it. 

I realize that you all, just as much as I, are vitally interested in the matter 
of "timing". Something may be forced on us at any moment which would pre- 
cipitate action, though I don't look for it as I can see no advantage to Mr. Hitler 
in forcing us into the war unless, of course, Matsuoka agrees to fight at the same 
time. On the surface, at least, the Japanaese situation looks a trifle easier, but 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2161 

just what the Oriental miUif plans, none of us can be sure. I have had several 
long talks with Admiral Nomura and unless I am completely fooled, he earnestly 
desires to avert a Japanese crisis with us. We have been extremely frank with 
each other. 

I am enclosing a memo on CiOnvoy which I drew up primarily to give the Presi- 
dent a picture of what is now being done, what we would propose to do if we con- 
voyed, and of our ability to do it. It concerns you directly in the detachment 
from your command of what I believe to be necessary for King to have, to do the 
job. I feel it is only a matter of time before King is directed to convoy or patrol 
or whatever form the protective measures take. 

You may not agree with me on this move. I can only hope that I am right. 
The situation is obviously critical in the Atlantic. In my opinion, it is hopeless 
except as we take strong measures to save it. The effect on the British of sink- 
ings with legard both to the food supply and essential material to carry on the war 
is getting progressively worse. Without our giving effective aid I do not believe 
the British can much more than see the year through, if that. The situation is 
much worse than the average person has any idea. 

Our officers who have been studying the positions for bases in the British Isles 
have returned, and we have decided on inmiediate construction of 1 destroyer 
base and (me seaplane base in Northern Ireland. We are also studying Scotland 
Iceland buses for further support of the protective force for shipping in the 
northward approaches to Britain. 

I am also enclosing a memorandum, which I regard as vitally secret and which 
I trust you will burn as soon as you have read it, covering the President's talk 
with Ghormley and me yesterday. 

I hope and I b?lieve that the foregoing gives you the picture pretty much as 
I have it to date without going into the Balkan situation, labor troubles, bottle- 
necks and the million otli-er things which you undoubtedly can glean quite well 
from the press. 

I might add that I am thoroughly in accord with your recent letter to Nimitz, 
can assure you of Nimitz' support, and that the letter was helpful from every 
standpoint. 

We handed the State Department and the Attorney General something 
to unravel when we took over the German, Italian and French ships last week- 
end. I had about as busy a 24 hours and about as interesting as I have had for 
sometime. I find that I stuck my neck out only in taking over the four Danish 
ships in the Philippines, but at least we have them and even if there was no law 
to support my action, I am glad I did it and the Big Boss, when I "fessed" up, 
approved. As a matter of fact, most of it was in hand before he knew about it. 
This letter is really long enough or I would tell you how we startetl the ball 
rolling and what a splendid job the Coast Guard did on short notice. Of course, 
the pity of it is that we could not have done it months ago before the sabotage 
took place. We have been pressing to do it for sometime and when I got word 
SatHrday afternoon of the sabotage on a couple of ships, we jumped the gun. 

Am sending copies of this letter to King and to Hart, although King is pretty 
familiar with affairs here because of his proximity and an occasional visit 
which is a great help. 

I just realized I had not touched on what we refer to as "practice cruises" 
which detachments from your force have recently made to Australia and New 
Zealand. I think there will be more of this to come; my hope is they will be 
confined to positions on the Jap tlanks and that they will have some of the bene- 
fit which the President and the State Department expect from them. Of interest 
to you is that we are directing King to make similar visits to Cape Verde, the 
Canaries and the Azores ; of course with a very few units. 

Coast Guard has just been directed to turn over to the British 10 of its 250 foot 
cutters. 

Rainbow 5 should be on its way to you all shortly. 
Keep cheerful. All good wishes. 

Sincerely, 

Bettt. 
Admiral H. E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, 

Commander in Chief, U. .S'. Pacific Fleet, 
U. S. -S'. PENNSYLVANIA, 
Pearl Harbor, T. H. 



2162 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

11932 
Secret April 1941. 

OcKAN Escort in Wkstekn Atlantic 
(West of Longitude 30° West) 

HALIFAX CONVOYS BP:F0BE FEBKUARY !">, 1!M1 

Usual British Escort ; 1 XCI., — occasionally augmented by 1 BB or 1 CC or 1 C. 

Last Summer Ki'itish occasionally augmented the 1 XCL by 1 large SS. 

Westbound traffic has had no ocean escort. 

Ships over 12 l<nots go it alone. 

Ships under 12 knots put in 9 or 6 knot convoys. 

BERMUDA CONVOYS BEFORE FEBRUARY 15, 1041 

Without escort until they join Halifax convoys some hundreds of miles East of 
Halifax. 

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 

About February 1.1th Britisii Chiefs of Staff stated that hereafter all convoys 
from Halifax must be escorted. Minimum strength of ocean escorts either: 
1 BB or 
1 CC or 
1 CA or 

1 XCL plus 1 large SS 
This st;itement was made before the recent cruise of GNEISENAU and 
SCHARNHORST changed the picture. 

U. S. NAVY PLAN 

Our concept ft>r the minimum strength of ocean escorts, so long as danger from 
GNEISENAU and SCHARNHORST or similar vessels remains, is: 

1 BB plus XCL plus 2 to 4 DDs. 

If BB be not available substitute 2 CAs. 
Obviously this escort might be weaker than German attackers, and therefore 
covering operations in the general area by heavy ships and carriers are necessary 
at times. 

To keep present flow of traffic moving, 2 to 3 convoys a week, 7 escort units are 
necessary. 

In the Staff Conversations the British stated they will make available to the • 
United States for assisting in the above work: 
10 XCL 
2 DD (Old) 
8SS 
The proposed war deployment of the Atlantic Fleet, as at present constituted, 
is: 

(a) Northwest Escorts, based in Northern Ireland (Admiral Bristol) : 

9DD 
18 ODD 
42 VPB (possibly 54) 

(b) Ocean Escorts, Western Atlantic: 

3 BB 
2CA 
2DL 
TDD 
4,0DD 

4 DMS 

(c) Striking Force, based Bermuda: 

2 CV 
2CA 
4 DD 

6 VPB 

(d) Southern Patrol, based Trinidad: 
4 CL (7500 ton) 

Several 327 Coast Guard cutters 

(e) Gibraltar Submarine Force : 
12 OSS 

(f ) Bay of Biscay Force, based England : 
9 OSS 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2163 

(g) North Atlantic Coastal Frontier: 

12 Vl'B plus Canadian corvettes of an unknown number, 
(h) Caribbean and Panama Coastal Frontiers: 
1 PG 
9 DD 
24 VPB 
8 OSS 
At the present time 1 BB is under regular navy yard overhaul, and one is under 
emergency repairs ; these are due for completion respectively 19 May and 28 April. 
The RANGER must go under tliree months overhaul April 17tii. From 5 to 10 
DD and 1 or 2 cruisers must remain under overhaul most of the time. 

Consideration of the above shovi^s that the Atlantic Fleet is unable to provide 
the minimum ocean escoit considered necessary. Shortages will be especially 
bad until June first. With the GNEISKKAU and SCHARNHORST at large, I 
consider 2 carriers, at least 2 cruisers, and 4 destroyers the miniimim for an 
effective striking force. 

To provide a proper degree of safety for convoys in the Western Atlantic, and 
to provide an important striking unit for catching raiders, the following rein- 
forcements in the Atlantic are necessary : 

3 BB (IDAHO. NEW MEXICO, MISSISSIPPI) 
1 CV (preferably LEXINGTON) 

6 DL. 
12 DD 

4 CL (new), (although this Division might come later). 

If this movement is made, it should be done with the utmost possible secrecy. 
The possible effect of this transfer as regards Japan is realized, but must be 
accepted if we are to take an effective part in the Atlantic. 

Secret 12212 

In reply refer to Initials and No. 

Navy Department, 
Office of the Chief of Navai. Operations. 

Washington, 19 April 1941. 

Dear Kimmei.: Recent correspondence regarding cruise to the Northwest; 
Detachments for the Atlantic ; Hemispheric Defense Plan No. 1 ; etc., etc. ; — well 
I can sort of visualize and hear you saying "Why the Hell doesn't Betty make 
up his mind on what he wants to do?" 

First, I will put at this point rather than at the end of this letter. 

"Keep cheerful" and help me to keep my sense of humor which is a little taxed 
sometimes. 

And again : — 

Just remember "We are doing the best we can." 

I wrote you about the Australian Detachment. The President .said (and 
Incidentally when I open up to you this way I don't expect you to quote the 
President and I know there is nobody who can keep things secret better than you 
can) ; "Betty just as soon as those ships come back from Australia and New 
Zealand, or perhaps a little before, I want to send some more out. I just want to 
keeji them popping up here and there, and keep the Japs guessing." This, of 
course, is right down the State Department's alley. To my mind a lot of State 
Department's suggestions and recoinmendations are nothing less than childish 
(don't quote me) and I have practically said so in so many words in the presence 
of, all concerned, but after 13 months they finally got it going. Of course I 
recognize some m^'rit, if exercised with some discretion — and that is where Navy 
has to count on F. D. R. for reserve ; .so we did not have to send ships into 
Singapore and we did keep them on a flank to be in iwsition to go to woi'k or to 
retire if something broke.. 

Interruption — The thought just flashes across my mind that Savvy Cooke is 
now with you. He has much background. I know you will talk to him freely, 
just as I always have. 

To that extent, namely, more or less in position if something broke, I acquiesced 
in the Australian Cruise with far nnore grace than I would have otherwise. I am 
not insensible to the advantages of a cruise of this sort, as well as to the disad- 
vantages of interruption in training. 

Now when the question of "Popping up everywhere" came and having in 
mind keeping on the flank, I said to the President: "How about going North?" 
He said ; "Yes, you can keep any position you like, and go anywhere." 



2164 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

There was a little method in my madness as to the Northern cruise; I thought 
for once, if I could, I would give the State Department a shock which might 
make them haul back, and incidentally, that Northwest cruise has many good 
points. It still conforms to the flank, and a detachment on an occasional 
sortie up in an unexpected direction might be good ball, and if you ever want to 
make such a cruise yourself on your own initiative, don't hesitate to ask. Of 
course you can see what a striking force of the composition I gave you, and 
known to the Japs, would mean to them, in view of their unholy fear of 
bombing. This striking detachment would have been right in position for most 
anything. 

I had a broad inward smile when the State Department in effect said ; "Please, 
Mr. President, don't let him do if ; or words to that effect. It was a little too 
much for them. 

The above very briefly touches the high points of this episode and gives you its 
inception and its calling off. 

I realize sometimes it might be less upsetting to you mentally not to tell you 
these things and then have them called off. On the other hand, I never can 
prophesy just what will come and in order that you may be prepared, I endeavor 
to keep you informed as we go along. You can just assume, or begin to guess, 
what goes on sometimes in between drinks. 

Now let's take up the letter we sent you regarding the Detachment coming 
to the Atlantic and without checking up, I believe it was 3 BB, 1 CV, 4 CL and 
2 squadrons of destroyers. This was the first echelon for the "Battle of the 
Atlantic." The entire world set-up was gone into very carefully and this detach- 
ment was one of the first means of implementing what we had every reason to 
anticipate here. It was agreed to, authorized and directed in its detail by the 
President. It was also cancelled by the President, and he gave the specific 
direction to bring only the one CV and I division of destroyers, with which you 
are now familiar. The reason for the change was that the President did not 
want, at this particular moment, to give any signs of seriously weakening the 
forces in the Pacific, and it is my opinion tiiat this will hold xintil there is some 
further clarification, incident to Matsuoka's return to Tokyo and this further 
illumination on the Russo-Japanese Treaty. Don't interpret this in any sense 
as a change in the general idea of Plan Dog which the President again recently 
reiterated to me, and which still holds. He does not, however, even while 
adhering to that Plan, want to give Japan any encouragement or lead right 
now as to our intentions. I am telling you, not arguing with you. 

You have received the word with regard to the 4 minesweepers. 

We are starting the "T" Cla.ss submarines, now in the Atlantic, into the Pacific. 
You will have to look out for them some way or other until a Tender is ready, 
which we anticipate will be sometime in August,— the USS PELIA8. 

The foregoing is just to give you a little inside information on recent events. 
I have really nothing new to add. The situation here is a little more hectic than 
usual, particularly because of the effect on the public of the situation in the 
Balkans, and the Near Plast. Your estimate of this situation probably will, 
differ little from ours ; that it is critical is obvious. 

For months I have been making recommendations along some lines now much 
in public discussion. To those who have final authority and responsibility the 
time seems not yet ripe for their adoption. 

Hemispheric Defense Plan No. 1 specifically implements the President's 
thoughts which he has been debating in his own mind for sometime. Whether 
or not it will actually be put into effect, or altered, I cannot say. King is in 
this morning. His order is ready. The President is examining this situation 
further today as a result of conversations with Mr. Hull, who is counselling 
something less aggressive. I will add n P. S. when this ts typed Monday. 

I had hoped that with the passage of the Lend-Lease Bill we could look 
forward to some unity on Capitol Hill but just at present there seems to be 
far from that desired unity on vital issues. What will be done about convoy 
and many other things, and just how much a part of our Democratic way of 
life will be handled by Mr. Gallup, is a pure guess. From that you might think 
I am getting a little bit cynical, but believe it or not, that is not the case, and 
I am sawing wood as usual and am still cheerful. 

The President has on his hands at the present time about as difficult a situ- 
ation as ever confronted any man anywhere in public life. There are tremen- 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2165 

dons issues at stake, to which he is giving all he has got. I only wish I could be 
of more help to him. 

Hoping you are cheerful and' with all good wishes, Sincerely, 

Admiral H. E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy 

Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, 
USS PENNSYLVANIA. 

P. S. I am sending copy of this letter to Tommy Hart, King returned from 
Hyde Park and as a result Hemispheric Plan No. 1 goes by the board, and a 
substitute, with no teeth, is being prepared today. 

Betty. 



In reply refer to Initials and No. Op-lO-Dy. 

Navy Department, 
Office of the Chiet' of Naval Operations, 

Washington, April 26, lOJfl. 

Dbiab Mustapha : This is just to get you mentally prepared' that shortly a 
considerable detachment from your fleet will be brought to the Atlantic. 

You will recall from my last letter what that detachment was and what the 
President cut it to, but only for the time being, awaiting some further clue to the 
Japanese situation. 

Not only do I anticipate the reinforcing of the Atlantic by the 3 BBs, 1 CV, 
4 CLs and 2 squadrons of destroyers, but also by further reinforcements. 

King has been given a job to do with a force utterly inadequate to do it on 
any efficient scale. 

I am enclosing a copy of his last order which implements the changed Hemi- 
spheric Defense Plan No. 1 and is now known as Hemispheric Defense Plan No. 2 
or WPL^9. 

Even the Press and those who wanted to go all out in the Pacific are now round- 
ing to and clamoring for an all out in the Atlantic. You know my thoughts with 
regard to this which were set down in my Memo about what is now known as Plan 
Dog and which will shortly be covered by Rainbow 5. 

Action on the above, that is transfer to the Atlantic, may come at any time and 
in my humble opinion is only a matter of time. 

No other news for the moment and this letter is the result of a long conference 
yesterday in the White House. 

I am sending a copy as usual to Tommy Hart. 

I am just in receipt of your letter. We will send you the Public Relations Offi- 
cer. I shall also go over the personnel situation again with Niniitz. I think we 
all see eye to eye in what we want to do and I agree with you that key men just 
should not be removed short of extreme emergency. 
Sincerely, 

[ S ] Bettty. 

Admiral H. E. Kimmel, USN 

Commander in Chief, U. 8. Pacific Fleet, 
USS PENNSYLVANIA. 



In reply refer to Initials and No. Op-10 Hu 

Navy DepabtmeiNT, 
Office of the Chief of Navat. Operations, 

Washington, 15 May lO^l. 
Confidential 

DE.VB Kimmel: This is in reply to your letter of May 5, 1941, which it was a 
pleasure to receive. 

The present plans for the Secretary's trip are briefly as follows: The party 
will consist of the Secretary ; Captain Frank E. Beatty, U. S. N.. Aide to the 
Secretary; Mr. Rawleigh Warner of Chicago, Illinois, a personal friend of the 
Secretary's; and Mr. John O'Keefe, private secretary to the Secretary. It is 
expected that the party (if Secretary can get away) will leave here May 24, 
1941, and, accompanied by Rear Admiral A. W. Fitch, U. S. N., will depart from 
San Francisco at near dawn in XPB- 2Y-1 on May 26, 1941, reaching Peai-1 Har- 



2166 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

bor, T. H. late the same day. The Secretary is looking forward with much antici- 
pation to the trip. As you know, he is keenly and intelligently interested in the 
entire Naval Establishment, and the Fleet in -particular. I am sure that both 
the Secretary and you will profit from the visit. 

The above arrangements are, of course, only tentative. I am informed that 
the President will speak to the country on May 27, 1941. In view of this, I have 
a mild suspicion that some change in the Secretary's plans may be necessary. 

All of us here are aware of your difficulties in connection with the loss of so 
many of your experienced men. Our proposal to automatically extend enlist- 
ments during war knd national emergency was introduced in the Senate by 
Chairman Walsh on January 14, 1941, but has not been introduced in the House, 
as Mr. Vinson is apparently opposed to it. The matter is not as simple as it 
appears on the surface. The Selective Service Act provides that a man inducted 
in the Service for a year's training must be discharged at the end of that period, 
unless the Congress meanwhile "has declared that the national interest is im- 
periled." Nimitz feels, and I agree, that Congressional action to freeze our 
enlisted personnel can best be accomplished by basing our demands on the same 
grounds provided for in the Selective Service Act, i. e., when "the national interest 
is imperiled." Accordingly, we are introducing legislation which will provide 
that whenever the Congress shall declare that the national interest is imperiled, 
all enlistments in the regular Navy or Marine Corps which are in force at that 
time and which will terminate during such emergency shall continue in force 
during the emergency, and that men detained in the Service in accordance with 
the above shall, unless they extend their enlistment, be discharged not later than 
6 months after the date of termination of the emergency. At the same time, the 
legislation, as proposed, [2] provides for a suspension of Section 1422 
of the Act of March 3, 1875, which provides for pay and a quarter for men 
retained in the Service beyond the normal expiration of their enlistment. 

Meanwhile, you have by this time the Department's dispatch about the provi- 
sions of revised statutes of Section 1422. Act of March 3, 1875. It is hoped 
that this will help relieve the situation to a certain extent. 

On May 6, the Bureau of Navigation issued circular letter No. 55-41, having 
to do with the subject of transfer of enlisted personnel in forces afloat. In this 
letter, it was stated that, until further notice, the tsansfer of enlisted personnel 
from forces afloat will, in general, be by rating and not by name. This contra- 
venes Navigation's policy, which has been in effect for some time — that of order- 
ing men from sea to shore duty, using length of Sea Service as a basis for such 
transfers. The change will permit you to retain your experienced men and 
transfer those whose service can best be spared. 

As to nucleus oflBcer personnel. Navigation advises that it is often difficult, on 
account of urgency in issuing orders, to request nominations from forces afloat, 
but every endeavor is being made not to detach experienced officers where it can 
be avoided. We will be glad to receive your ideas on the subject of nucleus 
crews when they have been prepared, as you suggest, "in a more definite form." 

Your plans for the landing at San Clemente have been received in the Navy 
Department. Fleet Training has studied them with interest. I have had a 
brief of the intended operations submitted to me, and I think the exercise will 
be of much value to all concerned. Needless to say, we are pressing preparations 
to the end that our landing forces will be well equipped ; shortages remedied, etc. 

Your remark about the use of AKs in connection with landing oi)erations is 
concursed in. We have been able to get two craft suitable for this purpose from 
the Maritime Commission. Unfortunately, the conversion of these ships cannot 
be completed until the fall of 1941. 

As suggested, I have informed the material bureaus of your ideas about 
availing themselves of shipping facilities between the coast and Pearl Harbor. 
I have done this by furnishing personally each of the Chiefs of Bureaus concerned 
with a copy of your letter. I am sure you can count on their active cooperation 
in this imiwrtant matter. Yards & Docks, for one, shares your concern about 
the matter of transportation, particularly to the outlying bases. Two old Panama 
Railway Steamships— the Ex-ANCON and Ex-CRISTOBAL— have already re- 
" cently been acquired and are to be operated for our account by the Matson liine. . 
They will help but not solve the problem. How do you feel about families of our 
personnel (and Army) continuing to remain in Hawaii. 

At the moment, there are no additional patrol craft that can be furnished 
the Fourteenth Naval District. As you no doubt know, effort is now being made 
to acquire a number of sampans, which should be of assistance in this regard. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2167 

DesDiv Eighty (80) is at Pearl Harbor, and 4 AMCs are going forward from 
San Diego under e.scort of the TIPPECANOE. We are also giving consideration 
to supplying some 165' coast guard bots for this duty. I must confess that our 
preliminary survey in this regard does not appear to be promising. I am keenly 
aware of your anxiety to save wear and tear on your destroyers, as well as 
releasing them from patrol duties for the mose important duty of perfecting 
themselves in other phases of their training. 

All of us in the Department are bending every effort to be prepared for war 
when and if it comes. I know you are likewise using your best effort to make 
the Fleet seady for all eventualities. Acquaint me with your troubles — I will 
do what I can — always wishing it were more. 
All good wishes — keep cheerful. 
Sincerely, 

[S] Betty. 
Admiral H. E. Kimmex, U. S. Navy, 

Commander in Chief, V. S. Pacific Fleet, 
USS PENNSYLVANIA, 

c/o Fleet Post Office, Pearl Earhor, T. H. 



In reply refer to Initials and No. Op-10 Hu 
Secret 

Navy Department, 
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, 

Washington, 14 May 1941 

Memorandum 

For Commandant, First Naval District 
Third Naval District 
Fourth Naval District 
Fifth Naval District 
Sixth Naval District 
Eighth Naval District 
Tenth Naval District 
Eleventh Naval District 
Twelfth Naval District 
Thirteenth Naval District 
Fourteenth Naval District 
Fifteenth Naval District 

You will recall my previous letter of 3 October 1940, in which I stressed 
readiness and not to be taken aback should somebody suddenly start depositing 
mines on our front doorstep, etc. etc. 

I might add that I have no inside information as to what is going to happen 
or when, but it seems to me now, as it did then, that it is a case of only 

when? 

The trend of events, and public opinion certainly all tend increasingly this way. 

If and when we do get in, my hunch is that Hitler would certainly, if one 
way or another, attack our shipping wherever he thought it would be profitable, 
either from a material or psychological standpoint. 

I am cognizant of how the sweeper-small craft-net program has lagged, am 
doing what I can about it ; but it never seems enough. 

This is just again to remind you all of the seriousness of the present situation 
and of the necessity of our being ready, to the utmost extent, to use what we 
have or what we can improvise, should the issue suddenly be drawn. 

Plans and machinery for convoy are pretty well in hand but here, too, there 
may be hitches or slips which, in the last analysis, may only be found by actual 
practice. However, convoy games on paper by those who must handle the 
details should be good mental exercise, and may bring to light certain correctable 
deficiencies. 



2168 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

What will happen in the Pacific is anyone's guess ; but here, too, there is only 
one safe course ; that is to be prepared, so far as humanly possible. Though the 
danger of mines, I'aiding and diversions, and even of sporadic or stunt air 
attack, may be more remote in the Eastern Pacific, we cannot discount it, and 
hence should likewise be bending every ounce of effort of which we are capable 
not to be caught napping in that area. Japan may come in the second Germany 
does — possibly preplanned joint action. Russia is still a ? 

I might add that some months ago (and less than that) our studies here 
in the Department indicated that if we did not get into this war by March we 
would be fairly well off in the local defense picture ; later it was put at April 
with assurances that in any case I could feel fairly comfortable by the first 
of May. Now I am told the latter part of May or maybe some time in June 
or the first of July. It continues to be just "Ai'ound the corner." I think the 
time is here now for even more personal strenuous effort by all of us, in 
responsible positions. 

Keep cheerful. Heap all the abuse you want to on my head, if it will help 
any to achieve our common objective. 

I trust you are all constantly checking ways for speeding up readiness in 
every department. 

[s] H. R. Stark 
H. R. Stark. 

Copy to Admiral King, Kimmel, Hart 



In reply refer to Initials and No. Op-lO-Dy. 

(Received 2 June) 

Navy Department, 
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, 

Washington, May 24, 1941. 
Secret 

Dear Kimmei. : I recently saw your letter with regard to ammunition. Regret 
the holiday in training caused by non-delivery and hope we can prevent recur- 
rence. 

We appreciate fully your personnel troubles. I have gone over them with 
Nimitz and trust your thoughts regarding non-disturbance of key personnel can 
be complied with. 

I am sending you a secret despatch this afternoon with regard to occa.sional 
visits by small units of your Fleet to the west coast in the interests of morale. 
While you have not suggested this, my hope is that it will be conducive to con- 
tentment. Of course how clo.sely an approved schedule for this could be followed 
in these times I do not know. I have just finished talking to the President about 
it and you can rest a.ssured that so far as possible we will see it through. We 
would leave any press releases on this subject to you, as it is something for which 
yoiir gang should look to you. 

You have probably been surprised over the movements of transports, Marines, 
hospital ships, etc., to the east coast, which you have, or will have shortly received. 
Please keep the following with regard to it highly secret, known only to your 
trusted few whom I assume you keep informed regarding such matters. In 
this I include Bloch. 

Day before yesterday afternoon the President gave me an over all limit of 
30 days to prepare and have ready an expedition of 25,000 men to sail for, and 
to take the Azores. Whether or not there would be opposition I do not know but 
we have to be fully prepared for strenuous opposition. You can visualize the 
job particularly when I tell you that the Azores recently have been greatly 
reinforced. The Army of course will be in on this but the Navy and the Marines 
will bear the brunt. 

I know your reaction will be "Why didn't we get the transports and assemble 
such a force months and months ago." My only answer to that is that such 
thoughts are water OA'er the dam, and I am confronted with the problem as is 
and not one as I would like to have had it, and for which I would like to have 
been ready long ago. I simply could not get authority to acquire and prepare 
the necessary train. 

King of course is active and operating in connection with Atlantic problems — 
our own and the Briti.sh. He has nothing like what he would like to have or 
what we would like to give him if we had it to give. I do not contemplate 
for the moment ordering anything additional to the Atlantic except auxiliaries 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2169 

In connection with the Azores task and except possibly later four CA's as per 
Rainbow 5. However, I am not the final "Boss of this show". 

In the last 48 hours we have been following the situation closely in Crete; 
and yesterday and last night the Naval situation to the eastward and southward 
of Greenland. 

My personal feeling is that it is only a matter of time until the British hold 
on the eastern Mediterranean is very much confined or non-existent. 

Only history will throw a full light on the Crete incident. Criticism will be 
rife but without full knowledge of the facts or at least more than we have at 
present I am withholding final judgment. 

German raiders (as you probably will have learned before this) both surface 
and sub-surface are now working well inside the generally accepted limits of the 
Western Hemisphere, in fact to the westward of the 40th meridian. The British 
escorts therefore get thinner and thinner. The situation is not good. Last night's 
naval engagement and its train of events will come out in due time. 

We are immediately confronted with taking over a considerable number of 
merchant ships for the Azores task — something I wanted to do as long as over 
a year ago. Also the Army is asking me to man 26 of their ships. I have been 
in touch with Admiral Waesche for the last 24 hours and that fellow has come 
across 1007o and is agreeing to furnish 18(X) men and 100 officers, which is liter- 
ally a God-send from our standix»int. These men will include surfmen. The 
lot should man about 5 transports depending of course on the size of the trans- 
ports selected. 

We have an expedition of flying boats going to Iceland for temporary basing 
and for reconnaisance of the east coast of Greenland. 

In addition we are sending three arctic ships to the Scoresby Sound area to . 
look for German meteorological or radio stations and to remain there during the 
Summer, besides two other vessels and an Army contingent which are proceeding 
with the construction of an air field and plane base on the southeast coast of 
Greenland. 

The Army also has an expedition studying Labrador with a view to the possi- 
bility of flying planes to that point then to Britain via Greenland. 

The anununition situation on which we are depending on the Army for supply, 
is bad. Even getting enough for the Azores is a problem. It promises not to 
get better before P^'all. 

The Force which we are preparing to go to North Ireland and Scotland on 
the outbreak of war is coming along in good shape so far as the Navy is concerned 
but the Army has neither the equipment, the amnnmition nor the aircraft to 
defend these bases; fall again being the earliest date when they can do this 
for us. Meanwhile we will try and find some way of solving it with Marines and 
British help if we are in the war before that time. God knows what will hapi)en 
if we are not in by that time though personally I give the British a longer time 
than do most people here in their ability to hold out. I most emphatically do 
not believe they can hold out indefinitely without effective aid from us. We are 
being pressed for ammunition and material from the South American Republics : — 
not a happy situation — and not to mention British requests for more DD's etc. 

The above are rambling thoughts for a few minutes conversation with you, 
Tommy Hart and Admiral Bloch. I will not try to put them in more logical 
sequence or dress them up further, simply assuming that you can straighten 
out the picture yourself as we more or less see it here. 
Keep cheerful, 
Sincerely, 



P. S. When I last wrote to you I indicated by doubts as to the Secretary 
leaving at this time. Personally I couhln't see how he could. He came to that 
same conclusion himself and you have been informed. 

Tell Bloch that I knew it would raise "H" with towing barges to Palmyra 
and other islands when we ordered the two tugs to the Canal Zone but that 
they are essential for the Azores operations. 

Referring to your letter of l.'i May 1o Admiral Nimitz of which I have a copy : — 
I am quite in agreement with your thoughts. The despatch about holding men 
over-time was not with the idea of telling you to do it but with the idea that 
if you found it necessary you would have department backing. I think your 
own estimate is quite correct. 

As regards freezing men for the duration — this is something which for years 
I have thought the Country should have on the statute books and during the 

79716 O— 4&— pt. 16 17 



2170 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

present emergency I have brought the point up many times but without success. 
I am not through trying but I doubt if we can get in a period short of war. 

/s/ Betty. 
Admiral H. E. Kimmex, U. S. N., 
. Commander-in-Chief, 

United States Fleet, 

U. 8. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship. 



Navy DEa>ARTMENT, 
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, 
Op-IOD- Hu Washington, 20 June 19.il. 

Deab Admirai, : At my conference this morning with Admiral Stark he said that 
he knew just as soon as you left he would think of something which he meant to 
tell you while you were here. 

I think what he wanted was simply to plant the thought in your mind of smoke 
screen around Pearl Harbor in case of an air attack such as has been used by the 
British around some of their Scotland shipyards or closed harbors. 

From what I understand it is something similar to the California smudge pots 
and leaves a black blanket and a very uncomfortable one, according to Captain 
Kirk, over the area innuediately concerned. 

The Germans did this at Brest, thereby preventing any accurate bombing or 
even vision of the targets. 

The Admiral asked me to get this ofiE as he had to go to conference and wanted 
to catch you before you left San Diego ; also to give you his best wishes in which 
all of us here join. 

Respectfully, 

/s/ J. L. McCkeia. 

Admiral H. E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, 

Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, 
% Commandant, 11th Naval District, 
San Diego, California. 



In reply refer to Initials and No. HRS/clp 

Navy Department, 
Office of the Chief of Naval Opeirations, 

Washington, June 26, 194i- 
Delar Kimmel: Colonel Maas is going to report for duty with you shortly. 
He was just in to say goodbye. 

He was one of our staunchest supported and strongest friends, particularly in 
opposition to a single air force, for the United States. 

He will fly from San Francisco to Hawaii in one of our 4-engine bombers. We 
were all glad to have him do it and give him a good picture of that type of craft 
which he has so strongly supported. 

He is not asking for any favors because of his Congressional importance. 
Nevertheless, I wanted to let you know he is coming and feel that his services with 
the Staff to Comairbatfor may be very helpful from many standpoints. 

We had a very interesting talk yesterday afternoon from Jimmy Roosevelt. All 
agreed it was well done. As you may know, he just completed a thirty-five 
thousand mile flying trip with Major Thomas of the Marine Corps. 
This afternoon Wellings is talking. 

Am asking Lee to take down the interesting points of both talks to send to you. 
Some of them, I feel, will be useful and you should know. 

You were made an information addressee on our despatch to Tommy Hart with 
reference to the next move which Japan might make. We feel strongly here that 
her attitude, at the moment at [2] least, will continue to be one of "watch 

and wait". 

Our information on the German-Russian operations are so uncertain at the 
moment that it would be useless to give them to you. We feel it will take 
at least a few more days to give any sort of picture. 
Every good wish, as always, 
Sincerely, 

/s/ Bejtty. 
Admiral Husband E. Kimmeil, U. S. N., 
Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, 
V. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA. 
Pearl Harbor, T. H. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2171 

In reply refer to Initials and No. Oi>-10 Hu 

(Received 9th July) 

Navy Dbpaetmbnt, 
Office of the Chief of Naval Oper.\tion8, 

Washington, 3 July 19Jfl. 
Secret 

Dbab Mustapha: Have just written a letter to Tommy Hart and think the 
following from it might be of interest to you : 

"I am still lioping you will be able to put over your thoughts about denying 
passage of the Japanese through the Eastern part of the Malaya Barrier; but 
I know from experience in the last War, as well as in this one, that what you 
say about 'trade and raider consciousness' is very pertinent. 

"After a careful study of the ADB report we find that we are unable to 
approve it. Army and Navy War Plans are drawing up a letter to the British 
rejecting it, and requesting a new conference be held that will give a practical 
and realistic operating plan to carry out the purpose of ABD-1. The report has 
all the faults you mentioned, both in your official and your personal letters, and 
I do not believe it necessary for us to accept any such ineffective plan. Of 
course, I will forward you a copy of our joint letter to the British, which should 
be ready within a few days." 

Have just finished a Budget session and am hoping to give you some of the 
things you want. 

I really have no interesting news other than has been communicated to you 
by radio. 

Keep cheerful. 
Sincerely, 



Admiral H. E. Kimmeil, U. S. N., 

Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, 
U. 8. S. PENNSYLVA'NIA, 
Pearl Harbor, T. H. 

P. S. It looks to us at the moment as you will judge by a despatch you will 
receive ere this as though the Germans had persuaded the Japs to attack Russia 
within the next month. It is anybody's guess and only time will tell. 

/&/ HRS. 



Navt DE3»ABTMENT, 

Secret Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, 

Op-10 Hu Wushinnton, 7 July 19.'fl. 

Deue Mustapha : Referring to the last sentence, paragraph 4-E : 
I think if I were the skipper of our cruiser and a foreign man-o-war told the 
Dutchman to stop I would tell the Dutchman to disregard the order of the 
foreign man-o-war. Moreover I would lay my ship fairly close to the Dutchman 
and between the Dutchman and the foreign nian-o-war, and let tlie latter do 
his worst. 

This is not an order ; it is just a thought which I wanted to transmit to you. 

Admiral H. E. Kimmel, U. S. N, 

Commander in Chief, U. 8. Pacific Fleet, 
U. 8. 8. PENN8YLVANIA. 
Pearl Harbor, T. H. 

P. S. Your imagination may produce something better. I hope it can. My 
imagination just now is almost beyond the elastic limit. It was working over- 
time last night in the White House conference, and will again before the night 
is over. 

Keep cheerful. 



2172 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Op-IOD-MD 

July 10, 1941. 

Memorandum for Admiral Hart, Admiral Kimmeh^ Admiral King, Commandants 

OF ALL Naval Districts 

In an excellent paper which I recently read, I was struck by the paragraph 
quoted below and am sending it to you for further circulation or such use as 
you care to make of it. 

"It is to be noted that the unity and effectiveness of effort that has character- 
ized German operations has been due not only to the organization of the Higher 
Command and to careful planning and training. /« a large measure, it appears 
to be due to the fact that the personel of all ranks, including the highest, is imbued 
with a spirit of soldierly subm^crgenoe of self in the accomplishment of the common 
undertaking. It is suggested that it might tend toward the removal of some 
sources of friction in our Services if a secret letter on the subject were issued 
to oflBcers of the higher ranks, down to and including the grade of Colonel in the 
Army and Captain in the Navy." 

The lines italicized particularly struck me. 

I am not aware of sources of friction in our Services at the present time. 
While differences of opinion are bound to crop up, not only between the dif- 
ferent Services, but between forces of our own Service, they are, so far as I 
know, being ironed out. Certainly there is the will here in Washington to pull 
together which is bearing fruit, and which should ever grow stronger in purpose 
and effectiveness. 

There are many leaves which we can take out of the German book — as well 
as many not to take, 

H. R. Stabk 



In reply refer to Initials and No. Op-10 Hu 

Navy Department, 
Office OF the Chief of Naval Operations, 

Washington, 24 July, 1941. 
Secret • 

Deiar Mustapha : Haven't much to write about ; as a matter of fact the letter 
I dictated to Tommie Hart this morning contains what little I have and it is 
darned little I admit. 

This is more just to let you know I am thinking about you than anything else. 
We are pushing recruiting just as hard as we can and for budgetary purposes 
you will be glad to know the President has okayed a figure of 553,000 enlisted men 
and 105,000 marines. Please give us a "not too badly done" on that. But what a 
struggle it has been. If we could only have gone full speed two years ago but 
that is water over the dam and I am only hoping and praying we can take care 
of what we have in sight to man. 

I have asked Blandy to acquaint you with the trouble Tommie Hart has had 
with his mines firing after having been down several hours. 

Believe it or not, except for a day or two of scorching heat, we are having de- 
lightful summer weather in Washington. However, my fingers are crossed as 
it is only July. 

Am sending under separate cover a copy of the August number of "Coronet". 
Be sure to unfold the picture of the mountain mirror on page 86. Mrs. Hull said 
I should make sure you did not overlook it. 
All good wishes. 
Sincerely, 

/s/ Betty. 
Admiral H. E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, 

Commander in Chief, U. 8. Paeific Fleet, 
VSS PENNSYLVANIA, 

c/o Postmaster, San Francisco, California, 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2173 

Secret 

Oiv-10 Hu 24 Jui.Y 1941. 

De:ab Tommie: Things are happening out your way and according to schedule 
from dope we have had in the last couple of weeks. 

Yesterday, before Nomura went to the State Department, I had a two-hour 
talk with him ; very interesting, as my previous talks with him have been, and 
of course he is worried. I believe him to be genuinely sincere in his desire that 
Japan and the United States do not come to an open rupture. Of course, I have 
that same desire, but there are many flies in the ointment, and in my talks with 
him I have not minced matters one particle, or minimized the difficulties, or in 
any way condoned Japan's present course of action, or hesitated to discuss per- 
fectly frankly the shallowness (»f some of the reasons she is putting out in defense 
of her actions. We have had very plain talk. I like him and, as you know, he 
has many friends in our Navy. Nomura dwelt at length on his country's need 
for the rice and the minerals of Indo-China. My guess is that with the establish- 
ment of bases in Indo-China, they will stop for the time being, consolidate their 
positions, and await world reaction to their latest move. No doubt they will use 
their Indo-China bases from which to take early action against the Burma Road. 
Of course, there is the possibility that they will strike at Borneo. I doubt that 
this will be done in the near future, unless we embargo oil shipments to them. 
This question of embargo has been up many times and I have consistently opposed 
it just as strongly as I could. My further thought is that they will do nothing 
in regard to the Maritime provinces until the outcome of the German-Russian 
war on the continent is more certain. If Russians are well beaten down, I think 
it highly probable that they will move into Siberia. Meanwhile, they are merrily 
going their way and just where it all will end I do not know. 

I had a talk with the President after the Cabinet meeting last Friday and 
again yesterday after my chat with Nomura, and have succeeded in securing an 
appointment with the President for him today. I hope no open rupture will 
come, particularly at this time, but it would be wishful thinking to eliminate 
such a possibility or to think that conditions are getting better rather than worse. 
However, we can still struggle for something better, and I want you to know that 
I am. 

[2] Tour people who have been laying mines must have had an interest- 
ing time, but just what the Devil the cause is is a conundrum still. BuOrd 
went to work on it and did not stop for several hours. I hope the despatch sent 
you might give some clue but, of course, we shall be very apprehensive until 
we know. I mentioned it to Admiral Moore of the British Navy who was in 
here yesterday, and he said that they had the same trouble some time back and 
found the cause in a defective joint which permitted salt water to set up electro- 
lytic action with sufficient current to fire the mine, and had to recall all the 
mines that were made in that particular lot. Of course, our mines had not pre- 
yiously had that trouble, and I hope the trouble will be found in faulty assembly 
which can be readily cured. Any way, here's hopin'. 

I was disturbed no end to learn that some of your net equipment had not 
arrived at Cavite. As soon as we got your despatch, I immediately put Ray 
Spear on the job. He got in touch with Johnny Greenslade and found that 
eight (8) carloads of the flotation barrels had been loaded in the Navy Cargo 
Ship HERCULES (This ship is being operated by the Matson Lines as agents 
for the Navy Department.), due to depart from San Francisco July 20. He also 
found there were seven (7) carloads of barrels en route, by rail, due to arrive 
in the San Francisco area on July 20. Arrangements were made to delay the 
sailing of the ship a day in order to load this additional shipment on board. 
This has been done, and the ship sailed on July 21 and is due to arrive at Cavite 
on August 10. 

With the arrival of these barrels, you will have all but 250. which are destined 
for the 16th Naval District. The Bureau of Ordnance is doing its utmost to get 
these moving. The contractor (a firm in Conshohocken, Pennsylvania) has 
fallen down on deliveries. They undertook to deliver 100 per day. So far, they 
have only been able to deliver about half that number. Ordnance informs me 
that the 250 drums will leave Conshohocken some time this week. 

You are now undoubtedly familiar with the Iceland situation, and I am glad 
to say the Force is back, and just when the next contingent will go has not yet 



2174 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

been decided. In both the Far East and the Atlantic, there is plenty of potential 
dynamite. 

I may say that the State Department still agrees about the gunboats remain- 
lug in China, but of course, it is my understanding that they could not well be 
removed at this season anyway. 

I wish I had more small craft to send you for District service, and that goes 
for practically every District we have. The small boat program was one of the 
most difficult I had to get authorized and to get money for. We have several 
hundred District craft under construction but, like everything else, time is a 
vital factor. We are just doing the best we can with this proposition. The 
craft we have converted have been expensive, costly of upkeep, and not too 
satisfactory, though I am hoping they will get by until replaced by better 
material. 

[S] I think I previously told you I have been pressing for months to take 
over the Coast Guard, but Morgenthau has successfully resisted until finally he 
has given away in certain spots ; for example, he has just consented to turn over 
the Coast Guard in the Hawaiian Area to our control. Also, we hope to get 
seven of their large cutters, which will help a great deal in the Atlantic where 
King is pressed to the limit to perform the tasks given him. I am trying to 
get their 165-foot craft which also should be of assistance in the 14th Naval 
District. Waesche, Head of the Coast Guard, sees everything from our stand- 
point and is a great help. Mr. Morgenthau in many ways has been more than 
helpful to the Navy Department, but when it comes to letting go of the Coast 
Guard, he draws in. However, we shall keep on trying. 

I am late now for a conference, and I don't know if I had a lot of time I 
could really give you anything worth while, but I feel a little remiss if I don't 
drop you a line. 

Harry Yarnell is here and said he saw Caroline recently and that she is fine. 
My little brood are all well. 

With every good wish in the wide world to you as always. 
Sincerely, 



Admiral T. C. Habt, VSN, 

Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet, 
V8S HOUSTON, 
c/o Postmaster San Francisco, California. 



In reply refer to Initials and No. Op-lO-MD 
Secret 

Navy Depabtment, 
Office of the Chief of Naval Opebations, 

Washington, July 25, 1941. 
Deab Kimmel: I forgot to mention to you yesterday that you may be called 
upon to send a carrier load of planes to one of the Asiatic Russian ports. I don't 
know that you will, but the President has told me to be prepared for it, and I 
want you to have the thought. 

We spent a great deal of time on the letter which you will shortly get, relative 
to the training of pilots. Before sending it, I had King's complete Okay. As a 
matter of fact, he didn't change a word of it. I hope it will be equally satisfactory 
to you. 

Sincerely, 



Admiral H. E. Kimmeh:., 

V. 8. 8. PENNSYLVANIA, 

Fleet Post Office, Pearl Harbor, T. H. 



Secret Rec'd. 8 Aug. 1130 

Op-10 Hu 

Navt Department, 
Office of the Chief of Naval, Operations, 

Washington, 2 August 19^1. 
Deae Kimmel : I am grateful for your letter of the 26th of July. We shall go 
after it paragraph by paragraph but it may take a little time. It is a good sum- 
mary and we are glad to get an occasional check of this sort. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2175 

Also would be glad if you could give us occasionally a little personnel interest 
as well as material and I would more than welcome a little conversational "think- 
ing out loud" on how the morale of the Fleet is holding, how the visits to the 
West Coast are working out from that standpoint, how the target practices are 
coming along, etc. etc. 

We nor the British have no one at the front in the Russian-German war 
though both the Army and Navy have made every effort to this end. From the 
press, therefore, you have about as much information as we have. There is no 
doubt they are willing to pay the price where the stakes are worth it. The next 
month or six weeks should clarify the picture. 

I have written to Savvy Cooke who has been good enough to write me occa- 
sionally giving me his ideas which, as you know, I value so highly having gotten 
the habit when he was heading War Plans here. I am always glad to hear from 
him. I have asked Savvy to show you my letter if he thinks there is anything in it 
worth while. Am enclosing copy Bloch might find something interesting. Good 
luck 

Keep cheerful. 

Betty. 

Admiral H. E. Kimmel, V. S. Navy, 
Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, 
USS PENNSYLVANIA, 
Pearl Harbor, T. H. 

Tell Ad. Bloch — I have just directed sending him 12 P. T's — 40 knot-craft. 
HRS. 



Copy Adm. Kimmel 

Secret 

Op-10 Hu 

31 July 1941. 

Dear Savvy: I am grateful to you for your letters and hope that regardless 
of the unsatisfactoriness of my answers or my failure to answer, you will con- 
tinue to write ; — it seems like old times. 

This is going to be short and general. I think you should burn it after show- 
ing it to Kimmel. 

Some of the things that you have asked, and some of the things which Kimmel 
has recently asked, and which I will answer as soon as I can, are things for 
which I have been striving to get answers in Washington. The press on many 
of these points really gives you as much information as I have. 

Within forty-eight hours after the Russian situation broke, I went to the 
President, with the Secretary's approval, and stated that on the assumption that 
the Country' decision is not to let England fall, we should immediately seize 
the psychological opportunity presented by the Russian-German clash and 
announce and start escorting immediately, and protecting the Western Atlantic 
on a large scale; that such a declaration, followed by immediate action on our 
part, would almost certainly involve us in the war and that I considered every 
day of delay in our getting into the war as dangerous, and that much more 
delay might be fatal to Britain's survival. I reminded him that I had been 
asking this for months in the State Departmsnt and elsewhere, etc. etc. etc. 
I have been maintaining that only a war psychology could or would speed things 
up the way they should be speeded up ; that strive as we would it just isn't in 
the nature of things to get the results in peace that we would, were we at war. 

The Iceland situation may produce an "incident". You are as familiar with 
that and the President's statements and answers at press conferences as I am. 
Whether or not we will get an "incident" because of the protection we are giving 
Iceland and the shipping which we must send in support of Iceland and our 
troops, I do not know. Only Hitler can answer. 

The Far Eastern situation has been considerably changed because of the 
entrance of Russia into the picture. 

Personally, I threw into the arena that we consider along with the British a 
point protectorate over the Dutch Ea.st Indies, as a move calculated to prevent 
further spread of war in the Far East. It is a debatable question. Certainly 
there can be no joy in our camp over the occupation of Indo-China. I think it 
is fairly safe to say [2] opinion here in general holds that Japan will 
not go* into the N. E. I. Incidentally, we are not nearly so dependent on raw 
materials from the Near East as the Public envisages. The real problem is a 
British one — and hence our consideration. 



2176 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

As you probably know from our despatches, and from my letters, we have felt 
that the Maritime Provinces are now definitely Japanese objectives. Turner 
thinks Japan will go up there in August. He may be right. He usually is. My 
thought has been that while Japan would ultimately go to Siberia, she would 
delay going until she had the Indo-China-Thailand situation more or less to her 
liking and until there is some clarification of the Russian-German clash. Also she 
may concentrate on the China "incident". Of course, embargoes or near embar- 
goes may cause any old kind of an upset and make a reestimate of the situation 
necessary. 

Regarding the Philippines, as you know, even since I came here I have urged 
increasing their defenses. The Navy's contribution has not been great, but it has 
been about all Hart can handle with the facilities he has or which we have been 
able to make available. S'till, the increase is a factor, namely 28 PBYs and 11 
modern submarines. 

We are delighted with the Army move putting the Filipinos in harness ; we 
recommended this. Also it is being supplemented by a considerable number of 
planes, fighters and bombers. The Philippines are not too easy a proposition to 
crack right now, and in a couple of months the Army will have 50,000 odd men 
there under arms. But that is two months away. 

As for sending the Fleet to the Far East, I still have literally to fight for every 
auxiliary ship 1 get. Tonnage now making the British Isles is less than they need 
for their maximum effort. There just isn't enough shipping in the world to go 
around. If we cannot proi)erly support the Near East and the British Isles, it is 
obvious we could not support our Fleet in the Far East, unless we very greatly 
slowed up in the Atlantic. 

Our trade with South America has been greatly restricted and the pressure 
from there is another thing I have to contend with. 

Recently we asked for some small ships of very moderate draft to supply our 
forces in Iceland. We simply had to get them, but were told we would have to give 
up an equivalent tonnage from our recent acquisitions with which I think you 
and Kimmel are familiar and among which, for example, are the four transports 
to train marines on the West Coast plus AKs, AEs, AFs, etc., etc. Thank the 
good Lord, I was able to get the President to hold this in abeyance pending a 
chance for Jerry Land and me somehow or other, to work it out without taking 
anything away from the Navy. 

Whenever we have a tanker available for ten days or so, we immediately try and 
help Maritime out. If we send something anywhere and the ship is coming back 
with any space available we offer Maritime the spare cargo space. The world 
shipping situation is plain [3] rotten. Sometimes I wonder that with the 
opposition we have had, (and it is good, intelligent opposition) that we have 
gotten as far as we have. If any of our cargo ships are coming from Hawaii to 
the Coast light, we should offer the space to Maritime. 

The pressure, incidentally, to give what we have in ships, guns, ammunition, 
material, and what not, to those actually fighting is constant, and increasing. 
Several times recently I have been approached for destroyers and the Lord knows 
what not. Marshall's troubles in this respert are legion and of course the fellow 
at the front wants frequently what we most lack, particularly such things as 
50 caliber ammunition, anti-aircraft weapons, patrol vessels, fire control, guns 
for merchant ships, etc., etc. 

Do not think for a minute that I am not terribly disturbed about our lack of 
Radar on which I started pushing the scientific gang before I had been here a 
month, and also the production gang, so that I should think they would hate to 
hear me mention the subject. 

Mike Robinson called me up this morning and said he was sending me a twelve 
page explanation of what they have done in the last year. From the Fleet stand- 
point and mine, and of course from Mike's too, we all want more tangible evidence. 
The fact that our new aircraft carriers will not be available until 1944 is some- 
thing that is awfully hard to stomach, and I confess to considerable indigestion 
because of it, but whether or not there is a suitable remedy, I do not know. 

The converted LONG ISLAND is promising for her size, in fact better than we 
had hoped for. We have six more converting which will have much longer decks 
and be superior in every way. We are keeping at this as a stop-gap but here again 
it was not easy to get the ships. They will, in all probability, go to the British, 
if we are not in the war when they are completed. In fact we are doing the work 
on Lend-lease. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2177 

I have been much distressed over the oi)eratiiig troubles we have liad with our 
new planes. Of course tiiey are gradually being eliminated but it takes time. 
I still am glad for the 200 I'BY rei)eats we early made and which are coming 
along. Of course they haven't got what the later ones will ha»ve in range and 
performance, etc. Also, performance will be handicapped by armor and protec- 
tive features ; but we will have them, and they have not delayed the newer models. 

Towers will have given you all the picture on the air game. He went out a 
good deal at my insistence. With regard to the air, I know also that the training 
situation has been a good deal of a niglitmare. If anybody can convince us of a 
better solution than the one we recently sent out, we would be glad to get it. 

To some of my very pointed questions, which all of us would like to have 
answered, I get a smile or a "Betty, please don't ask me that". Policy seems to 
be something never fixed, always fluid and changing. There is no use kicking on 
what you can't get definite answei-s. God knows I would surrender this job 
quickly if somebody else wants to take it up and I have offered to, more than once. 
Some [4] generous souls have been charitable enough to ask me to stick. 
I shall, as long as I think I can be of use, or rather that they think so. 

We are doing what we can for China and taking unheard of chances on neu- 
trality; or rather unneutrality. This along with sanctions on Japan make her 
road certainly not less easy. 

Reverting to Japan again and to her holding off in Siberia until the Russian- 
German situation somewhat clarifies, I also think it possible, if not probable, 
that one of the reasons for Indo-China, and her pressure on Thailand, is a better 
position for an "all out" to clean up in China. I take my hat off to the Chinks. 

As to the war and what people in this country are thinking; I hesitate to say. 
However, I believe that the proportion of our population which feels we should 
enter this war is relatively small, and that with the majority it is still more 
or less an academic question, perhaps largely because of its distance from us. 
Whether or not that sentiment might change over night, I don't know. 

We are somewhat of a volatile people but I am afraid that the many events 
which have happened with no resultant definite action on our part, are having 
their effect. Had the Tutuila been hit and sunk it might have created a wave 
of public opinion which would have meant something. As it is, nobody seems 
to give much of a damn about it, although the principle involved is the same, 
even though there was no loss of life, or sinking. On the other hand, I believe 
the people would follow the President in any positive action — such as escort — 
which he might take. 

We shall give aid to Russia. However, nothing, to date, has shaken my original 
estimate that the Germans will take their limited objectives. She is having 
much more diflSculty than she anticipated. Of course I could hope the cost 
will be crippling. Only time will tell. 

I have urged propaganda wherever we could use it, particularly in South 
America, in France and in Africa. French Africa still has a semblance of inde- 
pendence against anyone who may attack it. There is no doubt in my mind that 
the Germans could have cleare<l up in the Near East had they gone in that direc- 
tion instead of to Russia. What will follow the Russian campaign is still a 
question mark. Certainly British strength is far from what it should be in 
the Near East area. 

Believe it or not, I am still keeping cheerful, doing the best I can; chafing 
that I can not do more and wide open to suggestion. 

Before you destroy this letter I would be glad, if you [5] think there 
is anything of interest in it, to have Admiral Bloch as well as Admiral Kimmel 
look over it; in fact I was going to write Kimmel, so will let tbis partly serve. 

Will not attempt to edit this "thinking out loud" on a busy morning. Please 
be charitable as to its lack of continuity., etc. etc. 

With all good wishes and good luck. 

Sincerely, 

Captain Charles M. Cooke, Jr., USN., 
USS Pennsylvania, 

% PoHtmaMer San Francisco, California. 

P. S. I apologize for the "short" in the second paragraph. Just got to rambling. 

P. S. #2. On second thought, I am enclosing an extra copy of this for Kimmel 

which he can show to Admiral Bloch, though I confess one fellow's estimate is 

as good as another and I really wonder whether this letter is worth while, but 

anyway, as you know, it comes with all good wishes and good luck to you all. 



2178 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Obviously, the situation in ttie Far East continues to deteriorate; this is one 
thing that is factual. 

Keep cheerful. 

One more P. S. — I am sending Kimrael the copy of this letter. When I got 
to thinking out loud I was really talking to you all including Admiral Hart, to 
whom I am also sending a copy. 

H. R. S. 
[J] In reply refer to Initials and No. 

Navy Department, 
Office of the Chibt of Naval Operations, 

Washington, August 21, 1941. 
Personal & Confidential 

Deab Kimmel: I have your despatch giving your reaction to the personnel 
requested from you for the comniLssioning of two new squadrons of patrol planes 
and the squadrons for the HORNET, plus certain additional men required for 
Kodiak and Dutch Harbor. This picture is set down on the enclosed sheet. 

We know how tight the personnel situation is ; also the seriousness of the 
Pacific situation which continues to deteriorate. We have tried to look at the 
whole situation as it exists at present and as it will continue to confront us, war 
or no war, with the expansion now taking place in planes for the Fleet (or 
if you will, call them replacements, because losses are bound to occur once we 
get in). 

The training problem we have already gone over with you. 

The greater part of the burden of supplying personnel for the squadrons now 
forming has been placed on the Atlantic Fleet. We have the Atlantic Fleet 
practically at the elastic limit with the demands just made on it which are 
greater than the demands made on you, and in a situation where they are now 
operating, in many respects, on a war time .schedule — keeping the routes to and 
from Iceland under surveillance as one example. 

As we see it here, after complying with Bunav's despatches, you would be left 
with 112% of your allowance of aviation machinist mates, 119% of aviation 
metalsmiths, 118% of aviation ordnance men and 105% of all radiomen. This 
is an overall picture of numbers in each rating group from the Base Force report 
of 30 June. We realize that the distribution of ratings in each rating group 
leaves considerable to be desired. 

[2] The shore establishments, including four main flight training centers, 
have only 61% allowance of aviation ratings, including radiomen. Further reduc- 
tion there is just not practicable. Rather must the complements of the flight 
training centers be increased to approximately 100% in numbers, by January, 
in order to maintain the training schedule of those stations, and to permit the 
stations to function at maximum capacity, which they must do to meet their pilot 
production schedule necessary for your needs. 

To man new squadrons we recently called on the existing units in the Atlantic 
for 298 aviation ratings. In addition the Atlantic Fleet is supplying 105 aviation 
ratings for advanced bases. 

Manning these new squadrons is of paramount importance and we feel must 
take precedence over duplicate flight crews for existing squadrons. Duplicate 
crews will come in due time, provided we do not neglect training now, but will 
never came if we continue to curtail the training program. Intensive training 
in aviation ratings and radiomen (qual-air) must be undertaken afloat to assist 
in supplying trained personnel for the expansion program. The same is true 
of all ratings. 

Now here's another shock : Patrons 91, 92, and 93 will be formed the last of 
this calendar year and additional rated men will have to be supplied for them. 
Tuck it in the back of your head. 

Taking up Comairscofor's despatch of 18 August : 

1. We are complying with his recommendation (a) that insofar as possible 
we recruit from Patvvings Atlantic. 

2. We will not reduce your qual-air radiomen below one per patrol plane. 
In making this concession it is necessary to ask that you increase the rate at 
which radiomen are qualified for duty in patrol planes in the Pacific Fleet. 

3. Due to the installation of special blind landing instruments it is considered 
that radiomen with aircraft experience should be assigned to Dutch Harbor and 
to Kodiak. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2179 

[3] 4. Comairscofor's recommendation (d) applies with equal force to either 
coast. Inasmuch as Patron 84 will be stationed in the Atlantic, we thought it 
better to organize it in the Atlantic. Of course this picture might change. We 
can only handle it as far as we can see. 

I wanted to give you the above and then ask you to transfer yourself to my 
seat and what I am up aaginst here, and tell me whether or not you think our 
original order the best all-around solution to an obviously vexing and difficult 
problem. 

The Atlantic Fleet is worse off in aviation ratings than the Pacific due to the 
greater demands which we have made on it. The Atlantic continuously lighting 
fog, long hours, and night work. Many of the Atlantic units are operating from 
advanced bases along the northern route — Iceland, Newfoundland and New 
England, with some operations in Greenland. 

Nimitz is sending you a despatch today holding up execution of Bunav's 
serials 1450, 1394, 1397 and 1406 of August 11th until September 15th. 

Please acknowledge receipt of this letter by despatch. I would be glad to get 
your reply at the earliest practicable moment. We shall endeavor not to renew 
demands on you prior to 15 September. 

It is a time when a "feller needs a friend", no matter where he is sitting, in 
the Atlantic, in the Pacific or in Washington. 

I am just back from the meeting in the Atlantic. Am wading into a mass of 
mail which accumulated during ray two weeks of absence. Will drop you a line 
giving you the best picture I can in a day or two. Meanwhile, many thanks for 
your letters which I found waiting, which were extremely interesting, and which 
I shall circulate to all concerned. Particularly did I enjoy the interesting news 
in your letter of 12 August. 

[.^1 I have just dictated the above in the presence of and with the help of 
Nimitz, Forrest Sherman, Brainard and Ramsey (Towers being away ) . Ingersoll, 
J am glad to say, is getting a much-needed vacation. All join me in sending you 
good luck and best wishes to all hands. 

Keep cheerful ! 
Sincerely, 

/s/ Betty 

Admiral H. E. Kimmel, U. S. N., 

Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, • 

V. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, 

c/o Postmaster, San Francisco, California. 



2180 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



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EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2181 

(Rec'd. 3 Sept.) 
Navy Department, 
Office of the Chief of Naval Opekations, 

Washington, August 22, ]941. 
In reply refer to Initials and Nos. HRS/mjf 
Secret 

Deak Kimmel: When I left I asked Ingersoll to reply to your letter. The 
enclosed draft I have just inherited. In order to get it off to you in the next 
clipper, I am sending it along as is, except for some pencil notes (both red and 
black) which I have just added. 

I know you want results, not excuses. So do I. I am doing everything from 
pleading to cussing with all the in-between variations and hope the picture 
presented is not too unsatisfactory. 

I realize that in addition to this letter I have two more of yours to answer 
which I shall try to get at the first of the week, if I can clear up urgent, current 
material now on my desk. Still wading into the pile I found on my return. 

There is much doing in the Atlantic in the formative stage. Thank God we 
should have things in full swing before long and with plans fairly complete. It 
has changed so many times — but now I think we at last have something fairly 
definite — may-be. 

To your own situation I am giving every thought I know how. You may rest 
assured that just as soon as I get anything of definite interest, I shall fire it 
along. 

My best to your fine District mate, (Admiral Block) and to all with you, 
and as always — 

Best of luck — wish you were close by 
Sincerely, 

/s/ Betty. 
Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. N. 

VS8 Pennsylvania, Flagship, Pearl Harbor, T. H. 



2182 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

SSSaiL . iUgut 19i 1941 

Dear Muitapha: .■ ^ -r- /. ^ Z. ^^'^ 

Your letter of 26 July 1941 arrived i^ the Navy Department 
on the eve of my departure for dietant parts. It was fine to hear from 
you, and I appreciate your laying before me so frankly the thoughts that 
are gois^ through your mind. 

My reply to you has been delayed for two reasonet 

1> there was unsuffictent time between the receipt of 
your letter and my departure to prepare a reply, and 

2. So mai>y of the points you raised I had hoped to have 
the answers ^<^upon ny return to the Navy Department. 

I can readily understand your wish to kept informed as to 
the Department's policies and decisions ejid the changes thereto which 
must necessarily be made tc meet the changes In the international situ- 
ation. This, we are trying to do, auid if you do not get as much Infor- 
mation as you think you should get, the answer probably is that the 
particular situation which is upoermost in your mlad has Just not Jelled 
sufficiently for us to give you anything authoritative. 

So far as the Russian situation Is concerned, and the degree 
of cooperation that will prevail between that country and ourselVes If 
and when we become ectlve participants In the war, little can be said 
at the moment. Some slight aid is being sent to Russia. Five bombers 
and 200 B-40's have already been allocated. The bombers will be flown 
to RussIp via Iceland and the British are supplying bottoms for the 
fighters and naval escorts for sane. On 11 .August 1941, the Russian 
Mission, headed by Ambassador Oumansky, and assisted by a Lieutenant 
General of their Jtrmy ead a Captain of their Navy, was received by 
Secretary Knox. The Ambassador stated thpt his country had pressing 
need for all manner of military supt)lie8( pl&aes - and sjiti-aircraft 
guns in particular. He announced that "quantities" of bombs, ammunition, 
and machine tools were needed. The Secretary explained to the Mission 
that the material they needed was largely of Army origin, and thfi.t there 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2183 

were no ri,s>-rvu stocks in th>- country frcra v/hich to draw. The Socr^tarj' 
summarized his r<.marks by saying that, since the President had made 
the decision to give aid to Russia, the Navy could be counti^d upon to 
cooperate to the utmost. 

You are correct in stating that "the new situation opens up 
possibilities for us ivhich should bo fully explored." This v.lll be done. 
The conversations v.-hich took placc^bctween the Chiefs of Staff on 11-12 
August soraewhat helped to crj^stalize thought on the matter. Specifically, 
no decision vras reached cs to v;hether or not England rrculd declare war 
on Japan if the Japanese attack the Ilaritine Provinces. Neither can I 
forecast rrhat our action w.uld be if Enrlind declared var on Japan as 
a result cf the latter' s attack en the pro'/inces in question. -t/XMuyot-C ^jjJ ^ 

Of course, Japanese action against the Iiaritinc provinces re- 
mains a decided possibility. The results of such aggressive action, 
of course, lies in the realm of conjecture. Hov/ever, it is mj' ov/n 
thought that if Japan gets embroiled vdth Russia over the Maritime prov- 
inces, such action could hardly react other than to sonev/hat relifc-\% 
the prt-ssure novj- being exerted by Japan to the southward. 

If England declares war on Japan, but v;e do not, I very much 
suppose that we would follow a coxirse of action similar to the one vre 
arc now pursuing in the Atlantic as n neutral. It is, of course, con- 
ceivable that wc would lay down a '■'estem Tonisphero Defense plan with 
reference to the Pacific. ^^:)', ^u>i /.o ■ >-(. cnt, - tit',^ .a^,'^ ^■^rM-ur V 

'7e are in coapl..te agreer.^nt about developing Guam and bolster- 
ing the defenses of the Philippines. The Arr-ij'- is Sundinc; everything it 
can out there. As you know, we are sending Tomm^'' som e PTs. Ilorc aid ^ 
would be sent him if it were possible to do so. I fear, however, that 
it is pretty .late tc start on Guam anything more than V7e already have 
in hand. Tfe will make all the progress v;e con, remuTibering that "Dcrllars 
Cannot Buy Yesterday." 



2184 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



SECRET 



In discussing the priorities in connection '.-rith pn-paration 

for a Pajific V/ar, for your convenience, I shall quote the paraf3raphs 

fron youFyjlettcr andyyComment. 

Paragraph 2(a) of your letter . Transports and L ight De stroyer 
Transports . During the Commander-inChief 's visit to '.Tashincton,ali 
the transports, including the light destroyer transports, v.-ere trans- 
ferred to the Atlantic. The nec«-S3it3'- for this is recccnized. Never- 
theless, We still ni.:cd transports in the Pacific and the need is even 
greater ncvf (in point of view of tine particularly) because inost of ■ 
our trained marines T/^nt vTith the transports and v^e are faced with an 
inncdiate training problen in addition to a possible vrar situation. 
The Department has initiated action to co-plet^^ th^ M/'JIRIS and ZlilLIi! 
and to acquire and convert four nore trcJi?;ports for the Pacific, but, 
so far as is Inoivn, has done nothing about replajing the li-'ht destroyer 
transports (APD's). Those vessels vfero jriginally conceived and devel- 
oped foi- a Pacific canpaign. T)-.ey arc especially suitable for use. in 
attacks on atolls and roay be the only i.-.^ans of readily attaokj.ng those 
positions. Y.Tiile by no moans discounting tlieir usefulni-ss in the Atl.'-Ji- 
tic, the need for then in the Pacific is paranoimt. If at all possible, 
they sould be retum>-d to this ocean at once. If this cannot be done, 
and only if it cannot be dont, additional destroyers must be converted 
as soon as possible. V.'ork on the large trcjisports nust also be eiipedited 
and completion dat>..s anticipated if possible. 

Comment . Ti'e all recognize that the APD's were dev>. loped 

vrith a Pacific campaign in mind. Vi'o vdthdrew them to the Atlrjitic with 

great reluctance, and you can count on their being returned to the 

Pacific at the earliest opportunity. Like^vrise, work is being pushed 

on the HARRIS and ZEILH'I. I must confess that progress' on those r.hips 

has not been wholly satisfactory. 






EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2185 

SECRET 
ROUGH DR.'JT FOR .\DI.:iR.'J. KULiEL'S LETTER August l6, 19U1 

Paragraph 2 (b) of your letter - Marine Equipment . The Sixth 
Defense Battalion docs not now have its full equipment, particularly -U 
guns and .30 and .$0 caliber machine sj-ons. The remaininc units of the 
Second Marine Division were stripped of much of tlieir equipment to fit 
out the reenforccd regiment that went East. There is practically no 
marine ammunition now on the Vfest Coast. It is practically certain that 
these units will fight before the /jTiiy Mdll and their needs must be given 
priority. We can't fight an amphibious v/ar in the Pacific without ammu- 
nition, for the marines. 

We are going ahead with the preparation of a camp in 
Oahu for five thousand marines. V/hen they come, they should be fully 
equipped for -Tinphibious warfare. The transports etc., should be psady 
at the same time. ^Vn estimate of v/hen the needed equipment and men will 
be available would help us in our planning. 

Comment. In reference to the 3" -U pins, and the .30 caliber 
machine guns of the Sixth Defense Battalion, reports received at Head- 
quarters, Marine Corps indicate that that organization has had all of its 
initial allowances in those weapons since 7 Jiily 19lil; that is, 12 - 3" 
iU guns, and 30 - .30 caliber machine guns. The shortage in .^0 caliber 
X.\ machine guns should be remedied by SepteiTiber, 19Ul. 

^\n outline of the present situation in reference to 
Marine equipment and related matters, as well as an estimate as to when 
this equipment will be available is contained in CNO Serial 083312 which 

•Jas forwarded to the Commander in Chief, U. 3. Pacific Fleet about 2^ 
July l^lA. It is "jelievGd that this presents as complete a picture as 
is possible at thi.s time. The bulk of the shortages in equipment and 
ammunition lies in items which must be procured from the .tony. Existing 
stocks in the United States arc at prcscint much too low to meet the re- 
quirements of all Services. Proportionate allocations of new equipment 
for all Services have been made by the Joint Board, and the Navy and Mar- 
ine Corps may expect their proporti6n to be delivered from the manufactur- 
ers more steadily and conc-istcntly in the future than heretofore. 

The general shortages in ammunition for the Marine Forces are 
likely to exist for some t?jne, however, mainly due to the fact that 
quantity production will not obtain until late in the present calendar 
year. In the event of an acute emergency, it is believed that sufficient 

ammunition to fill immediate reqtiiremcnts of the Second Division . 



79716 O — 46 — pt. If 



2186 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



SECRET „ 



as it exists today may be specially obtained from the ^Irmy. -t^Q^mif -atta^ 

The present outlook indicates that sufficient person- 
nel vfill be available by 1 October 19l*l, to form for expeditionary duty 
a reinforced regiment from the Second Marine Division, and also leave 
within the Division a nucleus for training of ix.s remaining units. It 
is hoped that the Second Division can be completed in personnel by Janu- 
ary, 19li2. 

Parngraph 2 (c) of your letter - .Ammunition Facilities, The 
condition of ammunition handling and stowage facilities ashore are in 
general satisfactory at the present time. Stowage facilities have been 
completed, are in the process of constiniction, or are about to be started 
to handle assignments of service reserves of gun ammunition, bombs, mines, 
and torpedoes. This includes igloos already completed and others now 
under construction at Westloch aid at Lualualci, 

New construction authorized and about to be undertaken 
includes four powder magazines and four shell houses at Lualualei, 
and barricaded stowage for live mines, two new mine anchor buildings and 
a new mine assembly building at "Jestloch. 

New construction needed to conqjleta stowage and liand- 
ling facilities includes extension of Westloch dock to a maximum of two 
thousand feet and the construction of four powder magazines and two shell 
houses at TTestloch to accomodate target practice anrounition which cannot 
be stowed in vessels of the Fleet, This latter construction has been 
recommended to the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District in recent 
correspondence and wc have no word yet on i^at action he has tdcen. 

Comment , The Bureai of Ordnance has had all anraunition storaige 

items requested by the Commander-in-Chief provided, except: 

(a) Extension of ammunition pier at West Loch, Funds 
have been obtained to extend the antnunition pier from 600 feet to 1^00 
feet. Since no authorization vdll be required to extend the pier from 
1500 feet to 2000 feet, the Bureau of Ordnance expects to divert the 
necessary funds temporarily from other projects for this extension, to 
avoid delay. Tlie funds required are $2$0,000, which v/ill eventually be 
obtaLnod from Conycss to repay the project robbed, 

(b) llo fxinds are available for the construction of 

four poT.-der magazines and tvro shell houses at V/est Loch. No authoriza- ,^ 
has been obtained for the constnaction of these magazines. The Bureau uv^ 
of Orrlnance will have these magazines included in the next authorizaion 
bill toyypresented to Congress and will have the necessary funds requested 
for their construction. The funds required are estimates as at $210,000, 

2, 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2187 

SECR2T 

The following was supplied by the Chief of the Bureai of Yards 
and Docks: 

"The construction of four powder magazines and two shell houses 

at Westloch is a new item not previously presented to the Department and 

we are awaiting word from the Commandant as to his recommendation. The 

construction of these buildings will necessitate the purchase of additional 

land. " 

Paragraph 2 (d) of your letter . The importance of building 
v^) Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor to the point conteinplated by the Greenslade 
Board. For the present Navy Yard, Pearl' Harbor should be regarded pri- 
marily as a "restricted availabiltiy" yard. Overhaul of ships here should 
not include battleships and cruisers or other ships for extensive regu- 
lar overhauls. The facilities of the yard should be confined to emergency 
and low priority overhaul, regardless of overhead costs. 

Comment . -Ju jld t ng up Ma^'y Yay 'd , P &ap^j^fg'te^r- . The Bureau of 
Ships shortly expects an appropriation from Congress (Supplemental 19U2) 
to take ere of, among other things, all navy yard facilities necess.ary 
to repair and maintain the 19U6 fleet in war. Pearl Harbor is funded in 
the anount of ^0,000,000 for this purpose, which includes the cost of 
an additional major battleship dock. This dock, together with the other 
facilities which will be accor^lished with the money, will bring the yard 
up to the point conten^lated by the Greenslade Board Report. The time 
involved in expanding Pearl Harbor to the extent indicated above is as 
follows : 

12 months for $0% of the facilities. 

18 months for the remainder of the facilities, 

22 to 2U months for the dry dock. 
Note: -The Commander ip Chief , N^acifi'c Fleet, >ind Fleet Main- 

tenaice - Operajdons control maJctng ships available for ovewvauls and 

™_ u ^ --^ / \ 

set the priority for work at the Na.\'y Yard yearl Harbor, / \ 
/ \ / \ / \ ^ \ 
The Bureau of Ships has increased the special stocks at this 

Yard of spare propellers and shafting - it has under procurement, addi- 
tional stock in tubing for boilers, condensers, superheaters and heat 
transfer apparatus; additional stock of generators and ice machines. 



2188 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

SECRET 

The Shore Establishments Division intends to ducnent the vrorking 
force as the capacity and Trork load arc increased. 

Relative to the repair facilities at the Pearl Harbor Yard, the 
Bureau of i'ards and -^Dcks has issued instructions to ex;3editc all of 
this T/ork to the greatest practicable extent. 

The reconnendation to confine the activities of the Wavy Yard, 
Pearl Harbor to energency and low priority ovi.rhauls crai be acconplished 
by transferring regular overhauls of Battleships, Carriers, Cruisers, and 
Destroyers to 'Jest Coast yards but this recoinnendation is not concurred 
in for thi, follovring reasons; 

(1) The Greenslade Board report, approved by the Sec- 
retary of the Navy on iiay lU, l^i^l, reconnended that ihc Pearl Harbor Navy 
Yard be built up to take care of 20 per cent of the fleet in the Pacific 
when the two-ocean navy was in existence and that the yard be capable of 
handling "full overhauls and damage" vath simultaneous drydocking facili- 
ties for 2 Battleships, 1 CR, 1 CB, 1 CA, 1 twin DL and a DL marine rail- 
way. Pertinent to this is a letter from the Assistant Secretaiy of the 
Navy (Shore Establishments Division) uatcd June 26, l^iil in regard to 
building up the facilities at Pearl Harbor and noting that no Battleships 
or Carriers were scheduled for overhaul at Pearl Harbor in 19li3- The 

third paragraph of this letter is quoted hercvdth: 

"It is believed it is necessary that capital 

ships be overhauled at Pearl ^^rbor if that Yard is ex- 
pected to perform the war "task that has been assigned. 

It is, therefore, recommanded that in the next revision 
of the availability schedule, a start be na.de tov/ard an equit- 
able diversion of the overhaul of Battleships rjid Carriers 
from Puget Sound to Pearl na.rbor." 

-¥fce Sir&e^fe©-?y F-l^et— I'aintonancu Divi &i-cn-^bclieved that only by 

actual overhaul and repair of Capital Ships, Destroyers, and Cruisers can 

the Pearl f'arbor organization be trained and made capable of rop-iring 4» 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2189 

those ships in cjti cr.ercuicy, toguthcr v,'it!i d^vclop-.i^nt of n^,cossary 

facilities. 

(2) Runr.irs to BritisJi ;.'cv-l v.,s^uls, p.-.rticu- 

larly the larj^^r typ^s o2 ships, is cbsorbinr; r. lai'gc 

percentage of th^, r>-pair facilities of continental U.S. 

yards and it is ^xp< cted that tin- demands "'Till increase. 

East Coast yards arc being used prii.iarily for this -iTCrlc 

but it has bt;i,n found necessary - due to full schedules of 

these yards - to send some British ships to Furiet Sound 

and i^arc Island. 

If these latter yards arc fully schwdul^d v-'ith 

our o'-Tn ships (as can bu (jxpuct'^d if all Battleship, 

Carrier, Cruiser, and D;jstrcyv,r overhauls are transferred 

to them from Pearl '.'arbor) it is ^-^roble.viatical v:hether 

British ships can be repaired and ov^-rhauled at the rate 

that this is no-.: bcin~ undertaken. 

The fori-goinr-, ccmLier.t -by— I'-iU^^ ^ ai n t ^- ' i a-ne e is substrjntiolly 

in accord vrLth your letter L9-5 (50) ov^r L9-3 Serial 01176 of 1 Aufrust 

Paragraph 2 (c) of "our letter . Provide more and more per- 
sonnel to the fleet for training. The p-rsonm-l situation has been 
presented to the Bureau of i'-aviration and that ^ureau is thorour.hly 
familiar vdth cur roquirer.iunts . ".'e cannot provide experienced personnel 
for ncvr censtrud ion next year unless ve obtain recruits and train 
them intensively at once. I realize that recruiting has fallen off ajad 
that the Department is doing all it can but re are losing trained nen 
faster than 'je are getting neT; recr.dts. ^s I stated in a recent letter 
wc could use 20,000 more rien in the Pacific ?'lect rirht novf. - «3 ^oec.^-.^ - 

Comment . The present rate of recraiting is about 9j300 men 
a month, "-ccording to the best estimates, about 12,000 recruits arc re- 
quired in order to meet the requirenen-'.s of the service on June 30, 19l|2 
based on present allowanc>-s. (This estimate is subject to variables 
such as changes in dates of coamiscioning si-.ips and stations.) Therefore 
the Navy vn.ll lack a proxiior.tely 32,000 men necessar:/- for I-avj-- require- 
ments on "^une 30, 19li2. It is estimated that this rail bt^ enough men to * 



2190 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

SECRET 
fill conplcncnts rnd allov;ancc;s on that dcitt, to an average of about 

92^, Thci i-locts aro nov; fillod to about 9\^o of conplcr.(,nt£ . This per- 
centage vdll drop due to large recent increases in aviation squadron 
allowances. It is estiniated that Navigation can replace losses in the 
Fleets vdth recruits to maintain then at about the sane percentage of 
men aboard to complti.'.onts as at present. '^^-"^''•**- /«•o-^ 

The recent large vfithdrawals f ron the F ieots have been due 
to the necessity of supplying the crows for the large number of auxiliary 

vessels rccoitly acquired and for the assembly of men for iidvancod De- 
stroyer, Submarine, and Aviation Bases. These demands wi-r^, superimposed 

upon the di-nands for the regular building and usual purchasing program. 

The above e5ti:;:ates are based on a monthly rate of recruiting 
of 9,300. Recruitin,7 is now on the increase end additional men over 
the 9,300 monthly •in be furnished to the Fleets./y^o^iJT"-^'"^ 

P aragrap h 2(f) of your letter . tJecd for a hospital ship in 
the Pacific FTe>,t and for completion of ne^T hospital at Pearl Ilarbor. 

Comment. . It is contei:iplated assigning the SOLACE (i'lUS), Ex- 
IROQUOIS, to the Pacific Fleet upon readiness for service, which should be 
in the latter part of "-ugust, 19ltl. ?uither, it is contaaplate-d 
transporting Ilobile Base Hospital IIo. 2 from Kew York to Oahu in the 
U.S. 5. PROCYOM (AK19) departing New York early in October; she is a 
l5-knot ship and will call at San Die_-o to debark some personnel and 
stores there en route. 

So far as the nev/ hospital is concerned, the contract for 
this has been let and presumably the v/ork is underv;ay. 



Paragra h 2(g) of your letter . Urgency for sv.i 
ith llaval District for patrol purposes, to reli 



i.iall craft in , 

the Fourteenth llaval District for patrol purposes, to relieve the load 
on our limited number of destroyers. 



Comment . The project is now underrray to send twelve PT's to 
the lltth iJaval District as scon as the boats con be prepared and trans- 
portation provided. This shipment -.Till follow the six ilTB's going to 
the l6th Naval District via the GUADALUPE scheduled to depart from New 
York Yard about 15 August or as soon thereafter as practicable. 
jt^t) - -/<^ -«'** -*-!*. ..^to*^ .^Cjtt. /~44^C^^-e. yejt^n. . /U^^t.^ w>>«-*.»v ^-<^/t- 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2191 



SDcru:! 



,'d for acquiring :idvanccd 
base ;;uitt;ric 



Paragraph 2(h) of your lettur . The need 
il and assciiibling it at ''.are Island. 

Commtint. ■^ho project of assuiibling advance Base ilaterial has 



been raised to an A-l-a priority, and the asscaiibling of this naterial is 
t\r 



g' ing ah^ad satisfactorily 



axM, 



^L^fJL^t 



t^-Au£ «^-<.4>'<^ 



&A. 



2192 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Para[;rr.ph 2(i) or /our letter . Correspondence hcis rone TcnTard 
urrin:. that all available licht craft in the Pacific be fitted vdth depth 
charges, listening c<--r, etc. This is important. 

Corjien t. In this connection, I quote vcrbatira the ruinarks of 
the Fleet Maintenance Division in order that you nay have the entire 
picture: 

The status of placinc depth charges and under-water sound equip- 
ment on li ht craft is as follo\7S (taken up by classes); 

Pi Is and DtiSs - These vessels have depth cJu'.rgcs and echo-ranring 

equipment authorizsdj some have the equipment installed rT.d tjiosc ships 

that have not yet received thuir echo-ran^inf; equipment vdll rtt Tod^l 

X Series commencinc in September 19lil. .A«*l, -5/^»— ^ ^^r^y. ^ ^ 

f f 

AVDs - Stabilitj' conditions on these ships are not cood and the 

addition of depth charres, racks, sr Y-oms, and echo-ran ^in[T equipment 
T.lll necessitate compensating ^7ci;^•ht removal. It is xinderstood that the 
desired equipment can be installed providing the toving reel on tl.e fan 
tail is permanently removed. "A lii^'htiTei^ht echo-ran-_lng ane listening 
gear cquipn^-nt, Ilodel 'TZii'^, has been developed v>-hich weighs about 1300 
pounds, vrith deliveries connencin^ in October l^Ul. 

The follovTing are the requirements for the V/E/i equip- 
ment : 

(a) power supply 115 volts D.C. 

(b) Head room required for hoist train equipment 
about 70 inches. 

(c) At least 2U inches betv:een frames of ships to 
accomodate pedestal. 

(d) Remote control of train by means of cables and 
sheaves, using hand wheel at operating position. 

The above equipmi-nt is suitable for any installation 

in jUis (Bird Class) and in most converted yachts . Additionally, this 

equj.pm-nt can be installed in any ot'.ior t:,pes of eliips having adequate 

space and power supply. 

A lightweight listening equipment (I'odel JIT-9), about 1300 

Dounds, has been developed and contract avrarded for 230 setsj delivery 

7. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2193 

s3c?-":t 

cor.iincnccs in ^uf-ust 19U1 at c rate ol' 10 i_ach v;^ck. 'i'hc follo-::in;^' aro 
the requirununts for installation of the JIC-9 uquipmi-nt; 

(a) Power supply 115 volts D.C. or 21* volts D.C. 
(Two tj-pcs of motor cuncrators available, 
producing 11$ volts, A. C) Overall dimensions 

of motor generator set 292 x 13^ x 11-3/ii inches. 

(b) I.Iaxiraun head room required for hoist train 
laechanisn abcut 96 inches. 

(c) Onlj' limitation or frai.io spacing is that is 
pass the ii-inch projector shaft. 

(d) No remotu control - hand hoist ond train 
directly connected to projector sheift. 

This equipnont is for listening only (no echo-ran(i- 

ing feature) and is suitable for use in any type of ship havirig adequate 

space and pov/ur pupply. Space allotted to the equipment must provide 

for the hoist-train equipment (overall dimensions 7' -9" x 26| x 20"), 

receiver (overall dimensions 19" x 12" x l$-l/C") cjid sufficient space 

for the operator. 

APD s - The APDs have the depth charge tracks installed and noTf 
carry 2'n - 300 pound depth charges. The stability conditions of these 
ships is so unsatisfactory that they vdll require ^0 tons of fixed ballast, 
'^he installation of the V/EA echo-ranj-ing equipment, descrived under AVDs, 
above can be accomadated in these ships. 

/i.Is and A VPs - Thu question of installing dt-pth charge and 
echo-ranging and (or) listening equipment on these types has bucn referred 
to the bureau of Ships for study and recommendation as to the practic- 
ability of accomplishment. 

It should be pointed out t! at draft and stability 
conditions of these vessels is critical and instructions arj about to be 
issued limiting their displacements. Informal information from the Bureau 
of Ships indicates that corapunsatory wuirht reducdon must be y;ade on 
practically a pound-f or-po nd basis in order to install the desired equip- 
ment, '^'he installation of echo-rani:ing, or listening equipment is de- 

e. 

pendent upon the delivery schedule as outlined above under AVDs, 



2194 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

SECK^T 

It is to be noted that the liglitcst depth charge rack 
now developed (carrying six 300 pound depth charges) weighs about 1500 
poxuids. As each depth charge with its equipment weighs U20 pounds, the 
total weight of depth charges and track to be compensated for will be 
about liOOO pounds. The weight of the lightest underwater soxind equipment 
is sdoout 1300 pounds as is explained above under AVDs. 

PEs, Pes, FYs, and YPs. .Vll these vessels have depth 
charges, the ninnber depending upon the size of the vessels. Some of 
these vessels are equipped with both depth charge racks and Y-guns, 

Echo-ranging and (or) listening equipment has been 
authorized and yrill be installed as soon as the equipment can be provided. 

Paragraphs 3 and 3 (a) of your letter . Communications . The 
supply of communication, radio, and sound equipment to the fleet and the 
Shore Stations leaves much to be desired, although a great improvement 
has been noted in the last year. 

Specifically it is noted that the Kaneohe Air Station 
was acqilred, built, commissioned, and actually operated prior to the 
receipt of any radio apparatus, except some which we diverted from its 
intended advance base use. 

Comment , Here is quoted in their entirety the remarks of the 
Chief of the Bureau of Sliips: 

"During the fiscal year 19U1 the Bureau of Ships 
placed contracts for radio and so\ind material amounting to aqpproximately 

$110,000,000, The material contracted for included all of the material 
listed in the 191^1 and 19U2 Communication Inq^rovement Plans issued by the 
Chief of Naval Operations and a large amount of additional material required 
to meet previously unanticipated needs. The funds included in the regular 
19lil budget were made available in an appropriation bill which became law 
on June 11, 19U0, but the bulk of the funds utilized during the year did 
not become available until passage of a supplemental appropriation a ct in 
mid September 191*0, Considering the time when the necessaryfUnds became 
available, and the tremendous increase of procurement effort necessary, it 
is felt that the prosecution of the entire program has been as rapid as 
could reasonably be expected vinder the circiimstances. However, it is recog- 
nized that many needs of the service are of great urgency and that any delay 

9. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2195 

SECRET 
at all in effecting deliveries after needs have been determined is object- 
ionable. Difficulties in obtaining critical materials and con5)onents have 
in some cases caused serious delays in deliveries under contracts but 
by use of increased facilities all contractors involved have increased 
rates of production to a considerable extent. It is expected that most 
of the serious needs for radio and sound equipment will be taken care 
of v»ithin the next few months. 

Funds for the initial allowance of radio equipment for t he 
Kaneohe Air Station were included in the regular IJiil appropriation act, 
which became law on June 11, 19U0. Initiation of procurement of radio 
material for Kaneohe was commenced immediately afteB the funds becsme 
available4 Funds for items later axided to the allowance became avail- 
able in September, 19l|0, 

The tabiilation below indicates the present situation as regards 
radio equipment for the Kaneohe Mr Station: 

jectcd Remarks 



aVllowed equip - Installed To Be Shipped Exp' 
raent ' D 



_____ ate 

2 TBM 1 1 Jan.l9ii2 

2 TBP 2 

1 TBU 1 Mar.l9U2 
6 TBff 2 Sept.l9l4l 

h Jan.l9ii2 

2 TCA 2 Sept.l9la 1 TBO-1 in use 
2 TCB 2 N0V.I9I1I 

1 TCC 1 Aug.l9la 1 TBR-1 installed 

h BBX/RBB/BBC U Indefinite Mew type-other 

receivers avail- 
able if urgently 
required 
6 RAS . 6 

1 DY 1 11 Aug.l9ia from IH Tfash 

1 DP 1 11 Aug, 191a IDN from NYIil 

1 Inst. LDG Equip. 1 Sept.l9U2#U0 on priority 

list; deliveries 
start Sept.l9iil 
1 RAU 1 Oct.l9l4l 

in 1 Jan.l9U2 

There are available in the Pearl Harbor pool several more TBR-1 

portable equipments which may be utilized to take care of immediate needs 

at Kaneohe if required. These TBRr-l equipments are not necessarily reserved 

or intended for advanced base service, but are availabc for any use at 

}i 
the discretion of the CJoramandant or the Commander in Chief, 

10. 



2196 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

2SCRET 

Paragrayh 3(b) of yoiir letter . It took BuEnc two years to put 
"Chinese copies" of NRL's Radar on six ships. 

Comment . Here follows the remarks of the Bureau of Ships and 
the Director, Naval Communications Division^-n. .^-t^^i^ ^fi-m**^ • 

"The Model X^F R.IDj\R equipment developed by Naval Research Labor- 
atory was installcl in USS NET YORK 12-18 December, 193C,and was tested 
at the same time as the Model CXZ Radar equipment developed try RCA }l\£gt 
Co., and installed in USS TEX.'iS. These tests continued through March 
1939. Report of tests was received from Commander Atlantic Squadron 
8 April 1939. As a result of these tests, the equipment v/as returned 
to Naval Research Laboratory for modifications indicated as necessary. 
For example, the equipment had no calibrating feature installed. A 
conference was held with representatives of all interested officers of 
the Department as a rcs'ilt of which it was decided to proceed with the 
procurement of a limited number of these equipments. The size and weight 
of the equipment were at the time important factors in the decision. 
Conferences were held with contractors without delay and a specification 
was prepared. The requisition was issued 28 July 1939 and the contract 
was awarded 16 October 1939 to RaV Mfe. Co. The time between the date 
of requisition and date of contract was utilized by the RCA Mfg. Co., 
to inspect the model, work up estimates, submit bid and by the Bureaus 
of Ships and Supplies and Accounts to make award. The first equipment 

was shipped by factory May 21, 19^0. It i-dll be noted that the time 
for dilivery of the first equipment by contractor v/as approximately 13 
months from the date of completion of tests in U35 NET YORK and 7 months 
after date of contract. The last equipment vjas shipped by contractor 
on June 20, 19ll.O, The dates of installation of this equipment were 
dictated by the dates of availability of the vessels concerned, A 
matter over which this Bureau does not have control. According to the 
records of this Bureau, however, installation of the first equipment 
was completed August 2U, 19U0, and the last on October la, 19U0, and 
the last date being approximately 18 months after the receipt of the 
report on NSf YCSRK tests. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2197 



" The Model X.'lF Rlill\R, built by Kaval Rcscr.rch Laboratory', was 
tested afloat during the late v/inter and early spring of 1939. This 
test indicated that additional equi-p;n<^nt should be purchased for trial, 
A study was made to dctemine the practica' .bility of installing the 
equipin;,nt afloat; this study isclosed that only ten (10) ships could 
accomodate the large antenna array vrithout first making extensive 
alterations to ships or without experiencing serious interference to 
the radio bean from the ships' stracturcs. ^hief of llaval Operations 

requested prccur<-nent of ten (10) production models of the Xi'kF. The 
earliv,st that funds could be obtained to manufacture the :'odel CUc'. (copy 
of JniL :;odel X;j) was during fiscal 19liO, Due tc the hi:her unit cost 
of the equipr.-.ent and the extraordinary expenditures of radio funds in 
connection vdth "neutrality enlcrcer.cnt", the Uureau of Ships could manu- 
facture but six (6) complete uniLs. ''Iricn additional funds were nade 
available by emergency appropriations, fourteen (lii) Model CJL'^'-l's v^erc 
ordered as "stop-gap" equipnv.nt pending completion of development of 
an improved detector - the Ilodel SC." ^^ •^fU*^^ ,.»,^ x^^<^ /St.,^^^ , 

Paragraph 3(c) of your letter , "or years BviEng prevented re- 
search by NRL in anj'' form of radio recognition device and hence retarded 
the production of such apparatus. The Fleet is still \7ithout it thoufh 
it is under manufacture. 

Comment . In this connection, the '-'hiof of the Bureau of Ships 
stat<^s: 

" The need for a satisfactory reccgnition device in the fleet 

has been recognized by the Bureau of Ships as being the single greatest 

one since tlie time of the last war and ev.^ry id^^a advanced by th^. flee*, 

the Naval Research Laboratory'' or other laboratories tiat appeared to 

offer proma.se has been thoroui:hly investi; ated. This research has fully 

covered the fields of ultra violet, visible, infra red, radio and sound 

speitrums. Many systems vfhich .vcre developed tc a point v/hich warranted 

service tests have been tested in the Ilect and all have been reported 

unsatisfactory by the fleet eVen after modification by IJIIL and other 



12. 



2198 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

SSCRET 

laboratories in accordance vritii the r.lshcs of the fleet, '■'■heru has boon 

no lack of funds in this connection. I'he IIRL has been engagi-d centinu- ^ 

ously since its ustablishment in efforts to dcv-,lop ^ recognition s^^stein. j y 

That portion of the statement relating to the preventing of research by » 

NRL in any form of radio recognition device is not one of fact." *^ ^ t^ 

It can be concluded that very substantial additions to Fleet wr^ 

Radar installations rrill be nade before the end of the cr.lendar year, i*-^"-*- 

Paragraph 3(d) of your letter. T/e riust have the IFF (Identi- 
fication, Friend or Foe j for aircraft" aT"once. The program lags and on 
June llith cnly 56 v;erc on order from Canada -Jri-th indefinite delivery 
date. See "Aviation" betow. 

Consent. In regard to the forecoing, the Bureau of Aeronau- 
tics remarks as follov/s: / /y^jKrt^^f'"''^*^'^ - '^"^out^,*/*-*^-**^- /iry^^j^ ^m*^>^- 

"Currently, y(Jhe Bureau of Aeronautics is concentrating on the 
earliest practicable devolopn^-nt and procurcn-^nt of suitable RADilH equip- 
ment for aircraft. Recognition equipment '.^-ill be installed in all service 
aircraft at the earliest opportunitj'. One hundred (100) iS>L (/jaerican 
recognition) sets are nov: due for delivery, and they ^vill be distributed 
to the fleet in the most effective manner possible, liatcrial is being 
assembled for 1500 American ABA sets which ttiI]. be put in production by 
General Electric as soon as a satisfactory ser'/ice test is completed. fC**^A^ 
356 British I.F.F. sets have been ru^uestedj 56 of these sets are being 
delivered to the Atlantic Fleet and delivery is rapidly being completed." 

The tentative plan for initial R/iD/Jl installations in a,ircraft 
is as follows: 

A brief summary of nomenclature is: 

a. /iSV ;!K II - Dritish search equipment suitabl'- for VPBs. 

b. ASA - iUnerican search equipment including high altitude 

altimeter, suitable for VPB's. 

c. ASB - Ami-rican search equipment, expected to be suitable 

for 2 and 3 place planes, 

13. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2199 

d. ;^V - lacil (Fleet ..ir am nodiricd) , British socrch 

equipment for usv, in larce single engine planes, 
c, IlBI^ - jinerican r^cornition equipnent, 

f . IFF - British rccornition equipment, 

g. AYA - /jaerican hich range altimeter, 
h. AYB - /iDerican low range altimeter. 

i. AI - I.3( IV - British Interception equipr..,nt - multi-place 

airplanes. 
Search equipmen t (long range British i,.SV or ;jnericrji ASA) vfill 

be installed in all PBY-5 and subsequent VPB models. Initial installa- 
tions arc being made. 

It is expected to install ASB (snail search equipment) vdth a 

low ranee altimeter in one plane of each section of VT3's. All T3F 

airplanes irill have space reserved for this. It is expected to reserve 

space in all nev/ VSB and VSO airplanes for the ^iinerican ASB, and rfhere ^ 

practicable install this equipment in current typos, \^*f 

Initial installation is now being -made of the experimental rj^ 

model of the ;lSB in an SBD airplane. If successful, a number of these 
planes vrlll be made available as soon as the equipnent is provided. 

Steps liTiVe been taken to obtain models of the British I.X II 
ASV equipment (modified for Fleet ^ar Arm) for reproduction purposes. 
It is expected to supplement manufacture of ijnerican ASB equipment vrith 

an /jnerican version of the modified 1.0C II. 

Radio Altimeter (high altitude) will be installed as part 

of thfc /jnerican search equipr.ient in all VPB airplanes. It is plamiod to 

equip one airplane of each section of VTB's trith hirh altitude altimeters 
and another airplane of each section of VTB's ^fith a lor; range altimeter 
for use with the ISB equipnent (as indicated in poragraphs above re 
search equipment. ) . 

Recoenition equipment vrLll be installed in all service airolrjics 

at the earliest opportunity. The iirst 100 jjnerican i'JiA cquipnents are 

now due for delivery. 14. 



2200 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Inturcfaption equipncnts . Provision Tor thusi- oquipnonts vn.ll 

be nadc in r. ccrt:iin nvmbcr of I'liU "irplr.ncs c:s soon as tliL. d^v.,lopri^nt 

in the United Stc'.tcs rjid r.broc.d ox nodols suitr.blc lor use in single 

t-nf:inc, sinfic place .lii^ilcncc permits. Pending this JcvLlopnent, c 

tt-st installr.tion is being made of a British I3C IV cquipr.^.cnt in an 5BD 

airplane. If successful, a number of tl:esc planes T/ill be r.v.dc available 

for us^ as- interceptors as soon as this cquipnent crjn be obtained frora 

-ither British or ijnerican source. 

Projects have been initiated to deEi.::n search and interception 

antenna structures v/hicb are most readily duaountable and which are 

strea::ilined as much as practicable. Developnont of i'lncricaji search ^ / ,ojnrJt~ 

■gJ>^2,X - 
and interce-ition equipnent vrill stress read;;,'- reiuoval provisions in o.^Ji£ r^'^- 

order to result in maxinun of operational flexibility. '**'*^ 

Plans for further installation of Radar in carrier and cruiser 

airplanes are dependent on installation difficulti.s and initial per- 

fomiance. .. more conprchensive plan nay be expected to be published 

about Januairj'-, 19ii2. . ,, 

'Deliveries liave begun on lOh l.odel .'J;.. ITT" equipnents for 

aircraft tccether Tdth 32 nodel BE/B? eq'iip:,:_nts for shipboard use. 

These vlll be ^^iven service tests in the ^lect tccether vdth 3 '-f;del 

BI equipments for shipboard use. The first BI equipment is due at KRL 
September 22, 19lil. The contractor is asses.ibling material for l500 ad- 
ditional .Ji.i equipments and further production vrill be authorized just 
as soon as tests justify the step. ^.11 of the above is of .j.ierican 
design but because of desi;n and operational fv,atures it vdll not oper- 
ate vdth corresponding British ship, shore or ?.ircraft throes. To pro- 
vide for this contingency two each of the latest British ship, shore 
and aircraft equipnents are being flovm to tlie United States and vrill 
be modified for production iji the United States and supplied to all forces 
likely to operate vdth British forces. These srjnple equipnents are due 
within a fev; days according to advic^^s fron the I'avrJ. Attrirht', London. 
The 56 equipnents nentioned in the paragraph to 'vhich tliis .or-r::ent is 
directed are for Support Force Aircraft and ei^ht are ncv; in the process 
of being installed." 15* 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2201 



SECRET 

Paragr^h 3(e) of yoxu- lottcr . Radar equipment for submarine 
is highly important. I am not informed as to exact status of this but 
understand development is not entirely satisfactory. There is evidence 
that German subs are equipped with Radar, 

In general, Naval shipboard radio and sound equipment is so 
ej-aboratc that it cannot be manufactured expeditiously, BuEnc should have 
type plans for apparatus of such a nature that they can c^t results from 
industry and not make each new piece of apparatus a research job, ■^^^■^^ 

Comment , /\n omni-directional aircraft detection equipment 
was tested in CSRiVYLING on 2 Aucust 19U.. Although the results of the 
test were somewhat discouraginc, the equipment showed sufficient promise 
to warrant its manufacture. It is believed that the development of a 
directional antenna system will jpreatly improve the performance of the 
submarine equipmontj this project will bo prosecuted, / 

Contracts have been awarded for the manufacture of 10-cm sur- 
face-ship detection equipment for submarines. This equipment is due for 
delivery about January 19U2, The equipment which is being desicned for 
making ni{^t attacks while the submarine is surfaced, is expected to be 
capable of taking accurate ranges and bcarinf;s on capital ships at dis- 
tances in the order of 10,000 yards. 

In order to expedite the manufacture of radio and sound equip- 
ment, the Bureau of Ships has frozen on current designs. The delay in 
procurement of radio and so\ind equipment is n2>t entirely due to the "elab- 
orate" design; the "priority ratings" for raw materials that the Navy De- 
partment is assigned greatly affects the production of equipment. The 
Bureau of Ships also is procuring modified commercial radio equipment. 

It has not been conclusively determined that the German submar- 
ines SXQ equipped with Radar, It is, however, highly probable that they 
are so equipped because it is known that these craft operate with much 
facility at nij^t. 

Paragraph U(a) of your letter . Pre-Fleot Training . Two units 
under the Fleet at San Diego, one for patrol squadrons and one for carrier 
squadrons. Moro pilots for battleships and cruisers, for traini:ig on 
board ship. Particular emphasis on double complements for patrol squad- 
rons j anticipation of snlisted personnel numbers and training in all 
categories, particularly patrol squadrons; building up the supply of spire 
airplanes; accomplishing the training without any further drain on combat 
readiness of active sqiiadrons, 

16. 



79716 O— 46 — pt. 16 19 



2202 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

sscRia 

Comaente. In this connection, the Chief of the Bureau of Aeronau* 
tics refflarka: 

"On 26 Jxily, 2 signed a letter that embodied meaaures for the 
improvement of aviation training of pilots and other nemhere of flight 
crews in the intermediate stage that occurs between primary school and 
fleet Bfuadrons. I hope the effect will he salutary and beneficial in 
the irnnediate future. VP-13 will be held at Sen Diego to launch an ii>- 
tensive transitional training program in combination with the Training 
lest and Acceptance Unit already in operation for patrol planes. It is 
recognized that further drains on combatant squadrons are undesirable 
but the training centers must continue to function or the supply of 
pilots for the organisation of new squadrons will not be adequate. Every 
experienced aviation officer in the training establishnent ashore will 
be released for duty in fleet squodrons as soon as he can be replaced. 
The majority of the expansion of the aeronautical organization afloat 
will be accomplished without disturbing pilots already in fleet squadrons. 

▲side from transitional training in the larger ps.trol planes, 
pilots and enlisted members of flight crews must be trained in fleet patrol 
squadrons whose primary task is their nreparation for duty in active coi*- 
batant squadrons. Althotigh every squadron on the West Coast may be 
assigned this duty, it will be necessary for Patrol Wings OND and T.iO 
in the Hawaiian Area to absorb pny excess in personnel that cflnnot be 
trained effectively because of insufficient numbers of aircraft and quali- 
fied personnel. 

There will be an advanced carrier training organisation at 

Snn Diego in accordsjice with my letter of 28 July, Additional new VO/VS 

pilots will commence re-oorting to the Fleet during August, Any of these 

pilots who cojinot be trained expeditiously on boprd ship should be retained 

in the advanced carrier trpinlng squadron at Spn Diego for more flying, 

particularly gunnery, at the discretion of the Fleet. 

■ 17. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2203 

SECRST 

The priority pccorded to the Amy end British heavy honter 

orogracs has l)een the cause of oxtr nost urgent attention. The flnftl 

action on priorities was decided at a conference 'between the Secretary 

of the Navy and the Secretary of War which was attended by representa^ 

tives of the Amy ji.iT Corps, the Bureau of Aeronautics and the Office 

of Production Management. The net result was an A-l-t award to anproxl- 

nately 2,000 (plus or ninus 500) additional naval aircraft, and hrings 

a total of 3,596 naval aircraft into the highest nriority classification 

given to aircraft. One hundred per cent spare ai^tcraft are now planned 

for fleet carrier and ship-based squadrons, and fifty per cent spare 

aircraft have heen recpiested for petrol squadrons. 

In connection with the foregoing, the Chief of the Bureau of 
navigation renarksJ 

"The Chief of Naval Operations in his confidential letter^ 
0p-23-B5,(SC) Pll-1, Serial 081322 of July 28, 1941, directed Coraandeiw 
in-Chief , Pacific Fleet end Comnander-in-Chief , Atlantic Fleet to es- 
tablish as quickly as practicable within their respective fleets, the 
following unite; 

(a) Advanced Carrier Training Group, Pacific and Advanced 
Carrier Training Group, Atlantic— for the Pacific Fleet, in San Diego 
and for the Atlantic Fleet, In Norfolk, Virginie^-^Purpose of these 
groups is to give advenced carrier training to newly graduated naval 
aviators, fresh fron training centers, prior to assignment to carrier 
units in the two fleets. 

(b) Transition Training Squedron, Atlsntic and Transition 
Training Squadron, Pacific — Pui^ose of these sqiiadrons is to give advpnced 
patrol plane tr?ining to newly graduated naval rviators, fresh fron the 
training centers, prior to assignment to Patrol plane units in the two 
fleets. These squadrons eJ.60 train experienced aviators in the operation 
of the model EB2Y airplanes in the Pacific Fleet and the r.odel P3M air- 
planes in the A.tlantic Fleet. 18. 



2204 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

SECK5T 

Experienced Naval Aviators hpve plready been ordered to report 

to these training groups pnd equpdrons when they are forned by Comnander- 

in-Chief, Pacific and Conraander-iB-Chief, Atlantic. These aviators will 

oversee and administer the training of the personnel ordered to these 

units. 

By the letter referred to Pbove, Chief of Naval Operations 
has indicated that during the months of August to Decenber, 1941, inclu- 
sive, a total of 130 additional pilots for battleships and cruisers will 
be ordered to bothtfleets. Also, for the spne period, 334 carrier Dilots 
and 598 patrol plane pilots will be ordered to the above jnentioned. 
training units for assignnent to each fleet. 

After January, 1942, the training centers will be turning 
pilots out at such a rate thPt »>t all tires therepfter, we will always 
have sufficient pilots under advanced and transition training or in the 
operating aviation units to noet all the fleet requirenents, including 
double complements of petrol squadrons. 

Based on present estimates, the output of Class "A" Group IV 

Schools trainigg aviation ratings aiid radiomen (qualair) will be approxi-* 

nately 27,096 enlisted men (Navy) from August 1941 through June 1942, 
Sixty-five (65) nercent of the graduates of these Class "a" 
Schools have been narked for Pensacola, Corpus Christi, Jacksonville 
and Miami, until about 8,170 grrdxiates h?ve been fed Into the flight 
training centers, filling their allowances (in total numbers) by pbout 
January 20, 1942. 

This will leave an estimated bp lance of 18,926 Glass "A" School 

graduates for the Jorces Afloat and other shore establishments by June 
30, 1942. 

The allowances of patrol nlane squadrons have been increased 

220^3 over the 1941 allowances.' 

Paragraph 4(b) of youy letter . New Torpedo Planes . Highest 
priority — A-l-a — instead of present priority which is A-l-b, There 
are only half enough torpedo planes now and they are obsolescent, while 
war reports demonstrate that there nay be no single item of greater 
naval impoatance. 



19. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2205 

SECRET 

Comiaent . The A-l-a rating for torpedo plpnes wrs aot BRtis- 

fftctory to the Wpr Depprtnent and^the JOffice of Production Mftixagenent ^ 

without unP-coeptRtle reduction in priority of other wvpI pircrpft. \V» 

There is good reason to question whether a higher priority for torpedo ^ 

plpnee would hp.ve expedited their delivery. The Hpvy DepPTtnent will j 

continue to exert naxinun effort to expedite the production of TfTB for J 

the fleet. 



Coment . The conversion of the U.S.S. ■AKEFIELD pnd 

incor- jVk 



Ppragraph 4(c) of your letter . CGnversions for Ca rrier Land- .^ 
ing Trpininp . Auxilipry pircrpft carrier conversion was dropped hecpuse .^ 

of tine pnd cost factors. These cpn l>e greatly reduced by reouiring ^ 

only the characteristics needed for landing talnlng. The need for these Vvf 

ships is extrene. Aircraft carriers should not, and in w?r cpnnot, be a 

used for this purpose, while new -nilots nust he properly trained hefore ,J 

Joining pxtive squadrons if conhat readiness is not to be Jeopardized. \ 

U.S.S. ^J 
. x^ 

J *s 

porated is contenplated. Steps are now being tpken to procure naterial -? -S 

and equipment. The actual conversions will be initiated whenever present ^ V^ 

services of these vessels as transports can be concluded. It is probable J j 

also the the U.S.S. WEST POINT will be included in the pbove cptegory, -" 

Paragraph 4(d) of your letter . A.S.V. (ioiti-Surface Vessel) 
Equipment . This is of the highest potent ipl vplue. apparently none 
will be available for p8.trol planes until Decenber. It can be cai;:ried 
by other planes, as shown by reports of British toi-pedo plane operations. 
It shotild be provided for every plane that ceji carry it aiuL laueh earlier 
deliveries are essential. 

There is an aircraft BjJiMR project set up in the Bureeu of 
Aeronautics with the objective of providing all necesspry equipment that 
can be carried and operated efficiently in aircraft with due considera- 
tion for other essentipl equipment. The training of lUHAE operators is 
underway so that by the tine the equipaient arrives there will be trained 

personnel who are essential for its successful operation. aSV sets will 
be provided as alternate installptions in p11 carrier -olaJies that can 
accommodate them and all pa.trol ulrnes will be ASV-equipped, Every possi- 
ble source of supply, including British pnd Canadipn, is being investi- 
geted to accelerate the progrpn. Three hundred Canadian ASV equipment 
sets are expected at the monthly rpte of one hundred sets corjnencing 
1 October, 1941. 20, 



2206 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

SjiCBJiT 

or Joe J flomittii!^. Ihia la Absolutely conplementary to and esostifU 
for effective u«e of the Bftdar for Aircraft defense of the Tleat, with- 
out it, the Rada* eaanot differentiate between friendly and enei^ airplanes. 
There is no definite infomation on deliveries, Ko delay whate(ver is 
acceptable. 

SSMSal* This subject h»s been discussed elsewhere in this 
letter. However, it should be remarked that the Interior Control Board 
is setting up essential requirements for BAQAH equipment on boaxd ship. 
The Board has been Pdvised to incorporate the identification feature In 
ship control ajid flrec control sets since t'h > » » Is ga^A a n e Mfla t e b oiiie v e — 
-«»»- Identification is a very necessary pprt of the BADtsE Installation. 

^fffPff-pPh at) 9f y9Vr ^ontr- gngines f9r Haw Patrol Planes 
ifiatgjj.. Hose section failures have been occurring. Every effort Is 
^eis«_»ede to find and cure the trouble. This should be continued, for 
it will be no help to the Fleet or to any destination of these planes to 
get new planes that can't fly In place of older planes that can. 

Comnegt. The Bureau of Aeronautics and the engine manufacturer 
have been advised of the no«e section failures In the engines of VP-14, 
The loose-coupled shaft In these engines will elininate the restrictions 
on operating the engine within the -oresent critical speed range. However, 
this does not apply to VP-14 but this sciuadron is being supplied new heavier 
nose sections which the bureau believes will correct present deficiencies 
If engine speeds are kept outside the critical range. Only thrfee planes 
outside VP-14 have encountered failures In the light nose sections. The 
Heavy noses will be shipped from the factory at the rate of ten per week 

beginning August 11, 1941, with first deliveries to VP-14. 

Paragraph 4(g) of youp latter. Landplane Ti eld at Johnston 
Island. This wa^ removed from the project by the Department. It should 
be put back. It is needed not only as an adjunct to local defense but, 
more importantly, as en aid to defense pgainst expeditions headed east- 
ward and as a stepping stone for lendplane support of expeditions headed 
westward. 

Comment:. Funds in the amount of $750,000 for this project are 

available and the necessary construction work has been authorized. 

Paragraph 4(h) of your letter ^ K^ehl Lagoon Developcent . 
This will be of very great value to patrol plsnes in the He\/aiian area. 
It is the best location for operations of these planes and no other place 
Is suitable for planned patrol plane expenslon In this area. Inclusion 
of facilities for Navy patrol squadrons in this develoiaient should be 
undertaken iEDediptely, 

31. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2207 



Cocpgnt . The Navy DapArtment hae included Eeehi Lagoon as one 
of fch9 Vavyo-tponsored developments for cOEBeroial seaplanes in the Hawaiian 
N area in its reconnendations to the Oep^rtnent of Cotuserce. The War D^- 



/j 



partment has aa appropriation of approxiciitely 83,300.000 for this project 
. ^ and arrangements are 'being made for additional funds for the dredging 
^^ vhi«h la expected to ooonence very sooB* Vfcry patrol plane facilities 

are not Included in the provpeotive plans for ttis location. Any special 
facilities for naval patrol planes for the present at least must "be of 
a temporary nature. 

?wag>ift Ml) 9f ygK l^Hn* ffgT^towfflt tf m Pn»^gf 

Bf^>t9y's foifl ^. This approved developcant is very urgently needed, 
there is a strong tendency to turn down many aviation shore facility 
items in this area on the hasli that thay will be available when Barber's 
point construction is finisbsA« This mates it more thPA ever mandatory 
to e::pedite the work. 



^. Tour eeomeat on the need f<tr this development is 
supported who^e»heartedljr in the Department and will receive the most 
careful attention until it meets the Fleet's need, ruads for Barber's 
Point in the amount 9f 618,605.000 will be available in August and work 
begun immediately If the bill, now pending in Congress, is passed by the 
Senate and signed by the President. The bill has already passed the House 
and has been approved by the Haval Affairs Committee of the Senate, 

I have gone into the subjects you raised in some detail because I 
want you to be fully advised. Don't hesiliate to tell us hew you think 
we can help. We want to be of all assistance possible, end helpful criti- 
cism is always in order. 

lou no doubt have seen in the press about otu: conference at 
sea. Aside from being a most historic occasion, it was mdst helpful. 
It Is to my deep regret that time and distance precluded your being pres> 
•at« 



with all good wishes r 1 «ml^ CT yr 
r ^ Sincere Iv. 



J , ' - Sincerely, 
O** /S/ Betty 



2208 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

(Rec'd. Clipper 3rd Sept.) 
Navy Department, 
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, 

Washington, 28 August 1941. 
Secret 
In reply refer to Initials and No. Op-10 Hu 

Dear Mustapha : Have been trying to get a letter off to you for a week, al- 
though what I have already sent you covers fairly well our situation to date. 
I do, however, want once again to thank you for your splendid letter of August 
12th which has been so thoroughly enjoyed by everybody. It gave us a great 
close-up of the Fleet which was more than welcome. 

As of today we have about 262.000 men. Reenlistments for the year to date 
average something over 70% and the same is true for the month of Jaly. Our 
advertising campaign for men is bearing fruit and we hope next month to get 
at least 10.000, and our best hopes might realize 11,000. Our goal is not less 
than 12,000. Tommy Holcomb expects to reach his allowed 75,000 in March. 
The goal for enlisted men (Navy) is all I can get, regardless of deficits or 
what not. 

I shoved off the letter on RDF just as it came to me and with the rough notes 
I had made, and I really should apologize for its form, but the substance was 
there and that letter, together with the previous table which had been sent out 
by BuShips will, I believe, give your people the best picture we have. 

I note what you say about not resting until you get the' patrol vessels you 
have requested in official correspondence. I might add "neither will I". You 
know I am keenly alive to your needs. At present we are constantly fighting 
material shortage and priorities. You are thoroughly familiar with the building 
program and the dates of completion so no need to comment on it. We are 
ahead of schedule at present but the steel situation grows more critical daily 
and at last I believe the blocks are going to be put on unnecessary civilian needs. 
Our small ship program was the most difficult to get started. I was pei'fectly 
delighted the other day when some one told me they had tried to buy an electric 
refrigerator but it could not be had. Another example: I ordered an electric 
heater for the cottage at the Lake direct from the Westinghouse wholesale 
people here in Washington, who inform me it is well I got my order in when I 
did because it was the last one and no more would be manufactured. It has 
taken a long time to get the psychology started. I say started, because the 
country still is to a considerable extent, asleep to the efforts required. 

[2] I am perfectly delighted with your reaction to the recent directives from 
the Office of Fleet Training relative to target practices. Of course, Lee was tickled 
to pieces over your enthusiastic comment. 

I have talked not only to Nimitz but also to Carpender, who came down to see 
me after I had given Nimitz your notes with regard to personnel. You will have 
heard from Bunav direct. 

I am delighted also over your comment about the reaction facilities and hope 
the good work in this connection may continue to expand until the situation is 
satisfactory. 

I am told an official letter was sent to you on the Defense Battalion situation 
so will not repeat here. 

Once again, thanks for the human side of the news. 

With regard to the general situation in the Pacific about all I can say is the 
Japs seem to have arrived at another one of their indecisive periods. I can only 
intimate to you that some very strong messages have been sent to them but just 
what they are going to do I don't know. 

I told one of their Statesmen this morning that I felt another move, such as 
one into Thailand, would go a long way towards destroying before the American 
public what good-will still remained. As you know, I have had some extremely 
frank talks with them. 

I have not given up hope of continuing peace in the Pacific, but I could wish 
the thread by which it continues to hang were not so slender. 

There is much talk of the Japanese barring ships carrying anns to Russia. I 
am delighted that when Admiral Hart asked us to make the Sulu Sea a closed 
area we did not do it although there was some pressure here for it. One of 
my principal reasons against doing it was because of the precedent which it 
might establish, and thus give the Japs something to hang their hat on if later 
they wanted to make a similar pronouncement regarding the Sea of Japan. 
We have to go through one of those holes in the wall to get to the Russian 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2209 

Maritime Provinces. This also brings up the case of the so-called neutrality zone 
encircling the Western Hemisphere. But that, like the recent closing of the 
Canal to Japanese ships, is water over the dam and I won't bother you with my 
troubles on those pronouncements. 

Regardless of the will to do all you want in the line of permanence of per- 
sonnel, please keep in mind the tremendous expansion we are up against, and 
the many ships which have to be commissioned. Notwithstanding the fact that 
at least some of us foresaw that, regardless of our efforts, there just has to be 
considerable compromise in the arduous task of building up and manning the 
so-called Two-Ocean Navy, not to mention all the other stuff from AKs and APs 
to AMs and ATs. 

[3] Not in the way of an excuse, because I am not making any, but just 
giving reasons, I checked up on one of the battleships in the last war which had 
been in commission about a year. It has a complement of 65 officers, but of this 
number had only 13 regulars, including paymasters and doctors, in the entire 
outfit. The other 52 were all Reserves and temporaries. Nevertheless, 1 am told 
those 52 filled their billets very well and that they had a fine ship. I think histoiy 
has got to repeat itself, and the only thing I see to do is loyally to attempt to 
solve our present situation and do the best we can with what we have, and I know 
of no one better than yourself to tackle the job. That is why you are where 
you are. 

I expect all the kicks and forceful reasons you can send me for change and 
help and I will go just as far as it is humanly possible to do and so will every- 
body else in the Department. 

We all know that Naval personnel will rise up and do better under great diffi- 
culties than they will when things are easy and serene (if they ever were). 

You will be glad to know that the vibration troubles which, to put it mildly, 
were cause for concern in the WASHINGTON and NORTH CAROLINA are 
uearing solution. 

I am delighted the West Coast visits are proving so helpful. I hope they will 
not have to be stopped but only time will tell. 

I do not recall for the moment whether or not in previous correspondence I 
acknowledged receipt of your letter of 30 July regarding using one of your 
carriers for ferrying planes to the Russians. This is just one of the headaches 
we have here. 

Mrs. Hull ought to be reminding me that she has a mother for whom she has to 
get dinner because it is 1830. My day is just beginning. 

Keep cheerful and as always every good wish in the wide world to you all and 
best of luck. 

Sincerely, 

/s/ Betty 

Admiral H. E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, 

Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, 
V8S Pennsylvania, 

c/o Postmaster, Sati Francisco, California. 



Op-lO-MD 

Secret 

September 22, 1941. 

De:ae Tommy : Considerable has happened since I last wrote to you. 

So far as the Atlantic is concerned, we are all but, if not actually, in it. The 
President's speech of September 11, 1941 put the matter squarely before the 
country and outlined what he expected of the Navy. We were ready for this ; in 
fact, our orders had been issued. 

In addition to the incidents cited by the President, other and probably equally 
compelling reasons lay behind his decision. For some time, the British have 
found the problem of getting supplies across the Atlantic a difficult one. They 
have never had enough ships suitable for escort duty. Their forces are thinly 
spread and, as a result of casualties, the spreading has had to be thinner and 
thinner as the campaign has progressed. If Britain is to continue, she has to have 
assistance. She will now get it openly. King's forces, too, are thinly spread, 
working as he is from 20 South to the Iceland area. 

In a nutshell, we are now escorting convoys regularly from the United States to 
points in the Iceland area, where tb^se convoys are picked up by the British and 
escorted to the British Isles. In addition to our own escort vessels, t^e Canadiaris 



2210 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

are participating. Both forces (Canadian and our own) are operating under 
King's direction. 

This will be a boon for the British. It will permit them to strengthen their 
forces elsewhere, both with heavy and light ships, particularly in critical areas 
through which convoys for the Near East, via the Cape of Good Hope, must pass. 
It will further help the British to meet the ever-present threat of a raid on troop 
or merchant ship convoys by heavy units, in that it will narrow the area in which 
the British heavy units will be required to be resp«nusible. Moreover, ships for 
other possible activities, such as duty in the Mediterranean, etc., will thus be 
released. 

[2] The area which we regard as "our ocean" is roughly outlined as follows : 
all west of a line 10° West Longitude to Latitude 65° North, thence by rhumb line 
to a position 53° North, 26° West, thence south on 26°. Unless the Axis powers 
withdraw their men-of-war from this area, contacts are almost certain to occur. 
The rest requires little imagination. 

The GREER incident created quite a stir. Senator Clark (Missouri) pushed a 
resolution through the Senate which called for the log of the ship. This, we will 
not furnish. Mr. Nye (North Dakota) submitted a resolution calling for an 
investigation by the Naval Affairs Committee into the whole incident. The 
enclosed is a statement I propose to make — and pretty well gives you the story. 

Iceland has, of course, in recent months, taken on much significance for us. 
Since the President's speech, it lias taken on added significance. Since July, we 
have had 450(J marines there, and on Monday last we landed some (3000 Army. 
While this Army convoy was enix)ute, the Germans had by far the strongest con- 
centration of U-boats that they have ever had in the North Atlantic. It was so 
strong and so active that it raised the very devil with a British-escorted convoy, 
the Germans claiming 28 ships sunk. About half that number is more nearly 
correct, and admitted by the British. Our own Army troop convoy was in the 
immediate vicinity of the attack and had to be re-routed by despatch several times 
in au effort to avoid the area of action. At that, seven SS contacts were had. 
We should have gotten at least one SS, which was attacked under favorable 
circumstances. 

As to conditions in your part of the world, Mr. Hull has not yet given up hope of 
a satisfactory settlement of our differences with Japan. Chances of such a 
settlement are, in my judgment, very slight. Admiral Nonuira is working hard 
on his home government and, while he appears to be making some progress, I am 
still from Missouri. It looks like a dead-lock; but I suppose as long as there is 
negotiation there is hope. 

The press is making much at the moment of the way the Far Eastern situation 
has apparently quieted down. One cannot help being impre.ssed with the 
optimistic note of the editorial writers and columnists in tliis regard. For my 
own part, I feel that false hopes are being raised. While on the surface the 
Japanese appear to be making mme effort at reaching a satisfactory solution, I 
can not disregard the possibility that they are merely stalling for time and 
waiting until the situation in Europe becomes more stabilized. If Russia falls, 
Japan is not going to be easily pried away from her Axis associations. [5] 
She will no doubt grab any opportunity that presents itself to improve her position 
in Siberia. If Russia can hold out (which, at the moment, hardly appears pos- 
sible), I feel that there might be more hope of some sort of an agreement with 
Japan. 

The same sort of false hopes are being raised in our press with reference to 
the German-Russian situation. There is no question but that the Greece and 
Crete incidents delayed Germany's move on their Eastern front. I think it 
quite probable that they intended to move against Russia earlier in the year. 
If the delay incident to the two campaigns noted above have introduced sufficient 
delay in their time table, which, coupled with Russian resistance, will permit 
the Russians to carry on some sort of a front this winter, then possibly those 
two debacles were not entirely without compensation. The Hun is after the 
Buss Army. It has proved far more of a stumbling block than Hitler had 
imagined. However, the Germans are making steady progress. The Russian 
losses in men and material are great, and production of essential war materials 
is being much lessened. 'When the Harriman mission returns from Moscow 
(Admiral Standley is our senior Navy meml)er), we will pi'obably get some real 
news. Harry Hopkins saw only Stalin. The Russians Military Mission that 
is now in the United States has presented very large requests for war materials, 
and it makes our own planning an ever changing affair. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2211 

You now have our reply to your oflScial recommendation concerning the with- 
drawal of the Marines from China. We recognize the soundness of all your 
arguments, pro and con, and we put some weight on those questioning withdrawal. 
We feel that a complete withdrawal of our forces from China would create a 
reaction in that country and in Japan and in our own, that would be bad. 
So, for the moment at least, we will hang on. 1 know you will open it up again 
by letter or despatch if you consider it should l)e again reviewed; and it very 
well may be — there is little that is static in this old world at present. 

I would be less than frank if I did not tell you that I am not fully supported in 
the above view. Tommy Holcomb wants to withdraw, lock, stock, and barrel. 
I can easily see his point of view. He wants to avoid, if at all possible, "blood 
letting". In this, he is supported by Colonel Peck. That officer feels that all 
or none of the marines should come out. Peck is against leaving a "token 
force". He feels that to do so, we are inviting trouble and that the "token 
force" can be of little support to the local police. In that, I agree. But, 
something bigger is at stake. So far as China is concerned, we have "our foot in 
the door" — the door that once was "open", and if I had the say to, it would 
remain there until I was ready to withdraw [4\ it — or until the door 

opened to such a point that I could gracefully withdraw if and when I saw fit. I 
agree that proper timing may be extremely difficult. You may be right that 
they should come now. I hope I am right in holding on. Ultimately, I hope 
we may both see alike. I don't enjoy not being 100% with you. 

You know how I have long felt about reinforcing the Philippines. The enclosed 
memorandum shows what is in the wind. Personallj', I am delighted, and I am 
sure you will be, too. I thuik it should have a pronounced effect in prevention — 
or, if not, then in execution. 

We are awaiting with interest your reply to our despatch about additional 
aircraft for you and our proposition about giving you some additional long- 
range submarines. It is, I take it, largely a question of your upkeep facilities. 

Take care of yourself. Keep cheerful ! And every good wish in the wide 
world. 

Sincerely, 

[s] Betty 

Admiral T. C. Habt, USN 

Cotnimander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet 

% Postmaster, Asiatic Station, 
San Francisco, California. 



Secret 

Memorandum for Admiral Stark : 

Septembeb 12, 1941. 

Dear Betty : You asked me about what we are doing for the Philippines : 

August 26: There sailed from San Francisco part of a regiment of antiaircraft 
troops and some reserve supplies. 

September 8: There sailed from San Francisco the remainder of the anti- 
aircraft regiment, a tank battalion of 50 tanks, 50 of the latest pursuit planes, 
and the personnel to man them, which brings the modern pursuit planes in the 
Philippines up to 80. 

September J 8: 50 self-propelled mounts for 75 cannon to be shipped from San 
Francisco, and 50 more tanks. 

Today The squadron of nine Flying Fortresses landed in Manila after suc- 
cessfully flying the route Midway, Wake, New Britain, Dutch East Indies. 

September 30: Two squadrons (26 planes) of Flying Fortresses will leave San 
Francisco for Hawaii en route to the Philippines. 

October: A reserve of pursuit planes will have been in process of shipment, 
about 32 in October, rising to a total of 130 by December. 

November: Probably a reserve of six to nine of the super Flying Fortresses, 
B-24 type planes will be transferred to Manila. The.se planes will have an oper- 
ating radius of 1,500 miles, with a load of 14,000 bombs, which means that they 
can reach 0.saka with a full load and Tokyo with a partial load. They have 
pressure cabins and can operate continuously 35,000 feet for bombing. 

December: Another group of Flying Fortresses, some 35 planes, goes to 
Manila. 

A group of dive bombers, some 54 planes, also goes. 



2212 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

A group of pursuit, some 130 planes, along with two additional squadrons to 
build up the previous pursuit group, will be dispatched. 
A 50% reserve is being established for all these planes. 



You may have had word of this already ; 
I gave original to Mr. Stimson. 



G. C. M. 

Chief of Staff. 



(Rec'd 4 Oct.) 

Navy Depaktment, 
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, 

Washington, 23 September lO^l. 

In reply refer to Initials and No. Op-10 Hu 
Secret 

Deab Kimmel: This is in reply to your letter of 12 September. I have sent 
you a copy of my letter of 22 September to Tommy Hart which gives some of 
the picture as I see it up to that date. 

At the present time the President has issued shooting orders only for the 
Atlantic and Southeast Pacific sub-area. 

The situation in the Pacific generally is far different from what it Is in the 
Atlantic. The operations of raiders in the Pacific at present are not very wide- 
spread or very effective. Most of the merchantmen in the Pacific are of United 
States or Panamanian flag registry. Instittuing any steps toward eliminating 
raiders outside of waters close to the continents of North and South America, 
might have unfavorable repercussions, which would not be worth the cost to the 
United States in the long run. The longer we can keep the situation in the 
Pacific in status quo, the better for all concerned. 

One of the things you did not mention is what action the United States and 
the United Kingdom would take were Japan to attack Siberia. The policy of 
either government under such circumstances has not yet been clarified. In the 
meantime we are preparing an agenda for staff conversations with the Russians. 

In reply to question (a) your existing orders to escorts are appropriate under 
the present situation. They are also in accordance with Art. 723 U. S. Navy 
Regulations ; no orders should be given to shoot at the Present Time, other 
than those clearly set forth in this article. I believe there is little possibility 
of an Italian or German raider molesting a naval ship, but there might be an- 
other "Robin Moore" incident in the Pacific, in which case the President might 
give orders for action in the Pacific similar to those now in effect in the Atlantic ; 
but that is something for the future. 

Art. 723, U. S. N. R. reads as follows : 

"The use of force against a foreign and friendly state or against anyone within 
the territories thereof, is illegal. 

The right of self-preservation, however, is a right which belongs to States as 
well as to individuals, and in the case of States it includes the protection of the 
State, its honor, and its possessions, and the lives and property of its citizens 
against arbitrary violence, actual or impending, [2] whereby the State 
or its citizens may suffer irreparable injury. The conditions calling for the 
application of the right of self-preservation cannot be defined beforehand, but 
must be left to the sound judgment of responsible ofllcers, who are to perform 
their duties in this respect with all possible care and forbearance. In no case 
shall force be exercised in time of peace otherwise than as an application of 
the right of self-preservation as above defined. It must be used only as a last 
resort, and then only to the extent which is absolutely necessary to accomplish 
the end required. It can never be exercised with a view to inflicting punishment 
for acts already committed." 

Regarding question (b), we have no definite information that Japanese sub- 
marines have ever operated in close vicinity to the Hawaiian Islands, Alaska 
or our Pacific Coast. They may have been near Wake recently. The existing 
orders, that is not to bomb suspected submarines except in the defensive sea 
areas, are appropriate. If conclusive, and I repeat conclusive, evidence is 
obtained that Japanese submarines are actually in or near United States terri- 
tory, then a strong warning and a threat of hostile action against such sub- 
marines would appear to be our next stop. Keep us informed. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2213 

We have no intention of furtjier reducing the Pacific Fleet except that pre- 
scribed in Rainbow 5, that is the withdrawal of four cruisers about one month 
after Japan and the United States are at war. The existing force in the Pacific 
Is all that can be spared for the tasks assigned your fieet, and new construction 
will not make itself felt until next year. 

The operations of the Pacific Fleet ought not to be considered separately 
from the operations of the Asiatic Fleet and the British and Dutch forces in the 
Far East. Furthermore, the Japan-Soviet situation requires considerable 
attention from Japan's naval forces. While offensives by the Pacific Fleet in 
the Central Pacific may not draw important Japanese naval forces in that direc- 
tion, they ought to have an important effect in pinning the Japanese Navy to 
northern water, or to bases in the Western Pacific, and thus divert them away 
from the Philippines and the Malay Barrier. By copy of my letter to Admiral 
Hart you now know that the Armiy is building up its Philippine Garrison, and 
plans important increases in Army air forces in the Philippines. Dutch and 
British air and land forces are also gradually increasing in strength. We are 
now informed by the British that thej plan to send the Battleships ROYAL 
SOVERIGN, RAMILIES and RESOLUTION to arrive on the East Indian 
Station by late December ; to retain there the REPULSE until relieved by the 
RENOWN in January ; and to send one or two modern capital ships to the East 
Indian Station early in the new year. These, with one carrier, and a total of 
four eight-inch cruisers and thirteen six-inch cruisers (seven modern) ought to 
make the task of the Japanese in moving southward considerably more difficult. 
It should make Japan think twice before taking action, if she has taken no action 
by that time. 

[3] I may be mistaken, but I do not believe that the major portion of the 
Japanese Fleet is likely to be sent to the Marshalls or the Caroline Islands under 
circumstances that now seem possible. 

The NORTH CAROLINA and the WASHINGTON are not as yet finally com- 
pleted and have had no target practice. We ought to put aside any thought 
that these two battleships will be of any practical use to us before the end of 
next March, and I would consider it most unwise to reach any final decision 
now as to which Fleet they ought ultimately to be attached. At present, the 
need for them is far greater in the Atlantic than in the Pacific, particularly if 
we are to make possible the movement of British naval forces from the Atlantic 
to the Far East Area. 

With regard to the first and last paragraphs on page two, I believe that, in all 
probability, the Pacific Fleet can operate successfully and effectively even 
though decidedly weaker than the entire Japanese Fleet, which certainly can 
be concentrated in one area only with the greatest diflBculty. 

The following despatch has just been brought to my attention. You no doubt 
have seen it but I will quote it as a reminder. 

"Rear Admiral Toshio Matsunaga Retired in interview published in Hochi 
States Japanese should face future with calm confidence in ability Army Navy 
repel air attacks x Japan need not worry about weak ABCD powers encircle- 
ment plans X quoted as stating he has fiown over Guana total sixteen times once 
this year without sighting single American plane x American air power Far 
East negligible x prior retirement Matsunaga served twelve years as aviator 
Commander Ryujo Acagi Tateyama Air Station now Director Japan airways." 

In connection with the foregoing would it not be possible for your force to 
"carefully" get some pictures of the Mandated Islands? 

Keep Cheerful. 

Admiral H. E. Kimmel, U. S. N., 

Commander in Chief, U. »*?. Pacific Fleet, 
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, 

c/o postmaster, San Francisco, California. 

P. S. I have held this letter up pending a talk with Mr. Hull who has asked 
me to hold it very secret. I may sum it up by saying that conversations with 
the Japs have practieally reached an impasse. As I see it we can get nowhere 
towards a settlement and peace in the Far East until and unless there is some 
agreement between Japan and China — and just now that seems remote. Whether 
or not their inability to come to any sort of an understanding just now — is — or — 
is not — a good thing — I hesitate to say. 

Copy to Admiral Hart. 

29 Spetembeb 1941. 

P. S. #2 : Admiral Nomura came in to see ine this morning. We talked for 
about an hour. He usually comes in when he begins to feel near the end of his 



2214 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

rope ; there is not much to spare at the end now. I have helped before but 
whether I can this time or not I do not know. Conversations without results 
cannot last forever. If they fall through, and it looks like they might, the situa- 
tion could only grow more tense. I have again talked to Mr. Hull and I think 
he will make one more try. He keeps me pretty fully informed and if there 
is anything of moment I will, of course, hasten to let you know. 

Our transports which recently landed a contingent of Army in Iceland will, 
God willing, in another day be clear of the submarine concentration through 
which they have had to run and we will breathe easy with regard to them. How- 
ever, it is a continuous game now and yesterday I am glad to state we delivered 
our first big convoy to the British after having gone through safely from New- 
foundland well into the Eastern Atlantic. We also have a combatant force 
going up to strengthen the Iceland situation for the next few weeks because of 
the British situation and the possibility of a sortie of a German contingent 
which is under surveillance. 

I saw a photograph of your picture. It looks great and I think it is a fine 
thing to have it recorded ; the boys will be proud of it always. 

[s] Betty 

Secret Received 23 Oct. 

Op-10 Hu Navt Depabtment, 

Ofeice of the Chief of Naval Opekations, 

Washington, 11 Octo1)er 1941. 

Deab Kimmex: Things have been popping here for the last twenty-four hours 
but from our despatches you know about all that we do. 

Personnally I do not believe the Japs are going to sail into us and the message 
I sent you merely stated the "possibility" ; in fact I tempered the message handed 
to me considerably. Perhaps I am wi-ong, but I hope not. In any case after long 
pow-wows in the White House it was felt we should be on guard, at least until 
something indicates the trend. 

If I recall correctly I wrote you or Tommie Hart a forecast of the fall of the 
Japanese Cabinet a couple of weeks ago after my long conference with Nomura 
and gave the dope as I saw it. 

You will also recall in an earlier letter when War Plans was forecasting a 
Japanese attack on Siberia in August, I said my own judgment was that they 
would make no move in that direction until the Russian situation showed a 
definite trend. I think this whole thing works up together. 

With regard to merchant shipping it seemed an appropriate time to get the 
reins in our hands and get our routing of them going. In other words, take the 
rap now from the Hill and the Press and all the knockers, so that if and when 
it becomes an actual necessity to do it, it will be working smoothly. 

We shall continue to strive to maintain the status quo in the Pacific. How 
long it can be kept going I don't know, but the President and Mr. Hull are 
working on it. 

The stumbling block, of course, is the Chinese incident and personnally without 
going into all its ramifications and face-saving and Japanese Army attitude, civil 
attitude and Navy attitude I hardly see any way around it. I think we could 
settle with Nomura in five minutes but the Japanese Army is the stumbling block. 
Incidentally, the Chinese also think that they will lick Japan before they get 
through and are all for keeping going rather than giving way anywhere. A nice 
setup for not sounding the gong. 

Kitts was in this morning and I shall have a long talk with him before he 
goes back. 

Off hand without going into the "ins" and "outs" I see no reason for your 
stopping your normal visits to the Coast. The ships concerned constitute self- 
contained task forces. We have left it up to you and I am just giving you 
my reaction. 

We have no other news yet regarding the torpedoing of the KEARNY except 
that she was hit and is proceeding slowly to Iceland. She was deflected from 
an American escorted convoy to a Canadian escorted convoy which was being hard 
pressed. Of course losses are bound to be in order. My hope is that they can 
be kept to a mininmm with the curve ever favoring our end. 

In August for the first time there was a slight net gain in shipping. Our 
effort, of course, is to have that confirmed in subsequent months for two reasons — 
accelerated shipbuilding and better protection to convoys with results — decreased 
sinkings. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2215 

I know how you and Admiral Hart must be pleased with the Army increased 
air In the Philippines. The Island of Wake is a vital link in this connection. 
If it is put out of commission it stops Army air reinforcements. I hope we can 
maintain the integrity of these Island bases and push as fast as possible their 
completion. You have all the dope that I have on this and know the studies that 
are being made for alternate routes. 

You will be glad to know that recruiting is still on the increase and I can assure 
you I have your personnel situation always on my conscience as well. as most 
every other situation affecting everything afloat. 
Keep cheerful ! 
Sincerely, 

Bbttt. 
Will add a P. S. in the a : m., want this to make the clipper. 

H. R. S. 
Admiral H. E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, 

Commander in Chief, U. 8. Pacific Fleet, 
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, 

c/o Postmaster, San Francisco, California. 

P. S. Very little news from the Kearny, and we are asking her nothing, feel- 
ing that she will notify us as soon as she can. Radio silence may be essential. 
All we do know is that she was torpedoed in the forward fire room and is now 
making 8 knots. Not a thing on casualties or beyond the bare facts given above. 
I will release everything to the press as soon as I can, so you should know almost 
as soon as I do. 

Pinky Schuirmann made up an estimate for me yesterday on the Jap cabinet 
situatior\, which sums up my thoughts better than I have been able to -set them 
down. He and I see very much eye to eye on this. I am enclosing copy of what 
he gave me. 

Marshall just called up and was anxious that we make some sort of a recon- 
naissance so that he could feel assured that on arrival at Wake, a Japanese raider 
attack may not be in order on his bombers. I told him that we could not assure 
against any such contingency, but that I felt it extremely improbable and that, 
while we keep track of Japanese ships so far as we can, a carefully planned raid 
on any of these Island carriers in the Pacific might be diflBcult to detect. How- 
ever, we are on guard to the best of our ability and my advice to him was not 
to worry. 

He also thought it advisable that I release him at this time from the aerial 
photographs I wanted him to get of the mandates, stating that they might be 
detected and might complicate the international situation I agreed, and he 
stated that he would endeavor to make them later. 

I have nothing else for the moment. 

I will send copy of this to Tommy Hart as usual, and I assume also, as usual, 
that you will show Bloch. 

H. R. S. 



In reply refer to Initials and No. 

NAVT DEa'ARTMENT, 

Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, 

Washington, October 17, 19J/1. 
Memorandum for the C. N. O. 

I believe we are inclined to overestimate the importance of changes in the 
Japanese Cabinet as indicative of great changes in Japanese political thought 
or action. 

The plain fact is that Japanese politics has been ultimately controlled for years 
by the military. Whether or not a policy of peace or a policy of further military 
adventuring is pursued Is determined by the military based on their estimate as 
to whether the time is opportune and what they are able to do, not by what cabi- 
net is in power or on diplomatic maneuvi^ring, diplomatic notes or diplomatic 
treaties. 

Prince Konoye has been Premier and Konoye Cabinets in office for the most 
of the last five years. Time and again he and his Foreign Ministers have expressed 
disapproval of the acts committed by the Japanese Military, but remedial action 
has not been taken. 

Konoye was Premier when the attack on China began, he declared Japan's 
policy was to beat China to her knees. 



2216 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

The most that can be claimed for the last Konoye Cabinet is that it may have 
restrained the extremists among the military not that it has opposed Japan's 
program of expansion by force. When opportunities arise, during the coming 
months, which seem favorable to the military for further advance, they will be 
seized. 

At the present time the influence of the extremists goes up and down depend- 
ing on the course of the war in Russia. 

The same bill of goods, regarding the necessity of making some concession to 
the "moderates" in order to enable them to cope with the "extremists" has been 
offered to the United States since the days when Stimson was Secretary of State 
and Debuchi Ambassador. 

Present reports are that the new cabinet to be formed will be no better and 
no worse than the one which has just fallen. Jai)an may attack Russia, or may 
move southward, but in the final analysis this will be determined by the military 
on the basis of opportunity, and what they can get away with, not by what 
cabinet is in power. 

/S/ R. E. SCHUIRMANN. 



CW/vt 

Secret 

October 27, 1941. 

My Dkar Admiral Kimmel: During Commander Kitts recent visit here, he 
and Admiral Stark discussed the enclosed secret memorandum for the Secretary 
of State. Admiral Stark wished the enclosed copy to be forwarded to you and 
has directed me to do so because of his own ab.sence from the city in connection 
with the observance in Chicago of Navy Day. 
Very respectfully, 

Charles Wellborn, Jr., 

Conntumder U. S. N. 
Aide to Admiral Stark. 
Admiral H. E. Kimmel, U. S. N., 

Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, 
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, 

% Postmaster, San Francisco, Cal. 



[i] Secret 

HRS/HU 8 October 1941. 

Memorandum for the Secretary of State 

This morning you asked me what I thought would be the advantages and 
disadvantages of abolishing the combat zones around the British Isles and 
elsewhere. You also inquired as to the possibility of United States naval craft 
escorting all the way across the Atlantic ; also as to the disadvantages and 
advantages that would occur should Hitler declare war on the United States. 

The chief advantages to abolishing the combat zones, would, as I see it, be: 

(a) It would permit American flag vessels to enter British ports. This would 
be of some importance now but of much greater importance as the United 
States Merchant Marine increases in size. The United Kingdom is handicapped 
for man-power. Any great increase in their Merchant Marine might mean 
reduction In their output of munitions. Therefore, there can be no question 
but that it would be advantageous from the war effort standpoint if the United 
States flag vessels, manned by American crews, could increase the shii>ping 
both to the British Isles and to other military areas. Moreover since our ships, 
particularly those which we are now building, are generally faster than British 
cargo ships, submarine losses might be expected to decrease. 

(b) It is impracticable for the ocean e.scorts based in North America, whether 
United States or British, to make the entire trip across the Atlantic under 
normal circumstances. Furthermore, due to the fact that a large number of 
submarines have been operating in the Western Atlantic Area, no United States 
escort vessels could now be sent to the British Isles unless they were replaced 
in the Western Atlantic Area by British escort vessels. Were some of our Ships 
to operate in British waters it would have the advantage of raising British 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2217 

Morale, encouraging resistance to the Germans liy subjugated peoples and 
peoples in fear of subjugation, and would give the American people a stake in 
the decisive war area. 

(c) A special feature of the situation discussed iir subparagraph (b), would 
probably be the deterring effect on Italy with relation to a further war effort, 
and the encouraging effect on the French to resist German demands. 

[2] (d) The effect on the German people might be to lower their morale 

and thus reduce their wor effort. This, of course, might be offset to considerable 
extent, if, in the near future, they were to succeed in completely defeating the 
Russian Armies. 

(e) It seems probable that Germany would declai'e war on the United States. 
The possible disadvantages of this are referred to in the succeeding paragraph. 
The advantages of declaration of war would be that the United States would be 
given a free hand in the operation of its armed forces; it would gain important 
belligerent rights over neutral shipping and commei-ce ; and is would permit the 
Pacific and Asiatic Fleets to be employed for eradicating German raiders in the 
Pacific Ocean. It would give encouragement to resistance to the Germans by sub- 
jugated peoples and peoples in fear of subjugation. The United States could take 
appropriate action against enemy subjects, spies and agents within its borders. 
It would also permit specific offensive plans to be made by the United States Army 
and Navy. It would tremendously enhance the war effort put forth by this 
country and we could plan well into the future for the defeat of Germany with 
some assurance which we cannot now do. 

The disadvantages would be : 

(a) Until the present strength of the armed forces is materially increased 
by the programs now under way, the results which would be immediately apparent 
might be disappointing to the American and other peoples. 

(b) A declaration of war by the United States against Germany unless Germany 
had previously declared was against the United States, might bring Japan into 
the war as an active belligerent. This would be without question a decided dis- 
advantage because the United States would then be engaged in actual hostilities 
on two fronts ; something we may have to accept, but every effort should be made 
to avoid this situation. I might add that I believe efforts in this behalf will best 
be served by our continued strong stand against Japanese aggression. 

(c) It is questionable if sentiment in South America will actively support the 
United States until this country is in a position to make a much stronger effort 
by land and sea than it is now able to do and until the results of its participation 
are apparent. 

(d) A declaration of war would cause the loss of many of our contacts for 
information which we now have in Germany, Italy, and elsewhere in Europe. 
This, however, should not be a determining factor. I simply set it down, as one of 
the disadvantages. 

[S] It has long been my opinion that Germany cannot be defeated unless 
the United States is wholeheartedly in the war and makes a strong military and 
naval effort wherever strategy dictates. It would be very desirable to enter the 
war under circumstances in which Germany were the aggressor and in which 
case Japan might then be able to remain neutral. However, on the whole, it is 
my opinion that the United States should enter the war against Germany as 
soon as possible, even if hostilities with Japan must be accepted. 

It must be recognized that if Germany declares war on the United States and 
if the United States in consequence declares war on Germany, the United States 
must at the same time declare war on all nations who are Allies of Germany. This 
is particularly true in the case of Italy, as no distinction could be made at sea 
between German and Italian vessels. Such action probably would have a very 
marked effect on the morale of the Italian people. It might be possible not to 
declare war on such nations as Finland where the possibility of United States 
forces coming in contact with Finnish forces are remote. However, there are 
Finnish merchant vessels in oi)eration in the Atlantic Ocean. I do not include 
Japan as an Ally of Germany — at least — Not Yet. 

The foregoing has been hurriedly set down following your call. I thought it 
better to write it than to give it to you over the phone. 

I might finally add that I have assumed for the past two years that our country 
would not let Great Britain fall; that ultimately in order to prevent this we 
would have to enter the war and as noted above I have long felt and have stated 
that the sooner we get in the better. 

79716 0—46 — pt. 16 20 



2218 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

P. S. I did not set down in the attached notes what I have mentioned to you 
before, namely, that I do not believe Germany will declare war on us until she is 
good and ready ; that it will be a cold-blooded decision on Hitler's part if and 
when he thinks it will pay, and not until then. 

He has every excuse in the world to declare war on us now, if he were of a 
mind to. 

He had no legitimate excuse in the world (except to serve his own ends) to 
invade the countries he has. 

When he is ready, he will strike, and not before. 



Secret ' 

Op-lfr-MD 

November 4, 1941. 
Memorandum for — 

Admiral King. 

Admiral Kimmel. 

Admiral Hart. 

I am just about to get out something like the enclosed and thought you might 
be interested. 

With regard to the Salinas, she was hit by two torpedoes, one fairly well aft 
and one about half way between the first hit and the bow. The submarine then 
came up on her quarter and tired three more torpedoes, two of which went 
astern and one ahead. At this time the Salinas fired at her — thinks she hit her — 
and the Dupont is believed to have finished off the submarine. This information 
came by despatch. Detailed reports are noi >ei in. we are, oi cvuro^, o^^it- 
pedaling any materiel news and have mentioned nothing regarding any sinking 
or alleged sinking of submarines. We are constantly making submarine contacts, 
they having concentrated in our part of the northern passage for some time past. 

One of the destroyers reported getting a great deal of oil to the surface after 
a bombing of a submarine, but her written reports likewise are not yet in. 

Regarding the REUBEN JAMES, she went down so quickly that we know 
little. A despatch states that she was hit forward about abreast No. 1 stack. 
The explosion was so violent that it is possible a magazine was set off. The 
whole forward end of the ship was detached and sunk almost immediately — 
and the aft part about 5 minutes later. 

When the stern sank, a number of depth charges let go, adding to the number 
of casualties. Rescue operations were greatly hampered by oil, darkness, pres- 
ence of submarine, and cold. We published the casualty list this morning. 

[2] We have a report that the safety pins on the depth charges had pre- 
viously jarred loose. This, of course, is being looked into by the Bureau of 
Ordnance. The above is about all I know at present. 

Lessons learned will, of course, be communicated after reports are in and study 
made. 

My best to all hands. 
. Keep cheerful ! 

H. R. Stabk. 



November 4, 1941. 

A release announcing the torpedoing of the SALINAS has just been made, she 
having safely arrived at St. Johns. 

The SALINAS was torpedoed on 29-30 October 1941, the day before the 
REUBEN JAMES was tori^edoed. Initial reports showed her speetl to be re- 
duced to 5 knots and she had a long voyage to make the nearest port. Obviously, 
to have made public her damaged condition would have meant a direct invita- 
tion for further attack on her in the submarine infested waters through which 
she had to pass. Secrecy, therefore, was essential and every effort was made 
to maintain it. 

Relative to the above, the following incident occurred : 

One of the girls employed in the Navy Department reported to the OflScer in 
Charge of the Office where she worked that she heard two officers telling about 
the torpedoing of a naval vessel, the SALINAS. She said she could not help 
but hear them and wondered if it were true. 

It should be unnecessary to elaborate on this. Loose talk in public places, 
over the telephone, in the home, at a party, or anywhere else, except in strictly 
oflBcial circles, may bring disastrous results, the magnitude of which could only 
be weighed by what happened to be at stake. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2219 

It should not be necessary to add that this must stop. Any one worth his or 
her salt must realize the potential danger of carrying outside his or her office 
to anyone, ichose husiness it is not, anything regarding naval plans or operations, 
movements or damage to ships, etc. 

This memorandum has been intentionally withheld until the SALINAS ar- 
rived in port. 

(Mimeographed and distributed to Department.) 



Secret 22408 

In reply refer to Initials and No I.p-IOD-MD Received via clipper 

14 Nov 
Navy DEapABTMENT, 
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, 

Washington, November 7, 1941. 

Dear Mustapha: This is in reply to your letter of October 22, 1941. It was 
fine to hear from you and to learn that you are in a fine fettle. 

Ok on the disposition which you made in cormection with the recent change 
in the Japanese Cabinet. The big question is — What next?! 

I note the great desirability of man}/ things for the Pacific Fleet — particularly 
destroyers and cruisers. We just haven't any destroyers or cruisers to give 
you at the moment, nor is the prospect bright for getting any for you in the near 
future. I fully appreciate your need for them. We could profitably employ 
twice the number we now have if they were available. I will not burden you 
with a recital of King's troubles, but he is up against it for DDs for escort — 
and defense against raiders. 

The NORTH CAROLINA and WASHINGTON are not expected to be avail- 
able before March. As pointed out in my letter of September 23, 1941, I do 
not think any permanent assignment of either, or both of these ships can be 
made at this time. We are assigning them to King now in the interest of train- 
ing — arriving etc. 

With the possible exception of one division, it is our intention to send the long- 
range submarines to the Pacific as they come along. As you no doubt know, 
twenty-seven (27) of the 1525-ton SS are due for completion in calendar 1942. 

Due to the urgency for providing the destroyers of the Atlantic Fleet with 
high-spee<l anti-submarine searching equipment, 27 of the 29 Model QC retractile 
domes and projectors have been diverted from mine craft of the Pacific Fleet 
and Local Defense Force destroyers in the Pacific to the Atlantic Fleet. Inas- 
much as the power stacks, controls, etc., for the 29 QC equipments need not be 
installed in the Atlantic Fleet, it will be necessary for the manufacturer to 
produce only 27 additional retractile domes and projectors in order to complete 
the QC equipments required for the ships from which the equipment has been 
diverted. The Bureau of Ships is being requested to expedite procurement of 
the additional domes and projectors. This additional procurement should not 
require a great deal of time since the manufacturer is tooled for this production 

Two of the original order of 29 complete QC equipments will be delievered to 
the Pacific Fleet. Additionally, two preliminary models (one at Mare Island 
and one at Norfolk) can be made available to Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, 
as soon as installation plans for this new type of retractile dome equipment can 
be completed by the Navy Yards concerned. 

I note your criticism of the Gunnery Radar. The Model FA fire control RADAR 
is the first production equipment for the Navy. This equipment is unsatisfactory 
because of its low-power output and the short life of the vacuum tubes. Only 
ten production models were manufacture<l ; these were manufactured for the 
purpose of tooling the shops for later and improved models could be developed 
and manufactured. The FA equipment was installed in eight HONOLULU 
Class Cls, WICHITA, and Radio Materiel School, Bellevue. 

The improved fire control equipment is the Model FC. This equipment employs 
magnetron generators and has a very much higher powered output. It should 
be understood, however, that because of the high frequencies used by fire control 
RADAR, long ranges on aircraft cannot be obtained. The long range aircraft 
detection equipment is intended to be used for the purpose of tracking aircraft 
until the aircraft are within range of the fire control RADAR. Fire control 
RADAR will detect and range on aircraft at ranges greatly in excess of the 
ranges of the antiaircraft guns. 



2220 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Relative to the two Seati-ain vessels which we i-ecently acquired and which are 
now undergoing conversion for use in transporting Aircraft, they now have 
readiness dates of December 2nd and December 16th. It is our present intention 
to assign one to the Train of the Atlantic Fleet and one to the Base Force, Pacific, 
but if we have to send planes to the Near East, we may have to use these ships 
for this purpose. We are also going to take over the remaining other 3 vessels 
of this type and propose to use them un-converted for anticipated transport of 
planes to Europe-Russia-China-? May have to charter them rather than take 
them over — in order conserve Navy personnel. 

You asked about merchant ship conversions for carrier landing training opera- 
tions. The field from which to get ships for this purpose is, as you know, 
extremely limited. However, the best of these have been earmarked for conversion 
to AVG's as soon as they can be made available. Right now the ones we have 
in mind are engaged in an important duty. Conversion will take 12 to 15 months. 

[3] Your study of the Installations and defenses of Wake. Midway, John- 
ston, and Palmyra arrived in the Department yesterday. It is being routed to 
War Plans for study. I had an opportunity to skim through it hurriedly, and it 
looked like a very good paper. It will be of much help to us. 

In connection with the aircraft routes to the Orient via a southerly detour, 
I am enclosing a copy of a letter which I write to Admiral Bloch. 

Admiral Lyster. the Fifth Sea Lord, recently visited us. He is quite a chap 
and impressed us as knowing his job, and being a very able officer. I am enclos- 
ing,, as being of possible interest to you, copies of the notes which he gave to 
us as a result of his observations on the manner in which we employ our aircraft. 

In addition, I am .sending a copy of the notes made by Captain Lord Louis 
Mountbatten as the result of his observations in the fleet. He, too, impressed me 
as being a very capable officer. I am sure much good will i-esult from the observa- 
tions of both of these officers. 

Things seem to be moving steadily towards a crisis in the Pacific. Just when 
it will break, no one can tell. The principle reaction I have to it all is what I 
have written you before; it continually gets "worser and worser" ! A month 
may see, literally, most anything. Two irreconcilable policies can not go on 
forever — particularly if one party can not live with the set up. It doesn't look 
good. 

All good wishes. 
Sincerely, 

/S/ Betty, 

Admiral H. E. Kimmel, U. S. N., 
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, 

c/o Postmas'ter, San Francisco, California 

British movement of BB to far east area— I hope — will be completed in 
December. 



Secret 22915 received Clipped 20 Nov. 

In reply refer to Initials and No. Op-IOD-MD 

Navt Department, 
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, 

Washington, November 14, 19^1. 
removed conf. letter 182 
on Fortification Guam 

Dear Mustapha : This is in answer to yours of October 29, November 6 and 
7, 1941. It was fine to hear from you and to learn that you are going strong. 

I have not been able to get very much definite information about Mr. Hallet 
Abend. I am enclosing a copy of a memorandum which Public Relations had 
given me about him. I am told by an officer who recently returned from the 
Asiatic Station that he enjoyed a ffood reputation as a correspondent out there. 
This same source stated that the Jaips had beaten him up in Shanghai and de- 
stroyed a manuscript of a book he was about to submit to his publishers. 

I had previously seen the clipping from the New York Times, which you sent 
me, the authorship of which is credited to Mr. Abend. The way the yarn was 
written, one could easily spot it as a "phoney". 

Just what we will do in the Far East remains to be seen. Attached hereto is 
a copy of our Estimate, which was recently submitted by General Marshall and 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2221 

me to the President. You can see from it our ideas on the subject. Whether or 
not our advice will be followed remains to be seen. 

If Mr. Churchill's speech of Monday last, given at the Lord Mayor's house, is 
the expression of British policy, it would seem there might be considerable truth 
in the information given to you by Mr. Abend. 

Your estimate of the Japanese bases and forces in the Mandates has been 
received in the Department. It will be carefully studied. From a hasty exam- 
ination, it appears to be a very complete paper. 

I have taken up with Van Keuren the subject of the listening gear for ships 
you listed in your letter of November 6. Like Radar, the delay in getting this 
gear was caused by getting or, rather, not getting into production. At last, we are 
"over the hump" and [2] listening gear is coming on rapidly. Deliveries 
are underway, and four (4) or five (5) sets will go to Pearl Harbor by each 
ship from now on. By mid-December you should have received about 2i: sets. 
Of course, you can divert these for installation as you see fit. 

With regard to the VSO's going to the Asiatic. These will go out, orated, in 
a merchant ship. Instructions to do this have been issued to Com. 12. You 
should receive a copy of the order to do this in due time. 

Regarding your comments about the desirability of having fight deck merchant 
.ships for use in training aviators for carrier duty : — I agree with you 100%. 
The trouble is that we just can't get the ships to convert into carriers. The 
converted SS MORMACMAIL (now the USS LONG ISLAND) is far from 
satisfactory. She should have twenty (20) knots and actually hasn't sixteen 
(16) knots. She just doesn't have speed enough. She can be operated if con- 
ditions of wind are such as to give her the required apparent wind across the 
deck. Unless this condition prevails, she is almost worthless as a carrier. 

Incidentally, five (5) of this type are being converted in our yards for the 
British under Lend-Lease. The large fast ships which we now have and which 
cottid be converted for the duty you have in mind are currently engaged in an 
important mission (transporting British troops to the Middle Kast— obviously 
most secret) and will be so engaged for a number of months. I would give a lot 
if we had those ships noiv converted to carriers and fully equipped for combat 
purposes. 

The only other ships under U. S. registry out of which we could get twenty 
(20) knots (if we had them) are the four (4) Matsons and the three (3) Moore- 
McCormicks now engaged in the South American rim. We have had our eye 
on the NORMANDIE. Thus far. State Department and President are adamant. 
I suppose they think that to take hei- over would, in some way, drive Vichy closer 
to Germany. All in all, a dismal picture for the converted carrier idea prevails. 

The General Board has recently completed a study on Guam. I am enclosing a 
copy of this paper for your study. I would appreciate getting your reaction to it. 
Of course, if Guam were fortified and developed at the moment, we could make 
much use of it. One item to which I have liec-n giving much th(>ught and upon 
which I would like your advice — what do you think of going ahead now with 
the construction of a landing field out there? The thought I have is that we could 
construct such a field which might be of .service to us. To be sure, we might lose 
it, but we could build into it provisions for its at least temporary destruction. 

[3] The next few days hold much for us. Kurusu's arrival in Wa.shington 
has been delayed. I am not hopeful that anything in the way of better under- 
standing between the United States and .iapan will come of his visit. I note this 
morning in the press despatches a listing of a number of p<^)ints by the Japan 
Times and Advertiser upon which concession by the United States was necessary 
for the "solution of the Pacific Crisis." Complete capitulation by the United 
States on every point of difference between the Japanese and this country was 
indicated as a satisfactory solution. It will be impossible to reconcile such 
divergent points of view. 

With all good wishes ! Keep cheerful. 
Sincerely, 

/S/ Bm-TY. 

Admiral H. E. Kimmel. U. S. N., 
U. S. 8. PENNSYLVANIA, 

c/o Postmaster, San Francisco, California. 



2222 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[i] Secret 
Serial 0130012 

Wak and Na\'y Deipabtmeint, 
Washington, Nox^ember 5, 19Jfl. 
Memorandum for the President : 
Subject : Estimate concerning Far Eastern Situation. 

The Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff have reexamined the 
military situation in the Far East, particularly in the light of messages recently 
received from the American Ambassador to Chungking, the Magryder Mission, 
and the United States Naval Attache. These despatches have indicated it to 
be Chiang-Kai-Shek's belief that a Jai>anese attack on Kuming is imminent, and 
that military support from outside sources, particularly by the use of United 
States and British air units, is the sole hope for defeat of this threat. The 
Secretary of State has requested advice as to the attitude which this Government 
should take toward a Japanese offensive against Kunming and the Burma Road. 

There is little doubt that a successful Japanese offensive against the Burma 
Road would be a very severe blow to the Chinese Central Government. The 
result might even be the collapse of further effective military resistance by that 
Government, and thus the liquidation by Japan of the "China incident." If use 
of the Burma Road is lost, United States and British Commonwealth aid to 
China will be seriously curtailed for some months. If resistance by the Chinese 
Central Government ceases, the need for Japanese troops in China will be reduced. 
These troops can then be employed elsewhere, after the lapse of time sufficient 
to permit their withdrawal. 

[2 J Concentration of Japanese troops for the contemplated offensive, based 
in northern Indo-China, cannot be completed in less than about two months, 
although initial offensive operations might be undertaken before that time. The 
advance toward Kunming over nearly three hundred miles of rough country, with 
poor communications, will be extremely difficult. The maintenance of supply lines 
will not be easy. The Chinese, on favorable defense terrain, would have a good 
chance of defeating this offensive by the use of ground troops alone, provided 
these troops are adequate in quality and numbers. 

The question that the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff have 
taken under consideration is whether or not the United States is justified in 
undertaking offensive military operations with U. S. forces against Japan, to 
prevent her from severing the Burma Road. They consider that such operations, 
however well-disguised, would lead to war. 

At the present time the United States Fleet in the Pacific is inferior to the 
Japanese Fleet and cannot undertake an unlimited strategic offensive in the 
Western Pacific. In order to be able to do so, it would have to be strengthened by 
withdi-awing practically all naval vessels from the Atlantic except those assigned 
to local defense forces. An unlimited offensive by the Pacific Fleet would i*equire 
tremendous merchant tonnage, which could only be withdi-awn from services now 
considered essential. The result of withdrawals from the Atlantic of Naval and 
merchant strength might well cause the United Kingdom to lose the Battle of the 
Atlantic in the near future. 

[3] The only current plans for war against Japan in the Far East are to 
conduct defensive war, in cooperation with the British and Dutch, for the defense 
of the Philippines and the British and Dutch East Indies. The Philippines are 
now being reinforced. ' The present combined naval, air, and ground forces will 
make attack on the islands a hazardous undertaking. By about the middle of 
December, 1941, United States air and submarine strength in the Philippines will 
have become a positive threat to any Japanese operations south of Formosa. The 
U. S. Army air forces in the Philippines will have reached its projected strength 
by February or March, 1942. The potency of this threat will have then increased 
to a point where it might well be a deciding factor in deterring Japan in operations 
in the areas south and west of the Philippines. By this time, additional British 
naval and air reinforcements to Singapore will have arrived. The general 
defensive strength of the entire southern area against possible Japanese operations 
will then have reached impressive proportions. 

Until such time as the Burma Road is closed, aid can be extended \to Chiang- 
Kai-Shek by measures which probably will not result in war with Japan. These 
measures are : continuation of economic pressure against Japan, supplying in- 
creasing amounts of munitions under the Lend-Lease, and continuation and 
acceleration of aid to the American Volunteer Group. 

The Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff are in accord in the 
following conclusions : 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2223 

[4] (a) The basic military policies and strategy agreed to in the United 
States-British Staff Conversations remain sound. The primary objective of 
the two nations is the defeat of Germany. If Japan l>e defeated and Germany 
remain undefeated, decision will still have not been reached. In any case, an 
unlimited offensive war should not be undertaken against Japan, since such a 
war would greatly weaken the combined effort in the Atlantic against Germany, 
the most dangerous enemy. 

(b) War between the United States and Japan should'be avoided while build- 
ing up defensive forces in the Far East, until such time as Japan attacks or 
directly threatens territoi-ies whose security to the United States is of very 
great importance. Military action against Japan should be undertaken only 
in one or more of the following contingencies : 

(1) A direct act of war by Japanese armed forces against the territory or 
mandated territory of the United States, the British Commonwealth, or the 
Netherlands East Indies ; 

(2) The movement of Japanese forces into Thailand to the west of 100° East 
or South of 10° North ; or into Portuguese Timor, New Caledonia, or the Loyalty 
Islands. 

[5] (c) If war with Japan can not be avoidetl, it should follow the strategic 
lines of existing war plans ; i. e., military operations should be primarily de- 
fensive, with the object of holding territory, and weakening Japan's economic 
position. 

(d) Considering world strategy, a Japanese advance against Kunming, into 
Thailand except as previously indicated, or an attack on Russia, would not 
justify intervention by the United States against Japan. 

(e) All possible aid short of actual war against Japan should be extended 
to the Chinese Central Government. 

(f ) In case it is decided to undertake war against Japan, complete coordinated 
action in the diplomatic, economic, and military fields, should be undertaken in 
common by the United States, the British Commonwealth, and the Netherlands 
East Indies. 

The Chief of Naval Oi)eration8 and the Chief of Staff recommend that the 
United States policy in the Far East be based on the above conclusions. 

Specifically, they recommend : 

That the dispatch of United States armed forces for intervention against Japan 
in China be disapproved. 

That material aid to China be accelerated consonant with the needs of Russia, 
Great Britain, and our own forces. 

[6] That aid to the American Volunteer Group be continued and accelerated 
to the maximum practicable extent. 

That no ultimatum be delivered to Japan. 



Chief of Staff. 



Chief of Naval Operations. 



Secret 

In reply refer to Initials and No. HRS/Hu Sec #6 

received 3rd Dec 
#23593 Clipper 
Navy JDEPAETMEnvx, 
Office of thk Chief of Naval Operations, 

Washington, 26 November 19Jfl. 
Dear Mustapha :* This is in answer to yours of 15 November. If I didn't 
appreciate your needs as well as Tommy Hart's and King's I would not be work- 
ing almost literally eighteen hours a day for all three of you. 

We have .sweat blood in the endeavor to divide adequately our forces for a 
two ocean war ; but you cannot take inadequate forces and divide them into two 
or three parts and get adequate forces anywhere. It was for this reason that 
almost as soon as I got here I started working on increasing the Navy. It was 
on the basis of inadequate forces that ABC-1 and Rainbow 5 were predicated and 
which were accepted by all concerned as about the best compromise we could 
get out of the situation actually confronting us. 

I agree with you for exami)le that to cruise in Japanese home waters you 
should have substantial increa.se in the strength of your fleet but neither ABC-1 
or Rainbow 5 contemplate this as a general policy. After the British have 
strengthened Singapore, and under certain auspicious conditions, opportunity for 



2224 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

raids in Japanese waters may present themselves, but this will be the exception 
rather than the rule. 

It might interest you to know that King strongly recommended his taking the 
destroyers which we now have in our West Coast ports, and the Secretary was 
sold on it ; however it has been successfully resisted to date. King said that if 
they were out with you on the firing line he would not make such recommendation, 
but where they were he thought they were legitimate pi'ey. He, too, you know 
is up against it for suflBcient forces to perform his tasks. Just stop for a minute 
and realize that into his heavy routine escort work he has added at the moment 
large U. S. troop transports for Iceland on the one hand, British on another in 
Northern waters, and still another of 20,0G0 which have been brought over and 
are now on their way to Cape Town and possiblj' to Durban because of Bub- 
marines operating off Cape Town. Obviously these troop movements are highly 
secret. We are at our wit's end in the Atlantic with the butter spread extremely 
thin and the job continuously increasing in toughness. 

Regarding personnel, we have at last succeeded in g;etting the President to 
authorize our use of draftees. I have been after this for months. Now that 
I have got permission it will take some time to get it through the Congress as 
we have to have special [2] legislation to use our funds for this purpose. 
It has been ray hope to use draftees wherever possible in District work and Air 
Stations, tugs, net la.vers. mine layers, mine sweepers, etc. etc. Navigation is 
working to see just how many such men can be replaced, thus releasing men to 
the Fleet. 

Believe it or not, the REUBEN JAMES set recruiting back about 15%. We are 
increasing our advertising campaigns extensively ; not only that, but Navigation 
is hiring civilian managers to assist in recruiting. Draftees however constitute 
something sure and I only wish I could have gotten them months ago. The Presi- 
dent in giving final approval said he just hated to do it ; but sentiment is fast 
getting out of my system, if there is any left in it on this war. 

Regarding permanence of personnel I have been over with Nimitz in detail 
some to the recent changes and he will write you the details. There is a problem 
here as well as elsewhere ; and while we expect you and want you to hammer 
away on your own difficulties, just occasionally remember that we fully realize 
our only existence here is for the Fleet and that we are doing the best we can 
with increasingly vexing problems. 

Your letters at least give us ammunition, if not much comfort. 

I asked Nimitz last week to give me the figures showing the percentage of inen 
now on board on the basis of the old complements. Enclosed is a table he has just 
handed me. It may be poor consolation but at least it is something to know that 
the Fleet has more men now than at any time since the last war. I do not have 
the data for the last war. This does not mean that we are at all satisfied with 
it, but it is something I have been following. I assure you every effort is being 
made to improve it. It is steadily improving, but all too slowly to satisfy any 
of us. 

One thing I forgot to mention was your "the Pacific Fleet must not be con- 
sidered a training fleet for support of the Atlantic Fleet and the Shore Establish- 
ment." I'll hand that one to King. Once in a while something happens which 
gives real interest. I think I'll have a gallery ready to see King when he reads 
that, particularly after a recent statement of his that he noted he was getting 
fewer men and had less percentage of complement than did the Pacific Fleet, 
etc. etc. 

Keep cheer/ul. 
Sincerely, 

[S] Betty. 

Admiral H. E. Kimmel, U8N, 

Commander in Chief, U. 8. Pacific Fleet, 
USS PENNSYLVANIA, 

o/o Postmaster, San Francisco, California. 

[3] P. S. I held this up pending a meeting with the President and Mr. 
Hull today. .1 have been in constant touch with Mr. Hull and it was only after 
a long talk with him that I sent the message to you a day or two ago showing 
the gravity of the situation. He confirmed it all in today's meeting, as did the 
President. Neither would be surprised over a Japanese surprise attack. From 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



2225 



many angles 'an attack on the Philipi)iiies would be the most enil)arrassin}i thing 
that could happen to us. There are s<»nie here wlio think it likely to occur. 
I do not give it the weight others do, but I included it because of the strojig 
feeling among some people. You know I have generally held that it was not 
time for the Japanese to proceed against Russia. I still do. Also I still rather 
look for an advance into Thailantl, Indo-China, Burma Road area as the most 
likely. 

I won't go into the pros or cons of what the United States may do. I will 
be damned if I know. I wish I did. The only thing I do know is that we may 
do most anything and that's tlie only thing I know to be prepared for ; or we 
may do nothing — I think it is more likely to be "anything". 

/S/ HRS. . 



Summary — Nov. 25, 1941 



Type 



BBS 

CVs.... 

CAs 

CLs 

DDs (1850 Ton) 

(1500 Ton) (8 at 192) 

(18 at 191) 

(4 at 196) 

(Sat 178)-. 

(10 at 187)... 

(12 at 200) 

(1200 Ton) (Asiatic). 

(4 at 132).. 

(33 at 126).. 

SSs (4at29) 

(22 at 39) 

(22) 

(6at54) 

Patrol Vessels 

OOLALA 

ISABEL 

Totals.. 



Comple- 
ment 
fiscal 
year 
1939 



19, 351 
6,990 
12,164 
11,490 
3,119 
1,536 
3,438 

784 
1,424 
1,870 
2,400 
1,644 

528 
3,906 

174 

858 
1,203 

324 
1,062 

282 
84 



76,631 



Comple- 
ment 
recom- 
mended 
by fleet 
BD 



26,583 

7,602 

18,508 

15,860 

3,900 

1,920 

4,392 

1,000 

1,952 

2.480 

3,000 

1,898 

584 

4,626 

192 

946 



348 



Present 
comple- 
ment 



22,244 

7,258 

15, 878 

14,156 

3,119 

1,536 

3,438 

784 

1,424 

1,870 

2,364 

1,716 

536 

4,209 

180 

858 

1,203 

324 

1,078 

320 

84 



84,849 



Number 
onBD 



19, 870 

6,902 

14, 067 

12,896 

2,826 

1,346 

3,138 

728 

1,312 

1,717 

2,171 

1,673 

446 

3,704 

230 

891 

1,390 

375 

1,109 

290 

82 



77,163 



% on BD as of Oct. 31 
where available other- 
wise September 30 



To 1939 
comple- 
ment 



102.68 
98.74 

115.64 

112.23 
90.60 
87.63 
91.27 
92.85 
92.13 
91.82 
90.46 

101. 76 
84.46 
94.82 

132.18 

103. 84 
115.54 
115. 74 

104. 42 
102.83 

97.61 



103. 39 



To present 
comple- 
ment 



89.32 
91.68 
88.59 
91.09 
90.60 
87.63 
91.27 
92.85 
92.13 
91.82 
91.83 
97.49 
83.20 
88.00 
127.78 
103.84 
115.54 
115.74 
102. 87 
90.62 
97.61 



90.94 



[i] 



Section B 
Commander Cbuisebs, Battle Force 



UNITED STATES FLEET 



Confidential 



U. S. S. Honolulu, 
Pearl Harbor, T. H., January 21, 19^1. 



Dear Betty: I received your letter of 13 January. You may be sure that 
I will keep you fully, frankly and probably even critically informed of the 
situation out here. 

During even the brief time that I have had to survey the situation, I am 
particularly impressed with the lack of Army equipment, for the task of defending 
this base. This matter has been fully covered in recent official correspondence. 
I think the supply of an adequate number of Army planes and guns for the 
defense of Pearl Harbor should be given the highest priority. I will expand on 
this later. It Ls sufficient at this time to state that a secure base here is of 
paramount importance. I have discussed this matter fully with McCrea and 
he has taken notes on my ideas, and I am sure that he will present them fully. 



2226 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

We have been together long enough so that I am sure you are quite familiar 
with my methods of doing business. You know how I appreciate the value of 
conferences. I agree that it is essential to keep the principal subordinates within 
the command, fully informed of the circumstances as they develop. I shall 
follow such a policy. 

As you know, the Fleet Personnel Board, with Theobald at the head of it, 
has been giving long and careful study to the personnel requirements of the 
ships of the different types. I shall probably be required to make recommenda- 
tions on this subject shortly after I take over. It appears wise to now fill 
all ships with personnel to capacity, both on account of the needed increase in 
complement to man the ships, and to train men for new construction. 

[2] I now come to a point which I have discussed fully with Joe and with 
which we are in complete accord. Richardson believes and recommends that 
under present conditions I should move ashore with my staff. I believe, from 
my conception of what a campaign in the Pacific under present policies will 
amount to, that the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet and his staff should 
be quartered ashore in the Fourteenth Naval District, at least in the initial 
stages of the campaign. Facilities on the Fleet flagship are not suflScient to 
provide living and working accommodations for the personnel required on the 
staff. It is neither desirable nor practicable to scatter the staff through other 
ships of the Fleet. As I see it, the only solution lies in having them assembled 
ashore in the district. I have looked into this matter to a certain extent and 
believe that existing facilities within the district, particularly at the Submarine 
Base, are such that the staff can be quartered there. It appears that certain 
modifications and additions to the present communication set-up will have to 
be provided, in order that a complete communication set-up will be available. 
Facilities for oflice space, quarters for officers and enlisted men of the staff 
can be made available with little rearrangement of what now exists in the 
Submarine Base. Of course, that would be of a temporary nature. As soon 
as I have investigated this whole thing more fully and have had an opportunity 
to visualize the picture more completely, I believe that the correct solution to 
the whole problem will lie in the erection of a separate building to house the 
complete requirements of the Commander-in-Chief's staff ashore in the Four- 
teenth Naval District. I am not prepared to give you the details of this at 
this writing. Incidentally, in connection with the requirements of the 
Commander-in-Chief, I believe that he himself should be assigned to one of 
the official quarters now in the Fourteenth Naval District. 

You appreciate, of course, that this question of housing the staff ashore, has 
not passed much beyond the preliminary investigations. As you know, however, 
I have already obtained quarters for the War Plans Section in the Submarine 
Base and that section of four officers and all the files necessary for their work 
will be moved into those quarters very soon after 1 February. If further study 
of the Pacific set-up, as I visualize it, [3] substantiates my present ideas, 
and if the quarters I have in mind in the Submarine Base show that they can 
take my staff, I shall move from the PENNSYLVANIA to those quarters as 
soon as they can be made ready. In that connection, of course, you understand 
that the present facilities on board the PENNSYLVANIA will remain intact 
and that I shall arrange matters ashore so that my entire staff and myself can 
move on board the PENNSYLVANIA within a few hours. I shall, of course, be 
on board the PENNSYLVANIA whenever tactical exercises ai"e conducted and 
during any other times when I feel the necessity for it. My staff battle organi- 
zation will require training on the PENNSYLVANIA, and I shall embark on 
that ship for enough fleet work to keep them trained for any emergency. 

If I move ashore and find that the arrangement as I now visualize it is the 
correct one, I shall have plans drawn up for a permanent Fleet Center ashore. 
I shall submit the plans to the Bureau and request funds for its immediate 
construction. 

Things are buzzing around here, and I am taking every opportunity and a 
lot of Joe's time, to get his points of view on many vital questions that are 
involved in this job. I was sorry to hear that you had an attack of the fii^, 
but happy to know, from the press reports of the arrival of the KING GEORGE V, 
that you were able to get to sea in the Chesapeake to greet the new Ambassador. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2227 

That seems to be about all for this time; but I am sure that I shall have a lot 
more to tell you in our continued correspondence. 

My kindest regards and best wishes to you and your good wife, as always. 
Most sincerely yours, 

s/ H. E. Kimmel. 

H. E. KlMMEL. 

Admiral H. R. Stabk, U. S. Navy, 
Chief of Naval Operations, 

Navy Department, Washington, D. C. 



[i] CinC File No. 

United States Fleet 
Secret U. S. S. Pennsyi-vania, Flagship 

Peabl Harbor, T. H., 18 February 19^1. 

Deab Bettt : Your letter of 29 January reached me on 14 February, and your 
letter of 10 February arrived on board on 16 February. You will note that the 
delays were due to interference with clipper schedules. 

A check has already been sent to the Navy Relief for $39,000.00 and one to the 
American Red Cross for $9,900.00. This was done by Richardson just prior to 
his detachment. I trust that the Navy Relief has received it by now. 

I will inform Bloch in regard to the search of fishermen and think it an ex- 
cellent idea. I believe this search has been in effect here for some time. 

Nimitz has written me to put not more than 100% complement on any type of 
ship. I will pass this along to Calhoun, but with the present rates of supply and 
attrition I see small chance of exceeding 100%. 

I wrote Nimitz today in regard to the Bureau of Ordnance requirements for 
post graduate ordnance oflScers to be employed on shore, and asked Nimitz to 
show you the letter when he receives it. You will note that I took occasion 
in this letter to reiterate the need for additional enlisted personnel in all types 
of ships. From my standpoint there is every urge to train just as many men as 
is possible. This is in addition to the need for men in existing ships. The new 
construction program will, in a reasonable time, make inordinate demands on 
the Fleet. I would repeat here what I said in my letter to Nimitz, that the con- 
dition of the Fleet within the next few months may be of much greater im- 
portance to the Nation than the completion of the two-ocean Navy in 1946. 

I was delighted to learn about the Army fighters. The first contingent is now 
on its way, together with certain equipment for the outlying islands. In addition 
to the fighters I believe it of the highest importance to send just as many Army 
bombers and adequate supplies of bombs to Oahu as the Army establishment 
can support with the greatest effort. The need for Army anti-aircraft guns 
should also be stressed. Active and immediate steps are being taken to coordi- 
nate the Ai'my and Navy air effort as well as the ground crew defenses of Pearl 
Harbor. [21 I had a couple of interviews with Short and find him fully 
alive to the situation and highly cooperative. I recommend that you keep con- 
tinuous pressure on this question of Army reinforcement of Oahu. 

The full complement of Marines has landed at Midway. We utilized Crudiv 
EIGHT, Desdiv ELEVEN, and the ANTAR£:S to transfer troops, baggage, 
equipment, etc. You will have received our statement of the conditions existing 
at Johnson and Palymra. In this I tried to give you a complete picture, together 
with the only possible solution I see with the forces available. The transfer to 
these islands of the maximum numbers you indicated may carry with it very 
difficult complications, as a sudden call in the midst of the operation might 
involve serious consequences. As I gather from researches, the orders involve 
a drastic change from the original conception of the forces to be supported at 
Johnson and Palymra. I think our recommenadtion to send 100 Marines to 
Palymra and none to Johnson for the present, should be accepted. 

Will study, prepare plans, and be ready for a quick decision in case orders 
are received for a detachment of cruisers, destroyers, and a carrier to make the 
proposed cruise to Manila or elsewhere. From my standpoint this appears to be 
a most ill-advised move. Our strength in destroyers and cruisers is already lim- 
ited. A carrier can ill be spared if we are to carry out other poposed plans. 
While my political horizon is limited, I believe we should be prepared for war 
when we make this move. 



2228 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

The detail of local defense forces for the Fourteenth Naval District will have to 
be made from the Fleet. This is a further drain on our small craft. In this 
connection I am recommending in separate corerspondence that you send out one 
squadron of PTs and one squadron of the new PTC sub-chasers at the earliest 
possible date. I presume Bloch has his plans for commandeering local craft, but 
I will check with him and also inform him of the probability that the Coast 
Guard will be taken over shortly. 

Bill Halsey has been bombarding the Bureau of Ordnance in an attempt to 
get an increased supply of bombs. The copy of their reply, which I think you 
should read, leaves us with very little hope for early alleviation of this most 
unsatisfactory condition. In separate corerspondence, which will go forward 
at the same time as this letter, we are recommending the shipment of these 
bombs to Oahu in advance of the preparation of regultaion proof stowages. I 
think we must accept the hazard and possible \,i\ deterioration which 
may ensue from shelter stowage. The total lack of incendiary bombs should be 
remedied at the earliest date. 

The subject of reserve ammunition for the Fleet has been covered in various 
letters. I feel that the number of ammunition ships in commission and being 
converted is still entirely inadequate to handle the situation. 

I feel that a surprise attack (submarine, air, or combined) on Pearl Harbor is 
a possibility. We are taking immediate practical steps to minimize the damage 
Inflicted and to ensure that the attacking force will pay. We need anti-submarine 
forces, — DDs and patrol craft. The two squadrons of patrol craft will help when 
they arrive. 

After a thorough investigation, we are pr(»ceeding to fit existing facilities at the 
Submarine Base to permit shore basing my staff and my.self. Just when I will 
move ashore deiwnds upon the supply of essential equipment. I have only one 
object, that is to so place myself and my staff that we can best accomplish the 
task before us. 

To revert once more to the question of enlisted personnel, Theobald's board, in 
my opinion, has contributed more to the Fleet than any single factor in a very long 
time. It did a most excellent job and, in the absence of positive evidence that 
they are wrong, we should accept their recommendations. I have ordered the 
Medical Board, the members of which represent all tyi)es of ships, and have told 
them to expedite their proceedings. I propose to give you their findings by 
despatch. 

Before the report of the Fleet Personnel Board reached your office, I sent you a 
despatch outlining the minimum complements prescribed by the Board for each 
type of ship. In reply I was informed by despatch that the complements recom- 
mended exceeded those assigned in the Force Operating Plan for 1942, and was 
instructed not to install bunks, lockers, and messing facilities in excess of the 
complements already arrived at by the Department. I am go convinced that the 
complements recommended by the Fleet Personnel Board are the minimum re- 
quired to serve the ships in a campaign, and that the findings of the Medical Board 
will not declare the larger complements to be contrary to standards of health and 
comfort, that I sent another despatch last night asking for a reconsideration of 
your decision. Bunks [4] and lockers do not add greatly to the weight of 
a ship and are not unduly expen.sive. It is my frank opinion, as stated in the most 
recent despatch on this subject, that even if complements are not increased imme- 
diately to the limit recommended, it is better to install bunks and lockers now 
rather than do so in the confusion of mobilization, for I am convinced that if we 
take part in this war we shall most certainly have to build up our complements as 
recommended by the Fleet Board. 

The Bureau of Navigation has forwardeed me a long list of officers of post grad- 
uate training, now afloat, wanted by the Bureau of Ordnance for duty ashore. 
These oflScers occupy important command, gunnery, and staff positions. I realize 
the necessity for expediting ordnance projects and I want to help in every way I 
can. But the number of experienced officers in the ships at the present time is 
dangerously low. I can not view the detachment of additional experienced officers 
but with the greatest concern. I have asked the Bureau of Navigation to give 
me an opportunity to comment on the detachment in each case of officers with 
ordnance experience, prior to final action. 

T also hope that drastic steps can be taken to stop the continuing turnover of 
personnel, particularly qualified personnel. The detachment and changes of 
qualified enlisted men concerns me almost as much as the detachment of qualified 
and experienced officers. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2229 

I come to another question of the highest Importance, — the supply of modern 
type planes throughout the Fleet. I am forwarding under separate cover a copy 
of a letter written to the Bureau of Aeronautics on this subject. I have gathered 
the distinct impression that the Bureau of Aeronautics is primarily concerned 
with the expansion program and that the supply of planes and itersonnel to man 
the Fleet takes a secondary place. Obstacles are offered to most of Halsey's 
recommendations. I cannot subscribe to these views. We must have the most 
modern planes in our csirriers and other surface vessels, in fact in all the aero- 
nautical organization afloat. I realize of course the necessity for personnel 
ashore, particularly in the aeronautical organization, to train new personnel and 
to produce the material. But the balance should be maintained, and in any event 
the latest type planes should be supplied the Fleets. The forces afloat have 
repeatedly recommended the acquisition of two or more "seatrain" vessels to 
transport airplanes. I am not familiar with the technical difl8culties involved, 
but if it is at all possible to do so — and Halsey in- [5] sists that it is — I 
think this work should be undertaken at once. The recent required use of carriers 
to transport Army planes to Oahu illustrates the necessity for providing some 
means for aii-plane transport. Transporting planes and equipment by carrier is 
highly expensive, both in lost training of flyers and non-availability of carrier for 
other duty. 

We are going ahead with Plan Dog and RAINBOW THREE. Prior to the 
receipt of the letters received in the mail yesterday we had given priority to 
Plan Dog, but as you state you wish priority to be given RAINBOW THREE, we 
will do so. 

The necessity for additional store ships and transports is accentuated by plac- 
ing Marines on the outlying islands and I hope nothing will stand in the way 
to promptly supply those now planned, and to further increase them as soon as 
practicable. 

I shall decide upon the distribution of the exploders after consultation with 
Withers and Draemel. 

With kindest regards and best wishes. 
Sincerely, 

/S/ H. E. KlMMEL. 

Admiral H. R. S?tabk, U. S. Navy. 
Chief of Naval Operations, 

Navy Department, Washington, D. C. 

P. S. We receive through radio and other intelligence rather reliable reports 
on the positions of Japanese merchant ships, but we have no definite informa- 
tion on the important Japanese trade routes. Can you send us the latest informa- 
tion you have on this? I am initiating separate correspondence on this topic. 

I have recently been told by an oflScer fresh from Washington that ONI con- 
siders it the function of Operations to furnish the Commander-in-Chie|f with 
information of a secret nature. I have heard also that Operations considers the 
responsibility for furnishing the same type of information to be that of ONI. 
I do not know that we have missed anything, but if there is any doubt as to whose 
responsibility it is to keep the Commander-in-Chief fully informed with pertinent 
reports on subjects that should be of interest to the Fleet, will you kindly fix 
that responsibility so that there will be no misunderstanding? 

HEK. 



[1] CinC File No. 

SECRET 

CONFIDENTIAL 

Unitej) States Fleet 

U. S. S. Pennsylvania, Flagship 

TJ. 8. {'suibmarine \Base, 
Pearl Harbor, T. H., April 22, 1941. 
Deab Betty: So far I have not felt the need for a Public Relations Officer 
on my Staff. Situated as we are, the majority of this work has beon Miery 
succ-essfully handled by the District under Admiral Bloch. We have been in 
perfect accord as to what should and should not be released. From the stand- 
point of the newspaper and publicity men the situation may not be as satisfactory 
as it is from my standpoint. I can see where the services of a man like Waldo 
Drake could be of great value to the Service. So my answer is that if you can 



2230 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

send Waldo Drake out here to serve on my staff, I will be very glad to havb 
him. An individual with less experience might do more harm than good. 

We have been very much gratified at the responses to the items I enumerated 
in my letter of February 18. However, there is one outstanding deficiency that 
still exists in the Fleet — namely, permanency of personnel. The detachment of 
oflScers and men continues. I have written at length to Nimitz on this subject. 
I understand in some degree the personnel problem that confronts you and 
Nimitz. I feel that the establishment of a nucleus of trained and experienced 
oflScers and men in each ship of the Fleet is vital. This nucleus should include 
the Captain, Executive OflScer, Heads of Departments and as many other key 
officers as the Bureau feels they can retain in the ship for the duration of the 
emergency. For the enlisted personnel the same principle should govern, particu- 
larly as regards Chief Petty Officers and Petty Officers First Class. We cannot 
produce a satisfactory state of battle efficiency unless we have some degree of 
permanency in this nucleus of personnel. We must have on board a certain 
number of officers and men who know the ship, know the organization and who 
can whip the new personnel into shape by guiding their effort.s. I know that you 
and Nimitz are doing all that you can but I cannot refrain from calling your 
attention to it once more. 

Is it not ijossible to obtain legislation which will stop the discharge of qualified 
men and i)erniit them to remain in their present billets? 

I have now been established in my office on shore for some little time and things 
are working vei*y smoothly. I am of course prepared to move aboard ship on very 
short notice. 

[2] I know you are cognizant of the condition in the Carriers, as I have 
detailed it in various official correspondence. The effect of detachment of a 
carrier or any light forces from this command will affect the operations out of 
all proportion to the apparent fighting strength of the forces detached. This I 
know you will understand and in anything that you do I know you will carefully 
weight all the factors involved. 

Admiral Danckwarts spent a couple of days with us and gave me considerable 
information which is of value. I did not, however, commit myself in any way 
and tried to avoid talking too much. 

My kindest regards find best wishes to you. 

We are all cheerful. 

Most sincerely yours, 

H. E. KiMMEL. 

p. S. I must urge you once more to do all in your power to fill the ships 
with enlisted personnel to the limit of their capacity. Our ideas on this subject 
have been submitted in great detail. The last submitted about two weeks ago 
was the report of our medical board on this subject. 

/s/ Kim MEL. 
Admiral H. R. Stark. U. S. Navy, 
Chief of Naval Operations, 

Navy Department, Washington, D. C. 



[1] Confidential 
Via Clipper Air Mail 

Commandek-in-Chief 

United States Fleet 

U. S. STn?MARiNE Base, 
Pearl Harbor, T. H., Ma/y 5, 19^1. 

Dear Betty : I have your despatch in regard to the proposed visit of the 
Secretary. I am forwarding an official letter on this subject in this same mail. 
I think we will be able to give him an interesting time out here. I indicated 
the time that he might spend at sea if he so desires. I imagine, however, when 
we make up the final schedule he will probably want to spend more time in port 
than I have indicated in my official letter. There are a great many developments 
in and around the Pearl Harbor area that he should see and in which I am sure 
he will be very much interested. A perfectly enormous amount of work has been 
accomplished in this district and it is all going ahead full blast at the present 
time. 

We had planned rather extensive tactical maneuvers for Task Forces ONE, 
TWO and THREE which involved a trip to Midway by Task Force ONE and to 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2231 

Palmyra by Task Force TWO. When I received your letter in regard to certain 
ship movements we decided to curtail these operations and to maintain Task 
Forces ONE and TWO in the immediate vicinity of Oahu. I do not want to be 
caught short in the event of any sudden demands. 

Tell the Secretary that I will be very pleased indeed to see him. I am 
endeavoring to keep you informed primarily by official correspondence of the 
needs of the Fleet. I believe you are fully cognizant of all the problems. As you 
know, our principal problem out here is one of supply, i)articularly to outlying 
bases. Our food ships, store ships, oilers and ammunition ships are barely ade- 
quate now and this would be the cause of concern in the event of hostilities. 
I know you are doing all you can along this line. The transports are coming 
along very slowly. Brown goes to the Coast with a minimum force, starting 
in a few days to look over the progress of the landing force needs and to conduct 
the scheduled exercise at San Clemente. It looks now as though King's estimate 
that an AK will be required to accompany each division of transports to transport 
equipment, particularly landing boats, is absolutely correct. I feel that in any 
landing exercises that we may undertake, it should be done only when we have 
ample equipment and personnel to pursue our objectives tx) a successful conclusion, 
even in the event of the loss of very important units. In other words the 
landing should not be attempted until we have what amounts to an overwhelming 
force capable of a simultaneous landing. 

[2] We are losing quite a percentage of experienced enlisted men who, upon 
the expiration of their enlistment, go into civil life to accept the high wages now 
prevailing. This is a cause of concern and I repeat again something should be 
done to retain these men. The only method I can see is by congressional legisla- 
tion of some kind. We are attempting to use every bit of Fleet transportation 
from the West Coast to Honolulu to bring personnel and supplies out here. I 
believe you might help things if you would indicate to the material bureaus the 
shortage of shipping in order that they might go out of their way to meet our 
demands as to cargo such as bombs and ammunition. The type of incident I have 
in mind is the shipment of the supply of bombs from N. A. S., San Diego, which 
we finally straightened out with the Bureau of Ordnance after the exchange 
of several despatches. 

I hope Nimitz is taking our idea of nucleus crews seriously. This applies to 
officers as well as men. We must have sufficient experienced men in key positions 
in the ship who know the ship in order to properly train the young reserve officers 
and the recruits. Of course, this is over and above the urgent necessity to keep 
these ships in a condition to meet an emergency. Briefly I think if some twenty 
percent of the complement could be considered permanently assigned to the ships 
that it would help things enormously. I shall send forward our ideas on this sub- 
ject in a more definite form shortly. 

I know the demands upon you for patrol craft of all descriptions but I must 
again bring to your attention the urgent need in this area for some patrol craft 
fitted with listening gear and carrying a few depth charges. The demands upon 
destroyers would then be somewhat relieved and they fould have time to perfect 
themselves in other phases of their training. 

My kindest regards and best wishes to you alwbys. 
Most sincerely yours, 

/s/ Kimmel. 

H. E. Kimmel. 

Admiral H. R. Stark, U. S. Navy, 
Chief of Naval Operations, 

Navy Department, Washington, D. C. 



Air Mail 
United States Pacific Fleet 
[i] Cincpac File No. 

Confidential U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship 

Pearl Harbor, T. H., May 16, 1941. 
Dear Betty: The ammunition situation continues unsatisfactory and is a 
source of concern to me in regard to gunnery school and target practice ammuni- 
tion as it effects training, and mobilization and reserve service ammunition as 
it effects the general readiness of the Fleet. The problem as we see it here is 



2232 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

chiefly one of transportation, since in general the ammunition is available but not 
where we can get at it. 

Late in the winter I asked that giumery school ammunition be delivered to 
the Hawaiian Area not later than 2 June, 1941 and that certain target practice 
amunition be delivered here for use early in the gunnery year. Action on this 
request was an order to assemble gunnery school ammunition at N. A. D. Mare 
Island by 15 May 1941, with' the request that it be delivered to Pearl Harbor 
by vessels of the Fleet since no other transportation was available, and an order 
for shipment of a large part of the requii-ed target practice ammunition by PYRO 
and LASSEN from the East Coast by loading various vessels of the Base Force 
with gunnery school anumition as it is assembled at Mare Island during this 
month, we are in a fair way of getting enough of it here by 2 June to commence 
gunnery school firings. 

In view of the fact that PYRO and LASSEN were not sche<luled to arrive before 
the end of July I requested by despatch that target practice ammunition be 
shipped by rail across country .so that it too could be transported here by vessels 
of the Fleet, stating that we could u.se this ammunition as soon as delivered. This 
request was not approved for reasons best known to the Department. Since the 
LASSEN is now .scheduled to arrive here about 21 July, with a part of this ammu- 
nition, and the PYRO about 11 August, with the remainder, there will be a period 
of approximately two months during which the Fleet will be deprived of gun- 
nery training except for gunnery school firings. 

Since PYRO and LASSEN are already loading on the East Coast no further 
action to expedite shipment of target practice ammunition appears feasible, and 
we shall have to accept the handicap in training imiwsed by the lack of this ammu- 
nition. This is already water over the dam and I mention it only because I feel 
the time has come when the long haul of ammunition between the Ea.st and West 
Coa.sts by amunition ships should cease and full use be made of rail transporta- 
tion to place needed amunition at West Coast ports where we can get at it. Ob- 
viously in the event of hostilities water transportation of ammunition from the 
East to the West Coast will be too slow and risky. 

The shortage of machine gun ammunition, particularly .50 caliber, has placed 
us in a very serious position. Upon the urging of the Department I recommended 
a cut to the minimum possible allowance per gun for annual training and pro- 
posed to transfer all type gunnery school machine gun allowances to the Fleet 
Machine Gun School. Type gunnery [2] school allowances of machine 
gun ammunition have since been eliminated entirely, and we now find ourselves 
in the position where the Fleet Machine Gim School has only enough ammuni- 
tion to last until 10 June. On that date we shall be forced to close down the 
Fleet Machine Gun School unless more ammunition is made available. 

I stress the urgent need for early delivery of target ammunition in ample 
quantities because the turnover of personnel continues high and I can see no 
improvement in the near future. The only way we can counteract this and give 
adequate training to large masses of green personnel is to provide ammunition 
for frequent firings. 

I have stressed gunnery school and target practice ammunition because up to 
the opening of hostilities they may be considered our first requirement, and we 
can only hope that the last increments of mobilization supply, which are on their 
way, arrive in time. So far as mobilization supply is concerned the battleships 
and heavy cruisers are well fixed. The light cruisers and destroyers are still 
short, particularly in 6", 5" anti-aircraft and depth charges, although am- 
munition orders indicate that by midsummer deficiencies will be made up. In 
this connection it is suggested, when forces are moved from the Pacific to the 
Atlantic, that the Bureau of Ordnance be informed as early as it is practicable to 
do so, in order that final increments of mobilization ammunition, and target prac- 
tice ammunition for that matter, loaded in ships for delivery to Pearl Harbor may 
be diverted at West Coast ports and not brought out here. 

The situation in regard to reserve service ammunition is entirely unsatisfactory. 
Here again I realize it is largely a matter of transportation and that reserve 
service ammunition must come after mobilization ammunition. When PYRO 
becomes available as a ship of the Base Force she can be used in shuttle trips 
to the coast to bring up our reserve supply. We are making every effort to trans- 
port ammunition of all kinds in vessels of the Fleet, and I am happy to note 
that the Naval Air Station San Diego was permitted to give up some aircraft 
bombs for transportation out here in ENTERPRISE. Also an order to ship 1,000 
depth charge from Howthorne was a great help. These will be transported in 
ships of the Fleet. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2233 

Once we are over the mldsunimer hnnip we shall be in a much bettei" position, 
provided the inevitable d(»es not happen first. Even then, lujwever, the supply 
of reserves will be critical and the use of rail transportation urgent. 

With kindest regards. 
Sincerely, 

H. E. KiMMBX. 

Copy to Rear Admii'al Blandy. 

United States Fleet 
U. S. S. PENNSYI.VANIA, Flagship 

CinC File No. A16/0828 

Secret 26 May 1&41. 

From: CinC 

To: OpNav 

Subj : Survey of Conditions in Pac. Ft. 

I. PERSONNEL. 

(a) Stahiliti/. A most important, perhaps the most important factor in the 
day by day readiness of the Pacific Fleet is the question of stabilizing personnel — 
both officers and men. The Fleet is doing all it can, and is making good progress, 
in absorbing new men and training new officers, but facts are facts and neither 
the Fleet nor the individual ships can be a coordinated war machine if the 
present rapid turnover of personnel is continued. 

(b) Permanency of Officer Personnel. Regular and experienced officers have 
been detached at an alarming rate. Cooke, for example, who came to the 
PENNSYLVANIA the latter part of February, is fourth on the list of twelve 
l)attleship captains in time on present billet. Executive officers are going, if 
anything even more frequently. The situation is no better in cruisers. There 
appears to be a tendency to give priority in importance to shore duty over sea 
duty ; witness, transfer of officers skilled in fire control and gunnery to produc- 
tion and inspection jobs ashore, and the all too frequent detachment of com- 
manding and executive officers and [2] heads of departments from ships 
■of all types. Expansion of the Forces Afloat does call for sacrifice in per- 
manency of assignment in the Fleet, but we cannot afford to replace our ex- 
perienced officers with reserves, most of whom are untrained, if we are to be 
ready for serious business. It does seem that much can be done toward stabil- 
izing the experienced personnel we now have. Ordering captains, executives 
and heads of departments of the various types, well knowing that they will 
be eligible for selection and promotion within six months is an example of a 
condition readily susceptible of correction. 

(c) Permanency of Enliafed Personnel. The situation is well known to the 
Department, as indicated by a recent directive to take full advantage of the 
law and retain men whose enlistments expire outside the continental limits of. 
the United States. The drastic trend in reduction of reenlistments in the Navy 
as a whole in the month of April is of serious import to the Fleet. Even in 
the Pearl Harbor area the wages offered ashore are so attractive and the 
jobs are so many that skilled men whose enlistments expire are tempted not 
to reenlist. A recent survey of Battleship Division THREE indicates that of 
the men who.se enlistments expire between 1 June and 31 August 1941, 68.9% 
do not intend to reenlist. This is in line with a recent report of the Bureau of 
Navigation showing a reduction in reenlistments for the month of April from 
83.09% to 09.53%. The Commander-in-Chief has requested the Bureau [3] 
of Navigation to initiate legislation to hold for the duration of the war all 
men now enlisted in the Navy. He does not look with favor upon the directive 
mentioned in the first sentence of this sub-paragraph. It is discriminatory and 
does not apply equally to all Fleets or even to all ships of the Pacific Fleet, 
since some ships overhaul on the Coast while others overhaul at Pearl Harboi. 
The Fleet must and gladly will train and provide men for new construction and 
outlying stations to the limit of its capabilities, but it should be unnecessary to 
assign to shore duty so many experienced petty officers as we now find ashore. 
There is an urgent necessity that a continuous supply of recruits be furnished for 
training. It should be pointed out that since September, with new meti started 
coming in in large numbers, all vessels have had to absorb recruits in a large 
proportion. In the Fleet as a whole, complements are now made up of over 
25% of men with the maximum of a year's service, and in some ships the 

79716 O — 46 — i)t. 16 21 



2234 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

figure approaches 50%. In the case of newly acquired transports, cargo ships, 
tanliers and the like, the complements are almost 100% reserve, with little previ- 
ous Naval training. Present conditions are worse rather than better when new 
ships in large numbers are added to the Navy. The situation will be extremely 
acute if we are then at war. It is obvious that there are limitations on the 
capacity of active ships for supplying the large numbers of officers and men 
required to man the Navy now building, unless the immediate [4] fighting 
capacity of the ships is seriously crippled. 

Long range plaiming, with reasonable foresight as to future needs, is an 
imperative necessity. It would appear that training activities ashore must be 
greatly expanded, as the physical capacities of the ships limits the number that 
can be trained in the Fleet. The possibility that we may have to provide and 
quarter, ashore, a pool of trained men for new construction should be carefully 
examined, and provision now made for it, if found necessary. 

A problem of immediate importance is brought about by a recent letter from 
the Bureau of Navigation which states that between now and September some 
3.080 men, more than half of whom are rated, will be taken from the Fleet for 
new construction and for this purpose allocations are made in the ratio of 72% 
Pacific Fleet to 28% Atlantic Fleet. Unless a readjustment is made in these 
figures to correspond to the recent readjustment in the relative strengths of these 
Fleets, the Pacific Fleet will be seriously stripped of experienced men and may 
be unable to furnish some of the ratings demanded. 

(d) Health and Morale. The desirability, if international conditions permit, 
of health and recreation trips to the Coast by Task Forces, each of which shall 
be no more than one-fourth the strength of the Pacific Fleet as now constituted 
must be given serious consideration. 

[5] (e) Assif/nment of Flag Officers. It is particularly desired that Vice 
Admiral Pye be retained as Commander of the Battle Force. Admiral Pj'e is 
able, vigorous, and loyal ; and is an oflScer whom I would select, above all others, 
as Commander Battle Force. 

(f) Uniform. There is too much change and experimentation at this time. 
It is not important whether rank is shown on the sleeve or on the shoulder of a 
khaki uniform, nor is it important whether tho eagle of the cap device faces to 
left or to right. As for the khaki working uniform the Commander-in-Chief is con- 
vinced that it lessens the dignity and military point of view of the wearer and 
has a tendency to let down the efliciency of personnel. Reports from the aircraft 
squadrons are to the effect that from any considerable altitude they are unable 
to detect the color of the uniform on ships at sea. 

IL AVIATION. 

(a) Aviation Training. The following requirements for aviation have been 
urged but favorable action has not yet been taken : — 

(1) Newly graduated pilots for carriers, battleships and cruisers should first 
be ordered to San Diego for indoctrination in Fleet squadron work and familiariza- 
tion with latest types of planes. 

(2) Replacement carrier groups should be built up at San Diego, for indoc- 
trination of new graduates and for rotation with groups already in carriers. 

[6] (3) The rating of Aircraft Radioman should be established. 
The following requirements are in process of correction but progress is too 
slow : 

(1) The level of experience of pilots in the Fleet is very low and the total 
number is too low. 

(2) The level of exi^erience of aviation ratings in the Fleet is low and the 
allowances are not filled. 

(3) The rating of Aircraft Bomber, though approved, has not yet been 
established. 

(b) Aviation Material. The following items which apply to aviation are in 
process of correction but progress is too slow : 

(1) Carrier torpedo planes are obsolescent and spare carrier torpedo planes 
are too few. 

(2) Replacement of other carrier planes with more modern types is not yet 
completed and the replacement planes are not yet fully modernized. 

(3) There are not yet enough spare carrier planes of the new types and 
the stock of spare parts and engines is too low. 

(4) Deliveries of ordnance and radio equipment for new planes have been 
too slow. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2235 

(5) Cruiser planes are obsolescent and deliveries of replacements have been 
too slow. 

(6' Modernized patrol planes are not yet available in quantity. There are 
none in the Hawaiian area and there i.s no early [7] prospect for replace- 
ment of those of the older tyiie now in the Hawaiian area. 

(7) There have been no deliveries of special radio equipment for patrol 
planes, corresponds to RADAR for ships, which will enormously increase the 
potentialities of these planes. 

(8) There is a serious shortage of aircraft machine gun ammunition. 

(9) No armor-piercing bombs, antiaircraft bombs or aerial depth bombs are 
yet available. 

(10) There is a very serious shortage of aircraft torpedoes and of equipment 
for their maintenance and overhaul. 

(11) Completions of new carriers and new patrol plane tenders are too slow. 

(12) Provision for bombs and for refueling planes at outlying bases is 
sketchy. 

(13) There has been serious delay in deliveries of equipment under the 
cognizance of other Bureaus than Yards and Docks in connection with the 
construction of new air stations and bases. 

In addition to the afore-nientioned items the following have been urged but 
favorable action has not yet been taken : 

(1) Aircraft overhaul at N. A. S., Pearl Harbot, now limited to patrol planes, 
should be expanded to provide for all planes now based in this area. Transfer 
to and from West Coast for overhaul is impracticable. 

(2) Additional barracks should be established at N. A. S. Pearl Harbor. 

L&l (c) Separate Air Force. This ever present question is again being 
brought to the fore, in view of Mr. Scrugham's recent utterances. It is vital that 
the Navy's air service remain as it is. Our naval aviation is generally recog- 
nized, throughout the world, as being the best equipped, best trained, and most 
advanced of any naval air service. This has been brought about by the mutual 
recognition of the intimate relationship between air and surface sea forces, 
particularly in far-flung operations distant from established bases. Effective 
cooperation, in naval operations, between air and surface craft requires the closest 
kind of coordination, predicated upon precise knowledge of each other's capabili- 
ties, limitations, and tactics. This can only be attained by day-by-day operations, 
association, and exchange of ideas* as an integral part of one organization. It is 
vital that this relationship continue, even at the expense (though this feature is 
greatly exaggerated) of some duplication of effort between the Army and the 
Navy. Mr. Scrugham's chief complaint, which deals chiefly with duplication of 
facilities at coastal air stations and the proximity at those stations to each other, 
is not a valid one. The services perform separate functions ; the Army in extend- 
ing the range of coastal batteries and the Navy in extending the mobility and 
coverage of ships in off shore search. The proximity of the fields to each other is 
largely a matter of the vagaries of Congress and the [5] availability of 
land. The United States, due to its physical separation from its most probable 
enemies, has less need for a concentrated, offensive, air striking force than other 
nations. The present GHQ air force, however, amply supplies this need. It may 
be noted, in passing, that, in spite of the fact that the Air Corps is a part of the 
Army, the strong tendency within that Corps for separation, has prevented the 
development of effective cooperation between ground and air forces. A separate 
air corps w-ould make the situation much worse — for the Navy it would mean the 
death of naval aviation. 

The British have found it necessary to place their coastal air command under 
the direct control of the Navy. Aside from discoordination of operations, this 
command was suffering from lack of proper types. 

HI. MATERIAL, GENERAL. 

(a) Priorities. The Navy is at present suffering from a shortage of material 
and is experiencing difficulty in having this shortage corrected. The principal 
items, and those that directly affect our early readiness, are (1) small arms and 
machine gun ammunition for airplanes and the Fleet Marine Force; (2) airplanes, 
esi)ecially those equipped with modern armor and armament; (3) close-range 
antiaircraft guns, especially a 1.1", Bofors, and Oerlikon ; (4) ammunition in 
general, particularly adequate reserves, and bombs of all kinds. Our ability to 
correct these deficiencies is [/O] limited by two factors, (1) aid to Great 
Britain, and (2) rapid expansion of the Army. Both of these limiting factors are 
admittedly of great importance and are entitled to proper weight in any system of 



2236 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

priorities, but, from the point of view of the Fleet, it appears that there is a 
tendency to twerlook the time factor. A priority system based on relative quanti- 
ties needed by the three comiieting agencies. Britain, Army and the Navy, will 
prove fatally defective, if the time of beginning active operations is overlooked. 
As the situation appears now, the Navy may be called on for active operations in 
contact with well equipped opposing forces, yet is prevented from obtaining vitally 
necessary needs by the magnitude of the needs of Britain and the Army. If we 
are going into action first, our needs must be filled ahead of the Army's and those 
sine qua non needs such as small arms and machine gun ammunition, modern 
airplanes, and modern close-range antiaircraft guns, must be filled ahead of 
Britain's. There is a minimum need for the Navy without which it can not fight 
at all. Irrespective of how small that need may be I'elative to the quantitative 
demands of others, it must be filled first. 

It is important to bring out this point now, since it is understood that tlie 
Army is basing its procurement program on a 4,000,(X)0 man Army. If alloca- 
tion be based on relative quantities, under such a program, the Navy will get 
little consideration. The [11] imminence of active operations should be 
the criterion. Of course, the Navy Department is in a better position to judge 
that than we are, but we've been led to believe we were pretty close to war on 
several occasions, but we still didn't get the items we need. 

(b) RADAR Equipment. Such excellent results are being obtained from the 
few RADAR'S furnished that we should install now the equipment which will 
work, and not wait for something better to be developed. Delivery of RADAR 
should be accelerated. 

IV. COMMUNICATIONS. 

The need for establishment of confidential call signs is urgent. With the 
present system of calls the text of a message may sometimes be inferred from 
the radio calls used. The danger of the present system is that codes may be 
compromised, as well as information disclosed. The cryptographic aid section 
of opNav should immediately get out confidential call signs and more crypto- 
graphic aids. 

V. OPERATIONS. 

(a) Fleet Operations. With the recent detachment of many of the most mod- 
ern and effective units, the adequacy and suitability of the forces i-emaining to 
accomplish the tasks to which they may be assigne<i is very doubtful. 

In the Pacific, our potential enemy is far away and hard to gjet at. He has 
no exposed vital interests within reach of Pearl Harbor, and has a system of 
defense in the Mandates, Marianas, [12] and Bonins that requires land- 
ing operations, supported by sea forces, against organized land positions sup- 
ported by land-based air. This is the hardest kind of opposition to overcome 
and requires detailed preparation and rehearsal. It also requii'es a preponder- 
ance of light force and carrier strength, in which we are woefully deficient in 
the Pacific. Our present strength is in battleships— which come into play only 
after we have reduced the intervening organized positions. They (battleships) 
will have to be used to "cover" the intervening operations and prevent interference 
therewith, but their real value can not be realized until the intervening oppo- 
sition has been overcome and a position obtained from which solid strength can 
be brought to bear. The Japanese are not going to expose their main fleet until 
they are either forced to do so by our obtaining a position close enough to threaten 
their vital interests or it is advantageous for them to do so by our having "broken 
our backs", so to speak, by going up against their land positions and attrition 
operations. 

The foregoing discussion is brought out to emphasize that the role of light 
forces, and particularly carriers, in the Pacific, is far more important than a 
casual evaluation of relative strength would suggest. Under RAINBOW 5, 
the Pacific Fleet (perhaps justifiably, in view of the Atlantic situation) is so 
reduced in light force and carrier strength that its capabilities for offensive 
[13] operations of a decisive nature are severely crippled. Quick results 
may only be hoped for — common sense dictates that it is largely hope, based 
principally upon the idea that Japan will make a fundamental mistake, and 
that bold action may be able to take advantage of it. 

In the Pacific, with enemy vital interests so far away, and no bases of our own 
within striking distance, the logistic pi'oblem is acute. We have not, at present, 
suflBcient ammunition, provisions, cargo ships or tanks to support active oi)era- 
tions in the Western Pacific — where the real battleground will be. We are having 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2237 

difficulty, even now, supi)<»rtiiig the construction and defense activities of our 
own outlying bases. More auxiliary vessels are needed, now, for that purpose, and 
future needs must be anticipated to allow for acquisition and conversion of the 
ships. Our past experieJice, in this regard, has not been a happy one — the lag 
between acquisition and entrance into service being six months to a year. Repair 
and maintenance facilities at advanced bases can not be created overnight, nor 
can the Fleet remain long without them. 

(b) Fourteenth Naval Diatrict. The defense of the Fleet base at Pearl 
Harbor is a mater of considerable concern. We should continue to bring pres- 
sure to bear on the Army to get more antiaircraft guns, airplanes, and RADAR 
equipment in Hawaii and to insure priority for this over Continental and 
expanding Army needs. 

\H] The naval forces available to the Commandant are meager to the 
point of non-evistence. A Fleet base is a place of rest, recreation, and resus- 
tenance and must afford protection of the Fleet at anchor and during entrance 
and egress independent of the units of the Fleet. If units of a fleet must be 
employed f(u- its own defense, in its base, its freedom of action for offensive 
operations is seriously curtailed — possibly to the point where it is tied to the 
base by the necessities for defense of that base. The need for patrol boats and 
other small craft, especially those equipped with listening devices, is urgent. 
The Fleet must be relieved of those functions which properly belong to the 
District. The Fleet does not have the desti-oyei-s or other vessels to take over 
those duties. The situation has been brought to the Department's attention by 
letter. It is now much more serious as many destroyers have been detached 
from this Fleet. 

(c) Marine. The necesity for closely coordinated training of Marines and 
the ships which will support their landing operations is readily apparent. Opera- 
tions of this character require detailed training and realistic rehearsal. At pres- 
ent, the Marines and their ti-aining ground (San Clemente) are in one location 
and the ships in another, 2000 miles away. We need a training ground for landing 
operations and a camp for a substantial portion of the Fleet Marine Force in 
the Hawaiian area. This need will be worse, if we get in war in the Pacific, 
because we will not only need a training ground and [15] large camp 
site for Marine.s, but also must train and rehearse, as the campaign progresses, 
Army forces as well. 

Kahoolawe is practically undeveloped and can be used as an Hawaiian San 
Clemente. A camp site for 5,000 Marines has been selected and recommended for 
acquisition. This program should be pushed. 

The Sixth Defense Battalion should be brought to Hawaii now in order to 
relieve the Seventh Defense Battalion at Midway where the latter has been 
stationed for some months. Equipment for this battalion should be provided as 
soon as possible. Other defen.se battalions now in the Hawaiian area are being 
used for other outlying bases. 

(d) Loffistic Support. Ships to transport men and materials to and fi'om the 
Coast and to supply the outlying islands is urgent. 

There is similar urgency in the need for ships to transport aircraft. Aircraft 
carriers should not be used for this purpose in peacetime and cannot be so em- 
ployed in war. Action has repeatedly been requested. 

VI. NATIONAL POLICY. 

(a) Although largely uninformed as to day-by-day developments, one cannot 
escape the conclusion that our national policies and diplomatic and military 
moves to implement them, are not fully coordinated. No policy, today, is any 
better than the force available to support it. While this is well recognized in 
[1€] principle, it is, apparently, lost sight of in practice. We have, for ex- 
ample, made strong expressions of (mr intention to retain an effective voice in 
the F'ar East, yet have, so far, refused to develop Guam or to provide adequate 
defense for the Philippines. We retained the Fleet in Hawaii, last summer, as 
a diplomatic gesture, but almost sinmltaneously detached heavy cruisers to the 
Atlantic and retained new destroyers there, and almost demobilized the Fleet 
by wholesale changes in personnel. 

We .should decide on what we are going to do about the Philippines, now, and 
provide for their defense, if retained. It is easily conceivable that 50.000 troops 
and 400 airplanes on Luzon, might prove a sufficient deterrent to Japan to 
prevent direct action. We should develop Guam and provide for its defense 
commensurate with its state of development. It is foolish to develop it for some 
one else to use. 



2238 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

The military branches of the government should be told, by the diplomatic 
branch, what effect it is desired to produce and their judgment as to the means 
available and the manner of its accomplishment should be accorded predominant 
weight. 

Our Hemispheric Defense policy must comprehend the fullest cooperation be- 
tween participating nations and our commitments limited by our available force. 
A strong component of that force is bases. No Hemispheric Defense policy that 
does not provide for our free use [17] and development of South American 
bases (and local military and logistic suport) can be effective. 

Vn. INFORMATION. 

(a) The Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet is in a very difQcult position. He 
is far removed from the seat of government, in a complex and rapidly changing 
situation. He is, as a rule, not informed as to the policy, or change of policy, 
reflected in current events and naval movements and, as a result, is unable to 
evaluate the possible effect upon his own situation. He is not even sure of what 
force will be available to him and has little voice in matters radically affecting 
his ability to carry out his assigned tasks. This lack of information is disturb- 
ing and tends to create uncertainty, a condition which directly contravenes that 
singleness of purpose and confidence in one's own course of action so necessary 
to the conduct of military operations. 

It is realized that, on occasion, the rapid developments in the international 
picture, both diplomatic and military, and, perhaps, even the lack of knowledge 
of the military authorities themselves, may militate against the furnishing of 
timely information, but certainly the present situation is susceptible to marked 
improvement. Full and authoritative knowledge of current policies [18] 
and objectives, even though necessarily late at times, would enable the 
Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet to modify, adapt, or even re-orient his possible 
courses of action to conform to current concepts. This is particularly applicable 
to the current Pacific situation, where the necessities for intensive training of 
a partially trained Fleet must be carefully balanced against the desirability of 
interruption of this training by strategic dispositions, or otherwise, to meet 
impending eventualities. Moreover, due to this same factor of distance and 
time, the Department itself is not too well informed as to the local situation, 
particularly with regard to the status of current outlying island development, 
thus making it even more necessary that the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet 
be guided by broad policy and objectives rather than by categorical instructions. 

It is suggested that it be made a cardinal principle that the Commander-in- 
Chief, Pacific Fleet be immediately informed of all important developments as 
they occur and by the quickest secure means available. 

VIII. PUBLIC OPINION. 

(a) As preparation for war, the current mental and moral preparation of 
our people, as reflected in the newspapers and magazines, is utterly wrong. To 
back into a war, unsupported or only half-heartedly supported by public opinion, 
is to court losing it. [19] A left-handed, vacillating approach to a very 
serious decision is totally destructive of that determination and firmness of 
national character without which we cannot succeed. The situation demands 
that our people be fully informed of the issues involved, the means necessary 
and available, and the consequences of success or failure. When we go in, we 
must go with ships, planes, guns, men and material, to the full extent of our 
resources. To tell our people anything else is to perpetrate a base deception 
which can only be reflected in lackadaisical and half-hearted prosecution. 

/S/ H. E. KiMMEL. 



Navy DEyAKTMENT, 
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, 

Washington, 4 June 1941- 
Confidential 
Memorandum for Admiral Stark 

The agreement entered into betwixt the Commanding General, Hawaiian 
Department, and the Commandant, 14th Naval District, in regard to joint action 
of the Army and Navy Air Corps in Hawaii provides : 

(a) That in activities in the defense of Oahu and the other islands against 
enemy bombing attacks the command shall be vested in the Army Air Corps as- 
sisted by Navy fighters which may be available. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2239 

(b) That in a mission which involves bombing of enemy ships the command 
shall be vested in the Navy Air Commander in charge of the Base. Briefly, when 
an alarm is sounded the Navy patrol planes take off to locate the enemy ships 
and when located in the Navy directs the efforts of the Army and Navy bombers 
in the offensive action which they take against the enemy ships. 

The liaison betwixt the Army and Navy Air Corps in Hawaii is very satis- 
factory and weekly drills in air raid alarms with the two services acting in 
unisoji are held. These drills have developed many weaknesses but the condi- 
tions are steadily improving and it is felt they are in much better shape now 
than they were a few months ago. The conditions will continue to be unsatis- 
factory imtil certain equipment has been supplied and the personnel drilled in 
its use. 

There are about 140 light Army planes (fighters and light bombers) and 21 
heavy bombing Army planes now in the Islands. These in addition to some 
obsolescent bombers and fighters. It is believed that the number of Army bomb- 
ers in the Islands should be at least four times the number that they have there 
now and it is felt these planes should be sent out as soon as it is practicable 
to do so. 

There are not now a sufficient number of Army pilots to man all the Army 
planes in the Islands. 

[S] H. E. KiMMEL. 

[i] Commander-in-Chief 

United States Pacific Fleett 
U. S. S. Pennsylvania, Flagship 

Secret Pearl Harbor, T. H., July 26, lOJfl. 

Dear Betty : When the proposed visit of the Under Secretary was announced 
my staff prepared a list of topics which might be of interest for discussion while 
Mr. Forrestal and his party are here. Not knowing the punwse of Mr. For- 
restal's visit or whether he is informed concerning the general nature of our 
war plans and our problems I decided it better to combine these notes into a 
letter to you and believe quicker action can be obtained in that way. Following 
•are the principal items of which I have been thinking: 

(1) The importance of keeping the Commander-in-Chief advised of Depart- 
ment policies and decisions and the changes in policies and decisions to meet 
changes in the international situation. 

(a) We have as yet received no official information as to the U. S. attitude 
towards Russian participation in the w.ir, particularly as to the degree of 
cooperation, if any, in the Pacific, between the U. S. and Russia if and when 
we become active participants. Present plans do not include Rusisa and do not 
provide for coordinated action, joint use of bases, joint communication systems 
and the like. The new situation opens up possibilities for us which should be 
fully explored and full advantage taken of any opportunities for mutual support. 
Pertinent questions are : 

( 1 ) Will England declare war on Japan if Japanese attack Maritime Provinces? 

(2) If answer to (1) is in the affirmative, will we actively assist, as tentatively 
provided in case of attack on N. E. I. or Singapore? 

(3) If answer to (2) is in the affirmative, are plans being prepared for joint 
action, mutual support, etc.? 

(4) If answer to (1) is negative, what will England's attitude be? What will 
ours beV 

(5) If England declares war on Japan, but we do not, what is attitude in 
regard to Japanese shipping, patrol of Pacific waters, commerce raiders, etc.? 

(b) Depending upon the progress of hostilities, the Russian situation appears 
to offer an opportunity for the strengthening of our Far Eastern defenses, par- 
ticularly Guam and the I'hilippines. Cert.iinly, no matter how the fighting goes, 
Japan's attention will be partially diverted fi*om the China and Southern adven- 
tures by either (1) diversion of forces for attack on Russia or (2) nec-essity 
for providing [2] for Russian attack on her. It is conceivable that the 
greater the German succe.ss on the P^astern front, the more Russia will be pushed 
toward Asia, with consequent increased danger to Japan's "New Order" for that 
area. In my opinion we should push our development of Guam and accelerate 
our bolstering of the Philippines. The Russo-Axis war may give us more time. 

(2) Priorities in connection with preparation for a Pacific war: — 



2240 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

(a) Transports and Liffht Destroyer Transports. — During the Commander- 
in-Chiefs visit to Washington, all the transports, including the light destroyer 
transports, were transferred to the Atlantic. The necessity for this is I'ecog- 
nized. Nevertheless, we still need transports in the Pacific and the need is even 
greater now (in i>oint of view of time particularly) because most of our trained 
marines went with the transports and we are faced with an immediate training 
problem in addition to a pf)ssible war situation. The Department has initiated 
action to complete the HARRIS and ZEILIN and to acquire and convert four 
more transports for the Pacific, but, so far as is known, has done nothing about 
replacing the light destroyer transports (APD's). These vessels were originally 
conceived and developed for a Parifie campaign. They are especially suitable 
for use in attacks on atolls and may be the only means of readily attacking 
those positions. While by no means discounting their usefulness in the Atlantic, 
the need for them in the F'aciflc is paramount. If at all possible, they should be 
returned to this ocean at once. If this cannot be done, and only if it cannot be 
done, additional destroyers must be converted as soon as x)«ssible. Work on the 
large tran.sports must also be expedited and completion dates anticipated if 
possible.. 

(b) Marine Equipment: Tlie Sixth Defense Battalion does not now have its 
full equipment, particularly AA guns and .30 and .50 caliber machine guns. The 
remaining units of the Second Marine Division were stripi)ed of much of their 
equipment to fit out the reenforced regiment that went East. There is practically 
no marine ammunition now on the West Coast. It is practically certain that 
these luiits will fight befcue the Army will and their needs nmst be given pri- 
ority. We can't fight an amphibious war in the Pacific without ammunition for 
the marines. 

[3] We are going ahead with the preparation of a camp in Oahu for five 
thousand marines. When they come they should be fully equipped for amphibi- 
ous warfare. The tran.sports etc., should be ready at the same time. An estimate 
of when the needed equipment and men will be available would help us in our 
planning. 

(c) Awnmnition Facilities: The condition of ammunition handling and 
stowage facilities ashore are in general satisfactory at the present time. Stowage 
facilities have bepn completed, are in the process of c(mstruction, or are about 
to be started to handle assignments of service reserves of gun ammunition, bombs, 
mines, and torpedoes. This includes igloos alrejtdy completed and others now 
under construction at Westloch and at Lualualei. 

New construction authorized and about to be umlertaken includes four powder 
magazines and four shell hou.ses at Lualualei, and barracaded .stowage fctr live 
mines, two new mine anchor buildings and a new mine assembly building at 
Westloch. 

New construction needed to complete stowage and handling facilities includes 
extension of Westloch dock to a maximum of two thousand feet and the con- 
struction of four powder magazines and two shell houses at Westloch to accom- 
modate target practice ammunition which cannot be stowed in vessels of the 
Fleet. This latter construction has been recommended to the Commandant of 
the Fourteenth Naval District in recent correspondence and we haVe no word 
yet on what acti<m he has taken. 

(d) The importance of building up Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor to the point 
contemplated by the Greenslade Boatd. For the present Navy Yard, Pearl Har- 
bor should be regarded primarily as a "restricted availability" yard. Overhaul 
of ships here should not include battleships and cruisers or other ships for 
extensive regular overhauls. The facilities of the yard should be confined to 
emergency and low priority overhaul, regardless of overhead costs. 

(e) Provide more and more personnel to the Fleet for training. The personnel 
situation has been presented to the Bureau of Navigation and that Bureau is 
thoroughly familiar with our requirements. We cannot provide experienced 
personnel' for new construction next year unless we obtain recruits and train 
them intensively at once. I realize [4] that recruiting has fallen off and 
that the Department is doing all it can but we are losing trained men faster 
than we are getting new recruits. As I stated in a recent letter we could use 
20,000 more men in the Pacific Fleet right now. 

(f) Need for a hospital ship in the Pacific Fleet and for completion of new 
hospital at Pearl Harbor. 

(g) Urgency for small craft in the Fourteenth Naval District for patrol pur- 
poses, to relieve the load on our limited number of destroyers. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2241 

(h) The need for acquiring advanced base material and assembling it at 
Mare Island. 

(i) Correspondence has gone forwanl urging that all available light craft in 
the Pacific be fitted with depth charges, listening gear, etc. This is important. 

(3) Communicatiomi. The supply of communication, radio, and sound equip- 
ment to the Fleet and the Shore Stations leaves much to be desired, although a 
great improvement has been noted in the last year. 

(a) Specifically it is noted that the Kaneohe Air Station was acquired, built, 
conimissi<med, and actually operated prior to the receipt i>f any radio apparatus, 
except some which we diverted from its intended advance base use. 

(b) It took BuEng two years to put "Chinese copies" of NRL's Radar on 
six ships. 

(c) For years BuEng prevented research by NRL in any form of radio recog- 
nition device and hence retarded the production of such apparatus. The Fleet 
is still without it though it is under manufacture. 

(d) We must have the IFF (Identification, Friend or Foe) for aircraft at 
once. The program" lags and on June 14th only 56 were on order from Canada 
with indefinite delivery date. See "Aviation" below. 

(e) Radar equipment for submarines is highly important. I am not informed 
as to exact status of this but understand development is not entirely satisfactory. 
There is evidence that German subs are equipped with Radar. 

[5] In general, Naval shipboard radio and sound equipment is so elaborate 
that it cannot l>e manufactured expeditiously. BuEng should have tj'pe plans for 
apparatus of such a nature that they can get results from industry and not 
make each new piece of apparatus a research job. 

(4) Aviation Requirements. These items, all of which have recently been 
taken up with the Department, are summarized briefly :— 

(a) Pre-FIeet Trainiuf/. Two units under the Fleet at San Diego, one for 
patrol squadrons and one for carrier squadrons. More pilots for battleships and 
cruisers, for training on board ship. Particular emphasis on double comple- 
ments for patrol squadrons; anticipation of enlisted personnel numbers and 
training in all categories, particularly patrol squadrons; building up the supply 
of spare airplanes; accomplishing the training witiiout any further drain on 
combat readiness of active squadrons. 

(b )Netc Torpedo Planes. Highest priority— A-l-a — instead of present priority 
which is A-l-b. There are ordy half enough torpedo planes ni)w and they are 
obsolescent, while war reports demonstrate that there may be no single item 
of greater naval importance. 

(c) Conversions for Carrier Landing Training. Auxiliary aircraft carrier con- 
versi(m was dropped because of time and cost fa<'tors. These can be greatly re- 
duced by requiring only the characteristics needed for landing traiiung. The nee<l 
for these ships is extreme. Aircraft carriers should not, and in war cannot, be 
used for this purpose, while new i)ilots must be properly trained before joining 
active squadrons if combat readiness is not to be jeopardized. 

(d) A. S. V. {Anti-l^urfact Vessel) Equipment. This is of the highest poten- 
tial value. Apparently none will be available for patrol planes until December. 
It can be carried by other planes, as shown by rejiorts of British tori)edo plane 
operations. It should be provided for every plane that can carry it and much 
earlier deliveries are essential. 

(e) /. F. F. (Identtfieation. Friend or Foe) Equipment. This is absolutely 
complementary to and essential for effective use of the Radar for airciaft defense 
of the Fleet. Without it, the Radar cannot differentiate between friendly and 
enemy airplanes. There is no definite information on deliveries. No delay what- 
ever is acceptable. 

[6] (f) Engines for New Patrol Planes (PIiY-5's). Nose section failures 
have been occurring. Every effort is being made to find and cure the trouble. 
This should be continued, for it will be no help to the Fleet or to any destination 
of the.se planes to get new planes that can't fly in place of older planes that can. 

(g) Landplane Field at Johnston Island. This was removed from the project 
by the Department. It should be put back. It is needed not oidy as an adjunct 
to local defense but, more imjiortantly, as an aid to defense against expeditions 
headed eastward and as a stepping stone for landplane support of expeditions 
headed westward. 

(h) Keehi Lagoon Development. This will be of very great value to patrol 
planes in the Hawaiian area. It is the best location for operations of these 
planes and no other place is suitable for planned patrol plane expansion in this 



2242 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

area. Inclusion of facilities for Navy patrol squadrons in this development 
should be undertaken immediately. 

(i) Development of the N. A. S. Barber's Point. This approved development 
is very urgently needed. There is a strong tendency to turn down many aviation 
shore facility items in this area on the basis that they will be available when 
Barber's Point construction is finished. This makes it more than ever mandatory 
to expedite the work. 

My kindest regards and best wishes always. 
Most sincerely yours, 

/S/ H. E. KIMMEL. 
Admiral H. R. Staek, U. S. Navy, 
Chief of Naval Operations, 

Navy Department, Washington, D. C. 



Cincpac File No. 
Secret 

United States Pacific Fleet 

U. S. S. Pennsylvania, Flagship 

Pearl Harbor, T. H., July 30, 1941. 

Deab Betty: In acknowledging receipt of your letter of 25 July as to the 
possibility of using a carrier for transporting a load of planes to one of the 
Asiatic Russian ports, I want to give some of my own views as to such aoi 
undertaking. 

Whether or not planes are to be supplied to the Russians may be outside my 
province, but I do remain keenly aware of our own deficiencies in aircraft. It 
is quite an undertaking for the United States to supply planes to any quarter of 
the globe in which fighting against Axis Powers may occur. 

My views against diversion of carriers from their proper duties to act a^ 
aircraft transports are well known. If planes must be sent from the United 
States to Russia, the question of flying them out via Alaskan and Eastern 
Siberia fields should be most fully inquired into. That appears to be the 
most logical method of effecting delivery. 

Should it be finally determined to use one of our carriers as a transport, the 
time chosen should be one in which all three Pacific Fleet carriers are available 
for operation. This is essential in order to minimize the danger to the carrier 
transport. 

The port of destination should certainly not be to the westward of the Japan- 
Kurile-Kamchatka line. 

I entertain no doubt that such an operation, if discovered, (as is highly 
probable), will be tantamount to initiation of a Japanese-American War. If 
we are going to take the initiative in commencing such a war, I can think of 
more effective ways for gaining initial advantage. 

A carrier sent on such an operation manifestly must be protected. After 
careful consideration, I am constrained to feel that the minimum escort and 
covering force provided should be the entire Pacific Fleet. I also feel that 
combatant air or naval forces of a potential enemy encountered should be 
engaged at once rather than wait for them to gain an initial advantage through 
destroying any part of my own fighting strength. 

In short, it is my earnest conviction that use of a carrier to deliver aircraft 
to Asiatic Russian ports in the present period of strained relations is to invite 
war. If we have decided upon war, it would be far better to take direct offensive 
action. If for reasons of political expediency, it has been determined to force 
Japan to fire the first shot, let us choose a method that will be more advantageous 
to ourselves. Certainly an operation such as that proposed is far less likely to 
bluff Japan into acquiescence or inactivity than it is to disturb her to the point 
of hostile use of bombs, torpedoes and guns. 
Sincerely, 

H. E. KiMMEL. 

Admiral H. R. Staek, U. S. Navy, 
Chief of Naval Operations, 

Navy Department, Washington, D. C. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2243 

[jf] Cincpac File No. 
Confidential 

United States Pacific Fleet, U. S. S. Pennsylvania, Flagship 

Pearl Harbor, T. H., August 12. 1941. 

Dear Betty : Your news about the approval of 533,000 men and 105,000 Marines 
for the Navy is good news. I agree with everything you said in your letter on 
the subject and I certainly give you and Nimitz full credit for getting them under 
the conditions which exist. We should lose no time in getting* our ships filled 
up. I am ready to accept draftees if we cannot get them by voluntary enlistments 
quickly. 

I forwarded to Furlong all the information you gave me about Tommy Hart's 
trouble with mines. We are waiting for Blandy's report, which I have not yet 
seen. I should like to have it at an early date. 

Thanks very much for the copy of Coronet which you sent to me. I turned 
to page 86 and was somewhat shocked at the appearance of the photograph on 
that page. However, I sent it on to Dot and know that she will be pleased as 
I was to receive it. Please give my regards to Mrs. Hull. 

I note Ghormley's views on the importance of RDF, or RADAR as we call 
it. I think I can assure you that the oflScera of the Fleet are fully alive to the 
importance of this development. We have stressed its use in every exercise 
and are constantly drilling and training with it. We have had men tran.sferred 
to the ships so equipped to the limit of the capacity of ships having them. Army 
personnel have been trained aboard ships. I think you understand fronr our let- 
ters as well as from my verbal remarks to you on this subject how important we 
feel this development to be. I believe the numbers of the equipment in the Fleet 
is far behind what it should be. I shall permit nothing to interfere ^ith its 
installation in the ships as we receive the gear. It should be given the highest 
priority in manufacture, supply and installation. We have not yet received any 
purely g;unnery RADAR. In this connection, stress should be laid upon what 
the British call "IFF" (Identification, Friend or Foe) for installation in ships and 
planes; to the ASV (or RADAR in a plane to spot surface vessels) ; to the AI 
(RADAR in a plane to spot other planes). I don't know when we can expect 
these various types of RADAR but I do know that we need no urging in the 
Fleet to do anything within our power to get and use all the various' types of 
RADAR that have been developed. 

Many thanks for the news about the detail of the twelve PT's to the Four- 
teenth Naval District. This is a good start but neither Bloch nor I will rest 
easy until we get the various patrol vessels we have requested in oflScial corre- 
spondence. I do hope you will impress on the Secretary the vital importance of 
this [2] matter. We need more ships of all types for a successful Pacific 
campaign but I believe we need submarines, destroyers, carriers and cruisers even 
more than we need battleships. This is a vast ocean. 

You have approved our plan for putting guns and anarines on Wake. The first 
detachment of 165 Marines, one battery of 5" and one battery of 3" are now on 
their way. We will send the additional guns when transiwrtation becomes avail- 
able. A recent survey of the men required to man the defenses of Wake plus the 
other outlying islands indicates the desirability of forming another defense 
battalion for service in this area. I feel that there is no doubt that an additional 
defense battalion to provide periodic reliefs and replacements will be necessary. 
We will give you an oflBcial letter on this subject shortly. 

We have received the Department's plan in regard to the Marine Division and 
transports and your ideas as to the composition of the 5,000 men to be stationed 
in Oahu. We agree in general with all the plans but we would like the men, 
equipment and transports now. I know that you also would like them and will 
get them just as quickly as it is humanly possible to do so. I find that some of 
the defen.se battalions already out here are shy in equipment. The anti-aircraft 
guns for Wake are not equipped with directors. The battalions are short in .30 
caliber and .50 caliber machine guns and ammunition. I do think that the few 
machine guns required by these battalions should be spared from other activities 
and I hope that the ammunition situation will be remedied very shortly. 

The recreation facilities at Pearl Harbor are coming rapidly to a state where 
they can and are being used by the men of the Fleet. Baseball, Softball and foot- 
ball fields, though by no means entirely adequate have been commissioned and 



2244 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

we have large numbers of men who occupy these fields daily. The swimming 
pool at Aiea is filled to capacity at all times. We can use at least two more pools 
of this same size. The Fleet Recreation Center was partially commissioned on 
the first of Aujjust and will be in full operating condition within another week. 
It has been crowded with men from the day it was oijened. The facilities in- 
clude a very larire soft drink and sandwich stand, an enormous bar where beer 
is servefl, and a large number of chairs and tables in a very pleasant surround- 
ing. It includes ten bowling alleys, eleven pool tables, a reading and writing 
room, all of which have been in commission from the first ,of August. The 
stadium will be* in commission within the week. It is suitable for boxing and 
wrestling tournaments or ship's entertainments and for the movies. It will seat 
approximately 6,000 men and movies can be shown to approximately 4,000 men 
at one time. About a thousand families are now living in the houses built for 
that purpo.se. All of tbe [3] remainder will be in commission by the 
first of January. These houses are being finished daily and are occupied as soon 
as completed. Bloch is going a great job. 

The visits to the West Coast have been very successful and have, I believe, 
helped all hands. The are worth while and I believe should be continued as long 
as the international sitmition permits. I have watched the internatitmal situation 
in relation to the crui-ses to the West Coast and shall not hesitate to cancel them 
if, in my opinion, the situation so warrents. Y(^u will probably have informa- 
tion sooner than I do which will warrant the cancellation of such cruises and I 
shall of course expect advices or orders from you on this subject. 

The Honolulu people have been very fine in their continued efforts to entertain 
the officers and men of the Fleet in their homes and on their plantations. The 
entertainment of enlisted men by the Honolulu i)eople has been on a scale which 
taxes their capacity and is still going on. They deserve great credit for every- 
thing that they have done, except the increase in rentals. 

We recently submitted a letter dealing with the permanency of detail of 
Captains and Executive Officers of battleships. This letter was prepared by 
Admiral I'ye at my instigation. I forwarded it with my hearty approval. The 
letter strongly recommends that no officer be assigned as Captain or Executive 
Office of a battleship unless it is reasonably certain that he will remain in that 
billet for not less than two years. Specifically, it recommends that no officer 
coming up for selection within the period of his detail be assigned to either 
of tlie.«e two billets. I consider this a matter of first importance. If you read 
the letter to the Bureau of Navigation you will see that no Captain or Executive 
Officer now in these ships has been there for as long as a year. The exact times 
are set forth. We cannot 'expect satisfactory progress unless we make the tours 
of duty of our officers sufficiently long for them to give something to the job. 
I know this is an old story but it is an old stoiy which is much to the discredit 
of our service. The recommendations from battleships apply with equal force 
to heavy and light cruisers. In these ships the Captains in general comply with 
the specifications set forth because they are taken from the more junior ones. 
In the case of Executives I fear the situation is about the same as it is in battle- 
ships. Brown is now making a survey of the Captains and Executives in cruisers 
and I expect to forward that shostly to the Bureau of Navigation. 

In another recent letter to the Bureau of Navigation we made specific recom- 
mendations in regard to the Commanding Officers of destroyer divisions and 
squadrons. I am happly to say that Nimitz has informed me that he will can-y 
out our recommendations in regard [4] to the destroyer division and 
squadron commanders. I wish to add that I have not yet had time to hear from 
the Bureau of Navigation in regard to the battleship Captains and Executives. 

I feel that gunnery in the Fleet is better than we have any right to expect 
considering the enormous changes in personnel and the lack of permanency of 
the officers. We have of course stressed battle procedures above everything else 
and you well know how much more experience and training it takes to be pre- 
pared fos battle than for a target practice. Recent reports that have come to 
me on the firing of SRP "B" are very encouraging. The reports are fragmentary 
and I hear most about the ships that have made high scores. For example, the 
LOUISVILLE has three "E" turrets, six "E" five-inch giuis and one "E" three- 
inch gun. I know this because I went aboard the LOUISVILLE a couple of days 
ago. Other ships are doing very well indeed. 

Recent directives from the Office of Fleet Training have put our target prac- 
tices on a much fore realistic and practical basis. We feel that in the event of 
hostilities we will be forced to make very few changes, if any, in these directives. 
We are scheduling our services and area assignments in accoi-dance with these 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2245 

directives now and I hear from all sides that it is considered much more satis- 
factory than anything we have ever had before. 

To summarize, I feel that the morale of the officers and men of the Fleet is 
very satisfactory, that eveyoiie is working to the limit of his capacity, that we 
are never ^^oinj; to be satisfied ; but that we all feel that we are making progress 
and beginning to get some dividends from our efforts. 

What we neefl more than anything else right now is men. I have recently 
written Nimitz that this Fleet can use 20,000 additional men today. I will not 
go into that further at this time because I know that both you and Nimitz know 
this just as well as I do. 

Keep cheerful. We are ready to do our damnedest. 
Yours as always, 

H. E. KiMMEX. 

Admiral H. R. Stark. V. S. Navy, 
Chief of Naval Operations, 
Navy Departmemt, 
Washington, D. C. 

United States Pacific Fi^eet 

U. S. S. Pennsylvania (Flagship) 

Pearl Harisor, T. H., 2^ August 1941. 
Personal 
Secret 

Admiral H. R. Stark, U. S. Navy, 
Chief of Naval Operations, 

Navy Department, Washington, D. C. 
Dear Betty: I mailed today an official letter on the condition of the material 
readiness of the fighting squadrons in the Pacific Fleet. I wish to call your atten- 
tion particularly to the un.satisfactoi-y conditions disclosed in this lettei'. 

We now have on hand and operating from carriers 41 F4F-3 and F4F-3A 
fighting planes (of which 6 are currently luider overhaul or major repair) and 
17 obsolescent fighting planes. Tills makes a total of 52 fighting planes available 
for 3 aircraft carriers and 2 Marine fighting squadrons in the Pacific Fleet. Our 
operating allowance, not counting spares, is 90. 

I think you should take some drastic action to remedy this deplorable condition. 
My kindest regards as always. 
Most sincerely yours, 

/S/ H. E. KlMMEL. 

12 September 1941 Admiral Stark wrote the following note on above letter and 
returned to Admiral Kimmel. 
Dear Mustapha : 
See our serial 0136723 of 12 sept. 
Best we can do. 
Keep cheerful. 

/S/ BEnrT. 

[i] United States Fleet 

U. S. S. Pennsylvania, Flagship 

Peabi. Harbor, T. H., August 26, 1941. 
CinC File No. 
P16-l/MM/(96) 
Serial 01342 
Confidential 

From : Commander-in-Chief, Unite<l States Pacific Fleet. 
To: The Chief of Naval Operations. 
Subject : Expan.'^ion Program — Personnel for. 
References : 

(a) CinCpac Conf. disp. lS23r.l of August 1941. 

(b) BuNav serials 1386, 1394, 1397, 1406 and 14.50 of August 11, 1941. 

(c) BuNav Conf. disp. 201824 of August 1941. 

1. Transfer orders dated August 11, 1941 from the Bureau of Navigation to- 
Commander Base Force Subordinate Command, as enumerated in references (b), 



2246 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

require a total of 222 rated men from the Pacific Fleet for transfer to U. S. S. 
HORNET squadrons, two new Atlantic patrol squadrons and the Naval Air 
Stations, Kodiak and Dutch Harbor. The Pacflc Fleet has only a bare minimum 
of such ratings to meet present operating requirements. Similar ratings are 
needed for advanced training groups now in the process of being formed in the 
Pacific. The Commander-in-Chief has had no previous warning of this heavy 
demand upon the Pacific Fleet. As indicated in reference (c), transfer of these 
ratings is being held in abeyance pending departmental reconsideration. 

2. Of these 222 rated men a total of 88 radiomen qualified in aircraft is required 
and a total of 61 aviator machinist's mates in the experienced class namely chiefs, 
first and second class is required. In order that a bare minimum of one qualair 
radioman be assigned each operating plane requiring such a rate for the per- 
formance of its mission, a total of 437 such ratings is required in the Pacific 
Fleet. According to the latest available figures there are a total of 324 such rat- 
ings in the Pacific Fleet and the transfer of 88 in accordance with reference (b) 
will leave a total of 236 or 54% of the minimum needed for safety and ability 
to carry out the mission of all operating planes requiring such ratings. Figures 
in regard to aviation machinist's mates indicate a total of 988 chief, first and 
second class allowed, whereas there are only 722 now holding these rates in 
the Pacific Fleet or 73%. Removal of 61 such ratings as required in reference 
(b) will reduce the percentage to 67%. These percentages will be further reduced 
by the transfer of such ratings to the advanced training groups now forming 
in the Pacific. These ratings of qualair I'adioman and chief, first and second 
class aviation machinist's mates must be considered key personnel in the aero- 
nautical organization. Safety of operations and ability to carry out the mission 
depend on such ratings. The reduction of the percentage of these key men will 
adversely affect readiness for war of Pacific Fleet aviation. 

[2] 3. The Commander-in-Chief has repeatedly pointed out to the Bureau 
of Navigation the increasingly serious situation which is resulting from rapid 
expansion of all phases of Naval activities without sufficient increases in avail- 
able men in the Fleet to train for purposes of meeting the personnel require- 
ments of this expansion. The current practice of constantly withdrawing 
trained men from the Fleet cann()t continue if the Fleet is to remain in a satis- 
factory state of readiness. The huge building program, both aircraft and surface 
vessels, will require more trained personnel for manning than can possibly be 
obtained under the current program of draining already under-complemented 
Fleet units. At least two years are re<iuired to train acceptable petty oflBcers. 
The consequences of continuing along the present apparently unplanned path will 
be dire. The critical shortage with which the combatant air units of the Fleet 
will be faced if the subject transfers are made is merely the beginning of a 
deplorable situation which will certainly develop unless there is adequate plan- 
ning for training personnel to meet the demands of expansion. The Pacific Fleet 
can and will train the required ratings if given the material. Class "A" schools 
must be immediately enlarged to cover the entire program. Induction of recruits 
must b^ enormously increased. 

4. The Commander-in-Chief is convinced that the building program and the 
training program are not synchronized. Unless intra -departmental coordination 
and review of the entire question of supplying personnel for the expanding Navy 
are effectively undertaken, the current condition cannot be sensibly improved. 

5. It is therefore most urgently recommended : 

(a) That, in meeting the immediate demands of expansion, the distribution 
of available personnel in the Navy be reviewed ^nd a program be established for 
the acquisition of required ratings from the forces both afloat and ashoi'e in such 
a manner as to avoid the depletion of any ratings below an acceptable minimum 
in any combatant organization ; this review to form the basis for the reconsidera- 
tion, requested in reference (a), of current orders for transfer of aviation ratings. 

(b) That the entire expansion program be reviewed in order to determine in 
detail the rate at which personnel will be required properly to man the new 
units. 

[3] (c) That, through the immediate and adequate expansion of Class "A" 
service schools and the supply of additional recruits to the Fleets and shore 
stations, the training of men be undertaken now in suflBcient numbers to meet 
the maximum demands as they occur. 

/S/ H. E. KlMMEZ^ 

Copy to : 
BUNav 
BuAer 
Combasefor Subcom 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2247 

[1] Cine File No. 

Personal 

Confidential 

United States Fleet 

U. S. S. Pennsylvania, Flagship 

Pearl Harbor, T. H., August 26, 1941. 
Admiral H. R. Stakk, U. S. Navy, . 
Chief of Naval Operations, 

Navy Department, Washington, D. C. 

Deab BETrry. I have your letter of 21 August dealing with the question of avia- 
tion personnel required to man new patrol plane squadrons and the squadrons for 
the HORNET plus certain additional men required for Kodiak and Dutch Harbor. 
I have some appreciation of the problem which confronts you and I wish to state 
that I yield to no one in my desire to be of the maximum assistance to the Navy as 
a whole, but my immedkite responsibility is the Pacific Fleet. You must bear with 
me if I present the viewpoint and opinion as viewed from where I sit. I know 
that you have never wanted anything else and you can rest assured that you will 
never get anything else from me. 

In the first place, the orders for the transfers directed in the various Bunav 
serials left no time for consideration and to make the best distribution of transfers. 
The situation changes so rapidly in i)ersonnel and almost invariably for the force 
that I can see no answer except to make my protest and gather the facts based on 
the very latest figures. As we set forth in the oflScial letter which is now on its 
way to you, we now have in the ratings of aviation machinist's mates : chiefs, first 
class and second class, just 73% of complement. When transfers directed by the 
serials in question are completed we will have 67% of complement in these ratings. 
The excess is entirely in third class ratings. We can spare these ratings with least 
resultant harm to the organizations. We have been trying to build up these 
ratings against the time when we could look forward to double crews. You know 
full well that the chiefs, first class and second class, are the men that bear the 
brunt of maintaining the planes and insuring their safe and efficient operation. 
I think when you lump the third class ratings into a picture to indicate an over- 
complement the picture is not accurate. We make no protest on the transfer of 
third class ratings and will be glad "to comply under the existing circumstances. 

[2] On the basis of one (qualair) radioman for each plane, we now have 
74% of the number required. After transfers are completed we will have 54%. 

I note in the directive for transfers to the HORNET that 16 (qualair) radiomen 
are required for the Utility Unit. 

Transfers required take long-time men, leaving us with all the short-timers 
which is an added handicap. We are now attempting to organize our pre-Fleet 
training units at San Diego who require most of all the ratings I have just 
mentioned. 

Our percentages deduced from the Base Force reports of 30 June vary by some 

II to 16% from the figures given in your letter and they are uniformly lower than 
your figures. 

If after you have read this letter you still feel that we should make the transfers 
required by Bunav serials 1386, 1394, 1397, 1406, and 14.50, we can complete the 
transfers from the Pacific Fleet by 30 September, with the bulk completed consid- 
erably earlier than that and at the same time insure the ratings are taken from 
activities which will result in the least harm in the various organizations. 

If you can assure me that we wont be fighting the Japs within the next six 
months I will gladly make the transfers without the least protest. We can, will, 
and have been, training men in this Fleet just as rapidly as the existing facilities, 
including the number of recruits supplied, permit. I will not say anything further 
about the need for additional men because you have my views In a great many 
communications on the subject and I know you are doing everything within your 
power to improve the situation. 

I will take steps to insure the preliminary planning necessary to an exi>editious 
execution of the orders contained in the various serials and will give the order to 
go ahead just as soon as you indicate by dispatch or otherwise what your judgment 
dictates. 

With kindest regards and best wishes. 
Sincerely yours, 

H. E. ElMMGTT.. 



2248 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[1] CinC File No. 
Secret 

United States Fleeh 

U. S. S. Pennsylvanha, Flagship 

Peael Harbor, T. H., September 12, 1941. 

Dear "Betty" : We all listened to the President's speech with great interest. 
With that and King's operation orders, of which we have copies, the situation in 
the Atlantic is fairly clear. But what about the Pacific? 

I noted that BidwelTs Southeast Pacitic Force has shooting orders for surface 
raiders east of 100° West, which seems to clear that up as far as raiders are con- 
cerned, but just how significant was the restriction, limiting offensive action to 
"siu'face raiders"? Of course I know that the possibility of German or Italian 
submarines in that area is slight and Japanese improbable, but the question arises 
as to just how much we can discount the threat of Japanese action. This uncer- 
tainty, coupled with current riuuors of U. S.-Japanese rapproachment and the 
absence of any specific reference to the Pacific in the President's speech, leaves 
me in some doubt as to just what my situation out here is. Specific questions 
that arise are: 

(a) What orders to shoot should be issued for areas other than Atlantic and 
Southeast Pacific sub-areas? This is particularly pertinent to our present 
escorts f(»r ships proceeding to the Far East. So far. my orders to them have 
been to protect their convoy from interference; to avoid use of force if possible, 
but to use it if necessary. These orders, at least by implication, preclude taking 
the offensive. Shouldn't I now change them to direct offensive measures against 
German and Italinn raiders? In view of the delicate nature of our present Pacific 
relations, with particular reference to their fiuidity, I feel that you are the only 
one who can an.swer this question. 

(b) Along the same lines, but more specifically related to the Japanese situa- 
tion, is what to do about submarine contacts off Pearl Harbor and the vicinity. 
As you know, our present orders are to trail all contacts, but not to bomb unless 
you are in the defensive sea area. Should we now bomb contacts, without wait- 
ing to be attacked? 

[2] The emphasis, in the President's speech, on the Atlantic also brings up 
the question of a possible further weakening of this Fleet. A strong Pac-iflc Fleet 
is unquestionably a deterrent to Japan — a weaker one may be an invitation. I 
cannot escape the conclusion that the maintenance of the "'status quo" out here 
is almost entirely a matter of the strength of this Fleet. It must be reduced, 
and, in event of actual hostilities, must be increased if we are to undertake a bold 
offensive. 

Our present shortage of carriers, cruisers and destroyers gives me much con- 
cern, as it is these types that must bear the brunt of our early operations. Later, 
we'll need a superiority in all types, as, according to reports, new Japanese 
BB's, CV's and CA's are coming out and the balance is going against us. We can- 
not carry the war very far into the Pacific until we are able to meet the Japanese 
Fleet on at least equal terms. Pertinent to the maintenance of the "stitus quo" 
and, if necesary, later hostilities, is the disposition of the NORTH CAROLINA 
and WASHINGTON. I feel that their moveiuent to the Pacific, now, would have 
a tremendous effect on Japan and would remove any impression that all our 
thoughts are on the Atlantic. If we can't do it now, we should at least be pre- 
pared to do it later if the situation deteriorates. 

When we get into a shooting war with Germany there will be an increased 
demands for escorts in the Pacific. In view of the immense distance involved 
and the character of probable opposition, this, in the main, means cruisers. We 
may need additional cruisers and I cannot see how we can handle the job prop- 
erly if our cruiser strength is reduced. We now have three cruisers on escort 
duty to Manila. My orders are to escort to Manila but not to escort on the return 
trip. Bidwell in the Southeast Pacific has two cruisers. 

I feel better now that we have gotten something at Wake. The success of 
the Army flight has re-emphasized its importance, and, while by no means 
"impregnable", its present defensive strength is considerable and will require 
the exposure of quite a force to capture it. It is even possible [3] that 
should its capture be an early objective of Japan, such an effort might be 
supported by a substantial portion of their Combined Fleet, which would create, 
for us, a golden opportunity if we have the strength to meet it. Do not misunder- 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2249 

stand me — I don't discount the Atlantic problem — but from where I sit, I discount 
the Pacific problem even less. Until we can keep a force liere strong enough to 
meet the Japanese Fleet we are not secure in the Pacific — and the Pacific is still 
very mucli a part of the world situation. 

I IvJiow you have these thoughts in ndnd and share my concern, but I am 
not sure but that there are some in Washington who might be inclined to overlook 
them. 

Please let me have your views on the questions raised herein. With regard to 
offensive action against raiders in the Pacific and submarines off Hawaii, etc., 
I presume I will get official orders, if any change in present policy is desired. 
Sincerely, 

/S/ KiMMEL. 
[1] • COMMANDKR-IN-rHIF:F 

United States Pacific Fleet 

U. S. S. Pennsylvania, Flagship 

Pearl Harbor, T. H., October 22, 19A1. 
#1 
Secret 

Dear Betty : On receipt of your despatches following the change in tlie Japanese 
cabinet we made the following dispositions :— 

Continued to maintain the patrol of two Submarines at Midway. 

Despatched twelve patrol planes to Midway. 

Despatched two submarines to Wake. They will arrive there on 23 October. 

Despatched the CASTOR and two destroyers to Johnston and Wake with ad- 
ditional marines, amnuinition and stores. 

The CURTISS arrives at Wake on 21 October with gas, lube oil and bombs. 

Prepared to send six patrol planes from Midway to Wake, replacing the six 
at Midway from Pearl Harbor. 

Despatched additional marines to Palmyra. 

Placed Admiral Pye, with the ships making a health cruise, on twelve hours 
notice after 20 October. . i 

Had six submariries prepared to depart for Japan on short notice. 

Put some additional security measures in effect in the operating areas outside 
Pearl Harbor. 

Delayed the sailing of the WEST VIRGINIA until about 17 November when 
she is due to go for an overhaul to Puget Sound and deferred final decision until 
that time. 

With minor changes I propose to continue the health cruises to the Pacific Coast ' 
until soJuething more definite develops. The despatch in regard to the submarines 
for Manila went forward to you today. 

I previously pointed out to you the great desirability of many things in the 
Pacific Fleet. If you will bear with me I want now to repeat some of them 
once more. The urgency for additional patrol craft in this area is as great as 
ever. Such craft are not [2] worthwhile unless they can operate in 
trade wind seas which result from winds from 15 to 35 knots blowing almost 
continuously. The 12 PT's which you sent to us I fear will be of very little use 
in this area. We sent them on an average day to make a trip from Os<hu to 
Molokai. The reports of this trip have gone forward officially. They were prac- 
tically useless in this sea and could not make more than 10 knots. Several of 
them had to turn back and a few personnel were quite seriously injured from 
being thrown about. We need something much more substantial to be of any use 
out here. In this connection I noted that the Department diverted the listening 
gear allocated to the four-stackers (DM's) in this Fleet to Atlantic destroyers 
and we will get no listening gear for these craft until a new c(mtract is made. 
I had fondly hoped that all these craft would be fitted with listening, gear by the 
first of December. 

In order to get anything like the capabilities of the heavy ships of this Fleet 
made effective we requiie at least two more squadrons of destroyers. Every 
exercise we plan we find the destroyers are lacking. You can well understand 
of course, that two squadrons is, in my opinion, a very modest request. We can 
use many more. 

I have been struggling with the availability of battleships and am concerned 
about the long interval between overhauls that will result if we continue to have 
only one battleship overhaul at one time. I am loath to reduce the operational 

79716 O— 46— i»t. 16 22 



2250 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

forces by more than that particularly as the interim availability further reduces 
the number available for operations. Two more battleships out here, particularly 
if they could be the NORTH CAROLINA and WASHINGTON, would ease the 
situation enormously. We have indications that one new battleship has been 
commissioned by the Japanese and rumors that an additional one will s6on be 
placed in commission. Such a contingency will further disturb the balance of 
power in the Pacific. 

We can use all the Jong range submarines that you can send us. They can 
be most effective in keeping destroyers and other patrol craft occupied near the 
Japanese bases, homeland, and trade routes. 

We should have more cruisers because we can expect that Jap raider activities 
will result from employment of a considerable number of converted merchant 
types as well as old cruisers in this work. Then, too, our own planned offensive 
operations require cruisers and more cruisers. The least you can do for us 
is to leave us with the cruisers we have. I can easily keep three or four more 
divisions profitably occupied when war breaks. 

The type of operations we have planned in the early stages of the war puts a 
premium on aircraft operations from carriers. We [5] have only three. 
One of them is occupied part-time in training activities at San Diego. I note 
in a letter signed by Ingersoll and received today that the chances of getting 
a merchant ship converted to a carrier for training purposes at San Diego are 
very poor. I feel that this matter shoiild be pushed ; that we should have 
at least one such vessel in the Atlantic and one in the Pacific. Uiitil we do get 
such a ship we are required to occupy a considerable time of a carrier at greatly 
increased cost, diversion from active operations and reduction in the efficiency 
of the carrier. These carrier training vessels will be useful so long as the war 
lasts and will pay for themselves many times over. 

We had information some time ago that you were converting two sea train 
vessels for use in transporting aircraft. What has become of them? Are they 
operating in the Atlantic and so you propose to send a carrier to San Diego to 
ferry planes. 

I feel that the training in the Fleet is coming along very well. The shooting 
so far has been very good by any standards. We are developing the use of radar 
and our principal handicap at the present time is lack of material and lack of 
trained personnel. Both are being reme<lie(l at a satisfactory rate. We have had 
no experience yet with the use of gunnery radar. The first sets are now being 
installed. The gunnery radar installed in the HONOLULU Class is a bitter dis- 
appointment. Thel have been able to get surface ships at ranges not in excess 
of twenty thousand yards, on a big ship, and around twelve thousand on a 
destroyer. This radar is apparently useless for the detection of aircraft. Luckily, 
this type is being installed in the HONOLULU Class only. It is useful only for 
short range work against surface craft at night or in low visibility. I presume 
steps are being taken to eliminate or radically improve this type of radar. 

The radar installed in the battleships and carriers is well worthwhile and 
we have got highly creditable results from its use. 

The new big drydock here has been pumped out and the contractors' forces 
are now in process of cleaning it out preparatory to finishing off the bottom. I am 
informed that an emergency docking will be possible any time after about the 
15th of November, although the dock will not be entirely completed until some- 
time later than that. 

The recreation facilities are being added to and I believe the men are in much 
beter shape now than they were a few months ago. The shooting has, I believe, 
served to increase their confidence in themselves, to a considerable degree. 

[4] I sent forward to you today an exhaustive study on the installations and 
defenses of Wake, Midway, Johnston and Palmyra. I hope it will be of assistance 
in deciding what you want done out here. I feel that a comprehensive plan is 
essential if we are to get coordinated results in the shortest time. This we tried 
to give you. 

You will note that we recommend two full defense battalions over and above the 
requirements of the Islands now occupied in order to provide two balanced forces 
to occupy any desired location on short notice. Until such time comes these 
personnel can be used to rotate the defense battalions at the various permanently 
garrisoned islands. 

The investigation of an alternate land plane route to the Eastward of the 
Marshalls and on to Australia has my hearty approval. We may be able to get 
some quick results from the expedition to Christmas Island sufficient to permit the 
routing of four-engine land plane bombers from Oahu to Christmas to Suva to 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2251 

Noumea and on to Australia. Additional stepping stones are, of course, highly 
desirable. In this connection, however, it must be remembered that there are not 
enough ships now available to handle our own island developments. Without 
greatly augmented shipping facilities we cannot possibly assume the additional 
burden for the Army. 
My best regards to you always. 
Most sincerely yours, 

[S] H. E. KIMMEIL. 

Admiral H. R. Stabk, U. S. Navy, 
Chief of Naval Operations, 
Navy Department, 

Washington, D. C. 



Commandeb-in-Chief 

united states pacific fleen* — flagship 

Secret 

Peabl Harbob, T. H., October 29, 19 U. 

Drab Betty : I had Mr. Hallet Abend for lunch with me today. He has just 
completed a tour for the Reader's Digest and his travels took him to Singapore, 
Manila, Java, Dutch East Indies, Australia and New Zealand. He gave us some 
very interesting information. The most vital information was information which 
he had received from oflGlcials in Australia and New Zealand that if Japan attacks 
Russia the British Empire will declare war on Japan. He was also assured that 
the Dutch East Indies would follow Great Britain and that the dutch are anxious 
that the war start. They feel that the present set-up in the world gives fhem a 
better chance now than they will ever have again, so long as Japan has her bases in 
Indo China. 

At the present writing it appears that the most probable direction for Japanese 
adventures is to the Northward. If they do embark on such an adventure and 
Britain and the Dutch East Indies declare war on Japan, what will we do? 

I have no means of knowing the accuracy of the statements. It may be that the 
idea was planted with Mr. Abend as a propaganda measure and he was told by the 
oflScials who informed him that he could pubish it after he got to the United States. 
I am informing you in order that you may run it down, and also in the hope that 
you may give me some inkling of what we will do in such a contingency. 

My kindest regards and best wishes, always. 
Most sincerely yours, 

[S] H. El KiMMEL. 

P. S. The officials told Mr. Abend that this information came from the Privy 
Council but he was not privileged to use this. 
Admiral H. R. Stakk, V. 8. Navy, 
Chief of Naval Operations, 
Navy Department, 

Washington, D. C. 



[i] United States Pacitic Fleet 

U. S. S. Pennstlvania, Flagship 
Cincpac File No. 
Personal and Confidential Peabl Hakbok, T. H., November 6, 1941. 

Dear Betty : I have just signed a communication to you setting forth our 
estimate of the Japanese bases and forces in the Mandates. This estimate 
represents meticulous observations, principally by radio, over a long period of 
time with what* we conceive to be reasonable deductions therefrom. I think 
there can be no doubt that the Japanese have expanded very large sums and 
much effort in their attempt to strengthen the Mandates and provide numerous 
operating bases for submarines and aircraft. The numbers of aircraft are of 
necessity an etsimate, but with adequate operating bases for both submarines 
and aircraft, additional forces can be very quickly moved into the Mandates, 
depending upon the situation. 



2252 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

You will note, of course, that our estimate differs considerably from the one 
prepared in the Navy Department. I doubt very much if the Navy Department's 
effort has had the care expended upon it that we have given to the one we 
submitted. 

I must call your attention again to the anti-submarine effort that will be 
required in this area and at sea if our operations are to be carried on with rea- 
sonable security. You have approved installation of sound gear in the DM's, 
in the AM's, the AVP's, certain AT's, and the AVD's. At the present writing, 
the following vessels of these classes are lacking in sound gear and we have been 
furnished no date from the Department on which we can expect deliveries of 
same. 

DM's: PRUITT, TRACY, PREBLE, SICARD, DORSEY, LAMBERTON, 
BOGGS and ELLIOT. 

AVP's: TEAL, PELICAN, SWAN and AVOCET. 

AM's: BOBOLINK. GREBE, KINGFISHER, RAIL, ROBIN, SEAGULL, 
TERN. TURKEY, VIREO. 
XXXXXXXXXX and XXXXXXXX 

AT's: NAVAJO and SEMINOLE. 

AVD's: HULBERT. BALLARD, THORNTON, WILLIAMSON, GILLIS and 
McFARLAND. 

[2] In other words, we have in this area 2f> ships which can be fitted with 
sound gear and which are not so fitted. This is a very large number of potentially 
useful submarine hunters. 

I note that you plan to send 24 VSO's to the Asiatic Fleet in January. I pre- 
sume that you now plan to send those VSO's crated, in cargo vessels. Unless 
the situation changes materially I strongly recommend against sending them in 
a carrier. 

I have frequently mentioned the very great desirability of having a flight deck 
merchant ship for use in training aviators for carrier duty. On reflection, I 
have changed my mind to the extent that instead of providing one carrier of this 
type for each coast, we should provide about ten such carriers for each coast. 
Such ships operating in conjunction with cruisers or even destroyers, have a very 
great i)otential value. Of course, the mercantile aircraft carriers I am now 
recommending should be fully equipped for combat puri)oses — something that 
I did not contemplate when we recommended the carrier for flight deck training 
only. 

My kindest regards and best wishes, always. 
Most sincerely yours, 

H. E. Kim MEL. 

P. S. I have forwarded today by air mail the comments of Com-14, the C!om- 
manding General, and myself on the subjiect of a combined operating center for 
the Army and Navy in Oahu. You will note that we have presented several 
objections and feel that in any event the Commander-in-Chief, Commander Sub- 
marines, Scouting Force, and Commander Base Force have no place in such an 
operating center. I feel that the quarters and buildings we have requested for 
these agencies should be proceeded with forthwith ; no matter what decision 
is finally made in regard to an operating center the buildings we have requested 
will be necessary. 

Admiral H. R. Stakk. U. S. Navy, 
Chief of Naval Operations, 
Navy Department, 

Washington, D. C. 



[i] United States Pacific Fleet 

U. S. S. Pennsylvania, Flagship 

Cincpac File No. 

Secret Pearl Harbor, T. H., 15 November, 19J^1. 

Dear "Betty" : In repeated correspondence I have set forth to you the needs 
of the Pacific Fleet. These needs are real and immediate. I have seen the ma- 
terial and personnel diverted to the Atlantic. No doubt they are needed there. 
But I must insist that more consideration be given to the needs of the Pacific 
Fleet. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2253 

In case of war in the Pacific we shall have a problem difficult of solution under 
any circumstances; one requiring ^i major effort to bring the war to a successful 
conclusion. During preparation for such an effort we must be in a position to 
make Japanese operations costly and of limited effectiveness. The strength 
of this fleet limits our freedom of action and lack of modern equipment in 
ships we now have limits their effectiveness. 

We must be in a position to minimize our own losses, and to inflict maximum 
damage to Japanese fleet, merchant shipping, and bases. We should have suffi- 
cient strength in this fleet for such effective operations as to permit cruising 
at will in the Japanese Mandated Island area, and even on occasions to Japanese 
home waters. We should have the strength to make any enemy operations 
against Wake a highly hazardous undertaking. To do these things substantial 
increase of the strength of this Fleet is mandatory. 

Greater permanence of personnel is required to obtain tl^at ship, unit and fleet 
efficiency so essential for readiness to fight. Reduction of changes to a minimum 
especially in key positions, must be accomplished. Detachment of officers and 
men has already dangerously reduced efliciency of this fleet and they continue. 
Well qualified officers are in many instances, detached to fill billets much less 
important, in my opinion than those filled in this fleet. Battleship Captains 
must be chosen for proficiency regardless of seniority. 

This fleet requires approximately 9,000 men to fill complements; it can utilize 
an additional 10.000. 

[2] If this fleet is to reach and maintain a satisfactory degree of readiness 
for offensive action, the foregoing requirements must be met ; and it must not 
be considered a training fleet for support of the Atlantic Fleet and the shore 
establishment. 

With best wishes, 

H. E. KiMMEL. 



Commander-in-Chief 
United States Pacific Fleet 
U. S. S. Pennsylvania, Flagship 

Ser. #8 
S-e-c-r-e-t 

PE1A.RL Haebor, T. H., December 2, 19^1. 

De.\r Betty : We had your despatches in regard to reinforcing the outlying 
islands with Army pursuit planes and Army personnel. With regard to the 
u.se of Army pursuits on the island bases, some time ago we investigated the 
feasibility of putting some kind of fighters on the outlying islands and decided 
at the time that our best chance of quickly reinforcing the i.slands and to make 
the minimum demands upon the supplies in the island that we should send a 
minimum number of ground crews to Wake and Midway in order when the 
time came, to be in a position to fly off the Marine planes from a carrier or to 
send them direct from Pearl to Midway in the case of the SBD's. At the time 
your despatch in regard to Army pursuits was received we had the WRIGHT 
at Wake discharging the Marine ground crews and she arrives at Midway 
tomorrow, December 3, to discharge Marine ground crews there. 

Halsey, in the ENTERPRISE, with three heavy cruisers and a squadron of 
destroyers, will fly off 12 Marine fighting planes for Wake tomorrow morning 
after which he returns to Pearl. We have been covering his advance by 2 VP 
squadrons operating from Johnston, Midway and Wake. Upon the completion 
of the movement we now plan to return one VP squadron to Pearl and leave 
the other one at Midway awaiting further developments. I will hold the Marine 
SBD's at Pearl awaiting further developments as they can fly under their own 
power from Pearl to Midway. 

During all the period that I have been in command the question of the 
development of supply and defense of these outlying bases has been a very 
difficult one. We cannot expect to supply Wake quickly and expeditiously until 
we have a space to put a ship alongside for loading and unloading. The Com- 
mandant of the District has been and is exerting every effort to obtain this 
objective. As you know, ships have been delayed in unloading at Wake for as 



2254 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

long as 28 days, due to bad weather, and it is not unusual for a ship to take 
as much as 7 or 8 days. This, in the face of any opposition, presents an impos- 
sible situation. Present facilities at Wake must be improved, particularly as 
to storage of fuel oil, aviation gas, food and ammunition. This work should 
not stop and the 1,000 defense workers at Wake are essential to keep this work 
moving as rapidly as material can be supplied. A recent estimate by Bloch sets 
the time for the completion of the ship channel to about the first of May. I hope, 
and so does he, that this date can be anticipated. At the present time we cannot 
support more personnel on Wake than we now have there. As you will remember, 
we put six 5" guns and twelve 3" [2] anti-aircraft guns, together with 
a number of machine guns on the island, well knowing that we did not have 
suflBcient marine personnel to man them. However, I think good progress has 
been made in organizing the defense workers to assist in the manning of the 
battery at Wake. In, case the present situation should ease, we can readily 
withdraw the Marine fighters from Wake in order to decrease the demands upon 
the facilities there and also in order to keep up the training of the pilots of 
these planes. 

The situation at Midway is somewhat better than at Wake. You will note 
from our report of the defenses submitted today that we have shipped three of 
the four 7" guns to Midway. Also we have shipped, or are shortly shipping, four 
of the 3"-50 anti-aircraft guns to Midway. These, in addition to the batteries 
already installed there, which comprise six 5"-ol's and twelve 3" anti-aircraft. 
You will also note from our oflQcial letter submitted today that the defenses of 
Johnston and Palmyra, while not what we would like to have, are nevertheless 
not entirely inadequate. 

Your despatches in regard to the use of Army personnel and the organization 
of Army defense forces to be used in outlying islands is being given earnest con- 
sideration. I know you appreciate the difTiculties of mixing Army, Marine Corps 
and Navy personnel in a small island base. I believe you will subscribe to the 
principle that all these outlying bases must be under Navy command and the 
forces there must be subject to the orders of the Commander-in-Chief without 
any qualification whatsoever. I anticipate some difficulties along this line when 
Army personnel is injected into the picture unless a very clear directive is isssued 
jointly by the War and Navy Department. On inquiry and conference with the 
Army I find that the Army in Hawaii has no guns, either surface or anti-aircraft, 
available for outlying bases. They can supply some .30 caliber machine guns and 
rifles. I have frequently called to your attention the inadequacy, of the Army 
anti-aircraft defense in the Pearl Harbor area with particular reference to the 
shortage of anti-aircraft guns. So far, very little has been done to improve this 
situation. With nothing but .30 caliber machine guns and rifles the replacement 
of Marines by Army at outlying bases now will result in an increased number of 
Marines in Oahu with no suitable equipment as Army would require all of the 
Marine equipment now in the islands. The Marines in the outlying islands are 
trained, acclimated and efficient beyond standards immediately obtainable by the 
Army even if they took over the present Marine equipment. We cannot appreciably 
increase the number of military personnel in the outlying islands unless we re- 
move the defense workers. We cannot afford to remove the defense workers if 
we expect ever to reach a satisfactory condition in the islands. Essential items 
include, as I have previously stated, \3] provisions to berth a ship at Wake, 
completix)n of air fields at Palmyra and Johnston and completion of fuel, gaso- 
line, food and ammunition housing at all bases. I am proposing in official cor- 
respondence that: (2) the Army organize 3 defense battalions of approximately 
800 men each ; that steps be taken in Washington to supply them with guns, both 
surface and anti-aircraft ; supply them with 37mm or .50 caliber machine guns ; 
to make up a well balanced defense battalion ; that prijor to the time the equip- 
ment of these organizations is supplied that they drill with the five inch guns of 
the Fourth Defense Battalion now at Pearl as long as the equipment is available 
here. If it is decided to supply these battalions with some other caliber of guns, 
that sufficient number of guns of the type to be used be shipped to Oahu to be 
utilized, for training puriwses. (b) that these Army defense battalions be held 
in readiness to (1) furnish replacement to presently occupied islands (2) to re- 
lieve battalions in presently occupied islands (3) to garrison islands to be 
occupied. 

The Marine garrison's now at Midway, Johnston and Palmyra should be re- 
tained there for the present. They will not be withdrawn until arms and equip- 
ment for the Army defense battalions have been received and the Army trained. 
At this time a decision can be made according to the situation then existing. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2255 

That the Army organize three 18-plane pursuit squadrons and keep them in an 
expeditionary status; maintain the ground crews organized and ready to man 
them ; maintain the planes ready to be transported by carrier when ordered. 

The Array has orders to defend C'anton and Christmas. We are turning over 
to them two five-inch 51 guns for use at Canton. These they will man with 
Army personnel and supplement with some obsolete anti-aircraft guns and 
machine guns. The expedition is now due to leave here on December ninth. 

The Army is also sending some obsolete guns and a garrison to Christmas. I 
will let you know more definitely what they sent when I find out exactly. 

I feel that we cannot determine the defenses of Canton and Christmas until 
we find out how much personnel can be maintained there. Meanwhile the Army 
is sending some forces there. 

[4] In view of the foregoing I am unable to understand the reason for the 
despatches from the War and Navy Department directing us to utilize the Army 
in the defense of the outlying bases, as we can hope for no relief from this quarter 
until they have been supplied with suitable equipment. 

I feel the wiser course is to continue to organize Marine defense battalions 
and supply them with the necessary equipment. I believe we can train Marine 
defense tmttalions just as rapidly as the Army can do so and probably as 
rapidly as the equipment can be supplied. If there is any prospect of the imme- 
diate supply of considerable quantities of suitable equipment I can see some 
reason for injecting the Army into the picture. 

I think it would be well for you to read the despatch sent by the War Depart- 
ment to the Commanding General on this subject. It dififers considerably from 
the one you sent to us in that the War Department says they will take over the 
defense of some outlying bases from the Navy in accordance with an agreement 
to be reached by the Commanding General and myself. Your despatch left me 
with the conviction that the Army was to reinforce the Naval and Marine forces 
on the outlying bases in case of necessity. I feel that this should be clarified. 

We have one transport in commission which, due to a delay in the sailing of the 
WHARTON we are now obliged to use for one trip to transport essential Naval 
personnel from the West Coast to the' Fleet. The other transiwrts, to a total of 
six, are in various stages of completion. The Marines at San Diego are in urgent 
need of transport training and will not be ready to come to Hawaii until some 
time in February. I can see very little chance for any overseas expedition even 
on a small scale until that date. Eventually this war will require a much 
greater number of transports and supply ships in the Pacific. We are working 
on an estimate of the requirements. This estimate, in addition to some thirty or 
forty transports and an equal number of supply ships must also include a thirty 
to fifty i)ercent increase in the fighting strength of the Fleet before we can occupy 
the Mar.shalls and Carolines in an advance across the Pacific. 

With these considerations in mind I am at loss to understand the considerations 
which injected the Array into the picture. 

[5] My kindest regards and best wishes, always. 
Most sincerely yours, 

H. E. KiMMEL 

P. S. The Commanding General of the Hawaiian Air Detachment made the 
statement in conference that his pursuit planes could not operate farther than 
35 miles from land. If this be the case, I can see very little use for Army pursuit 
planes in nn outlying island. This, added to the inability of this type plane to 
land on a carrier, makes them practically useless for an overseas expedition of 
any kind. Except for the four-engined Anny bombers, we must depend upon Navy 
and Marine Corps planes to support any overseas expedition and to man outlying 
l)ases. This is and has been one of my reasons for urging the supply of all types 
of carrier planes. 

P. S. You will note that I have issued orders to the Pacific Fleet to depth 
bomb all submarine contacts in the Oahu operating area. 

H. E. K. 

Admiral H. R. Staek, U. S. Navy, 
Chief of Naval Operations, 

Navy Department, Washington, D. C. 

[61 P. S. In connection with the development of outlying bases by the 
Army, I must invite your attention to the fact that when the War Department 
issued orders to the Commanding General out here to develop these bases they 
authorized him to charter ships and to take all other necessary steps to insure 



2256 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

the early completion of the project. He has already taken over three large 
inter-island vessels and has caused some army transports and other shipping 
to be diverted to the supply of Christmas and Canton. He has also chartered a 
number of smaller vessels such as tugs and sampans. 

I feel he has done an excellent job. I feel that the Navy personnel in this area 
with equal authority would have their efforts much facilitated. I do not know 
the considerations which pronipted the Navy to turn over the development of 
the island bases to the Army I do know that it has complicated our problems 
considerably. 

The Conmiandiiig General is keeping me informed of what he is doing but 
frequently the information is s<> late that I have been unable to plan adequate 
protection. I am sure it is no fault of his because he informs me as soon as he 
himself is informed. I have nothing but the highest praise for the way General 
Short has taken hold of this problem which dropped in his lap. 

H. E. KIMMEL. 

[7] P. S. From correspondence which General Short has furnished me 
I note that the Army is engaged in developing air fields in Fijii and New 
Caledonia. This will involve questions of supply and protection both of shipping 
and the fields themselves. The Australians I understand are loath to assume 
the protection of the field in New Caledonia. The Navy is bound to be involved 
in these affairs. I fear we may l)ecome so much concerned with defensive 
roles that we may become unable to take the offensive. Too much diversion 
of effort for defense will leave us an inadequate force with which to take the 
offensive. 

With regard to the escort of convoys by using a single cruiser to escort not 
to exceed 8 ships, we endeavor to limit the number of cruisers so occupied at one 
time to four. We now find that routing via Torres Strait to Manila, we are going 
to have seven crui.sers continuously occupied with convoy duty. This without any 
consideration for such protection as may eventually be required from San 
Francisco to Oahu. I realize of course that the demands for trans-Pacific escorts 
may decrea.se if it becomes impossible to route ships to Manila but it will still 
be necessary to supply the Asiatic Fleet and our allies in the Far East. 

/S/ H. E. KIMMEL. 



[1] Ser. #9 
Secret 

Com MANDEB-i N -Chief 

United States Pacific Fleet 

U. S. S. Pennsylvania, Flagship 

Peabl Harbor, T. H.. December 12, 1941. 

Dear Betty : Thanks for your letter. The Secretary is here and I have given 
him verbally as complete an account of the action last Sunday as 1 could. Pye, 
Bloch and General Short were present during the interview. ~ Briefly, we had 
considered an air raid on Hawaii as a very remote possibility, particularly at 
the time that it occurred. There were 10 VP's in the air that morning but they 
of course could not adequately cover 369° of ai'c and their primary effort was 
directed against the submarine menace which everyone fully recognized. In 
our endeavor to avoid wearing out both . personnel and planes, we had made 
periodic sweeps to the Northward and Westward but none were made on the 
morning, in question. You, of course, are familiar with the exchanges of VP 
squadrons and the teething trouble that such new squadrons always experience. 

Full precautions were taken by all ships at sea and I am happy to state 
that no casualties were incurred by any of them. The submarines were promptly 
and I hope effectively, dealt with. We believe that since the action started we 
have accounted for several submarines. A task force commanded by Newton, 
including one carrier, was between here and Midway and about 400 miles from 
Midway, South of the line of islands. This task force included 1 carrier, 3 
CA's and a squadron of destroyers. Brown, in the INDIANAPOLIS, with 4 DM's 
was in the vicinity of Johnston Island. Halsey, in the ENTERPRISE, with 3 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2257 

CA's and 9 DD's was about 200 miles west of Oahii. The MINNEAPOLIS, with 
4 DM's, was in the operating area to the Southward of Oahu. 

The approximate locations of these forces are shown on the chart and in the 
statement enclosed herewith. The Army anti-aircraft guns were not manned. 
The condition of readiness of their planes is being reported by General Short. 

The ships in harbor opened fire very promptly but the first attack wave was 
practically unopposed. The fact that all ships were able to open fire so promptly 
during the breakfast hour indicates that the ships in harbor were alert and 
prepared. 

No amount of explanation can alter the results which are included in a letter 
which I am sending along to you today, giving in such detail as is now possible, 
the damage sustained. Prompt and vigorous action was taken in an attempt to 
intercept and destroy the attacking force. The Fifth Column activities added 
great confusion and it was most difficult to evaluate the reports received. 

[2] We gave Halsey, Brown and Newton our best information and estimates. 
Our first estimate, based on very meager information indicated a carrier might 
be to the Northward. Halsey had hardly steadied on a course in that direction 
when he intercepted a message as to strong enemy forces approaching Barber's 
Point and promptly diverted his ship and search to the Southward. A false report 
of a transport landing troops at Barber's Point was picked up by an lenemy 
ship and rebroadcast. 

For a time, indications seemed to point more definitely to a carrier, to the 
Southward than to the Northward and I advised the forces at sea that enemy 
carriers might be in both directions. Radar information was conflicting ; but that 
indicating planes to the Southward was strongly supported by R. D. F. bearings 
(not bilateral) of two Japanese calls showing carriers in that direction. Probably 
they were made by enemy ships planted there for the purpose ; although some 
possibility still exists that a carrier may have been there. 

We will endeavor to give you a complete account of our efforts when time 
permits. Up to now we have been far too busy in handling taatters of the 
moment and planning for the future to collate and analyze the vast amount 
of conflicting matter that came in at the time. 

I am enclosing an estimate of the situation, which will show you our present 
ideas on what we hope to accomplish. Needless to say we have been up to our 
ears in getting re-oriented ; so much so that we have scarcely had time to feel 
the terrific shock. 

The Secretary is taking with him photographs of the type of submarine which 
entered the harbor. This submarine 74' x '^Y/, bolted together in 3 sections 
and capable of 24 knots submerged, can pass under or around most nets. The 
Pearl Harbor anti-submarine net was down at the time the raid started. The 
submarine carried photographed silhouettes of Oahu from every angle of ap- 
proach ; and, among other things in its locker, it had an American Ensign. I 
shall forward shortly, considerable detailed information of this vessel. 

Charts and other things from crashed planes, as well as information gained 
from the submarine prove that this raid was planned for months. Details had 
been worked out with the greatest care. Each pilot, judging from material from 
unburned or partially burned planes, carried a book of silhouettes of our ships. 
The charts of Pearl Harbor in planes were as good as anything we have. [3] 
They showed the berths for all types of our ships. I entertain no doubt that the 
loss of the OGLALA was entirely due to the fact that she was in the PENN- 
SYLVANIA'S normal berth. 

The inspiring thing in all this business is the conduct of officers and men. 
During the action it was magnificent and their efforts since have been untiring 
and effective. As destroyers were clearing the harbor, they were boarded by 
men from sunken ships anxious to do their part. Numerous instances have been 
reported to me of mass volunteering from sunken ships to go to sea in ships that 
were left. Marines, hearing of attacks on Midway and Wake, have insisted on 
being sent there. 

Morale of all ofl^cers and men is high. They have but one tliought and that 
is to be able to get at the enemy. 

My kindest regards and best wishes to you always. 
Most sincerely yours, 



/S/ H. E. KiMMEL. 



Admiral H. R. Stark. U. S. Navy, 
Chief of Naval Operations, 

Navy Department, Washington, D. C. 



2258 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

EXHIBIT NO. 107 

CONFIDENTIAI, 

APPENDIX TO NARRATIVE STATEMENT OF EVIDENCE AT NAVY PEARL 
HARBOR INVESTIGATIONS 

(Reports (formerly Top Secret) advisory to the Secretary of the Navy in Navy 
Pearl Harbor Investigations. See Narrative Statement of Evidence at Navy 
Pearl Harbor Investigations, Vol. II, for official Navy action (formerly Top 
Secret) on the reports) 

Navy Department, Washington, D. C. 

COMMANDEB IN CHIEF, UNITED STATES FlEET, THIRD ENDORSEMENT TO REPORT OF 

Further Pearl, Harbor Investigation by Admiral, H. K. Hewitt, U. S. Navy 

[i] 

United States Fleet 

headquarters of the commander in chief 

Navy Department, Washington 25, D. C. 
FF1/A17 
Serial: 002008 
Top Secret 

Third Endorsement to Adm. Hewitt's Report to SecNav dated 12 July 1945. 
From : Commander in Chief, United States Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations. 
To : The Secretary of the Navy. 

Subject : Report of Further Pearl Harbor Investigation by Admiral H. K. Hewitt, 
U. S. Navy. 

1. I concur in general in the remarks and recommendations of the Judge 
Advocate General as expressed in the second endorsement. In answer to the 
specific questions asked in the first endorsement, the following opinions are 
submitted : 

(a) I am of the opinion that the evidence is not sufficient to warrant trial by 
court martial of any person in the Naval Service, in that the evidence will not 
sustain the charges required by the Articles for the Government of the Navy. 

(b) With regard to tlie sufficiency of the evidence to warrant other proceed- 
ings, I am still of the opinion, which I have previously expressed, that Admiral 
Stark and Admiral Kimmel, though not culpable to a degree warranting formal 
disciplinary action, were nevertheless inadequate in emergency, due to the lack 
of the superior judgment necessary for exercising command commensurate with 
their duties. 

(c) Appropriate action appears to me to be the relegation of both of these 
officers to positions in which lack of superior strategic judgment may not result 
in future errors. The action has been taken in the case of both Admiral Stark 
and Admiral Kimmel. No further action is recommended. 

[2] (d) For the reasons stated by the Judge Advocate General, I consider 
it impracticable to bring Admiral Stark and Admiral Kimmel, or either one of 
them, to trial prior to the termination of hostilities with Japan, nor are court 
martial or other proceedings (prior to the termination of hostilities with Japan) 
advisable because such proceedings would almost certainly involve disclosure of 
information which would be detrimental to current military operations and to 
national security measures. 

2. I concur in the opinion of Judge Advocate General that the Navy De- 
partment is morally obligated to order Admiral Kimmel to trial before a General 
Court Martial, should Admiral Kimmel so insist. However, this action should 
not be taken until after the completion of hostilities with Japan. 

3. I concur in the suggestion of the Judge Advocate that this record be made 
available to Admiral Kimmel and his counsel ; that Admiral Kimmel be informed 
that he is free to make public anything contained in this record and prior records 
as goon as that may be done without prejudice to security; that if- Admiral 
Kimmel insists, a General Court Martial will be convened to try him for alleged 
offenses he may have committed on or before December 7, 1941. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2259 

4. As to Admiral Hewitt's deductions from war experience — paragraph 28, page 
180-— I am unable to concur fully with (a) thereof but do concur fully with 
(b) thereof. Nor am I able to concur fully in his paragraph 29 (page 180) — 
which parallels his paragraph 28 (a) — for the reason that he himself sets forth 
in substance at various places in his "findings" and "conclusions", namely, that 
while the system of command was that of mutual cooperation it was, in reality, 
incomplete and inadequate implementation of that system which was at fault 
There is the further fact that, given the information which was available in 
Washington, it is reasonable to assume that the system of mutual cooperation 
would have been fully alerted and made to function effectively. 

[s] E. J. King 
E. J. King. 



The Judge Advocate General's 
Second Endobsement 

ON 

The Re^pobt of Fubtheb Pbabl Habbob Investigation 

BY 

AoMiBAL H. K. Hewitt, U. S. Navy 

[i] 

Depabtment of the Navy, 
Office of the Judge Advocate Genebal, 

Washington, D. C, 10 August 1945. ' 
Top Secret 

Second Endorsement 

From : The Judge Advocate General. 
To : Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet, and 
Chief of Naval Operations. 

Subject : Report of further Pearl Harbor investigation by Admiral 
H. K. Hewitt, U. S. Navy. 

1. Subject report clarifies obscure points and supplies omissions in the earlier 
investigations. It is considered that this and former investigations, taken 
together, present as clear a picture of the pertinent facts as will ever be adduced. 
With this report, therefore, I believe the investigation of the Pearl Harbor attack 
should be considered completed. 

2. Admiral Hewitt's report brings out and confirms a distinction which 
impressed me at the time of studying the earlier investigations, a distinction 
which does much to clarify thinking on the question of placing responsibility for 
the Pearl Harbor disaster. It appears that there was no lack of appreciation 
on the i>art of any of the responsible officers that war was coming, and coming 
quickly, during the critical period immediately preceeding 7 December 1941-, 
The point on which those oflScers failed to exercise the discernment and judgment 
to be expected from oflScers occupying their positions, was their failure to 
appreciate, from the information available to them, that Pearl Harbor was a 
likely target for aerial attack and their failure to take the necessary steps to 
prevent or minimize such a surprise attack. Elach of these officers, in estimating 
the critical situation, demonstrated a poor quality of strategical planning, in 
that he largely ruled out all possible courses of action by which the Japanese 
might begin the war except through an attack in the Western Pacific. 

3. I do not believe that the lack of more complete understanding and 
co-operation between Admiral Kimmel and Lieutenant General Short had any 
great affect on the ultimate result; for it is abundantly shown that they each 
entertained the same fallacious views, and closer understanding would most 
likely merely have strengthened those views. Likewise, I submit that the impor- 
tance of information from Japanese sources has been overemphasized ; for had 
more basically sound principles been observed, the Pearl Harbor disaster would 
not have occurred. The security of Pearl Harbor was the very core of our 



2260 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Pacific strategy, a fact which did not receive suflScient consideration in the 
strategic concept of responsible oflScers. 

[2] 4. In answer to the specitic questions asked in the first endorsement, 
the following opinions are submitted : 

(a) As is more fully developed in the answer to question (b), it is not believed 
that there is suflBcient evidence to warrant conviction of any of the oflScers con- 
cerned of any offense known to naval law. 

(b) Under the facts of this case, tliere are only two offenses which are worthy 
of consideration: (1) Neglect of Duty and (2) Culpable Inefficiency in the 
Performance of Duty. Under either charge it would be necessary to define the 
duty of the officer concerned, and to show that it was his duty to follow a course 
of action other than the one he did. In my opinion this would be impossible, as 
the acts of omi.ssion of the.se officers do not rise above the status of errors of 
judgment. No clearly defined duty can be established which was neglected or 
improperly performed. As stated by Fleet Admiral King, in his endorsement on 
the findings of the Ccmrt of Inquiry, the evidence in the case boils down to the 
fact that the acts of the officers in question "indicate lack of superior judgment 
necessary for exercising command commensurate with their rank and their 
assigned duties, rather than <-ulpable inefiiciency." "Lack of Superior Judgment" 
is not an offense triable by general court-martial. 

(c) The charges and specifications for any court-martial proceedings must 
be filed not later than a date "six months after the termination of hostilities in 
the present war with Japan as proclaimed by the President or as specified in 
a concurrent resolution of the two Houses of Congress, whichever is the earlier." 
Public Law" 77 — 79th Congress, approved June 7, 194rt. There are serious doubts 
as to the constitutionality of this and the earlier extensions of the Statute of 
Limitations enacted by the Congress since 7 December 1941 and applicable to 
trials arising out of the Pearl Harbor disaster as a violation of the Constitu- 
tional prohibition against ex post fncto laws. Admiral Kimmel has executed 
a waiver of the Statute of Liniitati<ms for a period of six months past the end 
of the present war, and therefore the question of the validity of the Congressional 
extensions is not controlling in his ca.se. However, as it has become apparent 
since the time that Admiral Kinnnel was requeste<l to execute this waiA^er that 
other officers are also blameworthy, it is my opinion that the Navy Department 
would be acting in an inequitable manner in instituting any proceedings against 
Admiral Kimmel on his waiver, unle.ss Admiral Kimmel himself so requests. 

[S] (d) The requirements of 39th Article for the Government of the Navy 

and Section 346 of Naval Courts and Boards pertaining to the rank of members 
of a general court-martial will make it most difficult to constitute a court for the 
trial of the officers here concerned during war time or during a period of six 
mxjnths after the cessation of hostilities. Many of the officers of appropriate rank, 
both <m the active and the retired lists, would be disqualified because of interest 
in the subject matter^ the probability of being called as a witness, or by virtue 
of having been connected with one of the investigations into the matter. If more 
than one of the officers in question are brought to trial, an entirely new court 
would be necessary in each case, as members who had tried a former case arising 
out of the Pearl Harbor attack would be subject to challenge. The Summoning 
of the necessary witnesses would result in temporarily removing from their duty 
Statiotfs many of the key officers in the naval organization. For the foregoing 
reasons, I am of the opinion that any such court martial proceedings prior to 
the end of hostilities with Japan is highly impractical and wotild be detrimental 
to the war effort, and further, that any such proceedings during the six months 
immediately following the end of hostilities would seriously impair the efficiency 
of the naval service. 

5. Notwithstanding the difficulties pointed out above, I am of the opinion that 
the Navy Department is morally obligated to order Admiral Kimmel tried by 
general court-martial should Admiral Kimmel so insist. In August 1943, Secre- 
tary Knox sent Admiral Kimmel a memorandum from which the following is 
quoted, "I feel that it would be to the best interests of all concerned if you should 
now agree not to plead the statute of limitations in bar of trial upon my assurance 
that the trial will be had. at the earliest practicable date." And in Admiral Kim- 
mel's waiver he agreed. "I will not plead, nor permit any attorney or other person 
on my behalf to plead, the statute of limitations in bar of my trial by General 
Court-Martial in open court for any alleged offenses with which I may be charged 
relating to the period on or before Dember (sic) 7th, 1941, should my trial be 
held during the present war or within six (6) months thereafter." 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2261 

6. I suggest that this record l)e made available to Admiral Kimmel and his 
counsel ; that Admiral Kimmel be informed that he is free to make public anything 
contained in this record and prior records as soon as that may be done without 
prejudice to the public interests; that if he insists, a general court-martial will 
be convened to try him for alleged offenses he may have committed on or before 
December 7, 1941 ; and that his decision be abided. 

/s/ T. L. Gatch. 
T. L. Gatch. 



The Secretary of the Navy's First Endorsement on the Report of Further 
Pearl Harbor Investigation by Admiral H. K. Hewitt, U. S. Navy 

The Secret^-ry of the Navy 

Washington 
First Endorsement. 
To: The Judge Advocate General. 

Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet and 
Chief of Naval Operations. ' 

Subject: Record of proceedings and Report of further Pearl Harbor investiga- 
tion by Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, USN. 

1. Forwarded for comment and recommendation. 

2. The endorsement by the Judge Advocate General will include his opinion 
(a) as to the sufficiency of the evidence to warrant court-martial or other 
proceedings, (b) as to the offense or offenses which might be made the subject 
of court-martial or other proceedings, assuming the sufficiency of the evidence 
concerning such offense or offenses, (c) as to the date prior to which any such 
court-martial or other proceeding must be in.stituted, and (d) as to the practi- 
cability of any such court-martial or other proceeding prior to the termination 
of hostilities with Japan, particularly in view of the regulations concerning the 
comiK»sition of a court and in view of the necessity of obtaining testimony from 
witnesses engaged in operaticms against the enemy. 

3. The endorsement by the Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet and 
Chief of Naval Operations will include his opinion (a) as to the sufficiency of the 
evidence to warrant court-martial or otiier proceedings, (b) as to the practica- 
bility of any such court-martial or other proceeding prior to the termination of 
hostilities with Japan, particularly in view of the regulations concerning the 
composition of a court and in view of the necessity of obtaining testimony from 
witnesses engaged in operations against the enemy, and (c) as to the advisa- 
bility of any such court-martial or other proceeding prior to the termination 
of hostilities with .lapan, particularly in view of the po.ssihility of disclosure of 
information relating to current and prospective military operations and to 
national security. 

Forbestal, 



Report of Further Investigation Into the Facts Surrounding the Japanese 
Attack on Pearl Harbor, 7 December 1941, by Admiral H. K. Hewitt, 
U. S. Navy 

12 July, 1945. 
From: H. Kent Hewitt, Admiral, U. S. Navy. 
To : The Secretary of tiie Navy. 
Subject: Report of further investigation in the facts surrounding the Japanese 

attack on Pearl Harbor, 7 December 1941. 
Reference : 

(a) Report of Commission appointed by the President to investigate and 

report the facts lelating to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, 7 
December, 1941. 

(b) Record of examination of witiies.ses having knowledge of the facts in con- 

nection with the Japanese attack cm Pearl Harbor, conducted by 
Admiral Tlwimas C. Hart, USN (Ret.). 

(c) Public Law 339, 78th Congress. 

(d) Precept appointing Naval Pearl Harbor Court of Inquiry, 13 July 1944. 



2262 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

(e) Record of proceedings and report of Naval Pearl Harbor Court of 

Inquiry. 

(f) First Endorsement, dated 2 November 11)44, by the Judge Advocate 

General, and Second Endorsement, dated 6 November 1944, by Com- 
mander in Chief, U. S. Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations, to record 
of proceedings of Naval Pearl Harbor Court of Inquiry. 

(g) Report of Army Pearl Harbor Board, dated 20 October 1944. 

(h) Letter 3 December 1944 from Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet and Chief 
of Naval Operations, to the Secretary of the Navy, on report of Army 
Pearl Harbor Board. 

(i) Procebt 2 May 1945 appointing H. Kent Hewitt, Admiral, U. S. Navy, to 
conduct further Pearl Harbor investigation. 

(j) Memorandum 18 May 1945, concerning the scope of the further investi- 
gation and approval thereof by the Secretary of the Navy. 

(k) Precept 6 July 1945 amending reference (i). 
Enclosure : 

(A) Report of further investigation into the facts surrounding the Japanese 

attack on Pearl Harbor, 7 December 1941. 

(B) Record of proceedings of this investigation and exhibits therein. 

1. Tlie precept of the Secretary of the Navy, dated 2 May 1945, reference (i) 
as amended by reference (k), directed that Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, USN„ 
make a study of the previous investigations, that such further investigation as 
might appear to be necessary be then conducted, and, that upon completion of 
the investigation a report be submitted to the Secretary of the Navy setting forth 
the findings and conclusions reached. 

2. Review of the previous investigations disclosed that various matters of 
Importance, principally concerning intelligence, had not been investigated thor- 
oughly. The subjects proposed for further investigation were approved by the 
Secretary of the Navy on 21 May 1945. 

3. Counsel in this investigation was John F. Sonnett, Special Assistant to the 
Secretary of the Navy. Also assisting were Lieutenant Commander Benjamin 
H. Griswold, III, USNR, and Lieutenant John Ford Baecher, USNR. The re- 
porters were Ship's Clerk Ben Harold, USNR, and Chief Yeoman Raymond E. 
Reese, USNR. These men took a special oath to maintain the security of the 
information developed during the investigation. 

4. During this proceeding, which commenced 14 May 1945, the testimony of 
38 witnesses, some of whom had testified previously, was taken on 26 day, at 
Washington, D. C, at San Francisco, and at Pearl Harbor. 81 exhibits were 
received. 

5. Delivered herewith are the report of this further investigation (Enclosure 
A), and the record of proceedings and exhibits therein (Enclosure B). In pre- 
paring this report, an effort has been made to present, in one document, the essen- 
tial facts within the scope of this inquiry which have been developed by this and 
preceding investigations. 

H. Kent Hewitt, 

Rbi^rt by Admiral H. K. Hewitt on FtrETHEB Pearl Harbor Investigation 

TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Introduction. Prior Investigations and Scope of this Investigation. Page * 

A. The Roberts Commission 1 

B. Admiral Hart's Investigation 4 

C. Naval Court of Inquiry 4 

D. Army Pearl Harbor Report 11 

E. Findings of the Secretary of the Navy and further Investigation 14 

F. Witnesses in this Investigation 15 

G. Exhibits received In this investigation 18 

Seeton I. The War and Defense Plans. 

A. U. S. Pacific Fleet Operating Plan Rainbow Five 23 

B. Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Theater, Orange 

14NB-JCD-42 31 

C. Annex VII, Section VI, to the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan 34 

D. Joint estimate covering Army and Navy air action in the event of sudden 

hostile action against Oahu 35 

E. Naval Base Defense Force Operation Plan No. 1-41 and Naval Base Defense 

Air Force Plan 37 

F. Pacific Fleet Letter on security of the fleet at base and In operating areas 39 

G. Execution of Plans prior to 7 December 1941 41 

H. Admiral Kimmel's Views as to the possibility of a surprise air attack 42 

I. Adequacy of forces to carry out tasks assigned 44 

J. Command Organization 45 

Findings 49 

' Pages referred to are indicated by italic figures enclosed by brackets and represent pages 
of original exhibit. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2263 

Section II. Japanese Espionage at Hawaii. Page ' 

Espionage Reports 53 

FindiugH 21 59 

Section III. Naval Intelliffence and Events Preliminary to the Attack. 

A. The organization of Naval Inteiligence in generai ; sources of information, 

and relations with the Paeilic Fleet 60 

B. The approach of war ; intercepted communications available at Washington 

and messages sent by CNO to Admiral Kimmel. 

1. The resignation of the Japanese Cabinet and October 16th dispatch 62 

2. Japanese messages concerning German attitude ; Nomura's desire to 

resign g3 

3. Action talcen by Admiral Kimmel 64 

4. The tirst Japanese deadline message ; Japanese interest In American 

ships 65 

5. Arrival of Kurusu ; Stark and Marshall recommendations as to ulti- 

matum gg 

6. Further and final Japanese "deadline messages " III" _~ I 66 

7. The November 24th dispatch to CincPac and others I__II 67 

8. Dispatches concerning reenforcement of Wuke and Midway 68 

,?• Intercepted Japanese communications of November 26th and 27th 69 

10. The State Department note of November 26th and Japanese reaction 

thereto ; the war warning of November 27th 70 

11. The dispatch of November 28th 73 

12. Intercepted diplomatic communications, November 29 t« 6 December 

1941 y^ 

13. Intercepted Japanese espionage messages between 29 November and 6 



December 1!)41- 



82 



14. Intercepted message advising of fourteen-part reply by Japanese and 
,K ^ hrst thirteen parts of reply — 6 December 1941 8'' 

15. Communications intercepted on 7 December 1941 83 

16. Delivery of part 14 and the 1 p. m. message and action takeii 85 

17. Messages sent to Admiral Kimmel between 29 November and 7 December 

18. Admiral Kimmel's failure t~o transmit informat^onfo subordinate com" 

manders o- 

9: ^^^ interception of Japanese telephone and cable messages ~__ 88 

D. The "winds" code and the alleged "winds" message. 

1. Prior investigations grj 

2. The basis o'f the previous findings that there was" a "winds" "execute 

message prior to the attack 9Y 

3. Evidence obtained in this investigation concerning "winds" message 100 
B. Information concerning the organization of the Japanese Navy b - v 

1. ONI report of 25 July 1941 __ ^(^^ 

2 Pacific Fleet Intelligence Bulletin No. 45-41 I-I-I"--~II~"I""" 107 

F. Information concerning the location and movements of Japanese naval forces 

o Information available at the time of the war warning 110 

2. Admiral Kimmel's source of information after the war warnlng___ 111 
Flndln ^°'*''"™*t'*'° received by Admiral Kimmel after the war warning I 112 

Section IV. Reconnaissance'. ^~^ 

A. The Responsibility for Long Distance Reconnaissance _ 1^4 

B. Reconnaissance Conducted from Oahu_-_ __"__!_ ~_ 1^^ 

C. Proposed Army Reconnaissance to Jaluit I IZ_I__IIIII 136 

S" mu Direction to Execute an Appropriate Defensive Deployment _ 137 

S- Z^^ Reconnaissance that could have been flown i^T 

F. The Sectors which would have been covered __ ' " iqq 

Findings " jjn 

Section V. The Attack on Pearl Harbor. ~ 

A. Japanese submarines on 7 December 1941 143 

B. Suspicious submarine contacts prior to 7 December 1941~ I_~" 148 

C. Detection of Aircraft by the Army Radar System ~ 140 

D. The Air Attack _ __~imZ"~I 140 

E. Location of Pacific Fleet Units " "" {I? 

F. Condition of Readiness i^4 

G. Reaction to the Attack I I~IIIII~IIIII"II~IIII 153 

?-rJ^°™i?°**'*^'<'" '^"'I ^o^<'">^°ts of the Attacking Force I_ _ ~ " ' 155 

I. The Casualties and Damage - __ i^^ 

Findings r ;:_:: ::":—:": — : :- Js? 

Section VI. Findings and Conclusions. ~ ~ ~ 

A. Restatement of Findings __ _ _ 150 

B. Conclusions I ^ J jjg 

of or^^nal'^exhTbit *° ^^^ Indi^-ated by italic figures enclosed by brackets and represent pages 
[1] INTRODUCTION — PRIOR INVESTIGATIONS AND SCOPE OF THIS INVESTIGATION 

A. The Roberts Cormnission. 

Pursuant to Executive Order dated December 1941, a Coininission, headed 
by Mr. Justice Owen J. Roberts, conducted an investigation into the facts sur- 
rounding the Japanese attack on Pearl Harl)or. The Commission reported its 
findings on 23 January 1942 and concluded : 

"1. Effective utilization of the military power of the Nation is essential to 
success in war and requires: First, the coordination of the foreign and military 

policies of the Nation ; and, second, the coordination of the operations of the 
Army and Navy. 



2264 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

"2. The Secretary of State fulfilled his obligations by keeping- the War and 
Navy Departments in close touch with the international situation and fully advis- 
ing them respecting the course and probable termination of negotiations with 
Japan. 

"3. The Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy fulfilled their obliga- 
tions by conferring frequently with the Secretary of State and with each other 
and by keeping the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations informed 
of the course of the negotiations with Japan and the significant implications 
thereof. 

"4. The Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations fulfilled their obliga- 
tions by consulting and cooperating with each other and with their superiors, 
respecting the joint defense of the Hawaiian coastal frontier; and each knew of, 
and concurred in, the warnings and orders sent by the other to the responsible 
commanders with respect to such defense. 

"5. The Cliief of Staff of the Army fulfilled his connnand responsibilities by 
issuing a direct order in connection with his warning of probable hostilities, in 
the following words: 'Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to under- 
take such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary.' 

"6. The Chief of Naval Operations fulfilled his command responsibility by issu- 
ing a warning and by giving a direct order to the connnander in chief, Pacific 
Fleet, in the following words: 

" 'This despatch is to be considered a war warning.' 
and 

" 'Execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the 
tasks assigned.' 

[2] "7. The responsible connnanders in the Hawaiian area, in fulfillment of 
their obligation to do so, prepared plans which, if adapted to and used for the 
existing eniergency, would have been adequate. 

"8. In the circumstances the responsibility of these commanders was to confer 
upon the question of putting into effect and adapting their joint defense plans. 

"9. These commanders failed to ccmfer with respect to the warnings and orders 
issued on and after November 27, and to adapt and use existing plans to meet 
the emergency. 

"10. Tlie order for alert No. 1 of the Army command in Hawaii was not ade- 
quate to meet the emergency envisaged in the warning messages. 

"11. The state of readiness of the Naval forces on the morning of December 7 
was not such as was required to meet the emergency envisaged in the warning 
messages. 

"12. Had orders issued by the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations 
November 27, 1941, been complied with, the aircraft warning system of the Army 
should have been operating; the distant reconnaissance of the Navy, and the 
inshore air patrol of the Army, should have been maintained; the antiaircraft 
batteries of the Army and similar shore batteries of the Navy, as well as additional 
antiaircraft artillery located on vessels of the fleet in Pearl Harbor, should have 
been manned and supplied with ammunition; and a high state of readiness of 
aircraft should have been in effect. None of these conditions was in fact inaug- 
urated or maintained for the reason that the responsible commanders failed to 
consult and cooperate as to necessary action based upon the warnings and to 
adopt measures enjoined by the orders given them by the chiefs of the Army and 
Navy commands in Washington. 

"13. There were deficiencies in personnel, weapons, equipment, and facilities to 
maintain all the defenses on a war footing for extended periods of time, but these 
deficiencies should not have affected the decision of the responsible commanders 
as to the state of readines to be prescribefl. 

"14. The warning message of December 7, intended to reach both commanders 
in the field at about 7 a. m. Hawaiian time. December 7. 1941, was but an added 
precaution, in view of the warnings and orders i>reviously issued. If the message 
had reached its destination at the time intended, it would still have been too late 
to be of substantial u.se, in view of the fact that the commanders had failed to 
take measures and make dispositions prior to the time of its anticipated receipt 
which would have been effective to warn of the attack or to meet it. 

[3] "l."). The failure of the officers in the War Department to observe that 
General Short, neither in his reply of November 27 to the Chief of Staffs message 
of that date, nor otherwi.«e. had reported the measures taken by him and the 
transmission of two messages concerned chiefly with sabotage which warned 
him not to resort to illegal methods against sabotage or espionage, and not to 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2265 

take measures which would alarm the civil population, and the failure to reply 
to his message of November 2!) outlining in full all the actions he had taken 
against sabotage only, and referring to nothing else, tended to lead General 
Short to believe that what he had done met the requirements of the warnings 
and orders received by him. 

"16. The failure of the commanding general, Hawaiian Department, and the 
commander in chief, I'aciflc Fleet, to confer and cooperate with respect to the 
meaning of the warnings received and the measures nece.ssay to comply with 
the orders given them under date of November 27. 1941, resulted largely from 
a sense of security due to the opinion prevalent in diplomatic, military and 
naval circles, and in the public press, that any immediate attack by Japan 
would be in the Far East. The existence of such a view, however prevalent, 
did not relieve the commanders of the responsibility for the security of the 
Pacitic Fleet and our most important outpost. 

"17. In the light of the warnings and directions to take appropriate action, 
transmitted to both commanders between November 27 and December 7, and the 
obligation under the system of coordination then in effect for joint cooi)erative 
action on their part, it was a derelection of duty on the part of each of them not 
to consult and confer with the other respecting the meaning and intent of the 
warnings, and the appropriate measures of defense reuired by the imminence 
of hostilities. The attitude of each, that the was not reuired to inform himself 
of, and his lack of interest in, the measures undertaken by the other to carry 
out the responsibility assigned to such other under the provisions of the plans 
then in effect, demonstrated on the part of each a lack of appreciation of the 
responsibilities vested in them and inherent in their positions as commander 
in chief. Pacific Fleet, and commanding general, Hawaiian Department. 

"19. Causes contributory to the .success of the Japanese attack were : 

Disregard of international law and custom relating to declaration of war 
by the Japanese and the adherence by the United States to such laws and 
customs. 

Restrictions which prevented effective counterespionage. 

Emphasis in the warning messages on the probability of aggressive action 
in the Far East, and on antisabotage measures. 

14] Failure of the War Department to reply to the message relat- 
ing to the antisabotage measures instituted by the Commanding General, 
Hawaiian Department. 

Nonreceipt by the interested parties, prior to the attack, of the warning 
message of December 7, 1941. 

"20. When the attack develoi>ed on the morning of December 7, 1941, the 
officers and enli.sted men of both services were present in sufficient number and 
were in Ht condition to perft)rm any duty. Except for a negligible number, 
the use of intoxicating liquor on the preceding evening did not affect tJieir 
efficiency. 

"21. Subordinate commanders executed their superiors' orders without ques- 
tion. They were not responsible for the state of readiness prescribed." 

B. Admiral Hart's Investigation. 

Pursuant to precept of the Secretary of the Navy dated 12 February 1944, 
Admiral Thomas C. Hart, USN (Retired), conducted an examination of wit- 
nesses having knowledge of facts in connection with the Japanese attack. 
Admiral Hart completed his examination on 15 June 1944. 

C. Naval Court of Inquiry. 

Public Law No. 339. 7Sth Congress, approved 13 June 1944, directed the Secre- 
tary of War and the Secretary of the Navy, severally, to proceed forthwith to 
investigate the facts surrounding the Pearl Harbor catastrophe, and to com- 
mence such proceedings against such persons as the facts might justify. 

A Court of Inquiry, consisting of Admiral Orin (}. Murfin, I'SN (Retired), 
Admiral Edward C Kalbfus, USN (Retired), and Vice Admiral Adolphus An- 
drews, USN (Retired), with Commander Harold Biesemeier, USN, as Judge 
Advocate, was appointed by the Secretary of the Navy on 13 July 1944. The 
Court was directed to convene on 17 July 1944, or as soon thereafter as prac- 
ticable, for the purpose of inquiring into all circumstances connected with the 
attack made by Japane.se forces on Pearl Harbor, Territory of Hawaii, on 7 
December 1941 ; to inquire thoroughly into the matter, and to include in its 

79716 0—46 — pt. 16- 28 



2266 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

findings a full statement of the facts it might deem to be established. The 
Court was further directed to state its opinion as to whether any offenses were 
committed or serious blame incurred on the part of any person or persons in 
the Naval service, and, in case its opinion was that offenses had been committed 
or serious blame incurred, to recommend specifically what further proceedings 
should be had. The Court of Inquiry commenced its proceedings on 31 July 
1944, and submitted the record of its proceedings on 20 October 1944. 

[5] The Court of Inquiry concluded: 

"Basetl on finding II, the Court is of the opinion that the presence of a large 
number of combatant vessels of the Pacific Fleet in Pearl Harbor on 7 December 
1941, was necessary, and that the information available to the Commander-in- 
Chief, Pacific Fleet, did not require any departure from his operating and mainte- 
nance schedules. 

"Based on Finding III, the Court is of the opinion that the Constitutional 
requirement that, prior to a declaration of war by the Congress, no blow may be 
struck until after a hostile attack has been delivered, prevented the Commander- 
in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, from taking offensive action as a means of defense in the 
event of Japanese vessels or planes appearing in the Hawaiian area, and that it 
imposed upon him the responsibility of avoiding taking any action which might 
be construed as an overt act. 

"Based cm Finding V, the Court is of the opinion that the relations between 
Admiral Husband E. Kimmel. U.S.N., and Lieut. General Walter C. Short, U. S. 
Army, were friendly, cordial and cooperative, that there was no lack of interest, 
no lack of appreciation of responsibility, and no failure to cooperate on the part 
of either, and that each was cognizant of the measures being undertaken by the 
other for the defense of the Pearl Harbor Naval Base to the degree required by 
the common interest. 

"Based on Finding VI, the Court is of the opinion that the deficiencies in per- 
sonnel and material which existed during 1941, had a direct adverse bearing 
upon the effectiveness of the defense of Pearl Harbor on and prior to 7 December. 

"Based on Finding VII, the Court is of the opinion that the superiority of the 
Japane.se Fleet over the U. S. Pacific Fleet during the year 1941, and the ability 
of Japan to obtain military and naval information gave her an initial advantage 
not attainable by the United States up to 7 December 1941. 

"Ba.sed on Finding VIII, the Court is of the opinion that the defense of the Pearl 
Harbor Naval Base was the direct responsibility of the Army, that the Navy was 
to assist only with the means provided the 14th Naval District, and that the 
defense of the base was a joint operation only to this extent. The Court is further 
of the opinion that the defense should have been such as to function effectively 
independently of the Fleet, in view of the fundamental requirement that the 
strategic freedom of action of the Fleet must be assured demands that the defense 
of a permanent naval base be so effectively provided for and conducted as to 
remove any anxiety of the Fleet in regard to the security of the base, or for that 
of the vessels within its limits. 

[6] "Based on Findings IV, VIII and IX. the Court is of the opinion that 
the duties of Rear Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U.S.N., in connection with the defense 
of Pearl Harbor, were performed satisfactorily. 

"Based on Finding IX, the Court is of the opinion that the detailed Naval 
Participation Air Defense plans drawn up and jointly agreed upon were com- 
plete and sound in concept, but that they contained a basic defect in that naval 
participation depended entirely upon the availability of aircraft belonging to 
and being employed by the Fleet, and that on the morning of 7 December these 
plans were ineffective because they necessarily were drawn on the premise that 
there would be advance knowledge that an attack was to be expected within 
narrow limits of time, which was not the case on that morning. 

"The Court is further of the opinion that it was not possible for the Com- 
mander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, to make his Fleet planes permanently available 
to the Naval Ba.se Defense OflBcer in view of the need for their employment with 
the Fleet. 

"Based on Finding X, the Court is of the opinion that Admiral Kimmel's action, 
taken immediately after assuming command, in placing in effect comprehensive 
instructions for the security of the Pacific Fleet at sea and in the operating areas, 
is indicative of his appreciation of his responsibility for the security of the Fleet, 
and that the steps taken were adequate and effective. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2267 

"Based on Finding XI, the Court is of the opinion that, by virtue of the informa- 
tion that Admiral Kimmel had at hand which Indicated neither the possibility 
nor the imminence of an air attack on Pear Harbor, and bearing in mind that he 
had not knowledge of the State Department's note of 26 November, the Navy's 
condition of readiness on the morning of 7 December, 1941, which resulted in the 
hostile planes being brought under heavy fire of the ships' anti-aircraft batteries 
as they came within range, was that best suited to the circumstances, although 
had all anti-aircraft batteries been manned in advance, the total damage in- 
flicted on ships would have been lessened to a minor extent and to a degree 
which is problematical ; and that, had the Fleet patrol planes, slow and unsuited 
for aerial combat, been in the air, they might have escaped and the number of 
these planes lost might thus have been reduced. 

"The Court is of the opinion, however, that only had it been known in advance 
that the attack would take place on 7 December, could there now be any basis 
for a conclusion as to the steps that might have been taken to lessen its ill effects, 
and that, beyond the fact that conditions were unsettled and that, therefore, 
anything might happen, there was nothing to distinguish one day from another 
in so far as expectation of attack is concerned. 

[7] "It has been suggested that each day all naval planes should have been 
in the air, all naval personnel at their stations, and all anti-aircraft guns manned. 
The Court is of the opinion that the wisdom of this is questionable when it is con- 
sidered that it could not be known when an attack would take place and that, to 
make sure, it would have been necessary to impose a state of tension on the 
personnel day after day, and to disrupt the maintenance and operating schedules 
of ships and planes beginning at an indefinite date between 16 October and 7 
December. 

"Based on Finding XII, the Court is of the opinion that, as no information of 
any sort was at any time either forwarded or received from any source which 
would indicate that Japanese carriers or other Japanese ships were on their way 
to Hawaii during November or December, 1941, the attack of 7 December at 
Pearl Harbor, delivered under the circumstances then existing, was unpreventable 
and that when it would take place was unpredictable. 

"Based on Finding XIII, the Court is of the opinion that the action of the 
Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, in ordering that no routine, long-range recon- 
naissance be undertaken was sound and that the use of Fleet patrol planes for 
daily, long-range, all-around reconnaissance was not possible with the inadequate 
number of Fleet planes available, and was not justified in the absence of any 
information indicating that an attack was to be expected in the Hawaiian area 
within narrow limits of time. 

"Based on Finding XIV, the Court is of the opinion that the shore-based air 
warning system, an Army service under the direct control of the Army, was inef- 
fective on the morning of 7 December, in that there was no provision for keeping 
track of planes in the air near and over Oahu, and for distinguishing between those 
friendly and those hostile and that, because of this deficiency, a flight of planes 
which appeared on the radar screen shortly after 0700 was confused with a flight 
of Army B-17s en route from California, and that the information obtained by 
Army radar was valueless as a warniTig, because the planes could not be identified 
as hostile until the Japanese markings on their wings came into view. 

"Based on Finding XV, the Court is of the opinion that by far the greatest 
portion of the damage inflicted by the Japanese on ships in Pearl Harbor was due 
to specially designed Japanese torpedoes, the development and existence of which 
was unknown to the United States. 

"Based on Finding XVI, and particularly in view of the Chief of Naval Oper- 
ations' approval of the precautions taken and the deployments made by Admital 
Kimmel in accordance with the directive contained in the dispatch of 16 October 
1941. the Court is of the opinion that Admiral Kimmel's decision made [8] 
after receiving the dispatch of 24 November, to continue the preparations of the 
Pacific Fleet for war, was sound in the light of the information then available 
to him. 

"Based on Finding XVII, the Court is of the opinion that, although the attack 
of 7 December came as a surprise, there were good grounds for the belief on the 
part of high officials in the State, War, and Navy Departments, and on the part of 
the Army and Navy in the Hawaiian area, that hostilities would begin in the 
Far East rather than elsewhere, and that the same considerations which in- 
fluenced the sentiment of the authorities in Washington in this respect, support 
the interpretation which Admiral Kimmel placed upon the "war warning mes- 



2268 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

sage" of 27 November, to the effect that this message directed attention away from 
Pearl Harbor rather than toward it. 

"Based on Findings XVIII and XIX, the Court is of the opinion that Admiral 
Harold R. Stark, U. S. N., (^hief of Naval Operations and responsible for the 
operations of the Fleet, failed to display the sound judgment expected of him in 
that he did not transmit to Admiral Kiramel, Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, 
during the very critical period 26 November to 7 December, important information 
which he had regarding the Japanese situation and, especially, in that, on the 
morning of 7 December, 1941 he did not transmit immediately the fact that a 
message had been received which appeared to indicate that a break in diplomatic 
relations was imminent, and that an attack in the Hawaiian area might be 
expected soon. 

"The Court is further of the opinion that, had this important information 
been conveyed to Admiral Kimmel, it is a matter of conjecture as to what action 
he would have taken. 

"Finally, based upon the facts established, the Court is of the opinion that no 
offenses have been committed nor serious blame incurred on the part of any 
person or persons in the naval service." 

[9] Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King, USN, commented in detail on the findings 
of the Court of Inquiry in the Second Endorsement thereto. He concluded, in 
part: 

"Despite the evidence that no naval oflicer was at fault to a degree likely to 
result in conviction if brought to trial, nevertheless the Navy cannot evade a 
share of responsibility for the Pearl Harbor incident. That disaster cannot be 
regarded as an "act of God", beyond human power to prevent or mitigate. It is 
true that the country as a whole is basically responsible in that the people were 
unwilling to support an adequate army and navy until it was too late to repair 
the consequences of past neglect in time to deal effectively with the attack that 
ushered in the war. It is true that the Army was responsible for local defense 
at Pearl Harbor. Nevertheless, some things could have been done by the Navy 
to lessen the success of the initial Japanese blow. Admiral Stark and Admiral 
Kimmel were the responsible oflicers. and it is pertinent to examine the possible 
courses of action they might have taken. 

"(a) Admiral Stark was, of course, aware that the United States was primarily 
concerned with its own possessions, and the most important United States posses- 
sions in the Pacific were the Philippine Islands and the Hawaiian Islands. His 
attention should have been centered on those two places, as the Pacific situation 
became more and more acute. He had been informed by Admiral Kimmel, in his 
letter of 26 May 1941, that Admiral Kimmel felt the need for early and accurate 
information as to the general situation, and that he needed to be informed of all 
important developments as they occurred by the quickest and most secure means 
available. This letter should have emphasized the obvious fact that Admiral 
Kimmel was in a difficult position, that he had to use his initiative to keep his 
Fleet dispositions in step with changes in the situation, and that in order to do 
so he had to have an accurate running picture of the rapidly moving course of 
diplomatic events. In my opinion. Admiral Stark failed to give Admiral Kimmel 
an adequate summary of the information available in Washington, particularly in 
the following respects : 

"(1) Admiral Kimmel was not informed of the State Department's note of 
26 November to the Japanese. This note was a definite step towards breaking 
relations. 

"(2) Admiral Kimmel was not informed of the substance of certain intercepted 
Japanese messages inquiring as to dispositions of ships inside Pearl Harbor, 
which indicated a Japanese interest in Pearl Harbor as a possible target, 

"(3) Admiral Kimmel was not informed of the implementation of the "Winds 
message". Admiral Stark says he never got this information himself, but it is 
clear that It [10] did reach Admiral Stark's office. This, together with 
the handling of other matters of information, indicates lack of efficiency in 
Admiral Stark's organization. 

"(4) Admiral Stark failed to appreciate the significance of the '1:00 p. m. 
message' received on the morning of 7 December, although the implications were 
appreciated by at least one of his subordinates. It appears that had this 
message been handled by the quickest available means, and with due appreciation 
of its significance, it might have reached Admiral Kimmel in time to enable him 
to make some last minute preparations that would have enhanced the ability of 
the ships in Pearl Harbor to meet the Japanese air attack. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2269 

"(5) There is a certain sameness of tenor of such information as Admiral 
Stark sent to Admiral Kimmel. • They do not convey in themselves the sense 
of Intensification of the critical relations between the United States and Japan. 

"(b) In my opinion Admiral Kimmel, despite the failure of Admiral Stark 
to keep him fully informed, nevertheless did have some indications of increasing 
tenseness as to relations witli Japan. In particular, he had the 'war warning' 
message on 27 November, the 'hostile action p<issible at any moment' message 
on 28 November, the 3 December message that Japanese had ordered destruction 
of codes, and the messages of 4 and H Decemi)er concerning destruction of United 
States secret and confidential matter at outlying Pacific Islands. These messages 
must be con.'sidered in connection with other facets of the situation, and Admiral 
Kimmel's statement on this phase of the matter must be given due consideration. 
After weighing these considerations, I am of the opinion that he could and should 
have judged more accurately the gravity of the danger to which the Hawaiian 
Islands were exposed. The following courses of action were open to him: 

"(1) He could have used patrol craft which were available to him to conduct 
long range reconnaissance in the more dangerous sectors. Whether or not this 
would have resulted in detecting the approach of the Japanese carriers is proble- 
matical. However, it would have made the Japanese task more difficult. 

"(2) He could have rotated the 'in port' periods of his vessels in a less routine 
manner, so as to have made it impossible for the Japanese to have predicted 
when there would be any vessels in port. This would have made the Japanese 
task less easy. 

[//] "(3) If he had appreciated the gravity of the danger even a few hours 
before the Japanese attack, it is logical to .suppose that naval planes would have 
been in the air during the early morning period, that ships' batteries would 
have been fully manned, and that damage control organizations would have 
been fully operational. 

"The derelictions on the part of Admiral Stark and Admiral Kimmel were 
faults of omission rather than faults of commission. In the case in question, 
they indicate lack of superior judgment necessary for exercising conmiand 
commensurate with their rank and their assigned duties, rather than culpable 
inefficiency." 

D. Army Pearl Harbor Report. 

Pursuant to Public Law No. 339, 78th Congress, an Army Board conducted 
investigation into the Japanese attack, and on 20 October 1944 submitted its 
report to the Secretary of War. The Army report discussed, among other 
things, various matters involving the Navy, such as the Navy's command rela- 
tionships at Hawaii, the "tapping" of the telephone wires of the Japanese con- 
sul in Hawaii by Naval Intelligence, information secured by Navy I'adio intelli- 
gence as to the location and movements of Japanese naval forces, the Navy's 
responsibility for long range reconnaissance ("The heart of the defense of Oahu"), 
and the entrance of Japanese submarines into Pearl Harbor on and allegedly 
prior to 7 December 1941. The Army report commented critically as to (a) the 
Navy's failure to conduct long range reconnaissance, (b) the Navy's failure to 
advise General Short of the presence of a Japanese task force in the Jaluits in 
late November 1941, (c) the Navy's failure to advise General Short of certain 
messages, relating to the destruction of codes by the Japanese during the first 
week of December 1941, and (d) the Navy's failure to advise General Short of 
the sinking of a Japanese submarine on the morning of 7 December 1941, prior 
to the air attack. The Army report included a finding that relations between 
General Short and Admiral Kimmel were not satisfactory, as a practical matter, 
although cordial. Concerning intelligence generally, the Army report stated, 
at page 232 : 

"The Japanese armed forces knew everything about us. We knew little 
about them. This was a problem of all our intelligence agencies. This should 
not come to pass again. Our intelligence service must be brought in line with 
the part which we are to play in world affairs. 

"We must know as much about other major world powers as they know about 
us. This is an absolute condition precedent to intelligent planning by those 
charged with formulating our international policies and providing for our se- 
curity. Our intelligence service should be second to none in its efficiency. It 
must not be inferred that this is the exclusive function of the M. I. D. It is a 
national problem. 



2270 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[121 "In the past our intelligence service has suffered from lack of funds, 
lack of interest, and legal obstacles and regulations. Steps should be taken to 
correct all of these." 

After consideration of the Army Pearl Harbor Report, Fleet Admiral King, in 
a letter to the Secretary of the Navy, dated 3 December 1944, stated in part: 

"The Army Board finds it difficult to understand the relations between the 
Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet, the Commander Hawaiian Sea Fron- 
tier, the Commandant. FOURTEENTH Naval District, and the local Air Com- 
mander (Rear Admiral Bellinger). The Board makes the comment 'The Army 
had a difficult time in determining under which of the three shells (Kimmel, 
Bloch, or Bellinger) rested the pea of performance and responsibility.' My 
comment as to this is that there are some unavoidable complexities in the Com- 
mand relationships between a fleet, a frontier, and a fleet base in the frontier. 
However, in this case, there was no possibility of misunderstanding the fact 
that all naval forces were under Admiral Kimmel. He and General Short 
should have been able to work out better arrangements for cooperation than 
they did. The reasons why they did not have been discussed in paragraphs 
4 and 5 above. 

"The Army Board stresses the point that General Short was dependent upon 
the U. S. Navy for infonnation as to what the Japanese Navy was doing and for 
estimates of what the Japanese Navy could do. This view is obviously sound. 
It was a naval responsibility to keep not only General Short but also the War 
Department fully acquainted with the estimate of the Japanese naval situation. 
There was some failure to pass on to General Short and the War Department 
information which should have been .given to them by the Navy, but the basic 
trouble was that the Navy failed to appreciate what the Japanese Navy could, 
and did, do. 

"The Army Board reports on three matters which should be further investi- 
gated by the Navy. These are : 

"a. It was stated that the War Department received information from some 
naval agency that on or about 25 November radio intercepts had located a 
Japanese task force, including carriers, in the Marshall Islands. About 1 De- 
cember it was reported that this force assumed radio silence. It is noted in 
the Record that this information never got to General Short. There is some 
reference to this incident in the Record of the Naval Court, but it was not 
followed up, presumably because the officer who was Director of Naval Intelli- 
gence at the time was not called as a witness. The matter is probably not of 
importance, since even if there actually was a Japanese force in the Marshalls 
it apparently had nothing to do with the attack on Pearl Harbor. However, 
for the sake of completing the naval Record, this matter should be pursued 
further. 

[13] "b. The Army Board is of the opinion that Japanese midget submarines 
operated freely inside of Pearl Harbor for several days prior to the 7th of Decem- 
ber, for the purpose of obtaining information. This opinion is based on the testi- 
mony of an official of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, who apparently 
reached his conclusions by a study of certain captured Japanese charts which 
were made available' to F. B. I. by Naval Intelligence. So far as is known, there 
is no real ground for the supposition that Japanese submarines were able to roam 
around Pearl Harbor at will, but since the allegation is made in the Army Record, 
it is advisable to clear up any doubt that may exist by further naval investigation. 

"c. There is reference to the fact that information was obtained from naval 
and F. B. I. espionage over telephones and cables in Hawaii, but no record of 
what this information was. This should be cleared up. 

"The Army Board finds that the Chief of Staff of the Army was at fault in 
that he failed to keep General Short informed of the international situation and 
that he delayed in getting critical information to General Short. In these respects, 
the Army Report parallels the Naval Court findings as to the Chief of Naval Opera- 
tions. The Army Board further finds that General Marshall was at fault and that 
he failed to keep his Deputies informed of what was going on, so that they could 
act intelligently in his absence ; in that he did not take action on General Short's 
report on 28 November that he had established 'Alert No. 1' ; and in that he 
lacked knowledge of conditions of readiness in the Hawaiian Command. 

"The Army Board finds that General Short was at fault in that he failed to 
place his command in an adequate state of readiness (the information which he 
had was incomplete and confusing, but it was sufficient to warn him of tense re- 
lations), in that he failed to reach and agreement with local naval officials for 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2271 

implementing joint Army and Navy plans and agreements for joint action, in 
that he failed to inform himself of the effectiveness of the long-distance reconnais- . 
sance being conducted by the Navy, and in that he failed to replace ineflScient 
staff oflBcers. 

"I find nothing in the Record of the Army Board to cause me to modify the 
opinions expressed in my endorsement on the Record of the Naval Court of In- 
quiry, except in relatijon to the cooperation between Admiral Kinnnel and Gen- 
eral Short. In view of the extensive and explicit Ascussion of this phase of the 
matter by the Army Board, I am no longer of the opinion that cooperation be- 
tween these two oflScers was adequate in all respects. The cordial, but informal, 
contact which they maintained evidently was not suflScient to coordinate the 
means at their disposal to the best advantage. However, as already pointed out, 
this fault was part and parcel of the [I'f] general blindness to Japanese 
potentialities in the Central Pacific which was the basic cause of the Pearl Harbor 
disaster. Tlie many details discussed by the Army Board and the Naval Court 
are useful in showing how this blindness redounded to our disadvantage, but 
they do not, in my opinion, prove anything more than that the two naval officers 
in the high commands concerned — Admiral ^tark and Admiral Kimmel — failed 
to display the superior judgment they should have brought to bear in analysing 
and making use of the information that became available to them. 

•'I recommend that the Secretary of the Navy cause further investigation to 
be made in the matter referred to in paragraph 8 above ; namely, the alleged radio 
contact with a Japanese force in the Marshall Islands, the alleged presence of 
Japanese midget submarines inside Pearl Harbor prior to 7 December, and the 
substance of information obtained by naval and F. B. I. telephone and cable in- 
tercept^. I do not think it necessary to reconvene the Court for this purpose, 
The proposed investigation could be made by another Court, or by an investigat- 
ing officer, for attachment to the Record of the original Court of Inquiry." 

E. Findings of the Secretary of the Navy and Further Investigation. 

Upon review of the previous investigations, the Secretary of the Navy found 
that there were errors of judgment on the part of certain officers in the Naval 
Service, both at Pearl Harbor and at Washington. The Secretary further found 
that the previous investigations had not exhausted all possible evidence and that 
the investigation directed thy Public Law 339 of the 78th Congress should be con- 
tinued until the testimony of every witness in possession of material facts should 
be obtained and all possible evidence exhausted. The Secretary stated that his 
decision would be reviewed when the investigation was finally complete, in the 
light of the evidence then at hand. 

The precept of the Secretary of the Navy, dated 2 May, 1945, and amended 6 
July, 1945, directed that Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, USN, make a study of the previ- 
ous investigations, that such further investigation as might appear to be necessary 
be then conducted, and that upon completion a report be submitted to the Secre- 
tary of the Navy setting forth the findings and conclusions reached. 

Review of the previous investigations disclosed that various matters of im- 
portance, principally concerning intelligence, had not been investigated throughly. 
The subjects proposed for further investigation were approved by the Secretary 
of the Navy on 21 May, 1945. 

Counsel in this investigation was John F. Sonnett, Special Assistant to the 
Secretary of the Navy. Also assisting were Lieutenant Commander Benjamin 
H. Griswold, III, USNR, and Lieutenant John Ford Baecher, USNR. The re- 
porters were Ship's Clerk Ben Harold, USNR, and Chief Yeoman Raymond E. 
Reese, USNR. These men took a special oath to maintain the security of the 
information developed during the investigation. 

[15] F. Witnesses in this Investigation. 
At Pearl Harbor in 1941: 

Captain Edwin T. Lay ton, USN, Intelligence Officer, Pacific Fleet. (R. 182) 
Captain Joseph J. Rochefort, USN, In charge of Communications Intelligence 

Unit, Fourteenth Naval District. (R. 43; R. 541) 
Vice Admiral Willian W. Smith, USN, Chief of Staff, CincPac. (R. 335) 
Vice Admiral Charles H. McMorris, USN, War Plans Officer, CincPac. (R. 293) 
Rear Admiral Walter S. DeLany, USN, Assistant Chief of Staff, Operations, 

CincPac. (R. 163) 



2272 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Vice Admiral Patrick N. L. Bellinger, USN, Commander, Hawaiian Based Patrol 
Wings, Commander, Patrol Wing Two, Commander, Task Force Nine, Commander, 
Fleet Air Detachment, Pearl Harbor. (R. 471) 

Captain John B. Earle, USN, Chief of Staff, 14th N. D. (R. 451) 

Mr. George Street, Manager, RCA, Honolulu. (R. 411) 

Rear Admiral Irving H. Mayfield, USN, District Intelligence Officer, 14th N. D. 
(R. 554) 

Captain Thomas H. Dyer, USN, Cryptanalytical and Decrypting, Fleet Radio 
Unit, Pacific Fleet. (R. 418) 

Captain Joseph Finnegan, USN, Translator, Fleet Radio Unit, Pacific Fleet. 
(R. 554) 

Commander Wesley A. Wright, USN, Assistant Comnninications Officer, Cinc- 
Pac, on temporary duty with Com 14 Cimimuni cat ions Intelligence Unit. (R. 442) 

Lieutenant (jg) Farnsley C. Woodward. USN, Cryptanalyst, Communications 
Intelligence Unit, 14th N. D. (R. 541) 

[16'] Colonel Alva B. Laswell, USMC, Translator, Communications Intel- 
ligence Unit, 14th N. D. (R..541) 

Captain William W. Outerbridge, USN, Commanding Officer, USS W^ARD. 
(R. 87) ' 

Lieutenant Commauder Monroe H. Hubbell, USNR, Commanding Officer, USS 
CONDOR. (R. 428) 

Richard W. Humphrey, RM3c, USNR, Bishop's Point Radio Station. 

Lieutenant Oliver H. Underkofler, USNR, Communications Office, 14th N. D. 
(R. 465) 

Lieutenant Donald Woodrum, USNR, District Intelligence Office, 14th N. D. 
(R. 376) 

Commander Harold S. Burr, USNR, Com 14 Liaison Officer at General Short's 
Headquarters. (R. 376) 

Brigadier General Carroll A. Powell, USA, Signal Officer, Hawaiian Depart- 
ment. (R. 387) 

At the Philippines in 19J,1: 

Captain Redfield Mason, USN. Fleet Intelligence Officer, Asiatic Fleet. (R. 68) 
Commander Rudolph J. Fabian, USN, Officer in Charge, Radio Intelligence 
Unit, Corregidor. (R. 68) 

At Washington, D. C in 1941: 

Vice Admiral Theodore S. Wilkinson, USN, Director of the Office of Naval 
Intelligence. (R. 389) 

Captain Arthur H. McCollum, USN, In charge of Far Eastern Section, Foreign 
Branch, ONI. (R. 10) 

Captain Laurence F. Safford, USN, Communications Security Section. (R. 
97; R. 529) 

Captain Alwin D. Kramer, USN, ONI and Communications Security Section. 
(R. 128) 

Mrs. Dorothy Edgers, Research Analyst, ONI. (R. 511) 

[17] Lieutenant Commander Fi-ancis M. Brotherhood, USNR, Communica- 
tions Security Section. (R. 143) 

Lieutenant Frederick L. Freeman, LTSN, Communications Security Section. 
(R. 149) 

Lieutenant Commander Allan A. Murray, USNR, Communications Security 
Section. (R. 433) 

Lieutenant Commander George W. Linn, USNR, Communications Security 
Section. (R. 140) 

Lieutenant Commander Alfred V. Pering, USNR, Communications Security 
Section. (R. 148) 

Other icitnesses: 

Captain William R. Smedberg, III, USN, now Assistant Combat Intelligence 
Officer, Staff, Cominch. (R. 4) 

Lieutenant Commander Leo Reierstad, LTSNR, now in charge of a translating 
unit in Op-16-FE. (R. 158) 

Lieutenant (jg) Joseph M. Conant, USNR, Translation sub-section head in Op- 
]6-FE. (R. 1.58) 

Commander Walter Karig, LTSNR, Lieutenant Welbourn Kelley, USNR, authors 
of "Battle Report." (R. 80) 

Lieutenant Commander Gilbert E. Boone, USNR, head of Op-20-GL. (R. 554; 
R. 607) 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



2273 



[18] G. Exhibits Received in this hiveittiiiation. 
Received in this investigation were the followiiifr exlul)its : 




Precept convening investigation ._ 

Modification of precept, directing report of findings and conclusions 

Narrative statement by counsel of previous Navy investigations... 

CinCPOA Weekly Confidential Intelligence Bulletin of 8 December 1944, relating to the 

attacking forw. 
A translation of a captured Japanese submarine chart, showing courses and location of 

U. S. ships in Pearl Harbor. 
CinCPOA Confidential Intelligence Bulletin of 20 October 1944, containing description of 

Japaese midget submarines. 

OXI document "ONI 220-J, Japanese Submarines". . 

Berthing plan at Pearl Harbor, 7 December 1941 (Ex. fiO of Naval Court)... 

Photostatic copies of Conil4 and Coml6 dispatch estimates of Japanese fleet location and 

movements, 26 November 194i. 

ONI Bulletin of 1 December 1941, Japanese fleet locations.. _ 

McCollum memorandum estimating situation as of 1 December 1941 

"Battle Report" _ 

FCC radio intercepts regarding "winds" code (Ex. 65 of Naval Court) 

Collection of intercepted Japanese dispatches — 

i Photostatic copies of captured Japanese submarhie chart, showing courses and location of 
U. S. ships in Pearl Harbor. 

Collection of intercepted Japanese dispatches (Ex. 63 of Naval Court). 

Copies of dispatches sent from RI unit, Corregidor, regarding Japanese fleet movements... 
Photostat of captured Japanese submarine chart used for Plate V of "Battle Report" 

Log of conversation between WARD and CONDORon the morning of 7 December 1941 

Tentative copies of Communication Intelligence Summaries, for 1 November 1941 to 6 De- 
cember 1941, at Pearl Harbor. 

Message from Tokyo establishing the hidden word code 

Pacific Fleet Intelligence Bulletin of 27 November 1941 concerning composition of Japanese 

Navy. 
Daily Communication Intelligence Summaries, 14 October 1941 to 5 December 1941, given 

to Fleet Intelligence Offlcer (Captain Lay ton) for delivery to Admiral Kimmel. 
Memorandum of 1 December 1941 from Fleet Intelligence Officer to Admiral Kimmel, esti- 
mating Japanese ship locations. 

November 21th dispatch from CNO to CincPac (Ex. 15 of Naval Court) 

"War Warning" (Ex. 17 of Naval Court) 

Lay ton Intelligence reports from 6 October 1941 to 2 December 1941 

Paraphrased copies of dispatches from various intelligence agencies delivered to CincPac 

Memorandum from Fleet Intelligence Officer to Admiral Kimmel regarding proposed Army 

aerial reconnaissance of Mandated Islands. 
Intercepted Japanese consular dispatches delivered to Fleet Intelligence Officer about De- 
cember 10th. 
Two Japanese panorama views of Pearl Harbor with Japane.se log on reverse side, recovered 
from submarine (returned to Captain Lay ton). 

Photostat of Japanese log on reverse of exhibit 30 

Translations of exhibits 30 and 30A.. 

Panorama sketch of Pearl Harbor from position five miles south of Pearl Harbor, recovered 
from submarine (returned to Captain Layton). 

Photostats ofexhibit31 

Original Japanese chart of Pearl Harbor recovered from Japanese midget submarine (re 
turned to Captain Layton). 



Photostat of exhibit 32 

Original Japanese chart of Pearl Harbor recovered from Japanese submarine, showing defen- 
sive installations (returned to Captain Layton). 

Photostatic copy of exhibit 33 

Staff Instructions, CincPac, 1941 

U. S. Pacific Fleet Operating Plan, Rainbow Five (Navy Plan O-l, Rainbow 

Five) (WPPac-46). 
Letter of 9 September 1941 from CNO to CincPac, approving Pacific Fleet Operating Plan 

Rainbow Five. 
Letter of 25 July 1941 from CincPac to CNO, submitting Pacific Fleet Operating Plan 

Rainbow Five. 
Photostatic copy of schedules .setting forth utiliz.ation of patrol planes of Pacific Fleet from 

17 November to 31 December and approved 22 November 1941. 
Transcripts of intercepted t('lei)hone calls of Ja[)anese Consul and Vice Consul in Honolulu 

from October to 2 December 19)1 (Consul's marked 38A; Vice Consul's marked 38B). 

Copy of intercepted "Mori conversation" 

ONI Summaries of messages sent by Japanese Consul in Honolulu from 1 December to 6 

December 1941. 

F ile of work sheets on Jap d iplomat ic t rafl^c (incorporated in other exhibit) 

Paper showing part of decryption process of Japanese "P.\" code 

Duty Officer, Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor, information sheets 

Extract from signal log of gate vessel of 7 December 1941 



2274 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

118] G. Exhibits Received in this Investigation — Continued 
Received in this investigation were the following exhibits — Continued 



Description 



E xtract from quartermaster's log of gate vessel of 7 December 1941 

Extract from log of Signal Tower, Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor, of 7 December 1941 

Collection of documents, containing Annex VII, Section VI, Joint Agreements, to Joint 

Coastal Frontier Defense Plan. 
Collection of dispatches regarding submarine contacts at Pearl Harbor in November and 

December, 1941. 
Bellinger "Estimate of Situation". 



Letter from ComTaskFor 9, to CinC, 20 December 1941, on recomiaissance prior to attack. 

Despatches cited in exhibit 50 

ComTaskFor 9 letter of 22 October 1941. file 0026 

ComTaskFor 9 letter of 16 January 1941 

ComPatWing 2 letter to CNO, of 11 December 1940 

Watch and duty schedules of Patrol Wings One and Two prior to attack.. 

RCA Communications, Inc., statement, listing certain Japanese cable messages from 

Honolulu in November and December, 1941. 
Coded messages from Japanese Consul General at Honolulu, via RCA, among those listed 

in exhibit 55, received by Navy 5 December 1941. 

Pages 7 to 12 of exhibit 56, containing messages not decrypted until after the attack 

Coded messages from Japanese Consul General at Honolulu, via RCA, among those listed 

in exhibit 55, received by Navy after the attack. 
Coded messages from Japanese Consul General at Honolulu, via RCA, received by Navy 

on night of 7 December and subsequently translated. 
Collection of dispatches from Naval Communication files relating to Japanese fleet move- 
ments and locations during the period 27 Novfember to 7 December 1941. 

Collection of Japanese plain language news broadcasts 

Collection of memoranda relating to messages received at Naval Communications in 

various Japanese code systems. 
Memorandum of Naval Communications, surveying work sheets processed by Navy of 

Japanese purple system. 
Report from DIO, 14th N. D., to Director of Naval Intelligence, of 19 April 1942, relating 

to coded dispatch traffic of Japanese Consul General, Honolulu. 
Certified collection of documents relating to anti-torpedo bafSes for protection against 

torpedo plane attacks. 
Copy of Itr. from Secretary of War to Secretary of Navy, dated 7 February 1941, relating 

to air defense at Pearl Harbor. 



CincPac secret letter of 7 August 1941 relating to the organization of the Orange fleet 

Map showing the location of ships present at Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941 

Telephone log of radio unit at Pearl Harbor, showing calls made and received on 7 December 

1941 as to Jap fleet locations. 
Photostatic copies of memoranda relating to questioning of captain of Japanese captured 

submarine. 
Pacific Fleet Weekly Intelligence Bulletin for 11 June 1945, containing description of midget 

submarines and method of transport to Pearl Harbor. 
Selected collection of Pearl Harbor dispatches, miscellaneous subjects, taken from CincPac 

Headquarters. 
Collection of dispatches relating to proposed Army reconnaissance in November of 1941... 

Collection of dispatches of December 7 and 8, 1941, from CincPac 

CincPac secret letter of 12 December 1941 reporting damage to ships at Pearl Harbor as 

result of attack and other details. 

Photostatic copy of War Diarv of Com 14 from 7 December 1941 to 1 January 1942 — 

War Diarv of USS WARD; War Diary of 0-in-C, Net and Boom Defenses, 14th N. D.; 

War Diary of USS CONDOR; excerpts from diary of 0-in-C, Net and Boom Defenses, 

14th N. D., WARD, and CONDOR. 
Photostatic copy of 1st and 2nd endorsements on Com 14 letter of 30 December 1941 relating 

to early morning submarine contact on 7 December 1941. 
Collection of correspondence relating to combined operating center for Army and Navy... 
Typewritten translation and copy of intercepted Japanese communication contained in 

exhibit 20, and notes relating thereto. 
Photostatic copy of page 44 of volume containing translations of files of operations orders, 

orders, memos, and serials dealing with Japanese Navy plans, recovered from Jap CA 

NACHI. 

Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Theater _ 

Collection of photostatic copies of ONI memoranda dealing with organization and loca- 
tions of Jap fleet as estimated during November and up to December 1, 1941. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2275 

[23] I 

THE WAR AND DEFENSE PLAA'S 

A. U. 8. Pacific Fleet Operating Plan Ruinhow Five. 

On 26 July 1941, U. S. Pacific Fleet Operating Plan- Rainbow Five (Exliibit 35) 
was distributed to the Pacific Fleet by Admiral Kininiel. This plan was designed 
to implement the Navy basic war plan (Rainbow Five) in so far as the tasks 
assigned the U. S. Pacific Fleet were concerned. It was approved 9 September 
1941 by the Chief of Naval Operations (Exhibit 36). The plan provided, in part : 

"INTRODITCTION 
CHAPTER IV. MOBrUZATION 

"0401. At the date of issue of this plan, the U. S. Pacific Fleet has virtually 
mobilized, and is operating, with intensive security measures, from the Pearl 
Harbor ba.se. It is expected, therefore, that the major portion of the Fleet can 
be ready for active service within four days of an order tor general mobilization. 
To provide for the contingency of M-day being set prior to the date on which 
hostilities are to open, the day of execution of this Plan is de.signated throughout 
the Plan as W-day. The day that hostilities open with Japan will be designated 
J-day. This may or may not coincide with W-day." 

"CHAPTER 11. ASSUMPTIONS 

"1211. The general as.sumptions on which this Plan is based are: 

"a. That the A.ssociated Powers, comprising initially the United States, the 
British Commonwealth (less Eire), the Netherlands East Indies, the Governments 
in Exile, China, and the 'Free French' are at war against the Axis powers, com- 
prising either : 

"1. Germany, Italy, Roumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, or 

"2. Germany, Italy, Japan, Roumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Thailand. 

"Note: As of 22 June war exists between the European Axis and Russia, and 
the latter may be tentatively considered as an ally against that part of the 
Axis but not necessarily against Japan." * * * 

[24] "CHAPTER III. INFORMATION 

"1314. The concept of the war in the Pacific, as set forth in ABC-1 is as 
follows : 

"Even if Japan were not initially to enter the war on the side of the Axis 
Powers, it would still be necessary for the Associated Powers to deploy their 
forces in a mariner to guard against Japane.se intervention. If Japan does enter 
the war, the military strategj- in the Far East will be defensive. The United 
States does not intend to add to its present military strength in the Far East 
but \yill employ the United States Pacific Fleet offensively in the manner best 
calculated to weaken Japanese economic power, and- to support the defense of 
the Malay barrier by diverting Japanese strength away from Malaysia. The 
United States intends to so augment its forces in the Atlantic and Mediterranean 
areas that the British Commonwealth will be in a jwsition to release the neces- 
sary forces for the Far East." 

"CHAPTER m. INFORMATION. 

"Section 3. Estimate of Enemy Action 

"1331. It is believed that German and Italian action in the Pacific will be 
limited to commerce raiding with converted types, and po.s.sibly with an occasional 
pocket battleship or heavy cruiser. 

"1332. It is conceived that Japanese action will be as follows : 

"a. The principal offensive effort to be toward the eventual capture of 
Malaysia (including the Philippines) and Hong Kong. 

"b. The secondary offensive efforts to be toward the interruption of American 
and Allied .sea communications in the Pacific, the Far East and the Indian Ocean, 
and to accomplish the capture of Guam and other outlying positions. 

"c. The offensive against China to be maintained on a reduced scale only. 

"d. The principal defensive efforts to be : 



2276 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

"1. Destruction of threatening naval forces. 

"2. Holding positions for their own use nnd denying positions in the Central 
and Western Pacific and the Far East which may be suitable for advanced bases. 

[25] "3. Protecting national and captured territory and approaches. 

"1333. To accomplish the foregoing it is believed that Japan's initial action 
will be toward : 

"a. Capture of Guam. 

"b. Establishment of control over the South China Sea, Philippine waters, and 
the waters between Borneo and New Guinea, by the establishment of advanced 
bases, and by the destruction of United States and allied air and naval forces 
in these regions, followed by the capture of Luzon. 

"c. Capture of Northern Borneo. 

"d. Denial to the United States of the use of the Marshall-Caroline-Marianas 
area by the use of fixed defenses, and, by the operation of air forces and light 
naval forces to reiluce the strength of the United States Fleet. 

"e. Reenforcement of the Mandate Islands by troops, aircraft and light naval 
forces. 

"f. Possibly raids or stronger attacks on Wake, Midway and other outlying 
United States positions. 

"1334. The initial Japanese deployment is therefore estimated to be as follows : 

"a. Troops and aircraft in the Homeland, Manchukuo, and China with strong 
concentrations in Formosa and Hainan, fairly strong defenses in the Carolines, 
and comparatively weak but constantly growing defenses in the Marshalls. 

"b. Main fleet concentration in the Inland Sea, shifting to a central position 
(possibly Pescadores) after the capture of Guam and the reenforcement of the 
Mandates. 

"c. A strong fleet detachment in the Mindanao-Celebes area (probable main 
base in Halmahera). 

"d. Suflacient units in the Japan Sea to counter moves of Russian Naval forces 
in that area. 

"e. Strong concentration of submarines and light surface patrol craft in the 
Mandates, with such air scouting and air attack units as can be supported there. 

"f. Raiding and observation forces widely distributed in the Pacific, and sub- 
marines in the Hawaiian area." * ♦ * 

[26] "Part II. Outline of Tasks 

"chapter I. TASKS ASSIGNED BY NAVY BASIC PI.AN — MISSION 

"2101. The Navy Basic War Plan (Rainbow Five) assigns the following tasks 
within the Pacific Area to the U. S. Pacific Fleet : 

"a. Support the forces of the associated powers in the Far East by diverting 
enemy strength away from the Malay Barrier, through the denial and capture 
of positions in the Marshalls, and through raids on enemy sea communications 
and positions ; 

"b. Prepare to capture and establish cont ol over the Caroline and Marshall 
Island area, and to establish an advanced fleet: base in Truk ; 

"c. Destroy Axis sea communications by capturing or destroying vessels trad- 
ing directly or indirectly with the enemy; 

"d. Support British naval forces in the area south of the Equator as far west 
as longitude 155° east ; 

"e. Defend Samoa in Catagory 'D'; 

"f. Defend Guam in category 'F'; 

"g. Protect the sea communications of the Associated Powers by escorting, 
covering, and patrolling as required by circumstances, and by destroying enemy 
raiding forces ; 

"h. Protect the territory of the Associated Powers in the Pacific Area and pre- 
vent the extension of enemy military power into the Eastern Hemisphere by 
destroying hostile expeditions and by supporting land and air forces in denying 
the enemy the use of land jwsitions in that hemisphere ;" * * *. 

"chapter II. TASKS FX)RMUI^TED TO ACCOMPLISH THE ASSIGNED MISSIONS 

"2201. It will be noted that the tasks assigned in the previous chapter are 
based upon Assumption a2 of paragraph 1211 (Japan in the war). In formu- 
lating tasks the Commander-in-Chief has provided also for Assumption al and 
divides the tasks to be accomplished by the Pacific Fleet into phases, as follows : 

[27] "a. Phase I — Initial tasks — Japan not in the war. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2277 

"b. Phase lA — ^Initial tasks — Japan in the war. 

"c. Phase II, etc., — Succeeding taslcs. 

"2202. Pha.se I taslcs are as follows : 

"a. Complete luobilization an<l prepare for distant operations ; thereafter main- 
tain all types In constant readiness for distant service. 

"b. Maintain fleet security at bases and anchorages and at sea. 

"c. Transfer the Atlantic reenforcement, if ordered. 

"d. Transfer the Southeast Pacific Force, if ordered. 

"e. Assign twelve patrol planes and two small tenders to Pacific southern and 
a similar force to Pacific northern naval coastal frontier, on M-day. 

"f. Assign two submarines and one submarine rescue vessel to Pacific northern 
naval coastal frontier on M-day. 

"g. Protect the communications and territory of the Associated Powers and 
prevent the extension of enemy military power into the Western Hemisphere by 
patrolling with light forces and patrol planes, and by tlie action of striking groups 
as necessary. In so doing support the British naval forces south of the equator 
as far west as longitude 155° East. 

"h. Esfablish defensive submarine patrols at Wake and Midway. 

"i. Observe, with submarines outside the three mile limit, the possible raider 
bases in the Japanese Mandates, if authorized at the time by the Navy Department. 

"j. Prosecute the establishment and defense of subsidiary bases at Midway, 
Johnston, Palmyra, Samoa, Guam and Wake, and at Canton if authorized. 

"k. Continue training operations as practicable. 

"1. Move the maximum practicable portion of Second Marine Division to Hawaii 
for training in landing operations. 

"m. Guard against surprise attack by Japan. 

[28] "Phase lA 

"2203. Phase lA tasks are as follows : 

"a. Continue tasks outlined in 2202 a, b, g, h, and k. 

"b. Accomplish such of the tasks in 2202 c, d, e, f, and j as have not been 
completed. 

"c. Make an initial sweep for Japanese merchantmen and enemy raiders and 
tenders in the northern Pacific. 

"d. Continue the protection of the territory and communications of the Asso- 
ciated Powers, and of the naval coastal frontier forces, chiefly by covering 
operations. 

"e. 1. Make reconnaissance and raid in force on the Marshall Islands. 

"2. If available cruisers and other circumstances i)ermit, make cruiser raids 
against Japanese shipping in waters between Nan.sei Shoto and Nanpo Shoto. 

"f. Establish and maintain maximum practicable submarine patrols against 
Japanese forces and communications near the Japanese homeland. 

"g. Maintain air patrols against enemy forces in the approaches to Oahu and 
outlying bases. 

"h. Escort important shipping, including troop movements, between the Hawai- 
ian Area and the West coast. 

"i. Route shipping in the fleet control zone when established. 

"J. Augment the local defense forces of the Hawaiian naval coastal frontier 
as necessary. 

"k. Move from San Diego to Hawaii the remaining units and equipment of the 
Second Marine Division. 

"1. Prepare to capture and establish control over the Marshall Island area." 

"Pabt III. Task Assignment 

"chapter I. PHASE I 

"Section 4. Task Force Nine (Patrol Plane Force) 

"3141. Task Force Nine will perform the tasks assigned in the following para- 
graphs of this section. 

[29] "3142. On W-day transfer twelve patrol plane.s and two tenders to 
each of the Pacific southern and Pacific northern naval coastal frontiers. Con- 
tinue administration of these forces and rotate detail at discretion. 

"3143. Perform tasks assigned in the patrol and sweeping plan (Annex 
I)." ,• * ♦ 



2278 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 
"Part V. Special Provisions 

"CHAPTER IV. TENTATIVE OPERATION PLANS, PHASES I AND lA 

"Section 1. Phase I 

United States Pacific Fleet 

U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship 

Place 

Date 
"Operation Plan No. 1-R5." ♦ • * 

"I. Information, Assumptions, etc., as previously given in Parts I, II, and III 
of Navy Plan O-l, Rainbow Five. 

"2. This Fleet will, in the Pacific Area, protect the territory and sea com- 
munications of the Associated Powers and will support British Naval Forces 
south of the equator as far west as Ix)ngitude 15.t° East, while continuing 
training and guarding against attack by Japan." * * * 

"Annex I 

United States Pacific Fleet, 

U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship 

Place 

Date 
"Patrol and Sweeping Plan." * * * 

"1. Information and Assumptions as previously given in Parts I, II, and III 
of this Navy Plan O-l, Rainbow Five. Latest information of enemy dispositions, 
estimated intentions, and location of merchant shipping will be furnished by 
the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, at time of execution. 

[30] Phase I. 

"2. This Fleet will, in the Pacific Area, protect the territory and sea communi- 
cations of the Associated Powers by : 

"(a) Patrolling against enemy forces, particularly in the vicinity of the Ha- 
waiian Islands; and on shipping lanes (1) West Coast-Hawaii, (2) Trans- 
Pacific westward of Midway and (3) in South Seas in vicinity of Samoa. 

"(b) Escorting as conditions require and forces available permit. 

"(c) Covering. 

"(d) Employing striking forces against enemy raids and expeditions. 

"(e) Routing shipping." * ♦ * 

"3. (d) 7'asfc Force ^me (Patrol Plane Force). 

"(1) Having due regard for time required to overhaul and unkeep planes and 
for conservation of personnel, maintain maximum patrol plane search against 
enemy forces in the approaches to the Hawaiian area. 

"(2) Initially base and operate one patrol plane squadron from Midway. At 
discretion increase the number of planes operating from bases to westward of 
Pearl Harbor to two squadrons, utilizing Johnston and Wake as the facilities 
thereat and the situation at the time makes practicable. 

"(3) Be prepared, on request of Commander Task Force Three, to transfer 
one patrol squadron and tenders to that force for prompt operations in the South 
Pacific. 

"(4) Be particularly alert to detect disguised raiders. 

"(5) In transferring planes between bases, conduct wide sweep enroute. 

"(6) Planes engaged in training operations furnish such assistance to Naval 
Coastal Frontiers in which based as may be practicable. 

[31] " (7) Effect closest cooperation practicable with surface forces engaged 
in sweeping during initial sweep of Phase lA. 

"(8) Modify patrols as necessary in order to carry out tasks assigned In 
Marshall Raiding and Reconnaissance Plan (Annex II to Navy Plan O-l ) ." * * * 

B. Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Theater, Orange IJfND- 
JCD-42 
The Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Coastal Frontier, Hawaiian 
Department and FOURTEENTH Naval District (14ND-JCD-42), was signed and 
placed in effect on 11 April 1941 by the Commanding General, Hawaiian Depart- 
ment, and by the Commandant, FOURTEENTH Naval District (Exhibit). The 
plan was based on the joint Army and Navy basic war plans, and was to constitute 
the basis on which all subsidiary peace and war projects, joint operating plans, 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2279 

and mobilization plans would be based. The method of coordination under the 
plan was by mutual cooperation which was to apply to all activities wherein the 
Army and the Navy would operate in coordination until and if the method of 
unity of command were invoked. The tasks asigned were as follows : 

"14. TASKS. 

"a. Joint Task. To hold OAHU as a main outlying naval base, and to control 
and protect shipping in the Coastal Zone. 

"b. Army Tusk. To hold OAHU against attacks by sea, land, and air forces, and 
against hostile sympathizers ; to support the naval forces. 

"c. Navy Task. To patrol the Coastal Zone and to control and protect shipping 
therein ; to support the Army forces." 

The Hawaiian Naval Coastal Zone was defined as "The Hawaiian Naval 
Coastal Zone comprises the waters of the Hawaiian Costal Frontier" (Oahu and 
such adjacent land and sea areas as were required for the defense of Oahu). 

The plan provided that the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and 
the Commandant, FOURTEENTH Naval District, should provide for the follow- 
ing: 

"17. ARMY. The Commanding General, HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT, shall 
provide for : 

"a. The beach and land, seacoast and antiaircraft defense of OAHU with par- 
ticular attention to the PEARL HARBOR NAVAL BASE and naval forces present 
thereat, HONOLULU HARBOR, CITY OF HONOLULU, and the SCHOFIELD 
BARRACKS— WHEELER FIELD— LUALUALEI area. The increasing import- 
ance of the KANEOHE area is recognized. 

[32] '"b. An antiaircraft and gas defense intelligence and warning service. 

"c. Protection of landing fields and naval installations on outlying islands 
consistent with available forces. 

"d. Defense of installations on OAHU vital to the Army and Navy and to the 
civilian community for light, power, water, and for interior guard and sabotage, 
except within naval establishments. 

"e. Defense against sabotage within the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS, except within 
naval shore establishments. 

"f. Establishment of an inshore aerial patrol of the waters of the OAHU 
D. C. A., in cooperation with the Naval Inshore Patrol (see par. 18.a.), and an 
aerial observation system on outlying islands, and an Aircraft Warning Service 
for the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS. 

"g. Support of naval aircraft forces in major offensive operations at sea con- 
ducted within range of Army bombers. 

"h. Provide personnel for and Army communication facilities to harbor control 
post provided for In paragraph 18.e. 

"i. In conjunction with the Navy, a system of land communications (coordi- 
nated by means of teletype, telegraph loops, and radio intercepts, and detailed 
joint instructions) to insure prompt transmittal and interchange of hostile 
intelligence. Radio communication between the Army and the Navy will be 
governed by 'Joint Army and Navy Radio Procedure, The Joint Board, 1940'. 

"j. An intelligence service, which, in addition to normal functions, will gather, 
evaluate, and distribute both to the Army and to the Navy, information of 
activities of enemy aliens or alien sympathizers within the HAWAIIAN 
ISLANDS. 

"k. Counter-espionage within the HAWAIIAN IS'LANDS. 

"1. Control of dangerous aliens or alien sympathizers in the HAWAIIAN 
ISLANDS. 

"m. Army measures to assure effective supervision, control, and censorship 
over communication systems which will conform to Joint Action of the Army 
and the Navy, 1935, Chapter IX. 

"n. Supply of all Army and civil population in the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS. 

[33] "0. Hospitalization of all Army and civil population in the HAWAIIAN 
ISLANDS. 

"p. Reception and distribution of personnel and supplies for the Army and of 
supplies for the civil population. 

"18. NAVY. The Commandant, FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT, shall pro- 
vide for : 

"a. An inshore patrol. 

"b. An offshore patrol. 

"c. An escort force. 

"d. An attack force. 



2280 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

"e Provide and maintain a harbor control post for joint defense of PEARL 
and HONOLULU HARBORS. 

"f. Installation and operation of an underwater defense for PEARL and 
HONOLULU HARBORS. (Hydro-acoustic posts, fixed, when developed and 
installed probably will be under cognizance of the Army.) 

"g. Support of Army forces in the OAHU-D. C. A. and installation of submarine 
mine tields in the defense of the OAHU-D. C. A. as may be deemed necessary and 
practicable. 

"h. Sweeping channels and mine fields. 

"i. Distant reconnaissance. 

"j. Attacking enemy naval forces. 

"k. Maintenance of interior guard and defense against sabotage within all 
naval shore establishments. 

"1. In conjunction with the Army, as provided for in paragraph 17 t., a local 
communication service to insure prompt transmittal and interchange of intel- 
ligence. 

"m. Navy measures to assure effective supervision, control and censorship over 
communication systems which will conform to Joint Action of the Army and the 
Navy, 1935, Chapter IX. 

"n. Operation of a Naval intelligence system, including counter-espionage, for 
the collection, evaluation, and dissemination of hostile information. 

"o. Supply and hospitalization of all local naval defense forces. 

[34] "p. Operation or supervision of all water transportation and facilities 
pertaining thereto." 

C. Annex VII. .S'c(7/(»? VI, to the Joint Coantal Frontier Defense Plan. 

Annex VII, Section VI to the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian 
Department and Fourteenth Naval District, dated 28 March 1941, and approved 
by Admiral Bloch and General Short 2 April 1941, (Exhibit 47), dealt with joint 
security measures and protection of the Fleet and Pearl Harbor base. It stated 
that in order to coordinate joint defensive measures for the security of the Fleet 
and for the Pearl Harbor Naval ba.se for defen.se against hostile raids or air 
attacks delivered prior to a declaration of war, and before a general mobilization 
for war, there were adopted the following agreements : 

Paragraph II, in re.spect of joint air operations, provided that when the Com- 
manding General and ComFOURTEEN agreed that the threat of a hostile raid 
or attack was sufficiently imminent to warrant such action, each commander 
would take such preliminary steps as were necessary to make available without 
delay to the other commander such proportion of the air forces at his disposal 
as circumstances warranted in order that joint operations might be conducted in 
accordance with the following plans: (a) joint air attacks upon hostile surface 
vessels to be conducted under the tactical command of the Navy; (b) defensive 
air operations over and in the immediate vicinity of Oahu to be executed under 
the tactical command of the Army; (c) when naval forces were insufficient for 
long distance patrol and search operations, and Army aircraft were made avail- 
able, these aircraft would be under the tactical control of the naval commander 
directing the search operations. 

Paragraph III provided for joint communications, and, among other things, 
that all information of the presence or movements of hostile aircraft offshore 
from Oahu secured through Navy channels would be transmitted promptly to the 
Command Post of the Army provisional Anti-Aircraft Brigade and the Aircraft 
Warning Service Information Center; that subsequently, when the Army aircraft 
warning service was established, provision would be made for transmission of 
information on the location or distance of hostile and friendly aircraft, and 
special wire or radio circuits would be made available for the use of Navy liaison 
officers so that they might make their own evaluation of the available information 
and transmit it to their respective organizations. 

Paragraph IV related to joint anti-aircraft measures, the arrival and departui'e 
procedure for aircraft, balloon barrages. Marine Corps anti-aircraft artillery, and 
Army Aircraft Warning Service. It provided that the latter service was to l)e 
expedited in its installation and operation by the Army and. "during the period 
prior to the completion of the AWS installation, the Navy, through use of Radar 
and other appropriate means, will endeavor to give such warning of hostile attacks 
as may be practicable." 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2281 

[35] D. Joint Estimate Covering Army and Nary Air Action in the Event 
of Sud(le)i Hostile Aetiwi Against Ouhu. 

Oil 31 March 1941. Rear Admiral Bellinger, Coiuniander Naval Base Defense 
Air Force (Commander Patrol Wing Two), and Major General F. L. Martin, 
Commanding Hawaiian Air Force, prepared a joint estimate covering joint 
Army and Navy air action in flie event of sudden hostile action against Oahu or 
Fleet units in the Hawaiian area (Exhibit 49). 

Paragraph I of the estimate included a "Summary of the Situation," which 
indicated that relations between the United States and Orange were strained, 
uncertain, and varying ; that in the past Orange had never preceded hostile 
action by a declaration of war ; that a successful sudden raid against our ships 
and naval installations on Oahu might prevent effective offensive action by our 
forces in the western Pacilic for a long period; that a strong part of our fleet 
was constantly at sea in the operating areas, organized to take prompt offensive 
action ; and. that it appeared possible that Orange submarines and/or an Orange 
fast raiding force might arrive in Hawaiian waters with no prior warning from 
our Intelligence Service. 

Paragraph II of the estimate embraced a "Survey of Opposing Strengths," 
indicating, among other things, that Orange might send into the Hawaiian area 
one or more submarines and one or more fast raiding forces composed of carriers 
supported by fast cruisers; that the most diflBcult situation to meet would be 
when several of the above elements were present and closely coordinating their 
actions; and that the aircraft available in Hawaii were inadequate to maintain 
for any extended period from bases on Oahu a patrol extensive enough to insure 
that an air attack from an Orange carrier could not arrive over Oahu as a com- 
plete surprise. 

Paragraph III of the estimate dealt with "Possible Enemy Action." It stated 
that a declaration of war might be preceded by a surprise submarine attack on 
ships in the operating area, a surprise attack on Oahu, including ships and 
installations in Pearl Harbor, or a combination of these two; that it appeared 
the most likely and dangerous form of attack on Oahu would be an air attack, 
most likely launched from one or more carriers which would probably approach 
inside of 3(X) miles. It was further pointed out that a single attack might or 
might not indicate the presence of more submarines or more planes waiting to 
attack after defending aircraft have been drawn away by the original thrust ; 
that: "(d) any single submarine attack might indicate the presence of consider- 
able undiscovered surface forces, probably composed of fast ships accompanied 
by a carrier" ; and that in a dawn air attack there was a high possibility that it 
could be delivered as a complete surprise in spite of any patrol that we might 
be using. 

Paragraph IV of the estimate considered "Action Open to Us." It was stated 
that it would be desirable to run daily patrols as far as possible to seaward 
through 360°, but this could only be effectively maintained with present person- 
nel and material for a very short period, and. as a practicable measure, could 
not therefore be undertaken unless other intelligence [36] indicated that 
a surface raid was probable within rather narrow limits of time. Reference was 
made to other types of action open in the event of a surprise attack on ships in the 
operating area or on the islands, and pointed out that none of the outlined courses 
of action could be initiated by our forces until an attack was known to be 
imminent or had occurred. 

Paragraph V contained "Decisions." The primary decision was that the 
Naval Base Defense Air Force would locate and attack forces initiating hostile 
action against Oahu or fleet unis in order to prevent or minimize damage to 
our forces from a surprise attack, and to obtain information upon which to base 
coordinated retaliatory measures. A number of subsidiary decisions were made, 
including decisions for the establishment of a search and attack group, an air 
combat group, the assignment of missions to the groups, and definitions of condi- 
tions of readiness. The search and attack group was to he under the Commander 
Naval Base Defense Air Force-Commander Patrol Wing Two, and, in accordance 
with current conditions of readiness, included patrol squadrons and Army 
bombardment and reconnais.sance squadrons. 

[31] E. Naval Base Defense Force Operation Plan No. 1-J,1, and Naval Base 
Defense Air Force Plan. 

Admiral Bloch. as Naval Base Defense Officer, issued his Operation Plan No. 
3-41, on February 27, 1941 (Exhibit r>3 of the Naval Court). The Task Organiza- 
tion prescribed was: (a) Destroyer Patrol (Commander Inshore Patrol) con- 
sisting of two destroyers, a boom patrol, d. harbor patrol, and an A/B boom 

79716 0—46 — pt. 16 24 



2282 CONGRESSIONAL IN\'ESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

and minesweeper, (b) Base Defense Air Force (Commander Patrol "Wing Two) 
in conjunction witli tlie Army, (c) Antiaircraft Defense (District Marine Officer) 
in conjunction with the Army, (d) Harbor Control Post (District Operations 
Officer) in conjunction with the Army. This plan directed 'attention, among 
other things, to the Hawaiian Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, and stated: 

"By cooperation in support of the Army, Naval security measures will be estab- 
lished as necessary for the joint protection of Pearl Harbor Base in order to 
safeguard the Fleet. 

"In conjunction with the Commanding General Hawaiian Department, the 
Naval Base Defense Officer (Commandant Fourteenth Naval District) will 
arrange to coordinate joint effort ; to set conditions of readiness ; to hold required 
drills; to make "alarm" and "all clear" signals. 

AssuDiptiotis. 

(a) That no responsible foreign power will provoke war under existing con- 
ditions, by attack on the Fleet or base, but that irresponsible and misguided 
nationals of such powers may attempt : 

(1) Sabotage from small craft on ships based in PEARL HARBOR. 

(2) Block the entrance channel to PEARL HARBOR by sinking an obstruction 
in the channel. 

(3) Lay magnetic or other mines in the approaches to PEARL HARBOR. 

(b) That a declaration of war might be preceded by : 

(1) A surprise submarine attack on ships in base area — probable. 

(2) A surprise air attack on ships in PEARL HARBOR — possible. 

(3) A combination of these two — i>ossibl(?." 

Annexed to Operation Plan 1-41 were: A detailed Inshore Patrol Plan, called 
Annex "A ;" a detailed Naval Base Defense Air Force Plan, called Annex "Baker ;" 
a detailed Anti-aircraft Defense Plan, called Annex "C ;" a detailed Harbor 
Control Post Plan, called "D ;" and a detailed Communications Plan, known as 
Annex "Easy." 

Annex "Baker." the detailed Naval Base Defense Air Force Plan, dated 9 April 
1941, was prepared by Admiral Bellinger and approved by Admiral Bloch. It 
divided the Task Organization into (a) Search and Attack Group, consisting 
of patrol squadrons and other planes, including Army reconnaissance squadrons, 
and (b) an air combat group. This plan was made in accordance with the Joint 
Estimate, dated 31 March 1941, which is digested above. The Naval Base 
Defense Air Force was, according to this plan, to [38] locate and destroy 
hostile forces raiding against Oahu or Fleet units in the operating areas. The 
plan was effective upon receipt and became operative without signal in the 
event of a surprise attack on Oahu. It might be made operative by dispatch. 
In the meantime, conditions of readiness, prescribed in Addendum Two to this 
plan, would be taken as directed by the Commanding General, Hawaiian Depart- 
ment, for Army units, and by the Naval Base Defense Officer (ComFOURTEEN) 
for Navy units. The condition of material readiness was to be signified by a 
letter, such as "E." signifying that all aircraft were conducting i-outine operations 
and none were ready for the purposes of this plan, and the condition of operational 
readiness by a number, such as ".5," signifying that all types of available planes 
would be ready in four hours. It was also required that a dispatch readiness 
report, as of 1500 each day, be made by each unit assigned by this plan to a 
task group, stating the number of planes and readiness. 

[39] F. Pacific Fleet Letter on Security_ of the Fleet at Base and in 
Operating Areas. 

Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter No. 2CL-41, from the Commander in Chief, 
Pacific Fleet, to the Pacific Fleet, concerning the security of the Fleet at base 
and in operating areas, was issued in February, 1941 and reissued in revised form 
on 14 October 1941. 

This order provided that the Security of the Fleet was predicated on two 
assumptions : 

(a) That no responsible foreign power would provoke war under present 
existing conditions by attack on the Fleet or base, but that irresponsible land 
misguided nationals of such powers might attempt (1) sabotage on ships based 
in Pearl Harbor from small craft, (2) to block the entrance to Pearl Harbor by 
sinking an obstruction in the channel, (3) to lay magnetic or other mines in the 
approaches to Pearl Harbor ; 

(b) That a declaration of wav might be preceded by (1) a surprise attack on 
ships in Pearl Harbor, (2) a surprise submarine attack on ships in operating 
areas, (3) a combination of the two. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2283 

Security measures were prescribed covering : 

A. Continuous patrols, inshore, boom and harbor. 

B. Intermittent patrols to consist of a destroyer offshore patrol and an air 
pfttrol. The destroyer patrol was to consist (a) of a patrol to 10 miles from the 
entrance, (b) three destroyers to search 12 hours prior to sortie or entry of Fleet 
or Task Force, (c) one destroyer (READY DUTY) for screening heavy ships, 
other than during a Fleet or Task Force sortie or entry, to be on one hour's notice. 
The air patrol was to consist of daily search of operating areas, as directed by 
Commander Aircraft, Scouting Force, an "air patrol to cover entry or sortie of a 
Fleet or Task Force, an air patrol during entry or departure of a heavy ship at 
other times. There also was to be a daily sweep for magnetic and anchored 
mines. 

C. Sortie and entry. 

D. Openating areas. 

E. Ships at sea. 

F. Ships in port. 

The security provisions covering defense against air attack (G), described the 
principal Army anti-aircraft gun defenses of Pearl Harbor, and directed that 
Marine defense battalions would assist the Army in manning them ; and provided 
that in the event of a hostile air attack, any part of the Fleet in harbor, plus all 
fleet aviation shore based on Oahu, would augment the local "air defense; it 
prescribed air defense sectors and a berthing plan in Pearl Harbor. It further 
provided that the senior oflScer embarked, exclusive of CincPac, should insure 
berthing so as to develop the maximum anti-aircraft gunfire ; and that 
ComFOURTEEN, as Naval UO] Base Defense Officer, should exercise 
with the Army joint supervisory control over the defense against air attack, and 
take other action, including supervisory control over naval shore based aircraft, 
arranging through the Commander of Patrol Wing Two for coordination of the 
joint air effort between the Army and the Navy, and coordinate Fleet anti-air- 
ci-aft flre with the base defense by advising the Senior Officer Embarked (exclu- 
sive of CincPac) of the condition of readiness to maintain, and by holding 
drills, etc. 

Three conditions of naval base defense readiness were prescribed. Condition 
III read as follows : 

"Anti-aircraft battery (guns which bear in assigned sector) of at least one 
ship in each sector manned and ready. (Minimum of four guns required for each 
.sector.) Condition of aircraft as prescribed by Naval Base Defense Officer." 

The procedure to be followed by the task forces in the event of an air attack 
was also set forth : the Senior Officer embarked was to execute an emergency 
sortie order, .sending destroyers out and preparing a carrier and heavy ships and 
submarines for sortie; the Task Force Commander at sea was to dispatch a 
striking unit, etc. ; and the Naval Base Defense Officer was to give the alarm 
indicating that an attack was in progress or imminent, inform the Task Force 
Commander at sea of the attack and type of attacking aircraft, launch air search 
for enemy ships, and arm and prepare all bombing units available. 

The action to be taken if a submarine attacked in the operating area was set 
forth. It was provided that the ship attacked was, among other things, to origi- 
nate a plain language dispatch containing the essential details; various actions 
were to be taken by other ships ; and the Patrol Wings were to assume readiness 
for search and for offensive action, to carry out search as directed by Task Force 
Commander, and to prepare to establish station patrol at a 220 mile radius from 
the scene of attack at one hour before daylight of the next succeeding daylight 
period. The shore based fleet aircraft were to prepare to relieve planes over the 
attack area, unless Pearl Harbor were also attacked, in which case the instruc- 
tions issued by the Naval Base Defense Officer would have priority. It was fur- 
ther provided that "It must be remembered that a single attack may or may not 
indicate the presence of more submarines waiting to attack," that "(3) it must 
be remembered too, that a single submarine attack may indicate the presence of 
a considerable surface force probably composed of fast ships accompanied by a 
carrier. The Task Force Commander must, therefore, assemble his task groups 
as quickly as the situation and daylight conditions warrant in order to be pre- 
pared to pursue or meet enemy ships that may be located by air search or other 
means." 

l-in G. Execution of Plans Prior to 7 December 19Jfl. 

(1) The Pacific Fleet Ojierating Plan Rainbow 5 provided that the day of 
execution of the plan was to be designated as W-Day, and that the day upon 



2284 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

which hostilities opened with Japan would be J-Day. which might or might not 
coincide with W-Day. Prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor, W-Day had not 
been designated. 

(2) The Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan had been signed and placed 
in effect on 11 April 1941 by the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, 
and by the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District. It will be recalled that 
under this plan the method of coordination of Army and Navy effort was "by 
mutual cooperation" and not "unity of command." It will be recalled further 
that under this plan the Army task was to hold Oahu against attacks by sea, 
land, and air forces, and against hostile sympathizers ; and to .support the Naval 
forces ; and, that the Navy task was to patrol the coastal zone and control and 
protect shipping therein ; and to support the Army forces ; and, that the Navy 
was obliged to provide distant reconnaissance. 

(3) Annex VII, Section 6 of the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, which 
provided for joint defensive measures for defense against hostile raids or air 
attacks delivered prior to a declaration of war (including joint air operations 
and for the use of Army aircraft by the Navy for long distance patrol when 
Navy forces were insufficient ) , was to become effective when the Connnanding 
General and ComFOURTEEN agreed that the threat of a hostile raid or attack 
was sufficiently imminent to warrant such action. No such agreement was made 
prior to the attack on December 7th. 

(4) The Naval Base Defense Force Operation Plan, which provided for an 
Inshore Patrol consisting of two desti-oyers, a boom patrol, a harbor patrol, 
and an A/B boom and minesweepers, a Base defense air force, anti-aircraft 
defense, and a harbor control post, although effective as to the inshore patrol 
was not in operation as to the base defense air force. 

(.")) The Naval Base Defense Air Force Plan, dated 9 April 1941, which was 
an annex to the Naval Base Defense Force Plan and which had been made in 
accordance with the joint estimate of Bellinger and Martin, dated 31 March 
1941, was effective upon receipt. It was to become operative without a signal 
in the event of a surprise attack on Oahu and it might have been made oper- 
ative bv dispatch. It was not made operative until the attack on 7 December 
1941. 

(6) The Pacific Fleet Letter on security of the Fleet at base and in operat- 
ing areas, which recognized the possibility of a surprise attack on ships in 
Pearl Harbor and which set forth security measures including patrols to be 
conducted both by destroyers and by aircraft, was in effect during 1941, and 
in revised form after 14 October 1941. 

[^2] H. Admiral KimmeVs Vieira as to the Possibility of a Surprise Air 
Attack. 

It appears from the War and Defense Plans, above summarized, that it was 
believed that prior to a declaration of war there might be a surprise attack 
by the Japanese on ships in Pearl Harbor or a surprise submarine attack on 
ships in the operating areas. The possibility of a surprise air attack on ships 
in Pearl Harbor had been expressed as early as 24 January 1941 by the Secretary 
of the Navy, in a letter to the Secretary of War (Exhibit 64), a copy of which 
was received by Admiral Kimmel shortly after he assumed command of the 
Pacific Fleet. In that letter, the Secretary of the Navy wrote: 

"If war eventuates with Japan, it is believed easily possible that hostilities 
would be initiated by a surprise attack upon the fleet or the naval base at Pearl 
Harbor . . . The dangers envisaged in their order of importance and prob- 
abilities are considered to be: (1) air bombing attack, (2) air torpedo plane 
attack, (3) sabotage, (4) submarine attack, (5) mining, (6) bombardment 
by gunfire." 

In his testimony before the Naval Court of Inquiry, Admiral Kimmel indi- 
cated some confusion as to his agreement with and his evaluation of the above 
letter by the Secretary of the Navy. He testified that he had felt that the most 
probable form of attack on Pearl Harbor was by submarine, and that a bomb- 
ing attack was the second most probable, but that he had been of the view 
that there was no danger of an air torpedo attack because the water was too 
shallow. He ther\ corrected his testimony, characterizing his previous testi- 
mony as erroneous, and stated that hie had regarded an air attack as no more 
than a possibility. 

It appears clearly that Admiral Kimmel at all times during his command of 
the Pacific Fleet was of the view that a surprise air attack on Pearl Harbor was 
a possibility. Thus, in a letter by Admiral Richardson, prepared in collaboration 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2285 

with Admiral Kimniel, on 25 JuDuary 1941 (Exhibit 70, Naval Court), it was 
stated in part that the security of the Pacific Fleet would be predicated on cer- 
tain assumptions, including an assumption that Japan might attack without 
warning and the further assumption that Japanese attacks might be expected 
against shipping, outlying positions, or naval units, and that surprise raids on 
Pearl Harbor were possible. Again, in a letter of 18 February 1941, concerning 
the adequacy of local defense (Exhibit 30, Naval ('ourt). Admiral Kimmel 
stated, "I feel that a surprise attack (submarine, air, or combined) on Pearl 
Harbor is a possibility." And, as previously pointed out, the Fleet Security 
Letter, reissued on 14 October 1941, predicated the security of the Fleet on 
two assnmptions, one of which was that a declaration of war might be preceded 
by a surprise attack on ships in Pearl Harbor. This, Admiral Kimmel testified 
before the Naval Court, referred to a surprise air attack. 

In connection with Admiral Kimmel's statement before the Naval Court of 
Inquiry that he thought there was no danger of an air [^S] torpedo 
attack on Pearl Harbor because tiie water was too shallow, several letters from 
the Chief of Naval Operations shoidd be noted: 

On 15 February 1941 (Exhibit 49, Naval Court), the Chief of Naval Operations 
wrote to CincPac regarding anti-torpedo baffles for protection against attacks on 
Pearl Harbor. This stated that the shallow depth of water limited the need for 
anti-torpedo nets in Pearl Harbor and the congestion and the necessity for 
maneuvering room limited the practicability of the present type of baffles. The 
letter indicated that a minimum depth of water of 75 feet might be assumed 
necessary successfully to drop torpedoes from planes and that the desirable height 
for dropping is 60 feet or less. There were various other considerations stated. 
The recommendations and conunents of the Commander-in-Chief were especially 
desired. A similar letter was sent by the Chief of Naval Operations to the Com- 
mandants of various Naval Districts, including the Fourteenth, on 17 February 
1941 (Exhibit 54, Naval Court). 

The reply to the request for recommendations and comments was made on 20 
March 1941, in a letter by Admiral Bloch. stating that the depth of water at Pearl 
Harbor was 45 feet, and for that and other reasons, he did not recommend anti- 
torpedo baffles. CincPac agreed, until such time as a light efficient net were 
developed. 

In June, 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations sent another letter to the Com- 
mandants of Naval Districts, copy to CincPac and others, referring to recent 
developments, and to experience at Taranto. which stated that no minimum depth 
of water could be assumed safe as regards torpedo attack if there were sufficient 
water around a ship to permit an attack to be developed and a sufficient run to 
arm the torpedo, but that such an attack in 10 fathoms or more was more likely 
than in shallow water (Exhibit 55, Naval Court). The torpedoes at Taranto, 
it was .said, were launched in thirteen to fifteen fathoms although some may have 
been in eleven. 

Admiral Kimmel testified that on this correspondence he based his opinion that 
there was no chance of an air torpedo attack on Pearl Harbor — and that even 
after the June letter, he did not think that torpedoes would run in such shallow 
water. He pointed out that the Navy made no effort to place such nets in Pearl 
Harbor. He later stated that he did not think an aerial torpedo attack would be 
made because he did not think such torpedoes would run in Pearl Harbor and did 
not give this a great deal of consideration for that reason. 

[44] I- Adequacy of Forces to Catry Out Tasks Assigned. 

The adequacy of forces assigned to the Pacific Fleet for carrying out the tasks 
assigned in the war plans was the subject of testimony before both Admiral Hart 
and the Naval Court of Inquiry. From the testimony it appears that although 
there were shortages concerning which Admiral Kimmel had extensive corre- 
spondence with the Chief of Naval Operations, there was general agreement by 
the witnesses to the effect that the Fleet was considered adequate to carry out 
the initial tasks assigned in the war plans. The initial tasks, it will be recalled, 
were primarily defensive in nature. As will appear subsequently in this report, 
the number of fleet patrol planes in the Hawaiian area was not sufficient to enable 
a 360 degree reconnaissance to be flown daily from Oahu for more than a few 
days, but was snifflcient for air reconnaissance of the more dangerous sectors to 
have been flown for at least several weeks. To this extent, therefore, the patrol 
planes assigned to the Pacific Fleet were a limiting factor as to the Fleet's ability 
to carry out one of the initial ta.sks assigned in the war plans, namely, to "main- 
tain air patrols against enemy forces in the approaches of Oahu . . ." 



2286 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

The Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan stated that the Navy through Com- 
FOURTEEN, would provide for distant reconnaissance from Oahu. Admiral 
Bloch had no air forces assigned to him and had to rely upon the Fleet planes, 
which were under the control of Admiral Kimmel, for the accomplishment of this 
task. Thus naval patrol planes could be and were used for long distance recon- 
naissance from Oahu only when they were made available by Admiral Kimmel for 
that purpose. 
[45] J. Command Organization. 

(1) Methods of Coordination Between Army and Navy Commands. 
According to "Joint Action of the Army and Navy, 1935," (Exhibit 6, Naval 

Court), the operations of Army and Navy forces were to be coordinated by 
one of two methods : 

(a) Mutual cooperation, or, 

(b) The exercise of unity of command. 

(2) Coordination Betiveen Army and Navy Commands in Hawaii. 

The command organization in the Hawaiian area was designed to function 
through "mutual cooperation" between the Army and Navy. This was the 
normal method of coordination according to Joint Action of the Army and the 
Navy (Exhibit 6, page 5), and applied to the defense of Pearl Harbor as well 
as the entire Hawaiian area. 

(3) Desirability of Unity of Command. 

(a) Unity of Command for Haicaii considered in Washington. Admiral Stark 
testified before the Naval Court that, prior to 7 December 1941, he had given 
much thought to the question of unity of command in Hawaii but that no satis- 
factory solution or decision had been reached as far as the Navy Department 
was concerned. It had been the topic of many conversations with the Chief 
of Staff of the Army, but it was anticipated only for amphibious operations 
(page 29, Naval Court). He and the Chief of Staff of the Army could have 
placed unity of command into effect at Hawaii, subject to the approval of the 
Secretaries of War and of the Navy (page 39, Naval Court). However, "Joint 
Action of the Army and the Navy" (Exhibit 6, Naval Court) does not indicate 
that the approval of the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy would 
have been required. 

(b) Unity of Command foi- Hawaii considered at Pearl Harbor. Admiral 
Stark testified that Admiral Kimmel, as Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific 
Fleet, in mutual agreement with the Commanding General, Hawaiian Depart- 
ment, could have placed unity of command in effect in Oahu (Naval Court, 
page 39; Exhibit 6. page 5). Admiral Kimmel testified (Roberts Commission, 
page 538; Naval Court, page 296) that he had never had any discussion with 
the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department on the desirability of 
putting unity of command into effect in the Hawaiian area, but did state that 
where command is vested in one agency, much better results can be obtained 
than when responsibility is divided. 

Admiral Kimmel testified that so far as the authority of ComFOURTEEN to 
accomplish unity of command was concerned, ComFOURTEEN did not have the 
authority without reference to him and that he would not have approved this 
nor accepted the responsibility for Army action without reference to the Navy 
Department. 

[46] Under the Naval Base Defense Plan (Exhibit 53, NC), unity of com- 
mand was vested in the Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force over all 
offensive air operations and under the Army Air Commander for all defensive 
air operations, but only after the plan had been activated. 

(c) Weakness of "Mutual Cooperation." 

(i) Air Command. Admiral Bellinger testified that the weakness of the air 
defense plan was that there was no one officer in command until after the plan 
was activated. The Bellinger-Martin estimate (Exhibit 49) he believed to be 
sound, but said that it lacked sanction and that the missing sanction was unity 
of command. 

(ii) Recommendation of Joint Command Center. In an endorsement dated 
6 December 1941 from the Director, Radio Liaison Division, to the Director, 
Naval Districts Division, advocating a combined operating center for the Army 
and Navy at Pearl Harbor (which was not established prior to the attack). 
Admiral Hooper stated "The most perfect set-up for command is one in which 
the supreme commander is exercised by one officer best equipped of any for the 
task . . . Because our defense is under two officers, Army and Navy, we must 
try and arrange matters so that when component parts of the commands are 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2287 

interwoven these two can function as nearly as possible as one." (Exhibit 77.) 

The recommendation for a Joint Command Center in Hawaii was originated 
by a dispatch from OpXav to ComFOI'RTEEN on 15 October 1&41 (Exhibit 77), 
requesting that consideration be given to the construction of a combined oper- 
ating center .sutficient in size and facilities to accommodate in time of emer- 
gency staffs of all essential operating activities of both Army and Navy in 
Hawaii. An informal joint working committee had been formed in Washington 
to endeavor to improve cooperation of Army and Navy shore defense activities 
by the formation of joint command centers. A reply to the above-mentioned 
dispatch strongly recommending against such a move is contained in a letter 
from ComFOURTEEN to CNO, via CincPac, enclosing a letter from General 
Short to ComFOURTEEN and an endorsement by CincPac. 

General Short stated that while he was strongly in favor of combined operat- 
ing centers for equivalent units of Army and Navy forces, he did not believe 
that all of the operating centers should be combined into one single building, 
because it was necessary that Army headquarters be located in separate com- 
mand posts for efficiency of individual operation. It was also undesirable from 
communication and security standpoint. He suggested that, as an alternative, 
additional space for Navy units be constructed adjacent to the existing command 
posts for equivalent Army units. 

[//7] In the basic letter (Exhibit 77) ComFOURTEEN recommended that 
no steps be taken to concentrate the Army and Navy in a common building and 
believed that the best interests of the CinC Pacific Fleet would be served by one 
building with only agencies of the Fleet therein. 

The CinC Pacific Fleet in his endorsement to this letter stated that the mission 
of the Army and the Fleet were considerably different, the operation of one being 
defensive and local, while the operations of the other were offensive and far- 
flung. Strategic, rather than tactical, cooperation was indicated and therefore 
the necessity for rapid receipt and exchange of information and arrival at quick 
decision was of less importance. He was of the opinion that the establishment 
of a combined operating center for the Army and Navy in Hawaii was not only 
unnecessary, but definitely undesirable. 

(4) Disagreement concerning Unity of Command at the Outlying Islands. 

The evidence in the previous investigations and in this investigation indicates 
that there was some consideration of unity of command at outlying islands dur- 
ing the critical period 27 November to 7 December 1941. This occurred as a result 
of dispatches by the Chief of Naval Operations to CincPac on 26 November 1941 
(Exhibits 18 and 40, Naval Court), in which it was advised that the Army had 
agreed to reenforce Midway and Wake with Army personnel and to station 25 
Army pursuit planes at Midway and 25 at Wake provided that Admiral Kimmel 
consideretl this feasible and desirable. It was stated that it would be necessary 
for Admiral Kimmel to transport these planes and ground crews from Oahu to 
Midway and Wake on aircraft carriers, that the planes would be flown off at 
destination and that the ground crews would be landed in boats. Admiral 
Kimmel was directed to confer with the Commanding General concerning this 
matter, and to advise as soon as practicable. 

It appears that this subject was considered at some length in conferences held 
by Admiral Kimmel on and after 27 November 1941. The discussion of unity of 
command as to these islands was summarized by Vice -Admiral Smith in his 
testimony in this investigation. He said that Admiral Kimmel asked the Army 
what he could expect of Army fighters at Wake, and that General Martin of 
the Army Air Force replied that the Army did nor allow such planes to go more 
than l.T miles offshore. Admiral Kimmel then stated that the Army planes 
were, therefore, no good to him. 

General Short stated that if he manned those islands, he must command them 
and "Kimmel replied, 'Over my dead body. The Army should exercise no com- 
mand over Navy bases.' General Short replied, 'Mind you, I don't want these 
islands. I think they are better manned by Marines. But if I must put planes 
and troops on them, then I must command them.'" (Page 352, record of this 
investigation). 

[Jf8] Admiral Kimmel's concern over the question of command at the out- 
lying islands was indicated by his dispatch of November 2&th to the Chief of 
Naval Operations, advising of the proposed reenforcement of Midway and Wake 
with Marine fighter planes and that he would investigate more thoroughly the 
feasibility and practicability of relieving them with Army planes. In this dis- 
patch he stated, "All outlying forces must be exclusively under Naval command" 



2288 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

(Exhibit 76, Naval Court). Similarly, in a letter of 2 December 1941 to Admiral 
Stark (Exhibit 50 of the Naval Court), Admiral Kimniel advised that the dis- 
patches in regard to the use of Army pex'sonnel were being given earnest consid- 
eration, that he believed Admiral Stark woiild subscribe to the principle that 
all these outlying islands must be under Navy command and the forces there 
subject to the orders of the Commander-in-Chief without any qualifications 
whatsoever, and that he expected some difficulties along this line when Army 
personnel were injected into the picture unless a very clear directive were issued 
jointly by the War and Navy Departments. 

It appears that Midway and Wake were reeiiforced with squadrons of Marine 
planes, and that therefore, unity of command under the Navy, actually existed 
at those islands. No solution of the command problem, in the event of possible 
future inclusion of Army forces, was reached. 

[Jf9] Findings 

1. T^e basic assumption of the Rainbow Five War Plan was that the United 
States and her Allies would be at war with the Axis Powers, either including or 
excluding Japan. 

2. The Navy Basic War Plan (Rainbow Five) assigned various offensive tasks 
to the Pacific Fleet, including the capture of positions in the Marshalls and 
raids on enemy sea communications and positions, and various defensive tasks, 
including the task of protecting the territory of the A.ssociated Powers in the 
Pacific area and preventing the extension of enemy military power into the 
Eastern Hemisphere by destroying hostile expeditions. 

3. The Pacific Fleet Operating Plan (Rainbow Five) assigned to the Fleet 
various initial tasks, including the maintenance of fleet security at the bases, 
at anchorages, and at sea, the protection of the communications and territory 
of the As.sociated Powers by patrolling with light forces and patrol planes, the 
establishment of defensive submarine patrols at Wake and Midway, and guard- 
ing against surprise attack by Japan. 

4. The Pacific Fleet Operating Plan (Rainbow Five) and annexes included 
among the initial tasks to be performed by the patrol planes the maintenance 
of the maximum patrol plane search practicable in the approaches to the 
Hawaiian area. 

5. The Pacific Fleet Operating Plan was to be put into effect on W-day, which, 
it was stated, might or might not coincide with the day that hostilities opened 
with Japan. W-day was not fixed prior to the attack. 

6. The Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Theater, was based 
on the Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plans. It constituted the basis of 
subsidiary peace and war project.s, joint operating plans, and mobilization plans. 
The method of coordination under the plan was to be by mutual cooperation until 
and unless unity of command were invoked. 

7. Under the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan the Army's task was to 
hold Oahu against attacks by sea, land and air forces, and against hostile 
sympathizers, and to .support the naval forces. The Navy's task was to patrol 
the coastal zone (which included Oahu and such adjacent land and sea areas 
as were required for the defense of 6ahu), and to patrol and protect shipping 
therein, and to support the Army forces. 

8. One of the specific tasks assigned to the Navy in the Joint Coastal Frontier 
Defense Plan was that the Commandant. FOURTEENTH Naval District, should 
provide for distant reconnaissance. 

[50] 9. The Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan was placed in effect on 
11 April 1941 by the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and by the 
Commandant, FOURTEENTH Naval District. 

10. Annex VII, Section VI, to the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan was 
an agreement between the Conunandant, FOURTEENTH Naval District, and 
the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, as to joint defensive measures 
for the security of the Fleet and for the Pearl Hai'bor Naval Base against 
hostile raids or air attacks delivered prior to a declaration of war. 

11. Annex VII, Section VI, to the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan pro- 
vided, among other things, for joint air operations and provided that when naval 
forces were insufficient f(»r long distance patrol and search operations and Army 
aircraft were made available, the latter would be under the tactical control of 
the naval commander directing search operations. 

12. Annex VII, Section VI, to the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan also 
provided that the Army was to expedite the Installation of its aircraft warning 
service, and that prior to the completion of that service the Navy, through the 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2289 

use of radar and other appropriate means, would endeavor to give such warning 
of hostile attacks as misht be practicable. 

13. Annex VII, Section VI, of the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan pro- 
vided that when the Commanding General and ComFOURTKEN agreed that 
the threat of a hostile raid or attack was sufficiently imminent to warrant 
such action, each commander would take steps to make available to the other 
the air forces at his dispo.sal, in order that joint operations might be conducted 
in accordance with the plan. 

14. The Conxmanding General and ComFOURTEEN did not effect any agree- 
ment prior to the attack that the threat of a hostile raid or attack was sufficiently 
imminent to warrant placing Annex VII. Section VI, in operation. 

15. The Naval Base Defense Force Operation Plan provided among other 
things, for a Base Defense Air Force in conjunction with the Army. One of 
the assumptions was that it was possible that a declaration (»f war might be 
preceded by a surprise air attack on ships in Pearl Harbor, that it was probable 
that there might be a surpri.se submarine attack on ships in the base area, and 
that a combination of both forms of attack was possible. 

16. The joint estimate by Admiral Bellinger and General Martin stated, 
among other things, that the most likely and dangerous form of attack on Oahu 
would be an air attack that would most likely be launched from carriers which 
would probably approach inside of three hundred miles. The estimate also 
stated that any single submarine attack miffht indicate the presence of con- 
siderable undiscovered surface forces, probably composed of [51] fast 
ships accompanied by a carrier. This Estimate came to the attention of Admiral 
Kimmel and Admiral Bloch. 

17. The Naval Base Defense Air ForcePlan was prepared by Admiral Bellinger 
and approved by Admiral Bloch. This plan, which was designated Annex 
"Baker" to the Naval Base Defense Force Operation Plan, made specific provi- 
sion for joint air operations by the Army and Navy. The Plan was effective upon 
receipt. It was to become operative without signal in the event "of a surprise 
attack, or might be made operative by dispatch. In the meantime conditions of 
readiness for aircraft were to be as directed by the Commanding General, Ha- 
waiian Department, for Army units, and by ComFOURTEEN, as Naval Base 
Defense OflScer, for Navy units. 

18. The Pacific Fleet letter on security of the Fleet at base and in operating 
areas, which was reissued by Admiral Kimmel in revised form on 14 October 
1941, provided that the Fleet's security was predicated on several assumptions, 
one of which was that a declaration of war might be preceded by a surprise attack 
on ships in Pearl Harbor, a surprise submarine attack on ships in the operating 
areas, or a combination of the two. This letter also stated that a single sub- 
marine attack might indicate the presence of a considerable surface force probably 
composed of fast ships accompanied by a carrier. 

19. The Pacific Fleet security letter prescribed security measures, injluding 
provisions for defense against air attack. It provided, among other things, that 
ComFOURTEEN, as Naval Base Defense Officer, should exercise with the Army 
joint supervisory control over the defense against air attack and that he should 
take other action, including supervisory control over naval shore-based aircraft, 
and arrange through the Commander of Patrol Wing Two for coordination of the 
joint air effort by the Army and the Navy. 

20. Under the Pacific Fleet security letter, the security measures were to include 
intermittent patrols to consist of a destroyer offshore patrol, and an air patrol. 
The air patrol was to consist of daily search of fleet operating areas as directed 
by Aircraft Scouting Force, one covering the entry or sortie of a fleet or task force, 
and one during the entry or departure of a heavy ship at other times. 

21. The only local defense plans in effect and operative prior to the attack of 
7 December 1941 were the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, under which the 
Navy was obliged to provide distant reconnaissance, and the Pacific Fleet security 
letter, under which the only aircraft patrol from Oahu was a daily search of fleet 
operating areas, a search during entry or sortie of a fleet or task force, and during 
the entry or departure of a heavy ship at other times. 

[52] 22. The Pacific Fleet Operating Plan (Rainbow Five), approved by the 
Chief of Naval Operations, in estimating probable enemy (Japanese) action, 
visualized that one of the enemy defensive efforts would be "destruction of 
threatening naval forces" ; that initial action would include "possible raids or 
stronger attacks on Wake, Midway, and other outlying United States positions" ; 
and that the initial Japanese deployment would include "raiding and observation 



2290 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

forces widely distributed in the Pacific, and that submarines in the Hawaiian 
area. . . ." (Underscoring supplied.) The possibility of an attack on Hawaii 
was, therefore, included but in no way emphasized. 

23. Admiral Kimmel was of the opinion, throughout his tenure of command of 
the Pacific Fleet, that a surprise air attack on Pearl Harbor was a possibility. 
Neither he nor the key members of his staff appear to have considered it as a 
serious probability. 

24. The method of command established in the local plans was that of "mutual 
cooperation." The relations between the responsible commanders were cordial. 
However, there was not in existence, prior to the attack, any permanent operating 
setup which could ensure the constant and timely exchange of information, deci- 
sions, and intended courses of action so essential to the efficient conduct of joint 
operations, particularly in an emergency. A recent proposal looking to the estab- 
lishment of a Joint Command Center had been the subject of adverse recommenda- 
tions by the responsible local commanders, both Army and Navy. 

25. In accordance with "Joint Action," unity of command for the defense of 
Oahu could have been placed in effect by local agreement between the Command- 
ing Oeneral of the Hawaiian Department and the Commandant of the FOUR- 
TEENTH Naval District. The latter, however, would naturally not make such 
an agreement without the approval of his immediate superior, the Commander- 
in-Chief, Pacific Fleet. The question of unity of command for outlying islands 
was discussed between Admiral Kinnuel and General Short in connection with a 
proposal for reenforcement of Wake and Midway by Army planes. General 
Short's position was that if Army forces were involved, the command must be his. 
Admiral Kimmel maintained that the command of naval bases must remain with 
the Navy. The islands were reenforced i^ith Marine planes. 

[5S] II 

JAPANESE ESPIONAGE AT HAWAII 

The center of Japanese espionage at Hawaii was the Japanese Consulate 
General located in Honolulu. As a matter of regular routine, information was 
collected by the Consulate General concerning the location and movements of 
United States ships in and around Pearl Harbor and concerning defense 
preparations. This information was forwarded by the Japanese Consulate 
General to Tokyo and elsewhere in coded messages sent via commercial com- 
munication companies. A collection of such messages, which has been decrypted 
and translated, appears in Exhibit 13 of this investigation and in Exhibit 63 
of the Naval Court. This collection of messages does not include every such 
message, but does fully illustrate the type of espionage reports which were 
made. Subsequent to the attack, the incoming and outgoing message log of 
the Japanese Consulate General at Honolulu was recovered and translated. 
These logs indicate the nature of all of the communications to and from the 
Japanese Consulate General and show the frequency with which espionage 
reports were sent by the Consul during 1&41. A copy of the log is set forth 
in Exhibit 62. 

It is to be noted that the espionage reports submitted during 1941 by the 
Japanese Consulate General became increasingly more detailed and, in the 
first week of December, 1941, indicated the likelihood of a surprise attack on 
Pearl Harbor. The possession of all of those messages by the American 
intelligence services prior to the attack would have been of inestimable value. 
Some of them, as will appear later, were obtained prior to the attack. Those 
obtained, however, although indicating Japanese intere.st in the location and 
movements of ships in and from Pearl Harbor, did not include those messages, 
particularly during the first week of December, 1941, which indicated the 
likelihood of an air attack. It may also be noted at this point that those 
Consulate messages which were obtained prior to 7 December 1941 were 
decrypted and translated in Washington but not at Pearl Harbor. 

illustrative of the type of message sent earlier in 1941 is a report from 
Honolulu to Tokyo, dated 10 March 1941, which describes various vessels seen 
in- Pearl Harbor (Translated by Navy, April 5 — Document 1, Exhibit 13). The 
Japanese interest in the location of ships in particular areas of Pearl Harbor 
is demonstrated by a dispatch from Tokyo to Honolulu, dated 24 September 
1941, requesting reports of vessels in five sub-areas of Pearl Harbor, and 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2291 

requesting reports of warships and aircraft carriers at anchor and tied up at 
wharves, buoys and doclis. Particular request was made for mention of the 
fact when there were two or more vessels alongside the same wharf (Army 
translation, October 9 — Document 2, Exhibit 13). The Japanese Consul at 
Honolulu established a code to refer to the location of vessels in particular 
areas (Navy translation, October 10 — Document 3, Exhibit 13). Tokyo on 18 
November 1941 requested a report on vessels anchored in certain areas and 
it directed that the investigation be made with great secrecy (Army translation, 
December 2 — Document 9, Exhibit 13). A report was sent by Honolulu to Tokyo 
on 18 November 1941 setting forth the warships in the harbor in certain 
areas, commenting on the [54] presence or absence of aircraft carriers, 
and describing in detail the course of certain destroyers which were observed 
entering the harbor (Army translation, December 6 — Document 10, Exhibit 13). 
On November 20th, Tokyo requested a comprehensive investigation of the Fleet 
bases in the neighborhood of the Hawaiian military reservation (Army translfi- 
tion, December 6 — Document 7, Exhibit 13). 

On 24 November 1941, Honolulu reported to Tokyo concerning the Fleet prac- 
tice of leaving Pearl Harbor, conducting maneuvers, and returning, that the 
Fleet had not remained for a long period of time nor conducted maneuvers at 
Lahaina Road, that destroyers and submarines were the only vessels anchored 
there ; that battleships seldom entered the port of Hilo, Hanalei or Haneo ; 
that virtually no one had observed battleships in maneuver areas ; and, stated 
that the Fleet maneuvered for one week at sea, either to the south of Maui or 
to the southwest and pointed out that aircraft carriers maneuvered by them- 
selves. This also mentioned the times when cruisers and other ships left Pearl 
Harbor and how long they were away, and generally how long they remained 
at Pearl Harbor when anchored there (Army translation, December 16 — Docu- 
ment 23, Exhibit 13). 

On November 28th, Tokyo requested intelligence, which was described as 
being of major importance, concerning the movements of battleships out of the 
harbor, pointing out that if such movements were reported but once a week, 
the vessels could have traveled far, and that Honolulu was to use its own 
judgment in deciding on reports covering such movements. As to capital ships, 
it was requested that reports of the entrance or departure and length of time 
at anchor from the time of entry into port until departure be made (Army 
translation, December 8 — Document 13, Exhibit 13). On November 28th, 
Honolulu reported to Tokyo concerning the B-17 planes at Midway and range 
of anti-aircraft guns, observations of maneuvers by tr(K)ps, prospective rein- 
forcements of troops at Honolulu during December or January, and advised 
of the presence of a carrier usually about 15,000 feet south of Pearl Harbor 
and one or two destroyers at the entrance of the harbor (Army translation, 
December 8 — Document 16, Exhibit 13). 

The messages sent by the Japanese Consul during the week of 1 December 
to 7 December 1941, are of particular significance. A message of December 1st 
reported on ship maneuvers and described the place where maneuvers were 
held as about 500 nautical miles southeast of Oahu, and stated the reasons 
why that conclusion had been reached. This message set forth the "usual" 
schedule for departure and return of the battleships and stated that they left on 
Tuesdays and returned on Fridays, or left on Friday and returned on ^Saturday 
of the following week, and that all ships stayed in port about a period of 
one week. In view of their importance,' five other messages sent during the 
first week in December, 1941, are quoted in full : 

From: Tokoyo (Togo) 

To : Honolulu 

December 2, 1941 ( translated by Army 30 December 1941 ) 

J-19 

#123 (Secret outside the department) 

In view of the present situation, the presence in port of warships, airplane 
carriers, and cruisers is of [55] utmost importance. Hereafter, to the 
utmost of your ability, let me know day by day. Wire me in each case whether 
or not there are any observation balloons above Pearl Harbor or if there are 
any indications that they will be sent up. Also advise me whether or not the 
warships are provided with antimine nets. 



2292 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



From: Honolulu (Kita) 

To Tokyo 

3 December 1941 ( translated by Navy 11 December 1941 ) 

(PA-K2) 

#245 (in 2 parts, complete) (Military Secret). 

'From Ichiro Fujii to the Chief of #3 Section of Military Staff Headquarters. 
1. I wish to change my method of communicating by signals to the following : 
I. Arrange the eight signals in three colunms as follows : 



Meaning 


Signal 


Battleship divisions including scouts and 


Preparing to sortie. . . .... 


5 


screen units. 


Preparing to sortie 


2 


Bnttleship divisions 


All departed between 1st and 3rd 


3 




Several departed between 1st and 3rd 


4 




All departed between 1st and 3rd 


5 


Battleship divisions.. 


-Ml departed between 4th and 6th.- 


6 


Carriers 


Several departed between 4th and 6th 


7 


Carriers 


All departed between 4th and 6th 


8 









2. Signals. 

I. Lanikai Beach House will show lights during the night as follows : 

Signal 

[56] One light between 8 and 9 p. m 1 

One light between 9 and 10 p. m 2 

One light between 10 and 11 p. m 3 

One light between 11 and 12 p. m 4 

II. 

Two lights between 12 and 1 a. m 5 

Two lights between 1 and 2 a. m 6 

Two lights between 2 and 3 a. m 7 

Two lights between 3 and 4 a. m 8 

(Part 2) 

III. Lanikai Bay, during daylight. 

If there is a "star" on the head of the sail of the Star Boat it Indicates signals 
1, 2, 3, or 4. 

If there is a "star" and a Roman numeral III it indicates signal 5, 6, 7, or 8. 

IV. Lights in the attic window of Kalama House will indicate the following : 

Times Signal 

1900-2000 3 

2000-2100 J 4 

2100-2200 5 

2200-2300 6 

2300-2400 7 

0000-0100 8 

V. K.G.M.B. Want Ads. 

A. Chinese rug etc. for sale, apply P. O. box 1476 indicates signal 3 or 6. 

B. CHIC . . CO farm etc. apply P. O. box 1476 indicates signal 4 or 7. 

C. Beauty operator wanted etc. apply P. O. box 1476 indicates signal 5 or 8. 

3. If the above listed signals and wireless messages cannot be made from 
Oahu, then on Maui Island, 6 miles to the northward of Kula Sanatorium at 
a point halfway between Lower Kulu Road and Haleakala Road (latitude 
20°40' N., longitude 156°19' W., visible from seaward to the southeast and south- 
west of Maui Island) the following signal bonfire will be made daily until your 
EXEX signal is received : 

[57] Times Signal 

From 7-2 3 or 6 

From 8-9 4 or 7 

From 9-10 5 or 8 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2293 

From : Honolulu 

To: Tokyo 

5 December 1941 (translated by Navy 10 December 1941) 

(PA-K2) 

#252 

(1) During Friday morning, the rith, the three battleships mentioned in my 
message #239 arrived here. They had been at sea for eight days. 

(2) The Lexington and five heavy cruisers left port on the same day. 

(3) The following ships were in port on the afternoon of the 5th: 

S battleships. 
3 light cruisers. 
16 destroyers. 

Four ships of the Honolulu class and were in dock. 



From : Honolulu 

To: Tokyo 

December 6, 1941 (translated by Army 8 December 1941) 

PA-K2 

#253 Re the last part of your #123. 

1. On the American Continent in October the Army began training barrage 
balloon troops at Camp Davis, North Carolina. Not only have they ordered 
four or five hundred balloons, but it is understood that they are considering the 
use of these balloons in the defense of Hawaii and Panama. In so far as 
Hawaii is concerned, though investigations have been made in the neighborhood 
of Pearl Harbor, they have not set up mooring equipment, nor have they 
selected the troops to man them. Furthermore, there is no indication that any 
training for the maintenance of balloons is being undertaken. At the present 
time there are no signs of barrage balloon equipment. In addition, it is difficult 
to imagine that they have actually any. However, even though they have 
actually [58] made preparations, because they must control the air over 
the water and land runways of the airports in the vicinity of Pearl Harbor, 
Hickam, Ford and Kwa, there are limits to the balloon defense of Pearl Harbor. 
I imagine that in all probability there is considerable opportunity left to take 
advantage for a surprise attack against these places. 

2. In my opinion the battleships do not have torpedo nets. The details are 
not known. I will report the results of my investigation. 



From : Honolulu. 

To: Tokyo 

December 6, 1941 (translated by Army 8 December 1941) 

PA-K2 

#254. 

1. On the evening of the 5th, among the battleships which entered port 

were and one submarine tender. The following ships were observed at 

anchor on the 6th : 

9 battleship.s, 3 light cruisers, 3 submarine tenders, 17 destroyers, and in 
addition there were 4 light crui.sers, 2 destroyers lying at docks (the heavy 
cruisers and airplane carriers have all left.) 

2. It appears that no air reconnaissance is being conducted by the fleet air arm. 



Findinffs. 

[59] 26. Japanese espionage at Pearl Harbor was effective and, particularly 
during the critical period 27 November to 7 December 1941, resulted in the fre- 
quent transmission to Japan of information of great importance concerning the 
Pacific Fleet, the movements and locations of ships, and defense preparations. 

27. Certain reports .sent by the Japanese Consul General via a commercial com- 
munications company at Honolulu in the week preceding the attack indicated 
the likelihood of an air attack on Pearl Harbor. 



2294 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

28. It will appear subsequently that various coded messages sent by the Jap- 
anese Consul General at Honolulu, which did not indicate the likelihood of an 
air attack on Pearl Harbor, wei'e intercepted by Army and Navy radio intercept 
stations and were decoded in Washington, D. C. prior to the attack ; that others 
which were obtained at Honolulu by Naval Intelligence prior to the attack were, 
with the exception of a few unimportant messages, in a code which could not be 
decripted there before December 7th ; and, that three messages intercepted by 
Army radio intercept stations at Hawaii and at San Francisco, which indicated 
the likelihood of an air attack, were forwarded to the War Department for de- 
cryption but were either not received there prior to the attack or were not 
decrypted prior to the attack. If the United States intelligence services had been 
able to obtain and to decode and tran.slate promptly all of the espionage reports 
sent by the Japanese 'Consul General during the period 27 November to 7 Decem- 
ber 1941, the information so obtained would have been of inestimable value. 

[60] III 

NAVAL INTELLIGENCE AND H:VENTS PRFXIMINARY TO THE ATTACK 

A. The Organization of Naval Intelligence in General; Sources of Information, 
and Relations with the Pacific Fleet. 

The Office of Naval Intelligence, which was under the Chief of Naval Opera- 
tions, consisted of two main branches — Domestic and Foreign. The Domestic 
Branch had to do with internal espionage and other subversive activities of for- 
eign nationals or organizations inimical to national and particularly naval wel- 
fare. It maintained branch offices in various of the principal cities of the United 
States, including Honolulu. The Foreign Branch was organized into a number of 
sections, of which one was the Far Eastern Section. The Director of Naval 
Intelligence was Rear Admiral T. S. Wilkinson, Jr. The officer in charge of the 
Far Eastern Section of the Foreign Branch was Commander Arthur H. McCollum. 

The primary sources of information which the Far Eastern Section had were 
Naval Attache reports from Japan and China, observers' reports from various 
ports in the Far East, reports from the Commander-in-Chief of the Asiatic Fleet 
and from the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet, including reports as to 
radio intelligence, and reports of investigations conducted by the domestic branch 
of ONI, particularly from Honolulu, and State Department reports at Washing- 
ton. A most important part of the information provided to the Far Eastern Sec- 
tion was supplied by a unit at Washington known as OP-20-G. This was under 
the command of Commander Laurence F. Safford and supplied information 
obtained from communication or radio intelligence. This section was staffed 
both by Communication officers and Intelligence officers. The information 
received by OP-20-G was supplied to Lt. Comdr. Alvin D. Kramer of ONI, who 
was working with that section, and was transmitted by him to the head of the 
Far Eastern Section and to the Director of Naval Intelligence. 

The section known as OP-20-G was concerned with the interception, decryp- 
tion, and translation of Japanese messages. In addition it was responsible for 
furnishing the Navy's own codes and ciphers and for the supervision of the, secur- 
ity of the Navy's own communications. Japanese messages were intercepted by 
various methods, including radio interception by a number of radio intercept 
stations located in the United States, which transmitted the Japanese communi- 
cations, as intercepted 'by them, to OP-20-G for decryption and translation. In 
addition to reports from intercept stations located in the United States, this sec- 
tion received reports from communication intelligence units- located at Pearl 
Harbor and in the Philippines. This unit was concerned with the plans and in- 
tentions of foreign governments, principally Japan, and with intelligence relat- 
ing to naval operations in the Atlantic. The communications intelligence organ- 
ization at Pearl Harbor, which had subsidiary stations at Oahu, Midway, Samoa, 
and Dutch Harbor, was concerned primarily with the dispositions and [61] 

plans of navel forces in the Pacific and with surveillance of Japanese naval com- 
munications. The communications intelligence unit in the Philippines, which was 
located at Corregidor, was concerned with Japanese naval communications and 
Japanese diplomatic communications. The Officer in Charge of the communica- 
tions intelligence unit at Pearl Harbor was Lt. Comdr. Joseph J. Rochefort. The 
officer in charge of the communications intelligence unit at Corregidor until Sep- 
tember, 1941 was Lt. Comdr. Rudolph J. Fabian. He remained thereafter assisting 
that unit. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2295 

Japanese diplomatic cominuiiications were in various codes, such as the code 
known ase "purple" code, the "red" code, the "J-19" code, the "PAK 2", and the 
"La." code. The so-called "purple" code contained the most important Japanese 
diplomatic messages. Messages in this and in other diplomatic codes were inter- 
ceptt'd and read at the Philippines primarily for the purpose of local information. 
They were sent, as intercepted, to the Navy Department in one of the Navy's own 
codes. All intercepted diplomatic traffic was sent to Washington whether o;r not 
it was deciphered and read at the Philippines. None of this information was sent 
from the Philippines to Pearl Harbor. The unit at Pearl Harbor was intercepting 
and decrypting no Japanese diplomatic traffic. It had been directed to concen- 
trate on Japanese naval systems. The unit at Washington was charged with the 
general control of the units at Corregidor, Pearl Harbor, and at Washington, and 
handled the Japanese diplomatic systems and also handled some Japanese naval 
systems. 

Intercepted Japanese diplomatic traffic received by the Washington unit was 
pooled with similar traffic intercepted by the Army and was decrypted and trans- 
lated by the Navy and the Army on an alternate day basis. The resulting infor- 
mation was distributed daily by ONI to the Chief of Naval Operations, and to 
(tthers in the Navy Department. The President and the State Department simi- 
larly were furnished this information daily. 

It appears that, although the Navy enjoyed considerable success in decrypting 
Japanese diplomatic communications, the Japanese naval codes were not being 
read. Information obtained by radio intelligence, therefore, from Japanese 
naval traffic was based almost entirely on so-called "traffic analysis" and not 
upon reading of the message themselves. 

The units at Pearl Harbor and the Philippines advised the Washington unit 
of the results of their traffic analyses of Japanese naval communications, and of 
the estimated location and movement of Japanese naval forces, and also ex- 
changed information with one another on that subject. The units also exchanged 
information on technical subjects, that is, pertaining to codes and ciphers and 
keys for decyphering codes. 

Information developed from the reading of the "purple" messages was not 
sent to the Pearl Harbor unit as such. It does appear, however, that various of 
the warning messages and other dispatches sent by the Chief of Naval Opera- 
tions to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, were based upon information 
derived, from the Japanese diplomatic messages. 

[62]' Thus it appears that the knowledge of the Comander-ift-Chief of the 
Pacific Fleet as to the status of diplomatic relations with Japan depended pri- 
marily upon the messages sent to him by the Chief of Naval Operations. The 
information received by the radio intelligence unit at Pearl Harbor as to the 
location and movement of Japanese naval forces was, however, brought directly 
to the attention of the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet daily by the 
Fleet Intelligence Officer, as was other material of an intelligence nature. 

B. The Approach of War: Intercepted Communications Availahle at Washington, 
and Messages Setit by CNO to Admiral Kimmel. 

It should be noted that the Japanese communications which were intercepted 
and decoded and translated by the War and Navy Departments, as set forth in 
this section, were not sent to Admiral Kimmel. Various of the messages sent to 
Admiral Kimmel by the Chief of Naval Operations were based on these Japanese 
communications. 

(1) The resignation of the Japanese Cabinet and October 16th dispatch. 

On 16 October 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations sent a di.spatch to Cinclant, 
CincPac and CincAF (Exhibit 13. Naval Court), reading as follows: 

"The resignation of the Japanese cabinet has created a grave situation X 
If a new cabinet is formed it will probably be strongly nationalistic and anti 
American X If the Konoye cabinet remains the effect will be that it will operate 
under a new mandate which will not include rapprochement with the US X In 
either case hostilities between Japan and Russia are a strong possibility X 
Since the US and Britain are held responsible by Japan for her present desperate 
situation there is also a possibility that Japan may attack these two powers X 
In view of these possibilities you will take due precautions including such prepara- 
tory deployments as will not disclose strategic intention nor constitute provocative 
actions against Japan X Second and third adees inform appropriate army and 
naval district authorities X Acknowledge" 

On 17 October 1941, Admiral Stark wrote to Admiral Kimmel (Exhibit 38, Naval 
Court). In this letter, Admiral Stark advised that things had been "popping" 



2296 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

here for the last twenty-four hours, but from the dispatches Admiral Kimmel 
knew about all that they did. He said, "Personally, I do not believe the Japanese 
are going to sail into us and the message I sent you merely stated the 'possibility ;' 
in fact, I tempered the message handed me considerably. Perhaps I was wrong, 
but I hope not. In any case after long pow-wows in the White House, it was 
felt that we should be on guard, at least until something indicates the trend." 

[63] Admiral Stark continued that Admiral Kimmel would recall that in 
an earlier letter, when War Plans was forecasting a Japanese attack on Siberia in 
August, Admiral Stark had said that his own judgment was that they would 
make no move in that direction until the Russian situation showed a definite 
trend. In this letter he said that he thought this whole thing worked up together. 
He stated that efforts would be made to maintain the status quo in the Pacific. 
How long it could be kept going, he did not know, but the President and Mr. 
Hull were woi'king on it. ,To this letter was annexed a postscript, stating in 
part, "General Marshall just called up and was anxious that we make some 
sort of i-econnaissance so that he could feel assured that on arrival at Wake, 
a Japanese raider attack may not be in order on his bombers. I told him that 
we could not assure against any such contingency, but that I felt it extremely im- 
probable and that, while we keep track of Japanese ships as far as we can, a 
carefully planned raid on any of these island carriers in the Pacific might be 
difficult to detect. However, we are on guard to the best of our ability, and my 
advice to him was not to worry." 

Also annexed was a memorandum of 17 October 1941. by Rear Admiral Schuir- 
mann, estimating the importance of changes in the Japanese Cabinet. The sub- 
stance of this analysis was that the military would determine Japanese action 
whether to attack Russia or move southward, and would make this decision on 
the basis of opportunity and what they could get away with, and that it would 
not be determined by the cabinet in power. 

(2) Japanese mcn^agcs conceiniyui Gernmn attitude; Noniina's desire to 
resign. — On 18 October 1941, the Navy translated an intercepted Japanese com- 
munication from Berlin to Tokyo, dated 1 October 1941, which stated that the 
Germans were becoming increasingly dissatisfied with Japan's postion, particu- 
larly because Japan was not advising Germany of the negotiations with the United 
States, although the United States was advising England (Document 4, Exhibit 
63, Naval Court). 

A Japanese message from Tokyo to Washington, dated 16 October 1941, was 
intercepted and translated on 17 October 1941. In this Toyoda advised Aomura 
that although he had been requested by both the German and Italian Ambassadors 
in Tokyo to give them confidential information on the Japanese-United States 
negotiations, he had, in consideration of the nature of the negotiations, been 
declining to do so. However, early in October, following the Gennan attacks 
on American merchant ships and the consequent revival of the movement for 
revision of the neutrality act, the German authorities demanded that the Japanese 
Government submit to the American Government a message that if the Roosevelt 
Administration continued to attack the Axis powers, a belligerent situation 
would inevitably arise between Germany, Italy, and the United States, which, 
under the Three-Power Agreement, might lead Jai^an to join immediately the 
war against the United States. It was indicated that such a message was 
being considered and there were reasons which would not permit of postpone- 
ment (Document 3, Exhibit 63, Naval Court). 

[64] On 22 October 1941, Nomura sent a message to Tokyo which was inter- 
cepted and translated on 23 October 1941. in which he said that he was sure that 
he, too, should go out with the former cabinet ; that he knew that the Secretary 
of State realized how sincere he was and yet how little influence he had in 
Japan ; that there were some Americans who trusted him and who said that 
things would get better for him, but that their encouragement was not enough; 
that among his confreres in the United States there were some who felt the same 
way, but they were all poor deluded souls ; that the instructions could be carried 
out by Wakasugi ; that Nomura did not want to be the bones of a dead horse ; that 
he did not want to ocntinue "this hypocritical existence, deceiving other people;" 
that he was not trying to flee from the field of battle, but as a man of honor, that 
was the only way open for him to tread ; and that he sought permission to return 
to Japan (Document 5, Exhibit 63, Naval Court). 

On 23 October 1941, a message from Tokyo to Washington of the same date was 
intercepted and translated, which stated that the efforts Nomura was making 
were appreciated ; that, as he was well aware, the outcome of those negotiations 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2297 

had 11 jrreat l)earinfc upon the decision as to which load the Inii>erial (ioverninent 
woiUd proceed; that as such it was an exceedinj^ly iinpoitaiit matter; that they 
were placiuj; all of their reliance on Nomura's reports for information on this 
matter; that for those reasons they hoped that he would see tit to saci'ifice his 
personal wishes and remain at his post (Docuinent (5, Kxhihit (53, Naval Court). 

(3) Action tdkcn by Admiral Kiiinnrl. 

Admiral Kimmel advised, in a letter of October 22nd (Exhibit 14, Naval 
Court), that the action talcen included maintaining two submarines for patrol 
at Midway, dispatching twelve patrol planes to Midway, prepai'ing to send six 
patrol planes from Midway to Wake, and to replace the six at Midway from 
Pearl Harbor, sending two submarines to Vv'ake, and sending additional Marines 
and stores there, dispatching additional Marines to Palmyra, placing Admiral 
Pye and his ships on twelve hours notice, getting six submarines ready to depart 
for Japan on short notice, putting some additional security measures in effect in 
the operating areas outside Pearl Harbor. 

On 7 November 1941, Admiral Stark wrote to Admiral Kimmel (Exhibit 74, 
Naval Court) in reply to Admiral Kinunel's letter of October 22nd. He stated, 
among other things, "O. K. on the dispositions which you made in connection with 
recent change in the Japanese cabinet. The l»ig question i.s— what next?!" Also, 
"Things seem to be moving steadily towards a crisis in the Pacific. Just when it 
will break, no one can tell. The principal reaction I have to it all is what I have 
written you before ; it continually gets 'worser and worser' ! A month may see, 
literally, most anything. Two irreconcilable policies cannot go on forever — 
particularly if one party cannot live with the setup. It doesn't look good." 

[6o] (4) The first Japanese deadline message; Japanese interest in 
American ships. 

On 5 November 1941, the Navy translated a message from Tokyo to Washington, 
reading as follows : 

"(Of utmost secrecy). 

"Because of various circumstances, it is absolutely necessary that all 
arrangements for the signing of this agreement be completed by the 25th of 
this month. I realize that this is a diflBcult order, but under the circumstances 
it is an unavoidable one. Please understand this thoroughly and tackle the 
problem of saving the Japanese-U. S. relations from falling into a chaotic condi- 
tion. Do so with great determination and with unstinted effort, I beg of you. 

"This information is to be kept strictly to yourself only." 

During the first half of November, there were translated in Washington 
various intercepted Japane.se communications concerning ships and planes at 
Manila and Seattle (Documents 1-8, Exhibit 68, Naval Court). According to 
one of these messages, which was dated ■"> Noveujber 1941, the Navy General 
Staff wanted investigation done at Manila as to the conditions of airports, types 
of planes and numbers of planes there, warships there, machinery belonging to 
land forces, and the state of progress being made on all equipment and 
establishments. 

(5) Arrival of Kurtisu; Stark and Marshall recommendations as to ultimatum. 

The situation existing early in November was .summarized by Nomura, in a 
report to Tokyo, dated 10 November 1941, intercepted on November 12th 
(Document 8, Exhibit 63, Naval Court) by reference to a report from the legal 
advi.ser to the Jaiianese Embassy, who had conferred with Senator Thomas and 
Secretary Hull, that the United States was not bluffing, that if Japan invaded 
again, the United States would fight with Japan, that psychologically the Ameri- 
can people were ready, that the Navy was ready and prepared for action. 
Nonmra ahso reported that he had a conversation with "a certain Cabinet 
member" who had said that Nomura was indeed a dear friend, that he would 
tell him alone this: that the American government was receiving reports that 
Japan would be on the move again and did not believe that Nomura's visit to the 
President or the coming of Kurusu would have any effect on the general situation. 
Nomura .said that he had explained how impatient the Japanese had bec-ome since 
the freezing, how eager they were for a quick understanding, how they did not 
desire a Japanese-American war, and how they hoped for peace until the end. 
The Cabinet member replied, however, that the President and Secretarv of 
State believed "those reports." [60] Nomura also said that his friend 
had stated that the United States could not stop because if Japan moved, some- 
thing would have to be done to save the "face", of the United States. 

Admiral Stark w-as not hopeful that anything in the wav of better 
understanding between the United States and Japan would come from Kurusu's 

79716 ()— 4() — i>t. 1« 25 



2298 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

visit. His opinion was that it would be impossible to reconcile the Japanese and 
American views. Admiral Stark so advised Admiral Kimmel by letter dated 
14 November 1941 (Exhibit 39, Naval Court). With this letter, Admiral Stark 
also sent to Admiral Kimmel a copy of a memorandum, dated 5 November 1941, 
by Admiral Stark and General Marshall, for the President. This was concerned 
with the belief of Chiang-Kai-Shek that a Japanese attack on Kumming was 
imminent and that outside military support was the sole hope for the defeat 
of that threat. The memorandum considered whether the United States would 
be justified in undertaking offensive operations against the Japanese to prevent 
her from severing the Burma Road. The memorandum stated that the Fleet in 
the Pacific was inferior to the Japanese Fleet and could not undertake an unlim- 
ited strategic offensive in the Western Pacific. It pointed out that by the 
middle of December, 1941, United States air and submarine strength in the 
Philippines would become a positive threat to any Japanese operations south 
of Formosa. The recommendations were in general that all aid short of war 
be given to China and that no ultimatum be given to Japan. 

(6) Further and Final Japanese ''deadline messages." 

At this time, information was received in Washington that the Japanese 
Government had established a further and final deadline for the completion of 
diplomatic negotiations. This consisted of two messages from Tokyo to 
Washington, which were intercepted and translated by the Army, as follows : 

(a) A translation on 17 November 1941 (Document 10, Exhibit 68, Naval 
Court), of a dispatch, dated November 16th. the highlights of which were: 

"* * * The fate of our Empire hangs by the slender thread of a few 
days, so please fight harder than you ever did before. 

"What you say is of course so * ♦ * but I have only to refer you to the 
fundamental policy laid down in my #725 (in which Togo says that conditions 
within and without Japan will not permit any further delay in reaching a 
settlement with the United States) * * ♦ try to realize what that means. 
In your opinion we ought to wait and see what turn the war takes and remain 
patient * * * the situation renders this out of the question. I set the 
deadline for the solution of these negotiations in my #736, and there will be 
no change. Please try to understand that. You see how [67] short the 
time is ; therefore, do not allow the United States to sidetrack us and delay 
the negotiations any further. Press them for a solution on the basis of our 
proposals, and do your best to bring about an immediate solution." 

(b) On 22 November 1941 (Document 11, Exhibit 63, Naval Court), a transla- 
tion of a dispatch of the .same date, reading in substance : 

"To both you Ambassadors. 

"It is awfully hard for us to consider changing the date we set in my #736. 
You should know this, however, I know you are working hard. Stick to our fixed 
policy and do your very best. Spare no efforts and try to bring about the solution 
we desire. There are reasons beyond your ability to guess why we wanted to 
settle Japanese-American relations by the 25th, but if within the next three or 
four days you can finish your conversations with the Americans ; if the signing 
can be completed by the 29th (let me write it out for you — twenty ninth) ; if the 
pertinent notes can be exchanged; if we can get an understanding with Great 
Britain and the Netherlands; and in short if everything can be finished, we have 
decided to wait until that date. This time we mean it, that the deadline abso- 
lutely cannot be changed. After that things are automatically going to happen. 
Please take this into your careful consideration and work harder than you ever 
have before. This, for the present, is for the information of you two Ambassa- 
dors alone." 

(7) The November 2Jfth dispateh to CincPac and others. 

On 24 November 1941 (Exhibit 15), a dispatch (which before the Naval Court 
Admiral Stark said was based in part on the "deadline" intercept — page 775), 
was sent by the Chief of Naval Operations to CincAP, CincPac, ComELBVBN, 
ConiTWELVE, ComTHIRTEEN, and ComFIFTEEN for action, reading: 

"Chances of favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan very doubtful X 
This situation coupled with statements of Japanese Government and movements 
their naval and military forces indicate in our opinion that a surprise aggressive 
movement in any direction including attack on Philippines or Guam is a possi- 
bility X Chief of Staff has seen this dispatch concurs and requests action ad- 
dressees to inform senior Army officers their areas X Utmost secrecy necessary 
in order not to complicate an already tense situation or precipitate Japanese 
action X Guam will be informed separately" 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2299 

[68] On 25 November 1941 (Exhibit 47, Naval Court), Admiral Stark wrote 
to Admiral Kimmel in response to his letter of 17 October 1941, on the inadequacy 
of local defense forces in Hawaii .(Exhibit 4(), Naval Court). Admiral Stark 
stated that CincPac had taken cognizance of his responsibilities in connection 
with tasks pertaining to the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier and that the forces avail- 
able in the Hawaiian area, both Fleet and local defense forces, and the actual 
operations of our own and hostile forces would indicate the numbers of Fleet 
Vessels or aircraft required to be assigned to local defense tasks. Admiral 
Stark's letter continued by summarizing the situation in regard to increasing 
the local defense forces and, among other things, pointed out that the Depart- 
ment had no additional airplanes available for assignment to the FOURTEENTH 
Naval District. A marginal note on a copy of this letter, apparently written in 
Hawaii, stated, "In other words, look to the Fleet. They seem to forget that the 
Fleet has offensive work to do." 

On 25 November 1941 (Exhibit 16, Naval Court), Admiral Stark also wrote a 
personal letter to Admiral Kimmel stating, among other things, that Admiral 
Stark agreed with Admiral Kimmel that, for example, to cruise in Japanese 
home waters, Admiral Kimmel should have a substantial increase in the strength 
of his fleet, but pointed out that neither ABC-1 nor Rainbow-5 contemplated this 
as a general policy ; after the British strengthened Singapore, and under certain 
auspicious occasions, opportunity for raids in Japanese waters might present 
themselves, but this would be the exception rather than the rule. A postscript to 
this letter stated that both Mr. Hull and the President confirmed the gravity of the 
situation indicated by the message which Admiral Stark sent a day or two before. 
It stated further that neither the President nor Mr. Hull would be surprised over 
a Japanese surprise attack ; that from many angles an attack on the Philippines 
would be the most embarrassing thing that could happen to us ; and there were 
some who thought it likely to occur. Admiral Stark further stated : "I do not 
give it the weight others do, but I included it because of the strong feeling among 
some people. You know I have generally held that it was not the time for the 
Japanese to proceed against Russia. . I still do. Also I still rather look for an 
advance into Thailand. Indo-China, Burma Road area as the most likely * * * 
I won't go into the pros and cons of what the United States may do. I will be 
damned if I know. I wish I did. The only thing I do know is that we may do 
most anything and that's the only thing I know to be prepared for; or we may 
do nothing — I think it is more likely to be anything." 

(8) Dispatches concei'ning reenforcement of Wake and Midway. 

On 26 November 1941, a dispatch (Exhibit 40, Naval Court) was sent by the 
Chief of Naval Operations to CincPac stating that the Array had offered to make 
available some units of infantry for reenforcing defense battalions now on sta- 
tion, if Admiral Kimmel considered that desirable ; also, that the Army proposed 
to prepare, in Hawaii, garrison troops for advances bases which Admiral Kimmel 
might occupy, but was unable to provide any antiaircraft units. Admiral Kimmel 
was instructed to take this into consideration and [69] advise when prac 
ticable the number of troops desired and recommended armament. 

Also on 26 November 1941, another dispatch (Exhibit 18) was sent to CincPac 
which stated that in order to keep the planes of the Second Marine Aircraft Wing 
available for expeditionary use. OpNav had requested the Army, and the Army 
had agreed, to station twenty-five Army pursuits at Midway and a similar number 
at Wake, provided CincPac considered this feasible and desirable; that it would 
be necessary for CincPac to transport these planes and ground crews from Oahu 
to these stations on aircraft carriers, and that the planes would be flown off at 
destination ; that ground personnel would be landed in boats and essential spare 
parts, tools and ammunition would be taken in the carrier or on later trips of 
regular Navy supply vessels ; that the Army understood that these forces must 
be quartered in tents; that the Navy must be responsible for supplying water 
and subsistence and transporting other Army supplies; that the stationing of 
these planes must not be allowed to interfere with planned movements of Army 
bombers to the Philippines; and, that additional parking areas should be laid 
promptly if necessary. A question was raised as to whether or not Navy bombs 
at outlying positions could be carriedby Army bombers which might fly to those 
positions in order to support Navy operations. CincPac was directed to confer 
with the Commanding General and advi.se as soon as practicable. 

(9) Iniertepted Japanese communications of November 26th and 27th. 

On November 26th and 27th, there were available in Washington additional 
intercepted Japanese messages, all of which had been sent from Tokyo, as follows : 



2300 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

(a) A Navy translation on 27 November 1941 (Document 14, Exhibit 63, Naval 
Court) of a message to Nanking, dated 15 November 1941, in the so-called "Purple"' 
code, addressed to "Naval authorities" which stated : 

"We are now in the midst of very serious negotiations and have not reached 
an agreement as yet. As the time limit is near please have them (defer?) for 
a while." 

(b) A Navy translation on 26 November 1941 (Document 13, Exhibit 63, Naval 
Court) of a message to Washington, dated 19 November 1941, stating that: 

"When our diplomatic relations are becoming dangerous, we will add the 
•following at the beginning and end of our general intelligence broadcasts: 

"(1) if it is Japan-U. S. relations, 'HIGASHI', 

"(2) Japan-Russia relations, 'KITA', 

"(3) Japan-British relations, (including Thai, Malaya and N. E. I.), 'Nishi'. 

[70] "The above will be repeated five times and included at beginning and 
end. Relay to Rio de Janeiro, Buenos Aires, Mexico City, San Francisco." 

(c) An Anny translation on 26 November 1941 (Document 9, p]xhibit 68, Naval 
Court), of a message to Manila, dated 20 November 1941, in the "purple" code, 
marked "Strictly Secret" and stating : 

"Please advise immediately the results of your investigations as to the type 
of draft — presumed to be in the waters adjacent to Subic Bay." (Near 
Manila, P. I.) 

"Furthermore, please transmit these details to the Asama Maru as well as 
to Tokyo." 

(d) An Army translation on 26 November 1941 (Document 12, Exhibit 63, 
Naval Court) of a message to Washington, dated 26 November 1941, in the 
"purple" code, which stated : 

"To be handled in Government Code. 

"The situation is momentarily becoming more tense and telegrams take too 
long. Therefore, will you cut down the substance of your reports of negotiations 
to the minimum and, on occa.sion, cjiU up Chief YAMAMOTO of the American 
Bureau on the telephone and make your request to him. At that time we will 
use the following code:" (Codes were then set fiu-th.) 

(10) The Stute Department note of November 26th and Japanese reaction 
thereto; the irar irarning of November 27th. 

The diplomatic negotiations with the Japanese representatives, Nomura and 
Kurusu, came to a head on 26 November 1941. At that time, the State Depart- 
ment presented a proposal to the Japanese and that Department reported to the 
Navy Department,, among others, that it had no further hopes of composing 
matters with the Japanese. The Japanese reaction to this proposal api>ears 
from dispatches which were subsequently decrypted and translated. They are 
as follows : 

(a) An Army translation (Document 17, Exhibit 63, Naval Court) of a mes- 
sage from Washington (Nomura) to Tokyo, dated 26 November IJMl, in the 
"purple" code and marked "Extremely urgent," which stated: 

"At 4 : 4.^) on the afternoon of the 26th I and Ambassador KURUSU met with 
Secretary HULL and we talked for about two hours. 

"HULL said, 'For the last several days the American Government has been 
getting the ideas of various quartei'S, as well as conferring carefully with the 
nations concerned, on the provisional treaty proposal presented by Japan on 
[71] the 20th of this month, and I am sorry to tell you that we cannot agree 
to it. At length, however, we feel compelled to propose a plan, tentative and 
without commitment, reconciling the points of difference between our proposal 
of June 21st and yours of September 25th.' So saying, he presented us with the 
following two proposals : 

"A. One which seeks our recognition of his so-called 'four principles.' 

"B. (1) The conclusion of a mutual non-aggressive treaty between Tokyo, 
Washington, Moscow, the Netherlands, Chungking and Bangkok. 

(2) Agreement between Japan, the United States, England, the Netherlands, 
China and Thai on the inviolability of French Indo-China and equality of 
economic treatment in French Indo-China. 

"(3) The complete evacuation of Japanese forces from China and all French 
Indo-China. 

"(4)Japan and the United States both definitelv promise to support no regime 
in China but that of CHIANG-KAI-SHEK. 

"(5) The abolition of extra-territoriality and concessions in China.- 

"(6) The conclusion of a reciprocal trade treaty between Japan and the 
United States on the basis of most favored nation treatment. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2301 

"(7) The mutual rescimliug of the Japanese and American freezing orders. 

"(8) Stabilization of yeu-dollar exchange. 

"(9) No matter wiiat sort of treaties either Japan or the United States has 
contracted with third countries, tiiey both definitely promise that these treaties 
will not be interpreted as hostile to the objectives of this treaty or to the 
maintenance of peace in the Pacific. (This is, of course, supi)osed to emasculate 
the Three-Power Pact.) 

"In view of our negotiations all along, we were both dumbfounded and said 
we could not even cooperate to the extent of reporting this to Tokyo. We argued 
back furiously, i)ut HULL remained solid as a rock. Why did the United 
States have to propose such hard terms a.s theseV Well, England, the Nether- 
lands, and China doubtless put her up to it. Then, too, we have been urging 
them to quit helping CHIANG, and lately a number of important Japanese in 
speeches have been urging that we strike at England and the United States. More- 
over, there have been rumors that we are demanding of Thai that she give us 
complete control over her national defense. All that is reflected in these two 
hard proposals, or we think so." 

[72] (b) An Army translation (Document 16, Exhibit 63, Naval Court) of a 
message from Washington to Tokyo, dated 26 November 1041, in the "purple" 
code and marked "Extremely urgent," message #1180, reading : 
"From NOMURA and KURUSU. 

"As we have wired you several times, there is hardly any possibility of having 
them consider our 'B" proiK)sal in toto. On the other hand, if we let the situa- 
tion remain tense as it is now, sorry as we are to say so, the negotiations will 
inevitably be ruptured, if indeed they may not already be called so. Our 
failure and humiliation are complete. We might suggest one thing for saving 
the situation. Although we have grave misgivings, we might propose, first, that 
President ROOSEVELT wire you that for the sake of posterity he hopes that 
Japan and the United States will cooperate for the maintenance of peace in 
the Pacific (just as soon as you wire us what you think of this, we will nego- 
tiate for this sort of an arrangement with all we have in us), and that you 
in return reply with a cordial message, thereby not only clearing the atmosphere, 
but also gaining a little time. Considering the possibility that England and 
the United States are scheming to bring the Netherlands Indies under their 
protection through military occupation, in order to forestall this, I think we 
should propose the establishment of neutral nations, including French Indo- 
China, Netherlands India and Thai. (As you know, last September President 
ROOSEVELT prop<ised the neutrality of French Indo-China and Thai.) 

"We suppose that the rupture of the present negotiations does not necessarily 
mean war between Japan and the United States, but after we break off, as we 
said, the military occupation of Netherlands India is to be expected of England 
and the United States. Then we would attack them and a clash with them 
would be inevitable. Now, the question is whether or not Germany would feel 
duty bound by the third article of the treaty to help us. We doubt if she would. 
Again, you must remember that the Sino- Japanese incident would have to wait 
until the end of this world war before it could possibly be settled. 

"In this telegram we are expressing the last personal opinions we will have 
to express, so will Your excellency please be good enough at least to show it 
to the Minister of the Navy, if only to him ; then we hope that you will wire 
back instantly." 

(c) An army translation (Document 18, Exhibit (>3, Naval Court) of a message 
from Tokyo to Washington, dated 28 November 1941, in the "purple" code, 
reading: 

[73] "Re your #1189. 

"Well, you two Ambassadors have exerted superhuman efforts but, in spite of 
this, the United States has gone ahead and pre.sented this humiliating proposal. 
This was quite unexpected and extremely regrettable. The Imperial Govern- 
ment can by no means use it as a basis for negotiations. Therefore, with a 
report of the views of the Imperial Government on this American proposal 
which I will send .vou in two or three days, the negotiations will be de facto 
ruptured. This is inevitable. However, I do not wish you to give the impre.s- 
sion that the negotiations are broken off. Merely say to them that you are 
awaiting instructions and that, although the opinions of your Government are 
not yet clear to you, to your own way of thinking the Imi)erial Government 
has always made just claims and has borne great sacrifices for the sake of 
peace in the Pacific. Say that we have always demonstrated a long-suffering 



2302 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

and conciliatory attitude, but that, on the other hand, the United States has been 
unbending, making it impossible for Japan to establish negotiations. Since 
things have come to this pass, I contacted the man you told me to in your #1180 
and he said that under the present circumstances what you suggest is entirely 
unsuitable. From now on do the best you can." (Note: The man is the Navy 
Minister. ) 

On 27 November 1941, Admiral Kimmel received a dispatch from CNO, which 
has been termed the "war warning." It read : 

"This dispatch is to be considered a war warning X Negotiations with Japan 
looking toward stabilization of conditions in the Pacific have ceased and an 
aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next few days X The num- 
ber and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of naval task forces 
indicate an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines (printed in ink, 
"Thai") or Kra Pennsula or possibly Borneo X Execute an approprate defen- 
sive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL 46 X 
Inform District and Army authorities X A similar warning is being sent by 
War Department X Spenavo inform British X Continental districts Guam 
Samoa directed take appropriate measures against sabotage" 

(11) The dispatch of November 28th: 

On November 28th, the Chief of Naval Operations sent a copy of a dispatch 
to CincPac for information which was received on November 29th (Exhibit 19, 
Naval Court), which repeated a dispatch which had been sent by the Army to 
Commander, Western Defense Command, as follows : 

[74] "Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical pur- 
poses with only the barest possibility that the Japanese Government might come 
back and offer to continue X Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile ac- 
tion possible at any moment X If hostilities cannot repeat not be avoided the 
United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act X This policy should 
not repeat not be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might 
jeopardize your defense X Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed 
to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary 
but these measures should be carried out so as not repeat not to alarm civil 
population or disclose intent X Report measures taken X A separate message is 
being sent to G-2 Ninth Corps area re subversive activities in the United States X 
Should hostilities occur you will carry out the tasks assigned in Rainbow Five 
so far as they pertain to Japan X Limit dissemination of this highly secret in- 
formation to minimum essential officers" 

The Navy dispatch continued that WPL-52 was not applicable to the Pacific 
area and would not be placed in effect in that area, except as then in force 
in Southeast Pacific Sub Area, Panama Coastal Frontier. It stated further : 

"Undertake no offensive action until Japan has committed an overt act X 
Be prepared to carry out tasks assigned in WPL 46 so far as they apply to 
Japan in case hostilities occur" 

(12) Intercepted diplomatic commiMications. November 29 to December 6, 
191,1. 

On 30 November 1941, there was a Navy translation of a message from Tokyo 
to the Japanese emissaries in Washington, dated 29 November 1941 (Document 
19, Exhibit 63, Naval Court), requesting that they make one more attempt to dis- 
cuss the situation with the United States, and to state that the United States 
had always taken a fair position in the past ; that the Imperial Government could 
not understand why the United States was taking the attitude that the new 
Japanese proposals could not be the basis of discussion, but instead had made 
new proposals which ignored actual conditions in East Asia and which would 
greatly injure the prestige of the Imperial Government ; that the United States 
should be asked what had become of the basic objectives that the United States 
had made as the basis for negotiations for seven months ; and that the United 
States should be asked to reflect on the matter. The emissaries were directed ia 
carrying out this instruction to be careful that this did not lead to anything 
like a breaking off of negotiations. 

[75] Also on 30 November 1941, there was a Navy translation of a trans- 
Pacific radio telephone conversation from Kurusu in Washington to Yamamoto 
in Tokyo, in which a telephone code was used (Document 20, Exhibit 63, Naval 
Court). This indicated that Kurusu expected a long message ("probably To- 
kyo's reply to Mr. Hull's proposals'') ; that the President was returning appar- 
ently because of the speech of the Japanese Premier which Kurusu said was hav- 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2303 

ing strong rei^ercussions here; that Kurusu said that unless the Premier and 
others used greater caution in speeches, it would put the Japanese emissaries 
here in a very difficult position ; that care should be exercise'd, that Yaraamoto 
said that they were being careful ; that Kurusu wanted the Foreign Minister 
told that the emissaries here had expected to hear something different — some 
good word — but instead got this (the Premier's speech) ; that the Japanese- 
American negotiations were to continue; that Yamamoto wanted them to be 
stretched out ; that Kurusu needed Yamamoto's help to do this, and that both 
the Premier and the Foreign Minister would need to change the tone of their 
speeches and that all would have to use some discretion ; that Yamamoto said 
the real problem that the Japanese were up against was the effect of happen- 
ings in the South. 

There were four significant Japanese communications intercepted on 1 De- 
cember 1941, as follows : 

(a) Navy translation — (Document 21, Exhibit 63, Naval CJourt) 

From : Tokyo 
To : Washington 
1 December 1941 
(Purple CA) 
#865 Re my #857 

"1. The date set in my message #812 has come and gone, and the situation 
continues to be increasingly critical. However, to prevent the United States 
from becoming unduly suspicious we have been advising the press and others 
that though there are some wide differences between Japan and the United 
States, the negotiations are continuing. (The above is for only your infor- 
mation.) 

"2. We have decided to withhold submitting the note to the U. S. Ambassador 
to Tokyo as suggested by you at the end of your message #1124. Please make 
the necessary representations at your end only. 

"3. There are reports here that the President's sudden return to the capital 
is an effect of Premier Tojo's statement. We have an idea that the President 
did so because of his concern over the critical Far Eastern situation. Please 
make investigations into this matter." 

[76] Army translation — (Document 22, Exhibit 63, Naval Court) 

From : Tokyo 
To : Berlin 
November 30, 1941 
Purple 

#986 (Strictly Secret (To be handled in Government Code) 
(Part 1 of 2) (Secret outside the Department) 

"1. Japan-American negotiations were commenced the middle of April this 
year. Over a period of half a year they have been continued. Within that 
period the Imperial Government adamantly stuck to the Tri-Partite Alliance 
as the cornerstone of its national policy regardless of the vicissitudes of the 
international situation. In the adjustment of diplomatic relations between 
Japan and the United States, she has based her hopes for a solution definitely 
within the scope of that alliance. With the intent of restraining the United 
States from participating in the war, she boldly assumed the attitude of carrying 
through these negotiations. 

"2. Therefore, the present cabinet, in line with your message, with the view 
of defending the Empire's existence and integrity on a just and equitable basis, 
has continued the negotiations carried on in the past. However, their views 
and ours on the question of the evacuation of troops, upon which the negotia- 
tions rested (they demandetl the evacuation of Imperial troops from China 
and French Indo-China), were completely in opjwsition to each other. 

"Judging from the course of the neogtiations that have been going on, we 
first came to loggerheads when the United States, in keeping with its traditional 
idealogical tendency of managing international relations, re-emphasized her 
fundamental reliance upon this traditional policy in the conversations carried 
on between the United States and England in the Atlantic Ocean. The motive 
of the United States in all this was brought out by her desire to prevent the 
establishment of a new order by Japan, Germany, and Italy in Europe and in 
the Far East (that is to say, the aims of the Tri-Partite Alliance). As long 
as the Empire of Japan was in alliance with Germany and Italy, there could 
be no maintenance of friendly relations between Japan and the United States 



2304 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

was the stand they took. From this point of view, they began to demonstrate a 
tendency to demand the divorce of the Imperial Government from the Tri- 
partite Alliance. This was brought out at the last meeting. That is to say 
that it has only been in the negotiations of the last few days that it has be- 
come gradually more and more clear that the Imperial Government could no 
longer [77] continue negotiations with the United States. It l>ecame 
clear, too, that a continuation of negotiations would inevitably be detrimental 
to our cause." 

(Part 2 of 2) 

"3. The proposal presented by the United States on the 26th made this attitude 
of theirs clearer than ever. In it there is one insulting clause which says that 
no matter what treaty either party enters into with a third power it will not 
be interpreted as having any bearing upon the basic object of this treaty, namely 
the maintenance of peace in the Pacific. This means specifically the Three- 
Power Pact. It means that in case the United States enters the European war 
at any time the Japanese Empire will not be allowed to give assistance to Ger- 
many and Italy. It is clearly a trick. This clause alone, let alone others, 
makes it impossible to find any basis in the American proposal for negotiations. 
What is more, before the United States brought forth this plan, they conferred 
with England, Australia, the Netherlands, and China — they did so repeatedly. 
Therefore, it is clear that the United States is now in collusion with those 
nations and has decided to regard Japan, along ~\vith Germany and Italy, as 
an enemy." 

(c) On 1 December 1941, the Army translated an intercepted message from 
Tokyo to the Japanese Ambassador in Berlin, dated 30 November 1941 (Docu- 
ment 6, Exhibit 13), which in substance statetl : 

The conversations between Tokyo and Washington now stand ruptured. Say 
very secretly to Hitler and Ribbentrop that there is extreme danger that war 
may suddenly break out between the Anglo Saxon nations and Japan, and that 
the time of the breaking out of this war may come quicker than anybody 
dreams. We will not relax our pressure on the Soviet, but for the time being 
would prefer to refrain from any direct moves on the north. . . . Impress on 
the Germans and Italians how important .secrecy is. 

(d) Army translation — (Document 23, Exhibit 63, Naval Court) 

From : Washington (Nomura) 

To: Tokyo 

November 28, 1941 

Purple 

#1214 To be handled in Government Code. 

"Re my #1190. 

"So far silence has been maintained here concerning our talks with the United 
States ; however, now the results of our conference of the 26th are out and 
headlines like [78] this are appearing in the papers: 'Hull Hands Peace 
Plan to Japanese', and 'America Scorns a Second Munich.' The papers say 
that it is up to Japan either to accept the American proposal with its four 
principles, or face war, in which latter case the responsibility would be upon 
Japan. 

"This we must carefully note." 

On 3 December 1941, there was available the Army translation of a report by 
Kurusu and Nomura to Tokyo, dated 2 December 1941 (Document 25, Exhibit 
63, Naval Court), which stated: 

"Today, the 2nd, Ambassador KURUSU and I had an interview with Under- 
Secretary of State WELLES. At that time,^ prefacing his statement by saying 
that it was at the direct instruction of the President of the United States, he 
turned over to us the substance of my separate wire #1233. Thereupon we 
said : 'Since we haven't been informed even to the slightest degree concerning 
the troops in French Indo-China, we will transmit the gist of your representa- 
tions directly to our Home Government. In all probability they never con- 
sidered that such a thing as this could possibly be an upshot of their proposals 
of November 20th.' The Under-Secretary then said : 'I want to to know that 
the stand the United States takes is that she opposes aggression in any and all 
parts of the world.' Thereupon we replied : 'The United States and other coun- 
tries have pyramided economic pressure upon economic pressure upon us Japa- 
nese. (I made the statement that economic warfare was even worse than 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2305 

forceful aggression.) We haven't tht> time to argue the pros and eons of this 
question or the rights or wrongs. The people of Japan are faced with economic 
pressure, and 1 want you to know that we have hut the choice between sub- 
mission to this pressure or breaking the cliains that it invokes. We want you 
to realize this as well as the situation in which all Japanese find themselves 
as the result of the four-year incident in China ; the President recently expressed 
cognizance of the latter situation. Furthermore, I would have you know that 
in replying to the recent American proposals, the Imperial Government is giving 
the most profound consideration to this important question which has to do 
with our national destiny.' Under-Secretary WELLES said : 'I am well aware 
of that.' I continued : 'We cannot overemphasize the fact that, insofar as Japan 
is concerned, it is virtually impossible for her to accept the new- American pro- 
posals as they now stand. Our proposals proferred on the 21st of June and the 
proposals of September 25th, representing our greatest conciliations based on 
the previous proposal, still stand. In spite of the fact that the agreement of 
both sides was in the offing, it has come to naught. At this late juncture to 
give thoughtful consideration to the new proposals certainly will not make for 
a smooth and speedy settlensent of the negotiations. Recently, we promised 
to evacuate our troops from French Indo-China in [79] the event of a 
settlement of the Sino-Japanese incident and the establishment of a just peace 
in the Far East. In anticipating the settlement of fundamental questions, the 
question of the representations of this date would naturally dissolve.' The 
Under-Secretary assiduously heard us out and then said : 'The American pro- 
posals of the 26th were brought about by the necessity to clarify the position 
of the United States because of the internal situation here.' Then he continued : 
'In regard to the opinion that you have expressed, I will make it a point 
immediately to confer with the Secretary.' I got the impression from the 
manner in which he spoke that he hoped Japan in her reply to the American 
proposals of the 26th would leave this much room. Judging by my interview 
with Secretary of State HULL on the 1st and my conversations of today, it is 
clear that the United States, too, is anxious to peacefully conclude the current 
difficult situation. I am convinced that they would like to bring about ai speedy 
settlement. Therefore, please bear well in mind this fact in your considerations 
our reply to the new American proposals and to my separate wire it 1233." 

There were various intercepted Japanese communications of interest available 
on 4 December 1^1, as follows : 

(a) Navy translation — (Document 26, Exhibit 63, Naval Court) 

From: Toyko 
To: Hsinking 
1 December 1941 
(Purple) 
#893 

"• * * In the event that Manchuria participates in the war * * * in 
view of various circumstances it is our policy to cause Manchuria to participate in 
the war in which event Manchuria will take the same steps toward England and 
America that this country will take in case war breaks out. 

"A summary follows: 

"1. American and British consular officials and offices will not be recognized as 
having special rights. Their business will be stopped (the sending of code tele- 
grams and the use of short wave radio will be forbidden). However it is desired 
that the treatment accorded them after the suspension of business be comparable 
to that which Japan accords to consular officials of enemy countries resident in 
Japan. 

[80] "2. The treatment accorded to British and American public property, 
private property, and to the citizens themselves shall be comparable to that 
accorded by Japan. 

"3. British and American requests to third powers to look after their consular 
offices and interests will not be recognized. 

"However, the legal administrative steps taken by Manchoukuo shall be equita- 
ble and shall correspond to the measures taken by Japan. 

"4. Tlie treatment accorde<l Russians resident in Manchoukuo shall conform to 
the provisions of the Japanese-Soviet neutrality pact. Great care shall be exer- 
cised not to antagonize Russia." 

(b) Navy translation — (Document 27, Exhibit 63, Naval Court) 



2306 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

From : Washington 

To: Tokyo 

1 December 1941 

(Purple) 

#1227 

(This raised the question of a possibility of a conference between persons in 
whom the leaders have confidence to have the' make one final effort to reach some 
agreement. The meeting to be held at some midway point, such as Hono- 
lulu * * * It was said that this last effort might facilitate the final decision 
as to war or peace.) 

(c) Navy translation — (Document 29, Exhibit 63, Naval Court) 

From : Tokyo 

To : Washington 

3 December 1941 

(Purple) 

#875 Chief of Office routing. 

"Re your #1232 

"Please explain the matter to the United States along the following lines: 
"There seem to be rumors to the effect that t)ur military garrisons in French 
Indo-China are being strengthened. The fact is that recently there has been an 
unusual amount of activity by the Chinese forces in the vicinity of the Sino- 
French Indo-China border. In view of this, we have [81] increased our 
forces in parts of northern French Indo-China. There would naturally be some 
movement of troops in the southern part a.s a result of this. We presume that the 
source of the rumors is in the exaggerated reports of these movements. In doing 
so, we have in no way violated the limitations contained in the Japanese-French 
joint defense agreement." 

(d) Navy translation — (Document 31, Exhibit 63, Naval Court) 

From : Washington 

To: Tokyo 

3 December 1941 

(Purple) 

#1243 

"If we continue to increase our forces in French Indo-China, it is expected that 
the United States will close up our Consulates, therefore consideration should 
be given to steps to be taken in connection with the evacuation of the consuls." 

On 5 December 1941, there were available translations of additional inter- 
cepted Japanese communications dealing with the diplomatic negotiations, as 
follows : 

(a) Army translation — (Document 33, Exhibit 63, Naval Court) 

From : Washington 

To: Tokyo 

3 December 1941 

(Purple) 

#1243 

"Judging from all ipdications, we feel that some joint military action between 
Great Britain and the United States, with or without a declaration of war, is a 
definite certainty in the event of an occupation of Thailand." 

(b) Navy translation — (Document 34, Exhibit 63, Naval Court) 

Prom : Washington 

To : Tokyo 

1 December 1941 

(Purple) 

#1225 

(This is a report of conversations held by Japanese representatives with Secre- 
tary Hull on December 1st, which referred to the Japanese Premier's speech, 
the President's return, Japanese troop movements, and apparent agreement as 
to the impossibility of reaching an agreement.) 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2307 

[82] (13) Intercepted Japanese espionage messages between 29 November 
and 6 December WJ^l. 

During this period there were available to the Navy and to the Army in Wash- 
ington translations of intercepted Japanese espionage reports concerning Manila, 
San Francisco and Honolulu. From these it appeared that the Japanese were 
interested in the movements of ships to and from those ports. The messages 
relating to Honolulu were as follows : 

(a) On December 3rd, the Navy Department translated a communication 
from Tokyo to Honolulu, dated 15 November 1941 (Document 24, Exhibit 63, 
Naval Court), which stated that since relations between Japan and the United 
States were most critical, the "Ships in the harbor report" should be made irregu- 
larly but at the rate of twice a week and that extra care should be taken to 
maintain secrecy. 

(b) On December 5th, there was available at the War Department a transla- 
tion of a message from Tokyo to Honolulu, dated 18 November 1941, i-equesting 
reports on vessels in certain areas of Pearl Harbor, and directing that the investi- 
gation be made with great secrecy (Document 37, Exhibit 63, Naval Court). 

(c) Also available on December 5th at the Navy Department was a translation 
of a message from Tokyo to Honolulu, dated 29 November 1941, stating that re- 
ports had been received on ship movements, but in the future Honolulu was also 
to report even when there were no movements (Document 36, Exhibit 63, Naval 
Court) . 

(d) On December 6th, there was available at the War Department a transla- 
tion of a message from Honolulu to Tokyo, dated 18 November 1941, ( Document 
40, Exhibit 63, Naval Court), reporting on ships anchored in Pearl Harbor and 
in certain areas of the harbor, and pointing out that the Saratoga was not in 
harbor and that the Enterprise or some other vessel was in a particular area. 
This message also reported on the course of certain destroyers which had been 
observed entering the harbor. 

(14) Intercepted message advising of fourteen-part reply by Japanese and 
first thirteen parts of reply — 6 December 19Jfl. 

On 6 December 1941, the Army translated an intercepted Japanese communica- 
tion (Document 38, Exhibit 63, Naval Court), from Tokyo to Washington, which 
read : 

"1. The Government has deliberated deeply on the American proposal of the 
26th of November and as a result we have drawn up a memorandum for the 
United States contained in my separate message #902 (in English). 

[83] "2. This separate message is a very long one. I will .send it in four- 
teen parts and I imagine you will receive it tomorrow. However, I am not sure. 
The situation is extremely delicate, and when you receive it I want you please 
to keep it secret for the time being. 

"3. Concerning the time of presenting this memorandum to the United States, 
I will wire you in a separate message. However, I want you in the meantime 
to put it in nicely drafted form and make every preparation to present it to the 
Americans just as soon as you receive instinictions." 

Also on 6 December 1941, the Navy translated the first thirteen parts of the 
Japanese reply (Document 39, Exhibit 63, Naval Court), which had been sent 
from Tokyo to Washington in the Japanese diplomatic code. It may be noted 
that the translations of parts 8 and 9 of the reply which were originally indi- 
cated as Navy translations were corrected so as to indicate that they were trans- 
lated by the Army. These 13 parts which are not set forth here, but particularly 
part 13, disclosed that the Japanese were of the view that the American proposal, 
viewed in its entirety, could not be accepted by the Japanese as a basis of negotia- 
tions. 

The message concerning delivery of the Japanese reply, and the first thirteen 
parts of that reply, were received in the Navy Department by 3 p. m. on 6 
December 1941. After decryption and translation by about 9 p. m. on December 
6th, they were distributed by Lt. Comdr. Kramer to the White House and to the 
Secretary of the Navy. The Secretary of War and Secretary of State apparently 
also received copies and a meeting was called of the three Secretaries for ten 
o'clock on the following morning. 

(15) Communications intercepted on 7 December lO^l. 

The Japanese communications which were translated and available on the 
morning of 7 December 1941 included the following : 
(a) From: Washington (NomuraJ 



2308 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

To: Tokyo 
December 3, 1941 
Purple (Urgent) 
#1256. Re your #875 

"I received your reply immediately. I presume, of course, that this reply was 
a result of consultations and profound consideration. The United States Gov- 
ernment is attaching a great deal of importance on this reply. Especially since 
the President i.ssued his statement yesterday, it is being rumored among the 
journalists that this reply is to be the key deciding whether there will be war 
or peace between Japan and the United States. There is no saying but what 
the United States Government will take a bold step depending [H^] upon 
how our reply is made. If it is really the intention of our government to arrive 
at a settlement, the explanation you give, I am afraid, would neither satisfy 
them nor prevent them taking the bold step referred to — even if your reply is 
made for the mere purpose of keeping the negotiations going. Therefore, in view 
of what has been elucidated in our proposal which I submitted to the President 
on November 10th, I would like to get a reply which gives a clearer impression 
of our peaceful intentions. Will you, therefore, reconsider this question with 
this in mind and wire me at once." 

(b) From: Washington 

To: Tokyo 
December G, 1941 
Purple (Urgent) 
#1272 

"In addition to carrying on frontal negotiations with the President and 
HULL, we also worked directly and indirectly through Cabinet members having 
close relations with the President and through individuals equally influential 
(because of its delicate bearing upon the State Department, please keep this 
point strictly secret). Up until this mcmient we have the following to report: 

"(1) On the 4th those engaged in Plan "A" dined with the President and advised 
him against a Japanese-American war and urged him to do the 'introducing' at 
once between Japan and China. However, the President did not make known 
what he had in mind. According to these men, this attitude of the President 
is his usual attitude. Recently, when the President discussed matters with 
LEWIS and settled the strike question, I understand that he did so on the advice 
of these individuals. 

"(2) Those carrying on IMan "B" Included all of our proposal of November 
20th into that of September 25th and after incorporating those sections in the 
United States' proposal of November 26th which are either innocuous or advan- 
tageous to us (MESSAGE INCOMPLETE) " 

(c) From: Budapest 

To: Tokyo 

December 7, 1941 

LA 

#104 Re my #103 

''On the 6th, the American Minister presented to the Government of this country 
a British Government communique to the effect that a state of war would break 
out on the 7th. 

"Relayed to Berlin." 

[85] (d) Navy translation— (Document 39, Exhibit 63, Naval Court) 

From : Tokyo 

To : Washington • 

7 December 1941 

(Purple-Eng) 

#902 Part 14 or 14 

(Note: In the forwarding instructions to the radio station handling this part, 
appeared the plain English phrase "VERY IMPORTANT") 

"7. Obviously it is the intention of the American Government to conspire with 
Great Britain and other countries to obstruct Japan's efforts toward the establish- 
ment of peace through the creation of a New Order in East Asia, and especially 
to preserve Anglo-American rights and interests by keeping Japan and China 
at war. This intention has been revealed clearly during the course of the present 
negotiations. Thus, the earnest hope of the Japanese Government to adjust 
Japanese-American relations and to preserve and promote the peace of the 
Pacific through cooperation with the American Government has finally been lost. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2309 

"The Japanese Government regrets to have to notify hereby the American 
Government that in view of the attitude of the American Government it cannot 
but consider that it is imiJossible to reach an agreement through further 
negotiations." 

(e) Army translation — (Document 41, Exhibit 63, Naval Court) 

From : Tokyo 
To : Washington. 
December 7, IWl 

Purple (Urgent-^ Very Important) 
#907 To be handled in government code. 
Re my #902. 

"Will the Ambassador please submit to the United States Government ( if possi- 
ble to the Secretary of State) our reply to the United States at 1 : 00 p. m. on the 
7th, your time." 

(16) Delivery of Part 14 and the 1 p. m. message and action taken. 

The evidence indicates that Part 14 of the Japanese reply, which required 
decoding but not translation, was received between 030."> and 0700 on 7 December 
1941. and that it and the first 13 parts were distributed [86] by Lt. Comdr. 
Kramer to Admiral Stark's office between 0900' and 0930, and then to the White 
House and to the State Department. The "1 p. m. delivery message" was not 
distributed at this time. Ki-amer testified that he returned to the Navy Depart- 
ment at about 10 : 20 and found that message and certain other messages, such 
as a message which directed the destruction of Japanese codes, still on hand and 
another which thanked the Ambassador for his services. This material, Kramer 
testified, was delivered to Admiral Stark at about 10: 30, and then to the White 
House and to the State Department. 

The evidence indicates that the "1 p. m. message" was decrypted and was avail- 
able in Japanese in the Navy Department prior to 0700 on 7 December 1941, and 
that because there was no Japanese translator on duty it was sent to the Army 
for translation at about 0700. It is not clear when the Army returned the 
translation of that message. Kramer stated that it was not in the Navy Depart- 
ment when he left to distribute the fourteen-part reply between 0900 and 0930 
that morning, but that he found it upon his return to the Navy Department at 
about 10: 20. It would appear, therefore, that the Army returned its translation 
of the "1 p. m. message" some time between 0900 and 1020 on 7 December 1941. 
It further apiiears that several hours' advance notice of the contents of that 
message may have been lost because there was no Japanese translator on duty 
at the Navy Department on that Sunday morning, and because it was necessary 
to wait for an Army translation. 

Prior investigations developed the fact that, after consultation with Admiral 
Stark that morning. General Marshall sent a message to various Army commands, 
including the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department. The message read: 

"Japanese are presenting at one p. m. Eastern Standard time today what 
amounts to an ultimatum also they are under orders to destroy their code machine 
immediately stop Just what significance the hour set may have we do not 
know but be on alert accordingly stop Inform naval authorities of this com^ 
munication." 

The prior investigations also developed the fact that the Army radio was 
unable to raise Hawaii that morning and accordingly sent that message by com- 
mercial cable in code. The message, according to General Short's prior testi- 
mony, was received by the Signal Ofl3cer at Hawaii at 1145, and decoded some four 
hours after the attack. 

Whether or not the Army message would have reached the Commanding Gen- 
eral. Hawaiian Department, prior to the attack if a Navy translator had been 
on duty on the morning of 7 December 1941, or if the Army had immediately trans- 
lated and returned the "1 p. m. mesage," is speculative. It is, moreover, also 
speculative as to what action might have been taken by General Short or Admiral 
Kimmel had they received that Army message prior to the attack. 

[87] (17) Messages sent to Admiral Kimmel between 29 November and 
7 December 1941. 

The messages sent by the Chief of Naval Operations to Admiral Kimmel dur- 
ing this period dealt primarily with the destruction of codes by the Japanese 
and with the advisability of destruction of United States codes at Guam. The 
messages are discussed subsequently in this report. 



2310 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

(18) Admiral KimmeVs failure to transmit information to subordimite 
commanders. 

It appears from the testimony secured by Admiral Hart in his investigation 
that Admiral Newton left Pearl Harbor on 5 December 1941 with a piowerful 
force consisting of the Lexington, Chicago, Portland, and five destroyers, to 
deliver a squadron of planes to Midway. He testified that on that mission he 
gave no special orders regarding the arming of planes or regarding preparation 
for war, other than the ordinary routine. He said that he never saw, nor was 
he ever informed of the contents of the October 16th dispatch, concerning the 
resignation of the Japanese cabinet, of the November 24th dispatch advising 
of the possibility of a surprise aggressive movement by the Japanese in any 
direction, including attack on the Philippines or Guam, or the November 27th 
war warning. He said that except for what he read in the newspapers, he did 
not learn anything during the period November 26th to December 5th which 
indicated the increased danger of hostilities with Japan. 

Admiral Bellinger, who was consmander of Task Force Nine, consisting of the 
patrol planes of the Pacific Fleet, testified in this investigation that he never 
saw nor did he learn the contents of the October 16th, November 24th, or Novem- 
ber 27th dispatches from the Chief of Naval Operations. 
[88^ C. The Interception of Japanese Telephone and Cable Messages. 

It appears that in Washington, D. C, the Navy was receiving information 
obtained from intercepted Japanese telephone and cable messages. For example, 
on 30 November 1941, the Navy decrypted and translated a trans-Pacific radio 
telephone conversation in code between Kurusu in Washington and Yamamoto 
in Tokyo (Document 20, Exhibit 63, Naval Court). And, on 10 October 1941, 
the Navy decrypted and translated a cable message from Honolulu to Wash- 
ington, in which a code was established for reporting the location of vessels in 
Pearl Harbor, which message had been photographed in the cable office in 
Washington and thus obtained by the Navy (Document 3, Exhibit 13). 

For many months prior to the attack, the Office of Naval Intelligence at Hono- 
lulu had been tapping the telephone wires of the Japanese Consul and of the 
Japanese Vice Consul. For a period of time also the home telephones of these 
officials had been tapped. The taps on the lines of the Consulate were removed 
on 2 December 1941 by direction of Captain Mayfield, who was then the District 
Intelligence Officer. The evidence indicates that he took this action because 
he was fearful that the existence of such telephone taps would be discovered 
by the Japanese Consul. His fear arose from the fact that an FBI tap on the 
lines of a Japanese official of the NYK Line had been detected by a telephone 
company employee who had advised the District Intelligence Office of this. A 
representative of the District Intelligence Office subsequently had informed the 
local FBI office. It was learned tha.t the FBI office had complained to the tele- 
phone company concerning the disclosure of its tap. In light of this situation, 
Captain Mayfield directed that the Navy taps be removed. 

It appears that no important military infornsation was intercepted by means 
of the Navy Intelligence taps on the lines of the Japanese Consulate General. 
Exhibits 38A and 38B of this investigation consist of photostatic copies of the 
notes made of the telephone conversations over the Japanese Consul General's 
line and the Japanese Vice Consul's line during the period 1 October 19il to 2 
December 1941. 

Subsequent to 2 December 1941, the Federal Bureau of Investigation appar- 
ently continued its telephone taps and in this fashion on or about 5 December 
1941 learned the contents of a telephone conversation between a man named 
Mori in Hawaii and a person in Japan. The fact of this conversation was 
brought to the attention of the District Intelligence Officer, and on 6 December 
1941, a transcript of the conversation was furnished to him and arrangements 
were made for a representative of the District Intelligence Office to listen to the 
recording of the telephone conversation ; this, however, was not done until after 
the attack. A transcript of the telephone conversation, with marginal notes 
made by the District Intelligence representative after the attack, in Exhibit 39 
of this investigation. It may be noted that it appears from prior investigations 
that this conversation was brought to the attention of General Short [8P] 
on the evening of 6 December 1941, and apparently nothing could be made out of 
it and no action was taken concerning it. There is no evidence indicating that 
this telephone conversation was brought to Admiral Kimmel's attention prior to 

In the conversation, there was mention of the flights of airplanes daily, the 
number of sailors preseat, the attitude of local Japanese, the local construction 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2311 

projects, the size of the local population, the precautionary measures taken at 
night time, the use of searchlights at night, the emphasis in Honolulu newspapers 
on the southern advance of Japan into French Indo-China, the visit of Kurusu, 
the local climate, the visit of LitvinofE, the Russian Ambassador, the recent 
return of a Japanese from Honolulu to Japan, and the number of Japanese in 
the United States Army. The person in Japan inquired for information about 
the United States Fleet. Mori stated that he knew nothing about the Fleet, and 
that since they tried to avoid talking about such matters they did not kniow 
much about the Fleet. He said he didn't know whether all of the Fleet had 
gone, but that the Fleet present seemed small, and it seemed that the Fleet had 
left. The person in Japan then inquired whether that was so and what kind of 
flowers were in bloom in Hawaii. Mori stated that the flowers in bloom' were 
the fewest out of the whole year, however that the hibiscus and the poiusettia 
were in bloom. He later stated that the Japanese chrysanthemums were in full 
bloom. 

There is some reason to believe that the statements concerning flowers in the 
Mori telephone conversation were the use of code words indicating the absence 
or presence of ships in Pearl Harbor. In this connection, the Operation Order 
for the Japanese task force which attacked Pearl Harbor (Exhibit 3) provided 
for the use of a radio broadcast code in which the statement "The cherry blos- 
soms are in all their glory" would signify that there were "No warships in Pearl 
Harbor." This lends support to the theory advanced by representatives of the 
District Intelligence Office in their testimony to the effect that the primary 
purpose of the Mori telephone conversation over the trans-Pacific radio was to 
provide information to Japanese Fleet units which would be listening in on that 
frequency. 

The espionage reports submitted by the Japanese Consul at Honolulu have 
been previously discussed. It will be recalled that in those coded messages 
considerable information was given of the movement of ships and location of 
ships in Pearl Harbor and of defense preparations at Oahu. Certain messages 
sent during the first week of December, 1941, indicated the likelihood of an 
attack by air on Pearl Harbor. The Japanese Consulate General at Honolulu 
transmitted its messages via commercial companies using the various communi- 
cations companies alternately. During the month of November, the McKay 
Radio Company handled the messages primarily, and during the month of 
December, 1941, RCA was transmitting the messages. 

[90] Prior to December, 1941, efforts had been made by the District Intel- 
ligence Officer to get a